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Abstract 
This thesis seeks to balance trade and environmental concerns in international law. It 
studies a number of multilateral environmental and trade agreements to observe the 
extent to which environmental and trade treaty regimes have made allowances for 
each other's interests, and whether allowed such interests to be disregarded or 
overridden in practice. 
Serious questions remain, however, about the compatibility between overlapping 
environmental and trade rules in the absence of a clear authority relationship or means 
of securing unity in the international legal order as a whole. The international legal 
system does not possess well-developed hierarchies; thus, none of the agreements 
inherently takes precedence in the event of a conflict. Consequently, the aim should be 
to achieve a better harmonization of the two regimes through available mechanisms. 
The multilateral trade agreements have made allowances and included exceptions with 
regard to the protection of environmental concerns. However, the precise way in 
which trade institutions balance environmental considerations by comparison with 
trade considerations is likely to prove critically important for the protection of the 
environment. 
It is for this reason that this thesis analyses the current balance between trade and 
environmental considerations in the international legal order, and proposes ways for 
improving its coherence. 
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'Our economic system - our civilization - is only possible if the basic resources of the 
atmosphere, oceans, forests and soils, andfundamental processes ... remain intact. To 
make economics and ecology into enemies is to doom both. But to reconcile them is to 
open up the possibility of a richer, more sustainable, more profitable and fairer 
world. ' 
Yvo de Boer) 
1. Introduction 
Since the middle of the last century, international law has been developing in many 
directions to keep pace with the complexities of life in the modem era,2 paving the 
way for numerous specialized regimes to come into existence. The tremendous 
expansion of both rules and institutions in specialist areas has led to the argument that 
international law as a 'holistic system' is in the process of fragmentation. 3 This has led 
to the fear that the decentralized system of international law might dissolve into a 
series of specialized sectors with little or no interrelationship.4 Consequently, the 
norms derived from these various sectors could overlap while addressing the same 
subject matter from different perspectives, causing lack of coherence or outright 
conflict between them.s This thesis accordingly sets out to study the relationship 
between two of these many specialized regimes of international law, with a view to 
4 
Yvo de Boer, Executive Secretary of the United Nations Climate Convention, 'The New 
Copenhagen Climate Deal', a pocket guide published by the WWK-UK (2009). 
Malcolm Shaw, International Law (6th edn CUP, Cambridge 2008) 43. 
For more about fragmentation of international law and its implications, see ILC, 'Report of the 
Study Group of International Law Commission on Fragmentation of International Law: 
Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law' (13 April 
2006) UN Doe. AlCNA11.682; Martti Koskenniemi and Pllivi Leino, 'Fragmentation of 
International Law? Postmodern Anxieties' (2002) 15 Leiden JIL 553; Mario Prost and Paul 
Clark, 'Unity, Diversity and the Fragmentation of International Law: How Much Does the 
Multiplication of International Organizations Really Matter?' (2006) 5 Chinese J IL 341; Bruno 
Simma and Dirk Pulkowski, 'Of Planets and the Universe of Self-Contained Regimes in 
International Law' (2006) 17 EJIL (2006) 483; Eyal Benvenisti and George Downs, 'The 
Empire's New Clothes: Political Economy and the Fragmentation of International Law' (2007) 
60 Stanford Law Review 595; Shaw, supra n 2, 65-7. 
Koskenniemi and Leino, supra n 3. 
Andreas Zimmermann, Hanna Goeters and Rainer Hofinann (eds), Unity and Diversity in 
International Law (Berlin, 2006); Karel Wellens, 'Fragmentaion of International Law and 
Establishing an Accountability Regime for International Organizations: The Role of the 
Judiciary in Closing the Gap' (2004) 25 Michigan JIL 1159. 
1 
establishing coherence between them and minimizing the risk of conflict or 
inconsistency. 
The relationship upon which this thesis will focus specifically is that between treaties 
from the contemporary environmental and trade regimes. The system of international 
trade is based primarily on the 1994 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization (hereinafter the WTO Agreement) and its annexed agreements, 
which aim to promote and liberalize free trade in goods and services.6 Since the WTO 
Agreement entered into force, the GA TT and other related multilateral trade 
agreements have been administered by the World Trade Organization (WTO). The 
WTO is the principal forum for negotiations on multilateral trading relations among 
member states, and provides for the binding settlement of disputes arising under the 
multilateral trade agreements. The other trade treaty that will be discussed in this 
thesis is the 2006 International Tropical Timber Agreement (ITTA)/ a commodity 
agreement8 dealing with trade in tropical timber. 
In contrast, a number of multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) address the 
effects and consequences of global and regional environmental degradation. Although 
the agreements are varied according to their subject matters, the aim of MEAs is 
uniform - to protect the environment from degradation occurring globally or 
6 
8 
For the text of the 1994 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, and 
related agreements, see WTO, The Legal Texts: The Results of the Uruguay Round of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations (CUP, Cambridge 1999) or WTO On line Database 
<http://docsonline.wto.org>. There are sixteen different multilateral agreements (to which all 
WTO members are parties) and two different plurilateral agreements (to which only some 
WTO members are parties) under the umbreIJa of the WTO Agreement. It is relevant to mention 
here that the discussion of this thesis is not extended to trade in services and therefore does not 
include the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS Agreement). 
The 2006 International Tropical Timber Agreement, Doc. TD/TIMBER.3112, 27 January 2006 
(not yet in force). Text available at: <http://www.itto.int>. 
See Michael Bowman, Peter Davies and Catherine RedgweIl, Lyster's International Wildlife 
Law (2nd edn CUP, Cambridge 20 I 0) 18. 
2 
regionally. At present, over two hundred and fifty MEAs are in force in order to 
address various environmental issues. Several require parties to restrict trade in order 
to protect the environment. The 1878 Phylloxera Agreement was the first international 
treaty to restrict trade in grapevines to prevent the spread of pests that damage 
vineyards.9 Since then, numerous international treaties have been adopted to respond 
to specific environmental issues. The WTO Secretariat has identified fourteen MEAs 
containing trade-related environmental measures. 1O These include conventions 
protecting fur seals, migratory birds, polar bears, whales and endangered species 
generally. 
Serious questions remam, however, about the compatibility between overlapping 
environmental and trade rules in the absence of a clear authority relationshipll or 
means of securing unity in the international legal order as a whole. 12 The international 
legal system does not possess well-developed hierarchies; thus, none of the 
agreements inherently takes precedence in the event of a conflict. 13 Consequently, the 
9 
\0 
11 
12 
13 
See Sophie Riely, 'Invasive Alien Species and the Protection of Biodiversity: The Role of 
Quarantine Laws in Resolving Inadequacies in the International Legal Regime' (2005) 17 JEL 
323. 
See Note by the Secretariat, 'Matrix on Trade Measures Pursuant to Multilateral Trade 
Agreements' (16 February 2005) WT/CTE/W/160/Rev3, TN/TE/S/5/Rev 1. 
See Patricia Birnie, Alan Boyle and Catherine Redgwell. International Law and the 
Environment (3rd edn OUP, Oxford 2009) Ch 14; Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public 
International Law: How WTO Law Relates to the Other Rules of International Law (CUP, 
Cambridge 2003); Richard Tarasofsky, 'Ensuring Compatibility between Multilateral 
Agreements and the GATTI WTO' (1996) 7 YblEL 52; Edith Weiss, 'Free International Trade 
and the Protection of the Environment: Irreconcilable Conflict?' (1992) 86 AJIL 700; Thomas 
Schoenbaum, 'International Trade and Protection of the Environment: The Continuing Search 
for Reconciliation' (1997) 91 AJlL 268; Steve Charnovitz, 'The World Trade Organization and 
the Environment' (1998) 8 YblEL 98. 
See Bruno Simma, 'Self-Contained Regimes' (1985) 16(1) NYIL 115. 
For the debate on hierarchy of norms in international law, see RSJ Macdonald, 'Fundamental 
Norms in Contemporary International Law', (1987) 25 Can YblL 115; V Gowlland-Debbas, 
'Judicial Insight into Fundamental Values and Interests of International Community', in S 
Muller, D Raic and JM Thuranszky (eds), The International Court of Justice: Its Future Role 
after Fifty Years (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: 1997); Dinah Shelton, 'Normative Hierarchy in 
International Law' (2006) 100 AJIL 291; Eva MK Uhlmann, 'States Community Interests, Jus 
cogens and Protection of the Global Environment: Developing Criteria for Peremptory Norms' 
(1998-9) 11 Georgetown IELR 101; George Schwarzenberger, 'International Jus cogens' 
3 
aim should be to achieve a better harmonization of the two regimes through available 
mechanisms. Both the GATTIWTO agreements and the ITTA have made allowances 
and included exceptions with regard to the protection of environmental concerns. 
However, the precise way in which the WTO trade institutions and the International 
Tropical Timber Organisation (ITTO)14 balance environmental considerations by 
comparison with trade considerations is likely to prove critically important for the 
protection of the environment. It is for this reason that this thesis analyses the current 
balance between trade and environmental considerations in the international legal 
order, and proposes ways for improving its coherence. 
1.1. Context of research 
Over the last two decades, the inter-relationship between MEAs containing trade-
related environmental measures and the WTO rules has received considerable 
attention. Consequently, at the 2001 Doha Ministerial Conference,15 WTO members 
agreed to negotiate on the relationship between WTO rules and MEAs, particularly 
those that contain specific trade obligations. 16 The ongoing efforts under the Doha 
Development Agenda and the regular Trade and Environment Committee (CTE) are 
also focused on the relationship between environmental policies relevant to trade and 
environmental measures with significant trade effects, and the provisions of the 
14 
IS 
16 
(1964-5) 43 Texas LR 455; Michael Akehurst, 'The Hierarchy of the Sources on International 
Law', (1974-5) 47 BYIL 273. 
The International Tropical Timber Organization (IITO) was established in 1986 under the 
auspices of the United Nations to promote sustainable forest management and forest 
conservation, and to assist tropical member countries to implement the ITTA. 
The Declaration of the Doha Ministerial Conference (4th WTO Ministerial Conference, Qatar, 
14 November 2001) WT/MIN(OI)/DEC/l. 
See especially, paragraphs 31(i) and 31(ii) of the Doha Ministerial Declaration. 
4 
multilateral trading system. 17 The CTE aims to achieve mutual supportiveness under a 
prescribed mandate and adopts technical approaches, including information exchange 
and choice of dispute settlement forum to that end. IS 
The 'trade and environment' issue has also been addressed by a number of 
GAIT/WTO panels and WTO Appellate Body decisions. 19 The WTO dispute 
settlement system provides interpretation of the Article XX GA TT exceptions to 
accommodate non-trade values. However, in those cases, the question at issue has not 
been the general revision or reinterpretation of a treaty. Rather, each case was 
concerned with the interpretation of particular provisions or phrases, such as 
'exhaustible natural resources' or 'necessary' .20 The interpretation of Article XX 
GA IT by the WTO panels and the Appellate Body in recent rulings demonstrates that 
the WTO is gradually developing an environmental conscience, but that this does not 
amount to full environmental protection or to giving environmental policy priority 
over trade.21 
The scholarly output in this area is also extensive and covers a relatively broad range 
of issues and policy debates?2 Studies have focused on the inconsistencies between 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
For the most recent Draft Ministerial Decision on Trade and Environment see CTESS 
TNffE/20, 21 April 2011. Available at: 
<http://www.wto.orglenglishltratop_e/dda_e/chair_textsll_e/chair_textsll_e.htm> (accessed 
on 1 May 2011). For the decision establishing the CTE see 'Trade and Environment', GAIT 
Ministerial Decision of 14 April 1994 (1994) 33 ILM 1267. 
See Chapter 3. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Anja Lindroos and Michael Mehling, 'From Autonomy to Integration? International Law, Free 
Trade and the Environment' (2008) 77(3) Nordic JIL 253 at 259 and 265; Mike Miere, GAIT, 
WTO and the Environment: To What Extent Do GA IT/WTO Rules Permit Member Nations to 
Protect the Environment When Doing So Adversely Affects Trade?' (1997) 8 Colorado JIELP 
241. 
On trade and environment generally, see Daniel Esty, Greening the GATT: Trade, Environment 
and the Future (Institute for International Economics, Washington DC 1994); James Cameron, 
Paul Demaret and Damien Geradin (eds), Trade and Environment: The Search for Balance 
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MEAs and WTO rules and proposed a flumber of ways to reconcile this relationship. 
Such proposals have included (i) examining each MEA case by case to observe 
whether it falls within the WTO Agreement's waiver provisions;23 (ii) following the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTAi4 approach, which gives precedence 
to certain MEAs over its own obligations;25 (iii) amending Article XX of the GATT to 
add a provision concerning MEAs; and (iv) adopting a collective interpretation of 
Article XX, validating existing MEAs and setting out criteria for future MEAs.26 
The ITTO has also been working to establish collaboration with relevant MEA 
institutions to ensure effective conservation of tropical forest biodiversity. In 2009, for 
example, ITTO and IUCN released the ITTOIIUCN Guidelines for the Conservation 
and Sustainable Use of Biodiversity in Tropical Timber Production Forests (hereafter 
23 
24 
25 
26 
(Cameron May, London 1994); Emst-Ulrich Petersmann, International and European Trade 
and Environmental Law after the Uruguay Round (The Hague 1995); RUdiger Wolfrum (ed), 
Enforcing Environmental Standards: Economic Mechanisms as Viable Means (Springer, Berlin 
\996); Richard Steinberg, The Greening of Trade Law (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 
Inc., New York 2002); Gary Sampson, The WTO and Sustainable Development (United 
Nations University Press, Tokyo 2005); Anupam Goyal, The WTO and International 
Environmental Law (OUP, Oxford 2006); Nathalie Bemasconi-OsterwaIder et aI., Environment 
and Trade: A Guide to WTO Jurisprudence (Earthscan, London 2006); Halina Ward, 'Common 
but Differentiated Debates: Environment, Labour and the World Trade Organization' (1996) 45 
ICLQ 592. 
JiIl Nissen, 'Achieving a Balance between Trade and the Environment: The Need to Amend the 
WTOIGA TT to Include Multilateral Environmental Agreements' (1996-97) 28 Law and Policy 
in International Business 901 at 917-8. 
The 1993 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), (1993) 32 ILM 682, entered into 
force I January 1994. NAFT A is a treaty between Canada, Mexico and the United States that 
was designed to foster greater trade between the three countries. 
Article 104 ofNAFTA applies the 'Ieast-trade-restrictive principle' to the use of MEA trade 
measures by enlisting seven international environmental agreements, and agrees that they will 
trump NAFT A in the case of disagreement. For further discussion see John Knox, 'The Judicial 
Resolution of Conflicts between Trade and the Environment' (2004) Harvard ELR I at 13-4 
and 17-9; Joseph Weiler (ed), The EU, the WTO and the NAFTA towards a Common Law of 
International Trade (OUP, Oxford 2000) Ch 6; Bradly Condon, 'Multilateral Environmental 
Agreement and the WTO: Is the Sky Really Falling?' (2002) 9 Tulsa J. Comp. & Int'l L. 533 at 
557 at 557-62. 
These ideas of amendment and/or collective interpretation are discussed in V Rage, 'GATT 
Law and Environment-Related Issues Affecting the Trade of Developing Countries' (1994) 28 
JWT 95; RE Hudec, 'GATT Legal Restraints on the Use of Trade Measures against Foreign 
Environmental Practice', in Jagdish Bhagwati and Robert Hudec (eds), Fair Trade and 
Harmonization (MIT Press, Cambridge 1996) vol. 11, 120-42; Steve Charnovitz, 'Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements and Trade Rules' (1996) 26 EPL 163 at 163-69; Nissen, supra n 
23, 90 I; Knox supra n 25, 14. 
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IITOIIUCN GUidelines)?7 Recently, ITTO and the Secretariat of the Convention on 
Biodiversity (CBD)28 signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to strengthen 
collaboration in the pursuit of their common objectives of conserving and sustainably 
managing tropical forest resources.29 In that MoU, both ITTO and CBD committed 
themselves to promoting the IITOIIUCN Guidelines. 
In this general context, Articles 31-33 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (hereinafter the Vienna Convention)30 offer rules for treaty interpretation. 
There are a number of principles and maxims available in general international law 
that also contribute to the interpretation of treaty provisions in order to harmonize 
inconsistent norms, such as the principle of good faith, the principle of effectiveness, 
the principle of proportionality, the principle of reciprocity and the maxims lex 
specialis derogat legi generali and lex posterior derogate legi priori. In addition, 
Article 30 of the Vienna Convention expressly offers rules to resolve tension between 
successive treaty norms relating to the same subject matter. 
A number of key soft law instruments, for example, the Stockholm Deciaration,31 the 
Rio Deciaration32 and the World Charter of Nature33 , have also contributed to the 
'environment and trade debate' by settling fundamental (trans-)sectoral principles for 
this relationship. Some of these principles have been reflected and accommodated in 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
ITTO, ITTOIIUCN Guidelines for the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Biodiversity in 
Tropical Timber Production Forests (Yokohama 2009). 
The 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity, 1760 UNTS 79, entered into force 29 December 
1993. 
CBD-COP Decision XL V1/6. 
The J 969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS 331, entered into force 27 
January 1980. 
The Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (1972), UN 
Doc.AlCONF/48/14/REV.l. 
The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (1992), UN Doc.A/CONF.15 I126/Rev. 
The World Charter of Nature UNGA Res 3717 (28 October 1982) UN Doc AlRES/3717. 
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both MEAs and m u l t i ~ a t e r a l l trade agreements, for example, the principle of 
sustainable development. Such principles may influence the interpretation, application 
and development of specific treaty rules.34 
Recent scholarly endeavours on this issue emphasize the integration of these 
specialized regimes. They are of the view that specialized regimes of international law 
are not 'self-contained' ,35 and that the WTO rules are not to be considered in 'clinical 
isolation' .36 In this regard, the International Law Commission (lLC), in a major study 
on fragmentation, examined the various techniques available within the international 
legal system for avoiding or resolving conflicts between treaties from different 
regimes addressing the same subject matter?7 The ILC emphasized the importance of 
'systemic integration' between different treaty regimes. The case law of the 
International Court of Justice (lCJ) appears to favour an integrated conception of 
international law rather than a fragmented one.38 Scholarly writings of lawyers, both 
practising and academic, have also attempted to provide methods and techniques to 
deal with divergence and conflicting treaty norms, but both acknowledge that more 
k · 39 wor IS necessary. 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
Alan Boyle and Christine Chinkin, The Making of International Law (OUP, Oxford 2007) 223. 
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Body (hereinafter US - Gasoline) (20 May 1996) WT/DS2/R and WT/DS2/AB/R, 33. 
See the ILC Report on Fragmentation supra n. 3,249. 
See especially Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovakia), ICJ 
Rep. 1997,7, paras 112 and 140; Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Use or Threat of the 
Nuclear Weapons (UNGA), Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep. 1996,66 at 95; Case Concerning Oil 
Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v US), ICJ Rep. 6 November 2003, 161. 
See supra n 3. Literature on conflicts of treaties in public international law include well-known 
handbooks on the law of international treaties: Arnold 0 McNair, The Law of Treaties 
(Clarendon Press, Oxford 1961) 219-22; Gyorgy Haraszti, Some Fundamental Problems of the 
Law of Treaties, translated by J Decsenyi (Akademiai Kiado, Budapest 1973) 294-306; Taslim 
o Elias, The Modern Law of Treaties (Oceana Publications, New York 1974) 54-8, Sir lan 
Sinc1air, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (2nd edn MUP, Manchester 1984) 93-
8; Anthony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (CUP, Cambridge 2007). Scholars have 
analysed this subject more extensively: Wilfred Jenks, 'The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties' 
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There is very little or no literature dealing comprehensively with the balance that has 
currently been struck between environmental and trade considerations in international 
law. Extensive discussion certainly exists on the balance struck between MEAs and 
WTO rules, but it tends to focus upon individual issues, and only emphasizes 
particular methods based on particular circumstances.4o None provides systemic 
methods or techniques which can be used not only to resolve specific inconsistencies 
or tensions between MEAs and multilateral trade agreements, but also to achieve a 
coherent legal system. 
1.2. Selection of treaties and research questions 
With that in mind, a number of particular multilateral agreements are reviewed in this 
thesis, including three MEAs, namely the 1973 Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (hereinafter CITES)41, the 1992 
Convention on Biological Diversity (hereinafter CBD or Convention)42 and the 2000 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(hereinafter Biosafety Protocol),43 and two multilateral trade agreements, namely the 
2006 International Tropical Timber Agreement (hereinafter lIT A)44 and the WTO 
Agreement and the annexed multilateral trade agreements. 45 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
4S 
(1953) 30 BYIL 401-53; KN Dal, 'The Application of Successive Treaties Dealing with the 
Same Subject Matter', (1974) 17 Indian YbIA 279-318; EW Vierdag, 'The Time of the 
Conclusion of the Multilateral Treaty: Article 30 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the 
Treaties and Related Provisions' (1988) 59 BYIL 92-111; W Czaplinski and GM Danilenko, 
'Conflict of Norms in International Law' (1990) 21 NYIL 12-28; Jan BMus, 'Conflicts 
Between Treaties in International Law' (1998) XLV NILR 208-32. 
See supra n 16, 17 and 24. 
993 UNTS 243, entered into force 1 July 1975. 
See supra n 28. 
2226 UNTS 208, entered into force II September 2003. 
See supra n 7. 
See supra n 6. 
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As mentioned earlier, a number of MEAs contain trade-related environmental 
measures to protect the environment. Since this thesis specifically considers issues 
related to the conservation ofbiodiversity, CITES, the CBD and the Biosafety Protocol 
are selected to study. They are all conservation agreements aiming to protect 
biodiversity. Yet, they make allowances for the protection of trade or commercial 
interests. On the other hand, multilateral trade agreements that are reviewed in this 
thesis are those whose rules overlap with relevant MEAs provisions whilst making 
allowances and exceptions for the protection of the environment. 
MEAs and the multilateral trade agreements studied in this thesis contain provisions 
which make allowances and provide specific exceptions for the interests of the other 
regime. The existence of such concessions has been an essential criterion for the 
selection of treaties for this study since this thesis aims to balance trade and 
environmental considerations in international law. They can be divided into three 
groups: i) treaties which provide the fundamental values and principles for the global 
environmental and trade treaty regimes respectively; ii) treaties which protect 
particular narrow interests within these respective fields; and iii) one treaty which 
balances interests from both fields. The WTO Agreement and its annexed agreements 
are the principal trade agreements, which provide for the fundamental principles of 
international trade. They also contain specific provisions providing exceptions for the 
protection of non-trade values, including environmental values.46 The CBD is the 
principal agreement for the conservation of biodiversity. It recognizes a range of 
values of the environment and also contains specific rules and principles for its 
protection and exploitation. In particular, it recognizes the anthropocentric value of 
46 See Chapter 3 for further discussion. 
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biodiversity along with its intrinsic values, and permits the sustainable use of 
biological resources. 
The lIT A is a commodity agreement which deals with tropical timber trade, while 
CITES is a conservation agreement, regulating trade in endangered species in order to 
protect them. The IITA aims to promote the expansion and diversification of 
international trade in tropical timber, as well as the sustainable management of 
tropical timber-producing forests. Thus, the lIT A addresses environmental concerns 
essentially in order to achieve trade objectives. On the other hand, CITES utilizes a 
number of trade measures in order to protect endangered species. Here, trade measures 
are primarily a means to achieve its conservation objectives. 
The Biosafety Protocol attempts to balance both environmental and trade interests by 
providing an international regulatory framework to reconcile the respective needs for 
trade and environmental protection with respect to biotechnology.47 The analysis of 
the Biosafety Protocol demonstrates the extent to which its specific rules permit the 
international trade in living modified organisms (LMOs) while protecting biodiversity 
and human health from its adverse effects. 
In a properly integrated legal system, approaches adopted under the MEAs would 
dovetail exactly with the approach adopted under the multilateral trade agreements 
when addressing the same subject matter, so that no possibility of conflict or 
inconsistency could arise. In practice, however, it is unlikely that full co-ordination is 
currently being achieved between these sectors in so far as their concerns overlap. 
47 See Chapter 7 for further discussion. 
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Furthermore, in the event of occasional overlap between trade and environmental 
concerns, trade interests tend to seek priority over environmental interests. Therefore, 
it becomes necessary to determine the precise relationship between these two sectors. 
This thesis seeks to balance trade and environmental concerns in international law. It 
argues that preserving biodiversity is not only an obvious prerequisite to continue 
trade, but also a prerequisite to attain all political aspirations and goals and also to 
pursuing the ultimate values of the international community. These values may also 
contribute to balancing the environment and trade consideration in international legal 
order. It also argues that both MEAs and multilateral trade agreements adopted 
political aspirations and basic community values as specific treaty rules in order to 
balance environmental and trade relationship. 
This thesis studies how environmental and trade concerns are balanced in MEAs and 
multilateral trade agreements. It examines the extent to which political aspirations and 
basic community values are realized through the adoption of more concrete rules in 
MEAs and multilateral trade agreements whilst balancing overlapping environmental 
and trade concerns. To what extent are MEAs trade-related environmental measures 
compatible with those of the relevant rules of the multilateral trade agreements? Are 
the rules available in international law adequate to balance this relationship? What is 
the best way to reconcile environmental and trade interests? Does any hierarchy exist 
between MEAs and WTO rules, and, if not, should such a hierarchy be established? 
What are the obstacles to, or limitations upon, achieving a coherent system among 
these legal regimes and how can they be overcome? These are the questions which 
this thesis seeks to answer. 
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1.3. Methodology 
This thesis is doctrinal and theoretical in its orientation, and aims to present a means 
of resolving inconsistencies and incoherence between treaties deriving from different 
regimes. Several different areas of law are implicated in the research, including public 
international law generally, as well as several of its sub-disciplines, including 
international economic law, international environmental law and the law of treaties. 
The scope and context of this thesis require a positivist approach48, as it analyses a 
number of environmental and trade treaties. This analysis is based on trade and 
environmental principles, rules, relevant cases and other sources of law. The thesis 
compares and contrasts trade and environmental treaties to expose inconsistencies and 
incoherence between them. Furthermore, it considers the underlying rules and 
principles of international law governing the inter-relationship between these treaties. 
Thus, the thesis analyses what the law currently is and how certain rules of law might 
be required to change in order to achieve a better fit with the central trends, themes or 
concepts that will be revealed through positive analysis. The positive side of 
deploying the doctrinal legal method in this research is that it has a direct relation to 
legal doctrine or substantive rules of law, rendering the research more authoritative 
and mainstream. The aim of this doctrinal analysis and evaluation is to increase the 
coherence of the international legal order and to present it as a systemic whole.49 
48 
49 
For the characteristics of legal positivism, see Herbert LA Hart, The Concept of Law (OUP, 
Oxford 1997); Raymond Wacks, Philosophy of Law (OUP, Oxford 2006) Ch 6; Hans Kelsen, 
Introduction to the Problem of Legal Theory (Clarendon Press, Oxford 2001); lan Mclecod, 
Legal Theory (5th edn Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) Ch 4, 67-82; Herbert Hart, 'Positivism and 
the Separation of Law and Morals' (1958) 71 Harv L R 593. 
Aleksander Peczenik, 'Can Philosophy Help Legal Doctrine?' (2004) 17 Ratio Juris 107. 
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The approach taken in this thesis is based on the understanding that the relationship 
between specialized treaty regimes can only be achieved 'through a process of 
reasoning' that makes them appear as parts of a 'coherent whole'. 50 It envisages an 
escalating scale, from modest to utopian, of techniques and processes that should be 
deployed to achieve an integrated system of norms in environmental and trade fora. 
This methodology is based on the argument that when appraising or evaluating the 
coherence and consistencies of the system, one should adopt a holistic perspective, i.e. 
one that is fully consistent and completely harmonious legal order. When determining 
the practical action needed to resolve any inconsistencies identified, however, one 
should start with the simplest, least demanding techniques and only move to the next 
phase once it has become apparent that a solution is not available via a less intense or 
demanding mechanism. 51 
This thesis involves a careful reading and comparison of treaties from the 
environmental and trade sectors with a view to identifying ambiguities, exposing 
inconsistencies and developing distinctions. Other primary sources include: customs, 
general principles of international law; resolutions and decisions of treaty institutions; 
WTO Ministerial Declarations; the United Nations Charter and General Assembly 
resolutions; political recommendations, declarations, programmes and the agendas of 
international conferences; decisions of the WTO dispute settlement organs, the ICJ, 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
and various other tribunals. Secondary sources include relevant scholarly works, 
journal articles, working papers, research papers, ILC reports and the websites of 
so 
SI 
The ILC Report on Fragmentation, supra n 3, para 414; Birnie et aI., supra n. 11, Ch 14, 809-
10. 
Michael Bowman, 'International Law and the Treaties of Coherence' (work in progress, 2010, 
University of Nottingham Treaty Centre). 
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different organizations and libraries. The positive and normative analysis of these 
sources52 does not consider any other kind of methodological approach, such as 
critical-legal theory, feminist legal theory, international relation theories or socio-Iegal 
theories. 
1.3.1. Terminological clarification 
To avoid ambiguity, it is important to clarify certain terms and concepts that will be 
commonly used throughout this thesis. The terms 'multilateral environmental 
agreements (MEAs)' and 'multilateral trade agreements' are used in this thesis 
specifically to refer respectively to conservation agreements and to the WTO 
Agreement, its annexed multilateral trade agreements and the ITTA. These terms are 
widely used in formal documents, academic writings and reports of the ILC in order to 
refer to international environmental agreements which aim to protect the environment, 
and international trade agreements, which aim to liberalize trade. 
The author is aware of the fact that such a 'pigeonholing' approach to terminology 
runs the risk of exacerbating the incoherence that exists between the environmental 
and trade treaty regimes even further. Moreover, certain MEAs and multilateral trade 
agreements might not actually fit in either of the pigeonholes when their contents and 
purposes are strictly considered, for example, if they have achieved a perfectly 
harmonious balance between the two sectors. Nevertheless, these terms have been 
retained on account of their general familiarity and convenience, as the risks involved 
seem relatively small. 
S2 Hart, The Concept of Law, supra n 48, Ch 10; Wacks, Philosophy of Law, supra n 48, Ch 6; 
Hilaire McCoubrey, Nigel White and JE Penner, Textbook on Jurisprudence (4th edn OUP, 
Oxford 2008) 11. 
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The author has also opted to use the term 'tension' in this thesis in order to describe 
any situation where a lack of appropriate harmony or proper coherence exists. By 
contrast, the term 'conflict' has been used to describe situations where implementing 
one treaty would require activity that would explicitly violate obligations set out in 
another treaty. According to Kelsen, 'A conflict exists between two norms when that 
which one of them decrees to be obligatory is incompatible with that which the other 
decrees to be obligatory, so that the observance or application of one norm necessarily 
or possibly involves the violation of the other'. 53 
With such a narrow definition of 'conflict', there are only a few examples available 
where a true conflict exists between environmental and trade treaties. This thesis, 
however, does not intend to restrict itself to the consideration of such cases. In 
particular, achieving a better integrated legal system requires looking beyond specific 
treaty norms. A legal system can only be said to be properly integrated when the basic 
values of the international community are given effect in all treaties regardless of their 
specificity. Using the term 'tension' allows this thesis to consider any lack of 
coherence between specific treaty norms and the ultimate community values. 
1.3.2. Emphasis on environmental considerations 
Both the environment and trade are an integral part of life for humans. 'Trade' is a 
means for growth. Having originated as barter, the modern form of trade has not only 
diversified but also extended internationally. International trade is the exchange of 
goods and services across national borders. While international trade has been present 
53 Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Norms (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1991), Ch 29, 123. 
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throughout much of history, its economIC, social and political importance has 
increased m recent times, mainly because of industrialization, advanced 
transportation, globalization and multinational corporations. 
On the other hand, planet earth is the only source of resources for the maintenance of 
such trade, and for human civilization generally. Crucially, these resources are not 
infinite. Excessive and uncontrolled utilization of these finite resources can threaten 
the sustainability of the earth's ecosystems, threatening the welfare of human beings 
and other life forms that depend on the environment for survival. 54 As the earth has 
never experienced such exceptional growth in population and consumption before, it 
is not clear how long its ecosystem will be able to keep pace with the present rate of 
growth. Recent research identifies safe boundaries for nine 'planetary life-support 
systems' that are vital for human survival and warns that humanity has already 
exceeded three of them, including the planetary boundary of biodiversity 
. h . 'h Id· 55 conservatIon, were It as a rea y entered deep mto a danger zone' . 
Although trade is an important means of achieving economic and social development, 
protection of the environment is both a means of securing key values of the 
international community and an end in itself. More recently laws have been made to 
protect the environment. The international community in successive environmental 
summits since 1972 has acknowledged the prerequisite of the preservation of the 
earth's life-support systems in order to attain all political objectives and goals. The 
S4 
ss 
Donella Meadows, Jorgen Randers and Dennis Meadows, The Limits to Growth: 30-Year 
Update (3rd revision, Earthscan, London 2005). 
Steffen RockstrOm et aI., 'Planetary Boundaries: Exposing the Safe Operating Space for 
Humanity' (2009) 14 Ecology and Society 32; Fred Pearce, 'Earth's Nine Lives' New Scientist 
27 February 2010, 31-5. 
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1992 Rio Declaration56 declares the conservation of both biodiversity and the global 
climate system as the common concern of humankind. 57 The CBD and the 1982 World 
Charter for Nature (WCNi 8 also endorse the intrinsic values ofbiodiversity.59 
Since humanity has already crossed the safe operational boundary in a number of 
environmental functions, further pressure on these systems can 'de stabilize critical 
biophysical systems' and trigger irreversible environmental changes, which could 
have a catastrophic effect for human well-being.6o For this reason, this thesis argues 
that environmental objectives, especially those related to the protection of 
biodiversity, should now be given higher priority, as compared to trade considerations, 
within the international legal order. 
1.4. Importance of research 
Two distinguishing features differentiate this thesis from other existing researches: i) 
an environmental perspective to study the trade and environmental relationship, and ii) 
introduces a formal legal mechanism through which environmental and trade 
considerations may be balanced in the international legal order. 
The existing literatures observe the trade and environmental relationship from a trade 
point of view. They study whether environmental rules are compatible with those of 
S6 
S7 
58 
S9 
60 
The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (1992), UN 
Doc.AlCONF.151126IRev.l. 
The Rio Declaration itself does not use the term. However, the Rio treaties, the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD) and the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) use 
the concept of 'common concern' to designate those issues which involve global 
responsibilities. 
Adopted by the UNGA Res 3717 (28 October 1982) UN Doc A/RES/3717. 
See the preamble of the CBD and the preamble and Annex 1(3) ofthe weN. 
RockstrOm et aI., supra n 55, 34. 
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the trade rules. However, this thesis examines whether environmental concerns are 
addressed in a balanced manner in the multilateral trade agreements. Thus, it discusses 
rules of selected MEAs and the multilateral trade agreements which provide 
exceptions and make allowances with regard to the protection of trade and 
environmental interests or concerns respectively. It then proceeds to compare and 
contrast the solutions provided in the MEAs and multilateral trade agreements on 
overlapping rules with high-level standards as evidenced in jus cogens, other non-
peremptory norms, key soft law principles, political aspirations and basic community 
values (are discussed in chapter 2) to observe the extent to which environmental 
concerns are balanced in the multilateral trade agreements. 
The most original aspect of this thesis is the analysis of formal legal mechanisms 
through which the inconsistencies and incoherence in overlapping treaty relationships 
can be addressed, and a balance can be achieved. A significant amount of literature 
exists on reconciling conflicting treaty norms and on the fragmentation of 
international law in particular, as mentioned previously. However, there is no other 
study known to the present author that has provided a comprehensive method 
applicable to all treaty relationships in the context of trade and the environment. 
The mechanisms proposed in this thesis would condition the application of individual 
treaty norms, where appropriate, by standards of higher and more overarching norms. 
Rather than concentrating on case-by-case solutions for inconsistent MEAs and WTO 
norms, this thesis seeks to achieve a broader level of coherence within the global legal 
order. Any attempt to establish a coherent global legal order cannot ignore the fact 
that there are numerous legitimate fields of concern, but this thesis seeks to achieve a 
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better accommodation of relevant values across relevant areas of international law, 
including the law of treaties, i n t e r n ~ t i o n a l l economic law and international 
environmental law. 
The thesis is divided into seven substantive chapters (excluding introduction and 
conclusion chapters). Chapter 2 analyses various methods and techniques for 
resolving inconsistencies and incoherence between overlapping and competing norms 
derived from the environmental and trade treaty regimes. It starts with the discussion 
of methods contained in the Vienna Convention. The Vienna Convention provides 
rules for treaty interpretation and, the application of treaties, which can be used to 
resolve certain inconsistencies and incoherence in treaty relationships. However, this 
chapter argues that these rules tend to leave considerable discretion to individual 
states, allowing them to depart from conventional practice and prevailing standards in 
many cases. 
This discretion is, however, limited to some extent by the Vienna Convention principle 
of jus cogens. The thesis accordingly identifies various high-level standards as 
evidenced in jus cogens, other non-peremptory norms, key soft law principles, 
political aspirations and basic community values. It argues that these high-level 
standards are to some extent implicitly reflected in every treaty or else individual 
treaties may make express reference to such standards: for example with the 
sustainable development principle. It also argues that such high-level standards not 
only affect the interpretation of individual treaties but also serve as a vehicle for the 
reconciliation of tensions or outright conflict between environmental and trade treaty 
regimes. 
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Chapters 3 to 7 then analyse selected MEAs and multilateral trade agreements, 
focusing on the extent to which environmental and trade treaty regimes have made 
allowances for each other's interests. It also examines the practical application of such 
exceptions or allowances. In the light of the overall objectives and purposes of the 
multilateral trading system, Chapter 3 analyses the Article XX GATT environmental 
exceptions, along with other specific provisions of the WTO Agreement and its 
annexed agreement, which provide exceptions and make allowances with regard to the 
protection of environmental interests or concerns. It also examines the practice of the 
CTE and the WTO dispute settlement system to observe the extent to which such 
permitted interests are disregarded or overridden. This chapter argues that, although 
the multilateral trading system embraced 'sustainable development' and 'protection 
and preservation of the environment' as objectives, it has failed to address current 
environmental concerns as recognized in various research and in the policy documents 
of the international community. Thus, it fails to achieve an appropriate balance in 
environmental and trade relationship in practice. 
Chapter 4 reviews the 2006 ITTA. The key objectives of the ITTA are to promote the 
expansion and diversification of international trade in tropical timber from sustainably 
managed and legally harvested forests and to promote the sustainable management of 
tropical timber producing forests. These broad and extended objectives show ITTA's 
intention to balance both the economic and the environmental concerns and interests. 
It refers to conservation, sustainable forest management, sustainable utilization and 
the maintenance of ecological balance in its various provisions in order to balance 
both economic and environmental interests. 
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This chapter analyses the Agreement's specific provisions on the protection of the 
tropical timber forest and observes the extent to which environmental concerns have 
been protected in practice under this commodity agreement. It concludes that although 
the lIT A is now paying greater attention to sustainable development, it is still 
effectively little more than a commodity agreement, with a commitment to increase 
international trade in tropical timber from sustainably managed and legally harvested 
forests. Therefore, this chapter argues that the ITT A has been unsuccessful to balance 
trade and current environmental concerns. 
Chapter 5 discusses one extremely important MEA that relies on trade measures to 
protect the environment - the 1973 CITES. Annually, international wildlife trade is 
estimated to be worth billions of dollars and to include hundreds of millions of plant 
and animal specimens. CITES recognizes the economic contribution of international 
trade of wildlife in the Contracting Parties economy. Thus, it does not prohibit 
wildlife trade, but subject international trade in specimens of selected species to 
certain controls in order to protect endangered species. CITES aim is to ensure that 
international trade in specimens of wild animals and plants does not threaten their 
survival. 
This chapter focuses on how the CITES' approach towards trade differs from that of 
the multilateral trade agreements. Consequently, some trade restrictions imposed by 
CITES appear to be in conflict with the principles of the GA ITIWTO agreements, 
increasing the potential for a conflict between the CITES and the WTO. It argues that 
CITES' trade related environmental measures to balance conservation and trade 
objectives are not disguised restrictions to trade. 
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Chapter 6 considers the CBD. It illustrates how the objectives of the Convention go 
well beyond the conservation of biological diversity per se and covers such diverse 
issues as sustainable use of biological resources, access to genetic resources, the 
sharing of benefits derived from the use of genetic resources and access to 
technology.61 Although the Convention does not contain any specific trade restrictive 
measures, the Contracting Parties, while implementing the Convention, may develop 
and adopt specific measures restricting trade in biological resources to pursue the 
Convention's objectives. Such measures have, or are likely to have, the possibility of 
overlapping with obligations set out in the multilateral trade agreements whilst dealing 
with the same subject matter. This chapter argues that the soft law principles of the 
Convention allow Contracting Parties to integrate the fundamental values of the 
international community balancing the environmental and trade relationship. 
Chapter 7 analyses how trade and environmental interests are balanced in the 
Biosafety Protocol, which provides an international regulatory framework to reconcile 
the respective needs for trade and environmental protection with respect to 
biotechnology. Hence, this chapter examines in particular the extent to which the 
Biosafety Protocol permits the international trade of living modified organisms 
(LMOs) while protecting biodiversity and human health from its adverse effects. 
Since some multilateral trade agreements also address issues related to the 
transboundary movement of LMOs, there is a possibility that some of the Protocol 
provisions may overlap with them. Thus, the chapter further analyses the extent to 
which the Protocol's permitted trade-restrictive measures are compatible with the 
multilateral trade agreements which deal with the same subject matter. It argues that 
61 Article 1 of the CBD. 
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the Biosafety Protocol includes soft law principles of the international community in 
order to balance environmental and trade relationship. 
Finally, chapter 8 proposes mechanisms to balance trade and environmental 
considerations in the international legal order whilst comparing and contrasting the 
various solutions provided in both the trade agreements and MEAs to reconcile 
overlapping environmental and trade interests, as discussed in chapters 3 to 7. It 
observes whether the solutions for overlapping issues adopted in the trade agreements 
and MEAs are identical, complementary or incompatible with one other. In the event 
of disagreement, it considers the underlying rules governing the interpretation and 
prioritization of legal norms as identified in chapter 2. Where it is possible to make a 
comparison between current solutions, it assesses the current balance against other 
relevant values of the international community as evidenced injus cogens, other non-
peremptory norms, key soft law principles, political aspirations and basic community 
values. Taking into consideration the current environmental concerns, this chapter 
argues that the WTO and the ITTO should give greater and more specific recognition 
to environmental values. 
This thesis concludes with the hope of stimulating academic discussion and general 
scholarship in the area, as well as encouraging practical action for WTO trade 
institutions, including its dispute settlement organs. The WTO is encouraged to give 
specific recognition to environmental values and its dispute settlement organs to 
interpreting environmental exceptions, broadly to reflect environmental values as 
recognized in MEAs and high-level standards set by the international community. 
Overall, this thesis seeks to demonstrate the need to acknowledge the role of high-
24 
level nonns in harmonizing different treaty interests and proposes a systemic approach 
to reconciling tension in overlapping treaties from different regimes. 
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2. Treatment of the competing norms 
2.1. Introduction 
As mentioned in the preceding chapter, a number of MEAs contain rules affecting 
trade interests, while several multilateral trade agreements also provide rules affecting 
environmental interests. This can lead to a situation where it becomes necessary to 
detennine the precise relationship between two or more overlapping nonns arising 
from MEAs and the multilateral trade agreements, both of which are valid and 
applicable in respect of a particular situation. Accordingly, this chapter analyses ways 
and techniques to resolve inconsistencies and incoherence between overlapping and 
competing nonns derived from different treaty regimes. 
In this context, the 1969 Vienna Convention Law of Treaties partly reflects customary 
law, and constitutes the basic framework for any discussion of the nature and 
characteristics of treaties. Its rules for treaty interpretation and application of treaties 
are particularly relevant to resolve inconsistencies and apparent conflict between 
overlapping treaty nonns from different regimes. Articles 31-33 of the Vienna 
Convention offer rules for treaty interpretation, whilst Article 30 expressly offers rules 
to resolve tension between successive treaty nonns relating to the same subject matter. 
To date, Article 3 1 (3)(c) of the Vienna Convention has been recognized as 'the only 
provision of international law' that can integrate the various sources of international 
law.62 Since this Article requires the interpreter of a treaty to take into account 'any 
relevant rules of international law applicable in relations between the parties', the 
62 Duncan French, 'Treaty Interpretation and the Incorporation of Extraneous Legal Rules' (2006) 
55 ICLQ 281 at 301; Philippe Sands, 'Treaty, Custom and the Cross-fertilization of 
International Law' (1998) I Yale HRDLJ 85 at 95. 
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International Law Commission (lLC) in its Report on the 'Difficulties Arising from 
the Diversification and Expansion of International Law' took the view that Article 
31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention gives expression to the 'principle of systemic 
integration,.63 Furthermore, Article 32 of the Vienna Convention allows for 
supplementary means of interpretation, for example, the preparatory work of the treaty 
(travaux pn!paratoires, or travaux for short), and other aids to interpretation as 
discussed in this chapter. 
Furthermore, the purpose behind applying Article 30 to 'successive treaties relating to 
the same subject matter' is that it acts as a guide to select only one of the two 
competing rules applicable to the particular situation at hand. However, these are not 
the only articles in the Vienna Convention governing the relationship between 
successive treaties; where the norms are actually incompatible, and it may be 
necessary to bring to an end one of the two norms through 'invalidity or termination 
or illegality'. In this context, the Vienna Convention provides rules for treaty 
amendment (Articles 39 and 40), modification (Article 41) and termination or 
suspension (Articles 58, 59 and 60), all of which may help to resolve conflicts 
between overlapping treaty norms. Furthermore, there is another category of norms 
from which no derogation is permitted, i.e.jus cogens norms (Articles 53 and 64). 
The application of Vienna Convention rules provides the following possible outcomes 
for inconsistent or conflicting norms: harmonizing the apparent inconsistent norms to 
avoid conflict; if that seems implausible, it must be established whether one of the 
norms supersedes the other; and finally, if that cannot be determined, it will be 
63 Report of the ILC on Fragmentation, supra n 3, para. 413. For more detail on 'systemic 
integration', also see Campbell McLanhlan, 'The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 
31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention' (2005) 54 ICLQ 279-320. 
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necessary to establish definite relationships of priority between them. How can 
competing norms be harmonized? How should priority between successive treaties be 
determined? Are the rules and techniques provided by the Vienna Convention 
sufficient to address conflicting treaty relationships? If not, are there any other 
methods or rules available in international law to resolve tension between treaties? 
Due to the proliferation of multilateral treaties in recent years, tension between 
successive treaties is rising and thus these questions are more important than ever. 
This chapter seeks to answer such questions. It presents a critical analysis of the rules 
and techniques of the Vienna Convention and examines the extent to which they are 
sufficient to address the complexities which can possibly arise between MEAs and 
multilateral trade agreements. This chapter addresses the strengths and weaknesses of 
those techniques provided in the Vienna Convention, pointing out what it can achieve 
and what it cannot, which technique offers the best hope for a balanced relationship, 
and if they fail to resolve probable conflicts, what alternatives exist. Furthermore, it 
focuses upon those aspects of normality which do not bind states and other legal 
persons to comply with them, but can set limits, or provide guidance, or determine 
how a conflict between other rules and principles will be resolved.64 Accordingly, it 
also analyses the key soft law norms and principles relevant to environmental and 
trade concerns, which can often be found in non-binding declarations and resolutions 
of the international community of states. 
The chapter consists of four sections. Sections II-IV critically analyse the rules of 
international law to observe the extent to which they tackle inconsistencies and 
incoherence in treaty relationships. The Vienna Convention offers three broad 
64 See Birnie et aI., supra n 11, 26-8. 
28 
techniques to tackle inconsistencies and incoherence in treaty relationships: 
harmonization, supersession and prioritization. Apparent conflict between mere 
unsympathetic but compatible norms can typically be resolved by harmonizing them, 
but in case of mutually exclusive norms, one will inevitably prevail over the other. 
Furthermore, where the norms are actually incompatible, it is necessary to establish 
definite relationships of priority between them. Section V's discussion focuses on 
various norms and principles of the international community as expressed in key soft 
and hard law instruments. Such norms include: fundamental sectoral and trans-
sectoral norms; general trans-sectoral or cross-sectoral meta-norms; global political 
aspirations; and ultimate community values. It observes the extent to which these 
norms and principles assist in establishing a coherent legal system in the trade and 
environmental relationship. 
2.2. Techniques to avoid apparent conflicts 
Many apparent or potential conflicts can be prevented or avoided before they actually 
materialize in a practical sense. One obvious way of preventing or avoiding conflict 
between norms from different regimes is to keep in mind existing norms of 
international law when negotiating and drafting new regimes. Another way is to 
interpret them in order to harmonize them. For this purpose, the two norms must be of 
such nature that they can be read in a way that makes it possible to harmonize them.65 
6S See Pauwelyn, supra n 11, 251. 
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2.2.1. Prevention is better than cure 
Many potential conflicts of overlapping treaty rules can be avoided by taking 
precautions while negotiating and/or drafting an instrument. This can be done by 
drafting a new treaty more clearly and thoughtfully, keeping other treaties fully in 
mind.66 Adding a 'conflict clause' with clear language while negotiating a new treaty 
can also reduce the potential for conflict between overlapping norms from different 
treaties. A conflict clause describes how that treaty's relationship with other treaties 
will be regulated insofar as their concerns overlap. This type of clause may seek to 
determine the relationship of the treaty in question with any treaty past or future. A 
conflict clause can clarify the basic parameters of an agreement. The Vienna 
Convention has recognized the 'conflict clause' as a way for parties to come to an 
agreement, to clarify their intentions vis-a-vis other agreements.67 If all parties to a 
negotiation are clear that no conflict is intended, they could agree to reflect this in an 
explicit provision. Thus, some multilateral treaties contain express provision for the 
priority of the present treaty over all other treaties.68 For example, Article 103 of the 
1945 UN Charter states its priority over all other treaties past and future. On the other 
hand, some multilateral treaties contain an express provision that subordinates it to an 
earlier treaty. For example, Article 4 of the 1995 Conservation and Management of 
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks Agreement establishes the 
66 
67 
68 
Jenks, supra n 39, 429; Wolfram Karl, Conflict Between Treaties, in Rudolf Bernhardt (ed), 4 
Encyclopaedia of Public International law (2000) 936; Christopher Borgen, 'Resolving Treaty 
Conflicts' (2005) 37 George Washington ILR 573 at 584. 
Article 30 of Vienna Convention. 
Hans Blix and Jirina Emerson (ed), The Treaty Makers Handbook (Oceana Publications, Dag 
Hammarskjold Foundation, Dobbs Ferry, New York 1973) 210-17 and Aust, supra n 39, 227--
9 sets out a typology of different types of conflict avoidance clauses, for example, i) the present 
treaty prevails over the other treaties; ii) the present treaty prevails over all earlier treaties; iii) 
the present treaty prevails over earlier treaties for parties to the present treaty; iv) the parties to 
the present treaty undertake an obligation not to enter into later treaties inconsistent with the 
present one; v) supplementary agreements are permitted only if they are compatible with the 
present treaty; vi) the parties to the present treaty undertake an obligation to modiry existing 
treaties that they may have with third parties; vii) the treaty prevails over all other treaties past 
and future, etc. 
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priority of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS) over its provisions.69 The 
insertion of such a clause may prove an effective way to prevent dispute between 
treaties. However, agreeing on a 'conflict clause' is not so simple. 
In the era of specialized treaty regimes, thoughtful drafting plays a significant role in 
avoiding or resolving potential conflict between specialized treaties from different 
regimes. As lenks pointed out, the negotiators of specialized treaties are often tempted 
'to secure fuller satisfaction for their own views on debatable questions of details at 
the price of conflict between different instruments and incoherence in the body of 
related instruments' .70 He calls for negotiators to 'form the habit' of recognizing any 
proposed new instrument as part of the entire corpus of international law, and thus 
keeping in mind what effect it might have on existing instruments.71 For this purpose, 
whenever negotiating a new instrument, negotiating states need to check beforehand 
whether a proposed new norm would be compatible with their own prior 
commitments. In this way, conflict can be avoided before it arises. 
Another way of avoiding conflict between specialized regimes is to establish 
cooperation and information-sharing arrangements between international institutions 
or between international organizations and states. This process makes it possible for 
international organizations and states negotiating specialized treaties to be aware of 
their area of competence and also enables them to take into account existing rules of 
other regimes while making new rules. This process is well recognized by the 
international community as a conflict-avoidance tool. An example is the 
69 
70 
71 
'Nothing in this Agreement shall prejudice the rights, jurisdiction and duties of States under 
[UNCLOS]. This Agreement shall interpreted and applied in the context of and in a manner 
consistent with the [UNCLOS]'. 
Jenks, supra n 39, 452. 
Ibid. 
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Memorandum of Understanding between the 1973 Convention on International Trade 
in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) Secretariat and the Food 
and Agriculture Organization (FAO). 72 CITES and FAO share an interest on a broad 
range of issues, which include certain marine and forest resources. When the CITES-
COP included certain commercially exploited marine species within its framework, it 
did not have the data or technical expertise on marine species to prove scientifically 
that the species is endangered - but the FAO does. As a result, the two institutions 
have fonned a 'Memorandum of Understanding' on joint work programmes.73 
However, one of the limitations of such cooperation is that nonns from a weaker 
regime may lose out to nonns from a stronger regime, as the latter may well provide 
for stronger compliance mechanisms, which states are more likely to follow in their 
decision-making process.74 For example, the WTO regimes are more likely to prevail 
in this process over most MEAs regimes, as the latter do not have strong enforcement 
mechanisms.75 In addition, it is questionable how far this cooperation process can 
hannonize conflicting nonns while they have to take into account the rights and 
obligations of each set of treaty parties. Moreover, it is difficult in practice to establish 
cooperation between institutions to resolve any conflict. 76 Cooperation requires 
expertise, resources and preparation. One group having huge resources may well be 
able to observe all meetings in all areas, but this is not possible for an institution with 
inadequate resources. 
72 
73 
74 
7S 
76 
Fifteenth meeting of the Conference of the Parties (13-25 March 2010). Available at: 
<http://www.CITES.org/eng/cop/15/doc/EI5-1O-02.pdf.> [2 September 2010]. 
For more examples of sectoral, cross-sectoral and trans-sectoral cooperation between treaties 
institutions and institutions and states, see Chapter 8. 
Claire Kelly, 'The Value Vacuum: Self-enforcing Regimes and the Dilution of the Normative 
Feedback Loop' (200 I) 23 Mich JIL 673 at 690. 
Ibid. 
See Chapter 8 for further discussion. 
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2.2.2. Treaty interpretation 
Interpretation is an established process to hannonize two or more agreed norms,77 
where either or both include terms that are open-textured or ambiguous. It begins with 
finding the meaning of ambiguous or potentially inconsistent treaty norms in the light 
of the context and object and purpose of a single treaty but it can be extended to 
systemic integration between norms from different treaties. 
2.2.2.1. Interpretation 'in the context' of a treaty 
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention sets out the basic rules for treaty interpretation, 
which is that treaties are to be 'interpreted in good faith in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light 
of its object and purpose'. In this process, priority has been given to the text of the 
treaty, as the ILC took the view that 'the starting point of interpretation is the 
elucidation of the meaning of the text, not an investigation ab initio into the intention 
of the Parties'. 78 Therefore, for the purpose of treaty interpretation, first the terms of 
the treaty need to be considered in the light of the context in which they arise, and 
then the 'objective and purpose' of the treaty. 79 Article 31 (l) of the Vienna 
Convention considers three main elements in treaty interpretation: the text, its 
context80 and the object and purpose of the treaty. Over-reliance upon anyone of these 
factors to the detriment of others is unlikely to produce a satisfactory result. 
77 
78 
79 
80 
Conclusions of the work of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of International Law: 
Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, Report 
adopted by the ILC in its 58th session in 2006, para. 1(4). 
Yearbook of International Law Commission (1966 - 11), 218. 
Ulf Linderfalk, 'Is the Hierarchy Structure of Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention Real 
or Not? Interpreting the Rules of Interpretation' (2007) 54 NlLR 133 at 136. 
By context it meant material related to the conclusion of the treaty; and the reference to 
'context' in the opening phrase of paragraphs 2 and 3 is designed to link those paragraphs with 
paragraph 1. 
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Therefore, an acceptable treaty interpretation needs to be a perfect blend of all these 
factors. 
The ILC observed that the principle of effectiveness (ut res magis valeat quam pereat) 
is 'subsumed in the reference to "good faith" and "the object and purposes of a treaty" 
contained in Article 31(1) ofVCLOT'.81 In the language of the ILC, '[W]hen a treaty 
is open to two interpretations one of which does and the other does not enable the 
treaty to have appropriate effects, good faith and the object and purposes of the treaty 
demand that the former interpretation should be adopted' .82 Consequently, in the 
absence of any explicit guideline, treaty interpretation by reference to the principle of 
effectiveness can work as a conflict-avoidance technique. The principle of 
effectiveness, by dint of interpretation, gives effect to both apparently inconsistent 
norms in such a way as to resolve any apparent conflict. Within a single treaty, in any 
situation where one norm explicitly derogates from another norm or makes it clear 
that the scope of one norm must be restricted to give effect to another norm, effective 
interpretation of both norms may solve apparent conflicts. For example, Articles III 
and XX of the GATT create a potential tension.83 However, this can be resolved by 
effective treaty interpretation, which will narrow down or carve out the effect of 
Article III to give proper effect to Article XX.84 
However, effective treaty interpretation does not necessarily call for a 'liberal' or 
'narrow' interpretation as a matter of abstract principle; on the contrary, interpretation 
on the basis of this principle is conditioned by the overall objective and purposes of 
81 
82 
83 
84 
Sinclair, supra n 39, 118 and Yearbook of International Law Commission, 'Draft Articles on 
the Law of Treaties with Commentaries', supra n 78, 219. 
Ibid. 
See Chapter 3. 
See Chapter 3 for the detailed provisions of Articles III and XX of the GA IT 1994. 
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the treaty.85 Often an exception, or a derogative norm, is given a relatively narrow 
interpretation so as not to undermine the overall objective and purposes of the treaty.86 
Even where a restrictive approach is adopted, the effective treaty interpretation 
principle does not allow interpreters to read apparent inconsistent norms in a way that 
would render whole clauses or paragraphs of a treaty 'redundant' or 'unutilized' .87 
Furthermore, such interpretation does not allow introducing words that are not in a 
treaty or the importation of concepts that are not intended.88 Consequently, words 
cannot be 'interpreted out or specific treaty provisions and new words cannot be 
'imported into' the treaty. 89 
Furthermore, the principle of effectiveness may well demand that an exception be 
given an extensive reading: it all depends on the relationship between the exception 
and the overall objective and purposes of the treaty. For example, CITES permit 
exceptions for captive breeding and artificial propagation, ranching and scientific 
research.9o Exceptions such as 'captive breeding or artificial propagation', 'ranching' 
and 'scientific research' are not only intended to accommodate CITES objectives (i.e. 
'protect' endangered species 'against over-exploitation') but also positively to 
h b·, 91 promote t ese 0 ~ e c t l v e s . .
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86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
In the Corfu Channel case the PCIJ applied this principle to interpret the term 'a special 
agreement'. Corfu Channel (UK v Albania) (Merits), IC] Rep. 1949, 4 at 24. Also see Hersch 
Lauterpacht, 'Restrictive interpretation and the principle of effectiveness in the interpretation of 
treaties' (\ 949) 29 BYIL 48. 
It is the practice of the GAIT panels to interpret exceptions narrowly, see decisions on US-
Countervailing Duties on Fresh. Chilled and Frozen Pork from Canada (1991) GAIT BISD 
38S/30, para. 4.4; Canada -Import Restrictions on Ice Cream and Yogurt (1989) GA IT BISD 
36S/68, para. 59. 
US - Gasoline, supra n 36; WTO, Japan: Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages /I - Report of the 
Appellate Body (hereinafter Japan - Alcoholic Beverage) (4 October 1996) WT/DSIO/AB/R 
and WT IDS II / AB/R. 
WTO, India: Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products -
Report of the Appellate Body (\ 9 December 1997) WT/DS501 AB/R, para. 46. 
Pauwelyn, supra n 11, 249. 
Article VII of the CITES. 
This issued has been discussed in detail in Chapter 5. 
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However, it is doubtful how far this principle is useful to solve a conflict between 
treaties from different regimes which have different objectives and purposes,92 since 
this principle does not call for an 'extensive' or 'liberal' interpretation in any sense 
which goes beyond the meaning of the terms and objectives of a treaty. Furthermore, 
if a harmonious reading of the two apparently inconsistent norms is not feasible by 
means of effective interpretation, it becomes necessary to choose between the norms, 
since the existence of a conflict is acknowledged. 
2.2.2.2. Interpretation with reference to norms outside of the treaty 
Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention incorporate provisions that may require a 
reference to normative elements other than those set out in the treaty itself, such as 
'any subsequent agreements' (Article 31(3)(a»; 'any subsequent practice' (Article 
31(3)(b»; 'any relevant rules of international law' (Article 31(3)(c»; and 
'supplementary means of interpretation' (Article 32). In the event of apparent conflict 
between the respective norms of MEAs and of multilateral trade agreements, if there 
is room for an interpretation of either one that would render it consistent with the 
other, such interpretation should be preferred in order to harmonize those norms. 
(a) Interpreting inconsistent norms taking into account subsequent agreements 
and practices 
Article 3I(3)(a) provides that, together with the context, the interpreter should take 
into account any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the 
92 Gerald Fitzmaurice, 'The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 1951-4: 
Treaty Interpretation and Other Treaty points' (1957) 33 BYIL 223. 
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interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provISIOns. This provision is 
understood to allow the parties to. effectively revise the treaty and permits the 
Conference of the Parties (COP) to a treaty to enact an authoritative interpretation of 
treaty provisions, which may amount in effect to an amendment. 93 It seems that 
Article 31(3)(a) also permits the evolutionary interpretation ofa treaty. 
Furthermore, Article 31 (3)(b) provides for account to be taken, together with the 
context, of any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes 
the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation. In the context of a treaty, such 
subsequent practices can be found either in state practice or in the practice of treaty 
organizations,94 for example, the COP of an MEA, or one of the WTO dispute 
settlement systems. Both the practice of parties to a treaty and the practice of a treaty 
institution can be referred to in the interpretation of a treaty. Consequently, subsequent 
practice can lead to further clarification of treaty rules. Furthermore, the ICJ decided 
in the Namibia case that 'subsequent practice' is capable also of actually changing 
treaty norms.95 In that instance, subsequent practice was equated with an explicit 
agreement which modifies a treaty by means of subsequent practice. 
Both subsequent agreement and practice carry considerable weight in the 
interpretation of a treaty and may be utilized in order to modify a treaty norm so that it 
reads consistently with norms from another treaty where an apparent conflict exists 
between them. However, the extent to which subsequent agreement or subsequent 
93 
94 
95 
Francis Jacobs, 'Varieties of Approach to Treaty Interpretation: With Special Preference to tht.: 
Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties before the Vienna Diplomatic Conference' (1969) 18 
ICLQ 318 at 330. 
Namibia Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep. 1971, 16, para. 22. 
Ibid. In this case the ICJ found that the voting practices of the UN Security Council have 
effectively changed the UN Charter provisions. 
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practice will work as a conflict-avoidance technique depends on the practice of states 
and organizations. 
(b) 'Systemic integration' referencing to norms external to the treaty 
Article 31 (3)( c) requires the interpreter of a treaty to take into account 'any relevant 
rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties'. It reflects a 
'principle of integration' ,96 which is based on a presumption that treaties are a creation 
of a single international legal system and their operation should be considered upon 
that basis.97 Article 31 (3)( c) allows for the application of other relevant rules of 
international law, which may themselves derive from treaties, customary rules or 
general principles of law,98 in order to interpret a treaty norm. This technique of 
interpretation helps to modify, clarify or update a treaty norm with the application of 
similar norms from other treaties regardless of their subject matter. Consequently, 
apparent conflict between overlapping treaty norms from different regimes may be 
avoided. 
In the Golder case, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in reference to 
Article 31(3)(c) decided that 'general principles of law' more precisely refer to the 
'general principles of law recognised by civilized nations', as recognized by Article 
38(l)(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.99 It is not completely clear 
whether this Article refers only to general principles of municipal law or also includes 
principles recognized by international law itself, such as the principle of good faith. 
% Sands, 'Cross-fertilization of International Law', supra n 62, 95. 
97 The ILC Report on Fragmentation, supra n 3, para. 4(17). Also see Sands, 'Cross-fertilization 
of International Law', supra n 62, 95. 
98 Ibid., para. 4(18). 
99 Golder v UK (App no 4451170) ECHR 21 February 1975, para. 29. 
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The positivist view is that Article 38(l)(c) refers only to general principles accepted 
by all nations infora domestico. Other writers, however, believe that Article 38(l)(c) 
does not codify an existing unwritten rule on general principles, but endeavours to 
establish a new secondary source, leaving it to a court or a tribunal, not states, to 
enunciate the relevant principles by induction. lOO This would give a court or a tribunal 
a more creative role, within certain limits, to construct new principles. 
Such general principles are also important, as they influence the interpretation, 
application and development of treaties in accordance with Article 31(3)(c) of the 
Vienna Convention. tOt Furthermore, Article 31(3)(c) also covers rules of customary 
international law and certain treaty provisions. 102 In the Case Concerning Gabcikovo-
Nagymaros Project, the ICJ noted that 'developed norms of environmental law are 
relevant for the implementation of the treaty' 103 In the AI-Adsani case, the Strasbourg 
Court resorted to Article 31 (3)( c) of the Vienna Convention and stated that '[ t ]he 
Convention ... , cannot be interpreted in a vacuum'; rather the court would have to 
take into account the 'generally recognized rules of public international law ... ' .104 
As discussed in chapter 3, this trend of taking into account not only the general 
principles of law but also other treaties finds reflection in US - Shrimps, where the 
WTO Appellate Body interpreted the words 'exhaustible natural resources' in Article 
XX(g) of GATT by reference to various MEAs. 105 It held that when interpreting a 
100 Antonio Cassese, International Law in a Divided World (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1986) 171-
2; Jonathan Charney, 'Universal International Law', (1993) 87 AJIL 529 at 535-6. 
101 Boyle and Chinkin, The Making of International Law, supra n 34, 225. 
102 The ILC Report on Fragmentation, supra n 3, para. 4(17). Also see Sands, 'Cross-fertilization 
ofInternational Law', supra n 62, 8; Sine lair, supra n 39, 119. 
103 ICJ Report (\997) 7, 67. 
\04 A I-A dsani v UK (App no 35763/97) ECHR 21 November 2001, 55. 
105 WTO, US: Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products - Report of the 
Appellate Body (6 November 1998) WT/DS581 AB/R. para. 130. 
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treaty nonn interpreters are free to seek 'additional interpretative guidance, as 
appropriate, from the general principles of international law' . which could derive from 
another treaty.I06 However, as the Appellate Body did not mention Article 31(3)(c) 
specifically, it is not clear whether it was intending to invoke that provision, or merely 
to detennine the ordinary meaning given to the treaty tenns in accordance with Article 
31(1 ).107 
Furthennore, it is also unclear either from the Vienna Convention itself, with respect 
to the specific implications for parties, whether Article 31 (3)( c) refers to rules 
applicable only between the parties to a treaty dispute or, by contrast, to all the parties 
to the treaty in question. I08 Therefore, the precise scope of application of this 
provision is unclear. I09 In this connection, to limit the application of Article 31(3)(c) 
only to rules applicable between parties to a treaty dispute, rather than to all the parties 
to a treaty, makes its application uncertain with regard to other treaty parties. 11O 
Furthennore, Article 18 of the Vienna Convention broadens the obligation of signatory 
states to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the treaty. 
Thus, signatory states although not 'parties' to a treaty are obliged not to act against 
106 Ibid .. para. 158. 
107 Pauwelyn, supra n 11, 256. 
108 Article 2.l(g) of the Vienna Convention defines the meaning of the term 'party' for the 
purposes of the Vienna Convention as 'a State which has consented to be bound by the treaty 
and for which the treaty is in force'. The GMO case has inferred from these elements that the 
rules of international law applicable in the relations between 'the parties' are the rules of 
international law applicable in the relations between the States which have consented to be 
bound by the treaty which is being interpreted, and for which that treaty is in force. Therefore, 
Article 31(3)(c) refers to 'the parties', not 'all parties'. See WTO, EC: Measures Affecting the 
Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products - Report of the Panel (hereinafter EC - Biotech 
Products) (29 September 2006), para. 7.68 and Pauwelyn, supra n 11,261. 
109 Sands, 'Cross-fertilization of International Law', supra n 62, 102. See discussion on Biotech 
case in Chapter 8. 
110 The COP of the MEAs engage from time to time in interpretation of the provisions of the 
MEAs in a way that relates to and gives effect to the substantive obligations of their parties. In 
some cases, this power of interpretation is expressly conferred by the MEAs.11O But more 
commonly, the COP interprets MEAs even though the agreement does not expressly authorize 
it with the power. In operation, sometimes MEAs experience scientific, technical or other 
developments which lead the COP to interpret MEAs to meet the demand of the present 
situation and to keep it up to date. 
40 
its objectives. If they do so, the ILC and academic commentators have concluded that 
that would amount to a material breach of their treaty obligations. III 
In any event, it is not easy to determine the intentions of the parties. States as such are 
not capable to forming intentions; they send delegations to treaty negotiations 
represented by natural persons. I 12 These delegations can have divergent 
understandings even amongst themselves regarding the 'meaning and objectives' of 
the instrument. Therefore, consensus should be based on 'objective appearances and 
ostensible intentions', so that 'the undeclared aims or secret aspirations of the parties 
cannot be allowed to dictate the sense which the instrument must bear'. 113 Thus, 
although the 'subjective approach' of treaty interpretation (whereby the aim of the 
interpretation is to ascertain the 'intentions of the parties') is well supported and 
advocated by various writers and jurists,114 the 'common intention' which is needed 
for this approach is widely criticized for not being clear in 'many and varied 
situations' .115 In multilateral treaties, moreover, many of the parties will, or may, have 
joined by subsequent accession. They have not taken part in the original framing of 
the text, and therefore they may well be unaware of the original framers' basic 
intentions. 
The terms of Article 31(3}(c} permit the evolutionary interpretation of a treaty. This 
approach is based on the presumed intention of the parties and is designed to ensure 
III 
112 
113 
114 
Yearbook of International Law Commission (1965) Part I, 87-99. 262-3 and Part 11, 43-5; 
Martin Rogoff, 'International Legal Obligations of Signatories to an Unratified Treaty' (1980) 
32 Mar LR 263; Jan Klabbers, 'How to Defeat a Treaty's Object and Purpose Pending Entry 
into Force: Toward Manifest Intent' (2001) 34 Vand JTL 283. 
Michael Bowman, "'Normalising" the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling' 
(2008) 28 Mich JIL 293 at 317. 
Ibid. 
McNair suggested that the main task of any tribunal to interpret a treaty is to give effect to the 
express intention of the parties. McNair, supra n 39, 365, The Restatement para. 146. 
I l ~ ~ Jacobs, supra n 93, 318-21. 
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that the continuous pursuit of the object and purpose of the treaty can be maintained 
over the course of time and in the light of ever-changing 'practical realities, social 
attitudes and normative demands of the wider legal system' .116 The drafters of the 
Vienna Convention initially intended to limit the boundary of these external I 17 sources 
by adding the clause 'in force at the time of its conclusion' to general rules of 
international law. However, the final version overcomes this limitation by dropping 
this clause. Accordingly, the ILC deliberately omitted a rule about 'inter-temporality' 
from the Vienna Convention, as some members of the ILC suggested that to retain it 
would fail 'to deal with the problem of the effect of an evolution of the law of 
interpretation of legal terms in a treaty' and would be 'inadequate'. Since international 
law evolves and develops during the operation of a treaty, this process may influence 
the meaning of such treaty terms, I 18 'especially where the concepts used in the treaty 
are open or evolving'. 119 
Two contrasting approaches can be adopted to interpret treaty terms which possess a 
potentially evolutionary meaning. 120 One is the 'static' approach, i.e. interpretation in 
the light of their meaning as understood by the parties at the time of negotiation. 121 
The other is the 'dynamic' or 'evolutionary' approach, i.e. objective revision of 
meaning. The static approach is based on the subjective understanding of a treaty that 
its meaning can only change when the parties themselves specifically intended to alter 
116 
117 
118 
Bowman, "'Normalising''', supra n 112, 149. 
In this context, interpretation of a treaty by reference to external rules can be divided into two 
parts: i) rules external to the text but internal to the process of treaty, e.g. travaux preparatories; 
and ii) external rules deriving from other sources, e.g. treaties, customary rules or general 
principles of law. 
Sinclair, supra n 39, 139-40. 
119 The ILe Report on Fragmentation, supra n 3, para. 4(23). 
120 French, supra n 62, 295. 
121 Island of Palm as Arbitration (Netherlands v US) (1928) 2 RI AA 829. 
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it in the light of changing circumstances. 122 Regarding the evolutionary approach, the 
ILC describes three characteristics for concepts used in treaties which are considered 
as being 'open or evolving' in nature. They must i) be capable of taking into account 
subsequent technical, economic and legal developments; ii) set up an obligation for 
further development for the parties; and iii) have a general nature to evolve in 
changing circumstances. 123 
The process of evolutionary interpretation has been explained and applied by the ICJ 
in a series of high-profile cases. 124 Interpretation of one norm by reference to another, 
allegedly conflicting norm may lead to a harmonized reading of both norms, thereby 
avoiding conflict. However, this process will not work if such interpretation leads to 
the conclusion that one norm itself, or its implementation by a state, will constitute an 
actual breach of another norm; then a harmonious interpretation is not feasible, since 
genuine conflict arises and treaty interpretation alone is incapable of resolving it. 
Some other limitations for the application of this approach are as follows. First, this 
provision enables the rules of interpretation to evolve in a wider spectrum to integrate 
different treaty, customary and general international law principles. However, whereas 
an internal source l25 of treaty interpretation can be used to interpret a t,reaty 
independently, and without the help of external sources, an external source can only 
ever be an addition to the internal source. That is to say, external sources for treaty 
122 
123 
124 
125 
In the Gabcikovic-Nagymaros case, the IeJ noted that '[b]y inserting these evolving provisions 
in the Treaty, the parties recognised the potential necessity to adapt the project. Consequently, 
the Treaty is not static, and is open to adapt to emerging norms of international law', see supra 
n 38, 67-8. 
Ibid., para. 4(23). 
In the Gabcikovic-Nagymaros case, supra n 38; Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case, (Greece v 
Turkey) ICJ (1978); Oil Platforms, supra n 38. 
Internal sources to interpret the treaty include the treaty context, preamble, annexes, any 
agreement relating to the treaty, any instrument made in connection with the conclusion of the 
treaty. 
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interpretation cannot be isolated from the internal sources. 126 Second, the norm of 
international law that has to be taken into account in order to interpret a treaty needs to 
be 'relevant' to the subject matter of the treaty under consideration. 127 That is, the 
other rule must say something about what the disputed term should mean, 
demonstrating their mutual relevance for the purposes of interpretation. 128 Third, 
applying customary rules or general principles of law to interpret a treaty norm 
depends on the nature of the term in question, i.e. the treaty term needs to be generic 
and open textured. 129 Furthermore, customary norms and general principles of law 
have only a secondary role here, as they cannot displace treaty norms 'either partly or 
wholly' .130 Fourth, the external treaty rule cannot introduce any entirely new norms to 
the treaty through interpretation. Therefore, the treaty interpretation process cannot 
add anything of substance to the treaty in question 'that goes either beyond or against 
the 'clear meaning of the terms" .131 
Article 31(3)(c) requires only that its provisions 'be taken into account, together with 
the context'; it is therefore clear that Article 31(3)(c) is only a part of the larger 
interpretation process, in which the treaty term would be considered initially in the 
light of its context and the treaty's overall object and purposes.l32 Therefore, it is 
apparent that although Article 31 (3)( c) shows lots of potential for the treaty 
interpretation process, its actual application may prove to be rather limited. In this 
126 In the Oil Platform (Merits) President Higgins in her separate opinion pointed out that in 
applying Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention, the court requires the 'context' of the 
disputed treaty to be taken into account. ICJ Report (2003), paras. 45-6 [www.icj-cij.org]. 
127 Sands, 'Cross-fertilization of International Law', supra n 62, 102. 
128 
129 
Pauwelyn, supra nil, 245. 
'Open textured' indicates generality of a term which is flexible in nature and subject to 
evolutionary interpretation, i.e. can be interpreted in the light of changing political and social 
situation. 
130 Sands, 'Cross-fertilization of International Law', supra n 62, 102-3. This issue will be 
discussed more fully in the section of 'evolutionary approach' of treaty interpretation. 
Pauwelyn, supra n 11, 245. 131 
132 See the contents of treaty interpretation in Articles 31-32 of the Vienna Convention. 
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context, although the ILC took a practical approach in its study on fragmentation of 
international law, it does not seem willing to go beyond the provisions of the Vienna 
Convention. Above all, there is a relative lack of judicial decisions with respect to this 
Article, which discourages over-reliance upon it. 
(c) Supplementary means of interpretation 
Article 32 of the Vienna Convemion provides that in certain circumstances, in order to 
confirm the meaning resulting from the application of Article 31, it might be 
necessary to consider the supplementary elements of a treaty such as the preparatory 
work (travaux preparatories, or travaux) in order to find the intention of the 
negotiators. In addition, wherever application of Article 31 i) leaves the meaning 
'ambiguous or obscure' or ii) leads to a result which is 'manifestly absurd or 
unreasonable', one can consider the supplementary means for interpretation in order to 
determine the meaning of a treaty norm. 
In the event of apparent conflict between MEAs and various multilateral trade 
agreements, the relevant preparatory work can serve as a supplementary means to 
determine the ordinary meaning of the inconsistent norms. Considering the travaux of 
a treaty to determine the meaning of a norm which is inconsistent with norms from 
another treaty may sometimes help to avoid conflict between them. For example, if it 
appears from the travaux of the GATT 1947/1994 that the parties intended their rules 
to be interpreted in the light of or consistently with the environmental norms, then that 
intention should be reflected in the interpretation of its norms, even if it is different 
from the ordinary meaning of the WTO norms. However, the ILC did not define what 
is included in the travaux and the materials considered, as travaux are often 
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incomplete and misleading. Therefore, the value and relevance of the travaux will 
commonly have to be determined by the court or other body entrusted with the task of 
interpretation. 133 
2.3. Superseding one of the norms to resolve conflict 
Whenever the above conflict-avoidance techniques fail, an apparent conflict will then 
become a genuine conflict. A conflict of norms may take one of two forms: i) where 
the very creation on existence of one of the two norms constitutes, in and of itself, a 
breach of the other norm, for example when a norm conflicts with another norm which 
has the status of jus cogens; and ii) compliance with, or the exercise of rights under, 
one of the two norms constitutes a breach under the other norm. 134 This part of the 
chapter discusses the first category of conflict of norms. The ways to resolve a conflict 
of norms where one of the two norms constitutes a breach of the other is to supersede 
the invalid norm so that it terminates and ceases to exist. 
2.3.1. One of the two norms ceases to exist 
In a conflict of norms, one of the two norms may disappear through i) invalidity, as it 
conflicts with a jus cogens norm; or ii) termination, if the emergence of a new and 
incompatible norm leads to the termination of the earlier norm. 
133 LaGrand Case (Germany v US), leJ Rep. 2001, para. 77. 
134 Pauwelyn, supra nIl, 275. 
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2.3.1.1. Invalidity of one of the two norms 
Any norm will be, or become, invalid if it conflicts with a jus cogens norm. In this 
context, Article 53 of the Vienna Convention states that a treaty is void if, at the time 
of its conclusion, it conflicts with an existing peremptory norm of general 
international law. In that situation, one of the two conflicting norms (the norm of jus 
cogens) continues and the other one ceases to exist. Consequently, the parties must 
both eliminate the consequences of actions taken on reliance on the superseded norm, 
and bring their mutual relations into conformity with the jus cogens norm. \35 Where a 
treaty is terminated under Article 64 of the Vienna Convention, the parties cease to be 
bound by the norms it contains, but it does not normally affect any rights and 
obligations created prior to the treaty's termination. 
Invalidity may also arise when an act of an international organization conflicts with 
the constituent instrument of that organization. The competence of international 
organizations and their organs is limited by the constituent agreement of that 
organization, so if they exceed this competence, the act in question is invalid. 136 For 
example, in the WTO, Articles 11 and III of the WTO Agreement set out the scope and 
functions of the WTO as an international organization, and of its organs. If the WTO 
or anyone of its organs acts beyond that stated 'scope' and 'function', that ultra vires 
exercise of competence may be considered invalid. 
m Article 53 of the Vienna Convention. 
136 Henry Schermers and Neils Blokker, International Institutional Law: Unity Within Diversity 
(4th edn. Martinus NijhoffPublisher, Leiden 2004) 158. 
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2.3.1.2. Terminating one of the two norms 
The emergence of a new norm by virtue of the conclusion of a later treaty may lead to 
the termination of an earlier norm with which it is in conflict. Article 59( I) of the 
Vienna Convention provides that a later treaty may terminate an earlier one, either 
because i) 'it appears from the later treaty or is otherwise established that the parties 
intended that the matter should be governed by that treaty'; or ii) 'the provisions of the 
later treaty are so far incompatible with those of the earlier one that the two treaties 
are not capable of being applied at the same time'. The incompatibility or conflict 
must be of such a nature as to result in the impossibility of applying both treaties at 
the same time. Article 59(2) adds that '[t]he earlier treaty shall be considered as only 
suspended in operation if it appears from the later treaty or is otherwise established 
that such was the intention of the parties'. 
If the later norm explicitly terminates or suspends the earlier norm, then strictly no 
conflict of norms arises, as the earlier norm simply ceases to apply. A conflict of 
norms arises only if the later treaty does not state that it terminates the earlier one and 
the termination is merely implied from the degree of incompatibility between the two 
treaties. In this situation, the earlier norm ceases to apply. Furthermore, such 
termination requires that all parties to the earlier treaty are also parties to the later 
treaty. If parties are not the same, Articles 30 and 41 of the Vienna Convention apply. 
2.3.2. Inter se modification of a treaty 
A later treaty concluded subsequent to the conclusion of a multilateral treaty in order 
to modify or suspend the earlier treaty between a limited numbers of parties may be in 
breach of the earlier treaty, if the earlier treaty explicitly prohibits such inter se 
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modification or suspension. In the event of conflict between two multilateral treaties, 
Article 41 of the Vienna Convention provides that two or more of the parties to a 
multilateral treaty may conclude an inter se agreement to modify an earlier treaty as 
between themselves alone. However, the creation of such inter se agreements is not 
permissible if the possibility of such modification is prohibited by the treaty. Again, 
Article 58 of the Vienna Convention states that two or more parties to a multilateral 
treaty concluding an agreement to suspend the operation of an earlier treaty, 
temporarily and as between themselves, are allowed to do so if 'the suspension in 
question is not prohibited by the treaty'. 
In this context, Articles 41 and 58 of the Vienna Convention prohibit inter se 
agreement and suspension in the following three circumstances: i) where the 
multilateral treaty itself prohibits the inter se agreement in question; ii) if the 
agreement affects the right and obligation of third parties; and iii) if the agreement 
relates to a multilateral treaty provision derogation from which is incompatible with 
the objective and purposes of the treaty. If any of these three conditions is met, it will 
be the multilateral treaty which prevails, not the later inter se agreement. 
Consequently, the later inter se agreement will be unlawful, as it breaches the 
conditions of the earlier multilateral treaty. It is evident from Articles 41 and 58 of the 
Vienna Convention that an earlier multilateral treaty limits the contractual freedom of 
states subsequently to change their bilateral relationships inter se. 
2.4. Prioritizing between inconsistent norms 
The other way to resolve a conflict between inconsistent norms is to establish priority 
between them. Where overlapping norms from two different treaties are directly 
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incompatible and it is not possible for a state which is party to both treaties 
simultaneously to comply with its respective sets of obligations, it becomes necessary 
to make a choice d e t e m ~ i n i , n g g priority between the treaties in question. In that event, 
both norms will continue to exist, but the specific conflict is resolved in favour of one 
of them, on account of its greater prominence or importance, or because it expresses 
the latest intention of the parties. As a result, only one of the two norms ultimately 
applies to the particular situation, but the other continues to apply elsewhere. 
Such questions of inter-relationship between treaties are first and foremost determined 
by the terms of those treaties. 137 If neither treaty contains any provision governing its 
relationship with other treaties, or if such provisions are not adequate to provide any 
solution, the various rules or techniques provided in the Vienna Convention need to be 
taken into consideration. The following discussion considers the scope of specific 
provisions determining the relationship between treaties, the rules of the Vienna 
Convention and principles of international law may be applied to directly 
incompatible norms identified in environmental and trade agreements in order to 
determine priority between them. 
2.4.1. Parties' intention as expressed in the 'conflict clause' 
When states negotiate a treaty, they often create rules stating what would happen in 
the event of a conflict between treaty norms. Such rules can take three forms: i) rules 
relating to other, pre-existing, treaties; ii) rules relating to other, future, treaties; and 
Hi) rules regulating conflicts of norms within the treaty itself. Such conflict clauses 
may be straightforward in that they provide that a later treaty is 'subject to' or 
137 Article 30(2) of the Vienna Convention. 
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'without prejudice to' an earlier agreement and the earlier treaty will prevail in any 
conflict,138 for example, the J 995 Fish Stock Agreement is expressed to be interpreted 
and implemented in 'the context and in a manner consistent with the J 982 Law of Sea 
Convention (UNCLOS).139 Again, if a new treaty contains a provision stating that it 
prevails over pre-existing treaties, then the later treaty will prevail in any conflict, for 
example, Article 311 (l) of the UNCLOS and Article 103 of the NAFT A. It is not 
always the case that a treaty is explicit in its attempt to determine priority over pre-
existing treaties. Sometimes there is a requirement to interpret the norms in question 
to establish this priority, for example, Article 22 of the CBD. The CBD conflict 
clauses give priority to earlier treaties on condition that 'the exercise of ... rights and 
obligations' under those treaties 'would not cause a serious damage or threat to 
biological diversity'. 
These clauses of relationship to other treaties are by no means free of difficulties. 
Many treaties contain provisions declaring that the treaty is not incompatible with or 
does not affect the parties' obligations deriving from any other treaty, convention or 
international agreement. 140 However, these provisions are of little or no help in 
resolving actual incompatibility between successive treaties for the lack of thoughtful 
drafting of treaty provisions. 141 In most cases, they have not even troubled to identify 
the treaties with which they claim not to be in conflict, still less the provisions with 
which a conflict might arise. By incorporating such provisions, the founders of treaties 
may imagine that they have created a means to resolve the treaty's future conflict with 
138 Ibid., Article 30(2). 
139 Article 4 of the 1995 UN Agreement relating to the Conservation and Management of 
Straddling and High Migratory Fish Stocks and Migratory Fish Stocks (1995) 34 ILM 1542, 
entered into force 11 November 200 I. 
140 For example, Article XIV(2),(3) of the CITES declares its relationship with other treaties that it 
does not interfere other treaties. 
141 Karl, supra n 66, 935-6. For further discussion see Chapter 8. 
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other treaties, but in practice they have actually avoided this issue. They may have 
decided that if a problem should arise, then the parties would have to resolve it in their 
own way. 
2.4.2. Treaty norms later in time get priority 
If none of the treaties contain any conflict clauses, or if such provisions are not 
adequate to provide any solution, the rules provided in Articles 30(3) and (4) of the 
Vienna Convention need to be taken into consideration. Rules in Article 30 of the 
Vienna Convention observe the inter-relationship between successive treaties relating 
to the same subject matter and, in the event of divergence, they apply the lex posterior 
rule to establish priority between them. Naturally, if the later treaty specifies that it is 
subject to an earlier treaty or not incompatible with that treaty, then the provision of 
the earlier treaty will prevail over the later treaty. If there is no such provision, the lex 
posterior principle articulates that if all the parties to the earlier treaty are parties to 
the later treaty, and the earlier treaty is not terminated or suspended, then the 
provisions of the later treaty prevail. Therefore, the principle 'lex posterior derogat 
legi priori' (lex posterior) considers that the later treaty has priority over an earlier 
treaty, as the later treaty expresses the evolving intent of parties. 
When parties to both successive treaties are identical, there should theoretically be no 
problem, as Article 30(3) of the Vienna Convention provides that if the earlier treaty is 
not terminated or suspended (that is, under Article 59), 'the earlier treaty applies only 
to the extent that its items are compatible with those of the later treaty'. However, the 
practical application of the lex posterior rule to determine priority between 
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'successive treaties', as stated in Article 30 of the Vienna Convention, is not as simple 
as it seems, and does not always work at all. 
The main reason why the lex posterior rule may not work is that by putting a date on a 
treaty, the Vienna Convention is effectively focusing upon the 'instrument in which an 
international obligation is exposed not the obligation itself: 142 i.e. Article 30 of the 
Vienna Convention puts a date on the treaty as an abstract instrument but does not 
consider 'when the treaty imposes a particular obligation as between two given 
states' .143 It makes the application of Article 30 complicated, as states can be parties to 
a particular treaty through accession or re-negotiation subsequent to the date upon 
which it was originally adopted. 144 According to Article 28 of the Vienna Convention, 
states which have acceded to a multilateral treaty later on through accession become 
bound by the treaty provisions only from the date of the entry into force of the treaty 
with respect to that party, unless the treaty has an express provision concerning the 
temporal expansion of the binding force of the treaty. 145 
Regarding re-negotiation, states party to the original treaty can re-negotiate it through 
subsequent amendments. The rules governing amendment of multilateral treaties in 
Article 40 of the Vienna Convention are residual in nature. 146 All the parties to the 
original treaty have the right to participate in the treaty-amending process and to 
become parties to the amendment. But according to Article 40(4) of the Vienna 
Convention, the amending treaty 'does not bind any state already a party to the treaty' 
142 Shabtai Rosenne, Breach of Treaty (Cambridge, Grotius, 1985) 3-4. 
143 Pauwelyn, supra n 11, 368. 
144 It is established that to determine earlier or later treaties, what is needed is to consider the 
relevant date of adoption, not entry into force. See Aust, supra n 39, 229. Also see Sinc1air, 
supra n 39, 98. 
145 Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law (Rinehart & Co. Inc, New York 2003) 341. 
146 That is, they apply only in the absence ofa contrary intention of the parties. 
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that 'does not become a party to the amending agreement'. Since the amended treaty 
needs to be ratified by states party to the original treaty to bind them, any state which 
does not ratify the amendment becomes a non-Party to the amended treaty, and Article 
30(4)(b) will apply to determine the relationship between the various states involved. 
As between Parties and non-Parties to the amendment, the original treaty, although 
earlier in time, will govern their mutual rights and obligations. This approach of 
putting a time-label on treaties as an instrument only really makes sense in the case of 
a treaty which is clearly concluded in order to amend an earlier one, and where the 
parties to both treaties are exactly the same. 
2.4.3. More 'relevant' rules get priority 
In the era of specialist regimes in international law, simple application of Article 30 of 
the Vienna Convention as a mechanism for prioritizing competing treaty norms is 
unlikely to resolve issues related to the rapid development of the multilateral treaty-
making process, as the specialist treaties set out a regulatory framework or system 
which continuously evolves and is continuously adopted, expanded and interpreted. 147 
Article 30 applies only to successive treaties 'relating to the same subject matter'. 
What this phrase means is not clear, but most scholars agree that it does not apply 
only between treaties from the same regime (for example, between environmental 
treaties) but also to the relationship between treaties from different regimes (for 
example, between environmental treaties and the WTO Agreement). In this context, 
scholars have attempted to determine priority between successive treaties by 
distinguishing specific treaty provisions from a general one. It is an accepted principle 
147 • • Boyle and Chmkm, The Making of International Law, supra n 34, 241; Joost Pauwelyn. 
'Bridging Fragmentation and Unity: International Law as a Universe of Inter-connected 
Islands' (2003-4) 25 Mich JIL 903 at 908. 
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that a lex specialis takes precedence over a lex generalis regardless of their priority of 
time. The 'lex specialis derogat legi generali' principle suggests that whenever two or 
more norms deal with the same subject matter, priority should be given to the norm 
that is more specific. This principle is not explicitly incorporated in the Vienna 
Convention. However, the ILC also accepted it as a technique both of interpretation 
and conflict resolution, supporting its broad application in internationallaw. 148 
Thus, the 'lex specialis' principle can play a significant role in resolving 
inconsistencies between successive treaties from different regimes. Despite Article 30 
of the Vienna Convention, in the absence of any contrary wording, the later treaty 
containing a general rule would not prevail over an earlier treaty containing a specific 
rule. This principle has explicit support from the ICJ's Advisory Opinion on the 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, where the Court found that 
environmental treaties and customary rules of a later but more general character did 
not displace specific treaty rules on the use of force and international humanitarian 
law. 149 However the question as to which rule is more specific between successive 
treaties may present serious problems of interpretation. 150 
It is apparent from the above discussion that the Vienna Convention rules for 
interpretation and the application of treaties are useful to resolve certain 
inconsistencies and incoherence in treaty relationship. However, these rules tend to 
leave considerable discretion to individual states, allowing them to depart from 
conventional practice and prevailing standards in many cases. In this situation, for a 
coherent system between trade and environmental sectors, the following section 
148 Th e ILe Report on Fragmentation, supra n 3, para 2(5). 
149 Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons, supra n 38, para. 30. 
ISO • Smciair, supra n 39, 96. 
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proposes to interpret and apply specific treaty norms (or lower-level norms) taking 
into consideration standards of higher and more overarching significance (higher-level 
norms). 
2.5. Resolving conflict by taking into consideration soft law principles and norms 
The current system of international law is understood to have begun with Dutch jurist 
and diplomat Grotius (Hugo de Groot) and with the Peace of Westphalia 1648. 151 In 
the Grotian tradition the international community is composed of states only.152 The 
famous 'Lotus principle' followed this classical view and also acknowledges that 
states are only bound by their express consent. 153 However, this classic international 
community concept no longer dominates the realm of international affairs, as the 
structure and norms of international law have changed significantly following two 
World Wars, which led to the emergence of international organizations as their 
recognition as subjects of international law. 154 
ISI 
152 
153 
154 
See Shaw, supra n 2, 13-48; Arthur Nassbaum, A Concise History of the Law of Nations (Rev 
edn, New York 1954). 
Hedley BuB, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (3rd edn. Palgrave, 
Basingstoke 2002) 13. 
The Lotus principle would mean that sovereign states are free to coBectively establish an 
international jurisdiction applicable to the nationals of non-party states unless it can be shown 
that this violates a prohibitive rule of international law. The case of the 'S.S. Lotus' (France v 
Turkey, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9) is one of the most frequently quoted passages of the 
PCIJ's jurisprudence, and the predecessor to the International Court of Justice stated, 
'Restrictions upon the independence of [s]tates cannot ... be presumed' and that international 
law leaves to states 'a wide measure of discretion which is only limited in certain cases by 
prohibitive rules'. Most recently, the ICJ confirmed the continuing vitality of the Lotus 
principle in Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons, supra n 38. 
For the historical development of the international community, see George Abi-Saab, 'Whither 
the International Community?' (1998) 9 EJlL 248; George Abi-Saab, 'International Law and 
the International Community: the Long Road to Universality' in R. Macdonald (ed), Essays in 
Honour of Wang Tieya (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden 1994) Ch 1; Bruno Simma and 
Andreas Paulus, 'The "International Community": Facing the Challenge of Globalization' 9(2) 
EJIL (1998) 266. 
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A 'true Grotian' view now sees 'the international system on its way to an organized 
state community' with an emphasis on common interests, the development of common 
values and the creation of common institutions. 155 The twentieth-century emphasis 
upon ideas of a reformed or improved international community has led to the 
recognition first of the League of Nations, and then the United Nations and other 
general international organizations as the chief instruments of the international 
community.156 Such international organizations often play a central role in the creation 
and shaping of contemporary international law. 157 There, states and other interested 
groups come together to address important international problems of mutual concern. 
Sometimes these efforts result in a consensus on solving the problem and express it in 
normative terms of general application. 
Thus, international law is understood as a normative system and a process, rather than 
merely a set of rules. 158 This insight reminds us that 'all international legal acts, 
including the making of treaties, form part of a wider legal system' .159 The 
international legal system accordingly draws its normative content from a wide range 
of sources operating at different levels of generality. Article 38(1)(c) of the Statue of 
the International Court of Justice ascribes no formal order of relative priority amongst 
those sources. The 'general principles of law recognised by civilised nations,160 are 
capable of express exclusion by the detailed rules of a treaty. Such principles might 
nevertheless be used to set limits, or provide guidelines, or determine how conflicts 
155 Simma and Paulus, supra n 154, 271. 
156 Bull, supra n 152, 38. 
157 Charney, supra n 100, 543. 
158 R 1 osa yn Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How 
Oxford 1994) 8. 
159 McLanhlan, Supra n 63, 282. 
160 Article 38(1)(c) of the Statutes of the ICJ. 
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We Use It? (OUP, 
between pnmary rules and principles will be resolved. 161 However, norms and 
principles of general application cannot override the express terms of a treaty. 162 
As mentioned earlier, Article 31 (3)( c) of the Vienna Convention also includes 
reference to general principles as an aid to treaty interpretation. For example, the 
sustainable development principle and the precautionary principle are fundamental 
principles which influence the interpretation, application and development of both 
MEAs and multilateral trade agreements. The ICJ's reference to sustainable 
development in the GabCikovo-Nagymaros case remains perhaps the best example of 
the role of such principles influencing treaty interpretation. Such principles also 
influence the interpretation and application of customary law. For example, the 
precautionary principle has influenced state practice, the negotiation of treaties and the 
judgments of international courts and tribunals. 163 
Yet, within the international legal system there are also other categories of norms that 
express the political aspirations or basic values of the community, which may also 
have an impact on the interpretation and implementation of individual treaty norms. 
These represent the basic values upon which the international community and 
international relation are predicted. This thesis argues that when states burden 
themselves with inconsistent obligations, no real incursion into their sovereignty is 
entailed by seeking to extricate them from this morass, and so that to resolve the 
conflict in accordance with widely accepted political goals or community values could 
be a plausible solution. Such an approach would not only help to resolve tension 
161 Boyle and Chinkin, The Making of International Law, supra n 34, 224. 
162 WTO, European Communities: Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products - Report of the 
Appellate Body (hereinafter EC - Hormones) (13 February 1998) WT/OS26/AB/R and 
WTIDS48/AB/R, paras. 120-5. 
163 See Chapters 3-7 of the thesis. 
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between inconsistent norms but would also advance a coherent system for the 
international legal order. The following discussion focuses on various external norms 
that can contribute to the rationalization of the relationship between MEAs and 
multilateral trade agreements. 
2.5.1. Environmental norms and principles of the international community 
The origins of international environmental law can be traced back to the second half 
of the twentieth century, but it has only really assumed its current form and structure, 
prominence on the international agenda, from the 1970s.164 Despite attempts by 
environmentalists to push conservation issues on to agenda, when drafting the UN 
Charter, it does not include any reference to environmental or nature conservation 
issues,165 probably through lack of appreciation by governments of the importance of 
the issue in 1945. However, Article 1 (3) of the UN Charter provides that one of the 
purposes of the Charter is '[T]o achieve international co-operation in solving 
international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character', 
which is the basis for the subsequent environmental activities of the UN. 166 The UN 
has convened various conferences and adopted global conventions not only to put in 
place a system for coordinating responses to international environmental issues, but 
also to integrate environmental concerns into all activities, including economic 
development. This suggests that the international community did not accord priority 
either to protection of the environment or to economic development but intended to 
balance their relationship. 
164 For historical development of international environmental law, see John McCormick, 
Reclaiming Paradise: The Global Environmental Movement (Indiana University Press 1991); 
Birnie et aI., supra n. 11, Ch 1; Philippe Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law 
(Vol. 1 MUP, Manchester 1995), Ch 2. 
16S M cCormick, Reclaiming Paradise, supra n 164,25-7. 
166 The 1945 Charter of the United Nations, 1 UNTS xvi, entered into force 24 October 1945. 
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2.5.1.1. Environmental principles of general application 
The principle of sustainable development and the precautionary principle are 
principles of general application found in non-binding declarations and resolutions of 
the United Nations, which can aid the interpretation of competing environmental and 
trade norms in order to avoid conflict. 
(a) The principle of sustainable development 
The Stockholm Declaration is the first international document that formally 
recognizes a direct relationship between environment and economic development. It 
was intended to provide a 'common outlook and common principle to inspire and 
guide the peoples of the world in the preservation and enhancement of the human 
environment' .167 It contains 26 principles and an action plan containing 109 
recommendations relevant to the conservation of the human environment and its 
natural resources. Among its Principles, Principle 1 later became an important element 
for the Rio Declaration and the concept of sustainable development. It states that 
humans 'bear a solemn responsibility to protect and improve the environment for 
present and future generations'. Principles 2, 3, 4 and 5 then set forth general 
guidelines for the natural resources of the earth to be safeguarded for the benefit of the 
present and future generations, stating that the earth's capacity 'to produce vital 
renewable resources must be maintained and, wherever practicable, restored or 
improved', and that humans have a responsibility to 'safeguard and wisely manage the 
heritage of wildlife and its habitat'. The Stockholm Declaration did not mention the 
167 Reports of the Preparatory Committee relevant to the Declaration are in UN Doe. 
AlCONF.48/PC.9, 13 and 17. The Final Report of the Working Group on the Declaration is in 
UN Doe. AlCONF.481l4IRev.IIAnnex 11. See in particular Louis Sohn, 'The Stockholm 
Declaration on the Human Environment' (1973) 14 Harv ILJ 423. 
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term 'sustainable development', but through these principles it established the basis 
for its subsequent emergence. 
The International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources 
(IUCN) has promoted the concept of sustainable use of resources since its foundation 
in 1948, but it was the 'BfUIidtland Report' of 1987 which articulated a new approach 
to international environmental law, expressed in the language of 'sustainable 
development' .168 Sustainable use of natural resources represents an independent but 
important element of sustainable development l69 and forms an essential link between 
conservation and trade. The concept of sustainable use involves applying restrictions 
to the exploitation of natural resources; it is recognized that the unfettered depletion of 
such resources will ultimately limit economic growth. Sustainable utilization policies 
and agreements are intended to create a more rational system of conservation and 
utilization of natural resources. The concept first appeared as a guiding philosophy in 
the World Conservation Strategy (WCS), which described sustainable use as 
'analogous to spending the interest whilst keeping the capital' . 170 
Principles 8-15 of the Stockholm Declaration recognize the relationship between the 
environment and development, and also support an 'integrated and coordinated' 
approach to rational development planning which 'is compatible with the need to 
protect and improve the environment' . 171 These Principles acknowledge the 
importance of conservation and also identify the need to take into account nature 
168 
169 
170 
171 
The World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) was established in 1983 
by the UN General Assembly and its report (the Brundtland Report) was published in 1987. For 
the text of the report, see WECD, Our Common Future (Oxford 1987). 
Bimie et aI., supra n. 11, 119. 
IUCN, UNEP and WWF, Caring for the Earth: A Strategy for Sustainable Living (1991). See 
World Conservation Strategy (1980) 19. 
Principle 15 defines 'rational planning' as a planning aimed to avoid adverse effect on the 
environment and to obtain maximum social, economic and environmental benefits for all. 
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conservation and wildlife protection in economic development planning. However, the 
approach of the Stockholm Declaration is primarily anthropocentric, recognizing that 
'man's environment, the natural and the man-made, are essential to his well-being and 
to enjoyment of basic human rights', and that 'protection and improvement' of this 
human environment is important for the 'well-being of the people and economic 
development' .172 In addition, its provisions are 'more policy oriented than normative 
in character', 173 in the sense that they identify the need to take into account the 
conservation of nature in economic development planning, without providing specific 
rules to implement this goal. Nevertheless, the Stockholm Declaration laid the 
foundation for an era of cooperation and treaty making, with numerous conservation 
and biodiversity agreements concluded between 1972 and 1992. 174 Its defining role in 
the protection of environmental resources secured near universal endorsement at 
RiO. 175 
This suggests that an appropriate relation between MEAs and the multilateral trading 
system could be set up on the basis of the sustainable development principle, so as to 
maintain the coherence of the ecological, social and economic system. Therefore, 
sustainable development should be the framework within which the whole trade and 
environment debate, and not only the specific question of the relationship between 
trade measures in MEAs and the WTO, is pursued. 
172 
173 
Part I of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration. 
Birnie et aI., supra n 11, 48. 
174 b d 1 i .,602. 
175 Since Rio, sustainable development has been adopted as a policy by numerous governments, 
and by international organizations and treaty bodies such as the International Tropical Timber 
Organization. For further details of agreements adopting the sustainable development principle, 
see Ibid., 112-14. 
62 
Principles 3-8 of the Rio Declaration set out the substantive elements of the 
sustainable development principle including sustainable use of natural resources, the 
integration of environmental protection and economic development, the right to 
development, and intra- and inter-generational equity. Furthermore, Principle 15 sets 
out the procedural element, i.e. the precautionary approach in the decision-making 
process. Principle 4 of the Rio Declaration states that '[I]n order to achieve 
sustainable development, environmental protection shall constitute an integral part of 
the development process and cannot be considered in isolation from it', thereby for the 
first time placing environmental considerations at the heart of economic 
development. 176 Implementation of this principle requires the attachment of 
environmental considerations to all economic and development activities. The le] in 
the Case Concerning the GabCikovo-Nagymaros Project acknowledged for the first 
time that the 'need to reconcile economic development with protection of the 
environment is aptly expressed in the concept of sustainable development'.177 In the 
Iron Rhine Arbitration, Principle 4 was regarded as 'a principle of general 
international law' which 'applies not only in autonomous activities but also In 
activities undertaken in implementation of specific treaties between Parties' . 178 
Thus, integration of competing environmental and economic values is fundamental to 
the concept of sustainable development. 179 This integration has a broad range of 
implications on national and international policy, as can be seen from Agenda 2 J , 
which refers to the 'more systematic consideration of the environment when decisions 
176 Philippe Sands, 'International Law in the Field of Sustainable Development', (1994) 65 BYIL 
324. 
177 Gabcikovic-Nagymaros ease, supra n 38, para. 140. 
178 Iron Rhine ease (Belgium v The Netherlands) (2005) the peA. Available at: <http://www.pea-
epa.orglshowpage.asp?pagjd= 1155>. 
179 • Blrnie et aI., supra n 11, 86. 
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are made about economic, social, fiscal, energy, agriculture, transportation, trade and 
other policies' .ISO Integration of environmental considerations is also an issue 
affecting international trade. In this context, Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration states 
that this environmental restriction 'should not constitute a means of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade'. However, 
this principle needs further clarification to explain how an appropriate balance 
between environmental protection and multilateral trade agreements can be achieved. 
Principle 3 provides that '[t]he right to development must be fulfilled so as to 
equitably meet developmental and environmental needs of present and future 
generations'. Thus, 'the development right' recognized in this principle is conditioned 
by the requirement that it 'be fulfilled ... equitably' to 'meet developmental and 
environmental needs of present and future generations'. A later discussion shows that 
the Millennium Declaration also recognized that it is the collective responsibility of 
the international community to uphold the 'principle of equity'. This equity is both 
intra-generational and inter-generational. The principle of intra-generational equity 
recognizes the special needs of developing countries and addresses inequity within the 
existing economic system. The Rio Declaration does not refer to it by name, but 
contains several provisions implying that intra-generational concerns are now an 
element in the contemporary development of international environmentallaw. lsl 
On the other hand, inter-generational equity is concerned with equity between one 
generation and the next. For this purpose, humans are recognized as the trustees of 
180 Chapter 8.2 of Agenda 21. 
181 h C apter 6 of this thesis shows how the CBD, one of the instruments adopted in the Rio 
Declaration, implies intra-generational equity to trade off between conservation and economic 
equity. 
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'the natural and cultural environment of the Earth ... both with other members of the 
. , 
present generation and with other generations, past and future'. 182 This means that we 
inherit the earth from preyious g e n ~ r a t i o n s s and have an obligation to pass it on to 
future generations in no w o r ~ e e condition than it was received. The Brundtland 
Commission defines it as 'development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs', emphasizing 
the centrality of .inter-generational equity to the concept of sustainable 
development. 183 The Stockholm Declaration also endorsed this aspect of the 
protection of the environment and the earth's natural resources. 184 
Some writers and philosophers argue that inter-generational equity is not only an 
inherent component of the sustainable development principle but also an established 
part of international law. 185 Although the implementation of their theory is 
controversial186 and the legal exposition before international courts of this issue 
remains underdeveloped, a national court, the Philippines Supreme Court in the 
Monors Opsa v Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources 
case, applied the principle of inter-generational equity to permit representative 
proceedings on behalf of the unbonl. I87 The discussion of the CBD in chapter 5 shows 
that some international agreements had already accommodated the interest of future 
182 Edith Brown Weiss, In Fairness of Future Generations (Dobbs Ferry, NY, 1990) 8. 
183 W ECD, supra n. 168,43. 
184 
185 
Principles 1 and 2 of the Stockholm Declaration, and also see 1968 African Convention on the 
Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, 100 I UNTS 4, entered into force 16 June 
1969. 
Alexander GilIespie, International Environmental Law, Policy and Ethics (OUP, Oxford 1998) 
Ch 6; Weiss, 'Future Generation', supra n 182; Anthony D'Amato, 'Do We Owe a Duty to 
Future Generations to Preserve the Global Environment?', 84 AJIL (1990) 190. Also see Judge 
Weeramantry in Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons, supra n 38, 266. 
186 Lother Gundling, 'Our Responsibility to Future Generations' (1990) 84 AJIL 207. 
187 Monors Opsa v Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, 33 ILM 
(1994) 173. 
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generations in balancing conservation and economic interests, even as far back as the 
1946 International Convention on Whaling. 188 
From a reading of Principles 3, 4 and 12, it is evident that the concept of sustainable 
development is not intended to serve environmental values exclusively. A more 
plausible interpretation of these principles is that sustainable development entails a 
compromise between environmental protection and economic growth. It intends, 
moreover, to integrate environmental values not only with development values but 
also with other social values of the international community. But this view fails to 
explain exactly how the parameters and the ultimate objective of this process of 
integration are to be determined. 189 
However, the defining role of sustainable use in the protection of environmental 
resources secured near universal endorsement at Rio. 19o Though the Rio Declaration 
does not explicitly refer to the terms 'natural resources,191 or 'sustainable use', it 
nevertheless establishes the idea that sustainable development involves limits to the 
utilization of natural resources; this is expressly employed by many Rio or post-Rio 
Agreements, which use the terms 'sustainable utilisation' or 'sustainable use' .192 
Sustainable utilization is an important element of the sustainable development 
principle, but operates as an independent concept. The CBD took this concept even 
further by providing a definition of 'sustainable use': it should be species-and-
188 
189 
190 
191 
In this context, Chapter 6 shows that the CBD applies the precautionary principle widely to 
avoid irreversible harm and founded on the policies of sustainable development. 
Birnie et al. supra nil, 55. 
For further details, see Chapter 4. 
Principle 8 of the Rio Declaration talks only of the need to 'reduce and eliminate unsustainable 
patterns of production and consumption'. 
192 h T e main conservation treaties adopted 'sustainable use' concept include the 1992 CBD. the 
1995 Fish Stock Agreement and the 200611TA. 
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ecosystem oriented and may either be consumptive193 or non-consumptive,194 which is 
a significant departure from the concept of 'sustainable yield' .195 The Convention's 
'sustainable use' requires that the use of biological resources does not reduce the 
future use potential of the target population or impair its long-term viability; it must be 
compatible with the maintenance of the long-term viability of supporting and 
dependent ecosystems; and it must not reduce the future use potential or impair the 
long-term viability of other species. 196 
Ten years after Rio, at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 
Johannesburg, the international community reaffirmed their commitment to 
sustainable development 'to build a humane, equitable and caring global society' .197 
To advance the Rio Declaration's sustainable development goals, at this summit 
meeting the world community negotiated and adopted the 2002 Johannesburg 
Declaration on Sustainable Development. 198 Although the Johannesburg Declaration 
did not adopt any new principles or policies and has generally been seen as a 
disappointment,l99 it also made significant progress towards achieving a common path 
to implement the vision of sustainable development by identifying the three pillars of 
sustainable development. Paragraph 5 of the Johannesburg Declaration states that it is 
193 Consumptive uses of species include gathering, harvesting or hunting animals and plants for 
food, medicine, clothing, shelter, timber, fuel and fibre. Consumptive uses of ecosystems 
include converting a forest to grazing land, draining a wetland for land or discharging 
pollutants into rivers. 
194 Non-consumptive uses of both species and ecosystems include whale-watching, 
mountaineering, the use of sacred sites for cultural and religious practices and some 
recreational uses, etc. 
195 
1% 
197 
198 
199 
See Article 2 of the CBD. 'Maximum sustainable yield' means the greatest yield of a renewable 
resource while keeping steady the stock of that resource. It is a conservation objective widely 
relied on in conservation treaties. However, it is no longer accepted as a conservation objective, 
as it fails to take into account the ecological relationships of species. 
IUCN, 'Guidelines for the Ecological Sustainability of Non-consumptive and Consumptive 
Uses of Wild Species' (Draft Guideline, 1994). 
Paras. I and 2 of the Johannesburg Declaration. 
UN, Report of the WSSD, UN Doc AlConf 199/20 (2002), Resolution I. 
Paolo Galizzi, 'From Stockholm to New York, via Rio and Johannesburg: Has the environment 
lost its way on the global agenda?' (2006) 29 Fordham ILJ 952. 
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the 'collective responsibility' of the international community 'to advance and 
strengthen the interdependent and mutually reinforcing pillars of sustainable 
development - economic development, social development and environmental 
protection - at the local, national, regional and global levels' .200 
The defining role of the sustainable development principle in the evolution of 
international law and policy on the protection of the environment secured universal 
endorsement in the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21, and was further advanced in the 
Johannesburg Declaration. Since Rio, sustainable development has been adopted as a 
policy by numerous governments and has also influenced the application and 
development of law and policy of various international organizations, including the 
WTO and the International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO).201 The 1995 
Agreement Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks also includes the sustainable development principle as applied 
to high sea fisheries. 202 However, it is the 1992 CBD which, for the first time, 
provided specific rules for the application of sustainable development by states in 
order to manage their own domestic environment. 203 
As mentioned earlier, there remain fundamental uncertainties about the nature of the 
sustainable development, which have a direct bearing on the question whether 
sustainable development can in any sense be considered a formal legal principle,z04 
200 Para 5 of the Johannesburg Declaration. 
201 See Chapters 3 and 4. 
202 Articles 5 and 6. 
203 See Chapter 5. 
204 See GUnther Handl, 'Sustainable Development: General Rules versus Specific Obligations' in 
Winfried Lang (ed.), Sustainable Development and International Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 
London 1995) 35-43; Judge Kooijmans, 'The ICJ in the 21 st Century: Judicial Restraint, 
Judicial Activism, or Proactive Judicial Policy' (2007) 56 ICLQ 751. He has drawn attention to 
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However, commentators convincingly demonstrate that the sustainable development 
principle and its components are very relevant when courts or international bodies 
have to interpret, apply or develop treaties or general internationallaw.205 
As Rio Principle 27 calls for the further development of international law in the field 
of sustainable development, in the GabCikovo-Nagymaros case, the ICl modernized 
existing intemationallaw in the light of the concept of sustainable development. 
(b) The precautionary approach 
The precautionary principle, which is recognized in the Rio Declaration, is an 
important element of the sustainable utilization concept. Having originated ill 
Germany in the 1970s,206 the precautionary approach was first legally recognized in 
the 1982 World Charter for Nature207 and was subsequently incorporated into the 
1992 Rio Declaration which codified it as a principle.208 Since then, although the legal 
status of the precautionary principle remains controversial,209 and the EU and the US 
205 
206 
207 
208 
209 
the Court's deliberate characterization of sustainable development as a 'concept' rather than a 
'principle' . 
Vaughan Lowe, 'Sustainable Development and Unsustainable Argument', in Alan Boyle and 
David Freestone (eds.), International Law and Sustainable Development: Past Achievements 
and Future Challenges (OUP, Oxford 1999) Ch 2; GUnther Handl, 'Environmental Security 
and Global Challenge: The Challenge to International Law' (1990) I YblEL I at 24-8; 
Philippe Sands, 'International Law in the Field of Sustainable Development: Emerging Legal 
Principles' in Winfried Lang (ed.), Sustainable Development and International Law (Springer, 
London 1995) 53-66. 
Boehmer-Christiansen, 'The Precautionary Principle in Gennany: Enabling Government' in 
Dan and Cameron (eds.), Interpreting the Precautionary Principle (Earthscan, 1994) 31. 
Adopted by the UNGA Res 3717 (28 October 1982) UN Doc NRES/3717. 
Principle IS of the Rio Declaration. 
The legal status of the precautionary principle in international law continues to be the subject of 
debate among academics; some law practitioners, regulators, authors and judges are of the view 
that it is a principle of customary international law. See, for example, Sands, Principles of 
International Environmental Law, supra n 164, 212; James Cameron, 'The Status of the 
Precautionary Principle in International Law' in James Cameron and Timothy O'Riordan (ed.), 
Interpreting the Precautionary Principle (Cameron May, London 1994) Ch 15, 262, 283; 
James Cameron and J. Abouchar, 'The Status of the Precautionary Principle in International 
Law', in David Freestone and Ellen Hey (eds.), The Precautionary Principle in International 
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have conflicting VIews on this issue,21o it has come to be considered one of the 
'salutary principles which governs the law of the environment'211 and is referred to by 
many major MEAs, for example, the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of 
the Ozone Layer/12 the 1987 Montreal Protocol to the Convention for the Protection 
of the Ozone Layer,213 the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity,214 the 1995 
Agreement on Straddling and High Migratory Fish Stocks215 and the 2000 Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity.216 
'Precaution' is a strategy of thinking ahead and taking anticipatory action to avoid 
uncertain future risks. The precautionary principle holds that uncertainty regarding 
serious potential environmental harm is not a ground for refraining from preventive 
measures. Thus, the precautionary principle demands regulation in the absence of 
complete evidence about the particular risk scenario. Although initially recognized as 
a principle in several multilateral environment agreements (MEAs), the precautionary 
210 
211 
212 
213 
214 
215 
216 
Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publisher, The Netherlands 1996) Ch 3, 52. Other authors argue that the 
precautionary principle has not yet reached the status of a principle of international law, or at 
least consider such status doubtful, among other reasons, due to the fact that the principle is 
still subject to a great variety of interpretations. See, for example, Patricia Birnie and Alan 
Boyle, International Law and the Environment (Clarendon Press, 1992) 98. 
The European Communities assert that the precautionary principle has by now become a fully 
fledged and general principle of international law, and in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, the 
European Union (EU) expressly provided that EU policy on the environment 'shall be based on 
the precautionary principle' (Article 130P, now renumbered Article 174). Since then European 
treaties and EC law generally refer to the precautionary principle. For example, 1992 Paris 
Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Northeast Atlantic, Article 2; 
1992 UNECE Convention for the Protection of Transboundary Watercourses and Lakes, 
Article 2(5); 1992 Maastricht Treaty on European Union, Article 174; 1994 Danube 
Convention, Article 2(4); 1999 Rhine Convention, Article 4. On the other hand, the United 
States has also adopted precautions in numerous number-specific US laws, but has not 
officially adopted the precautionary principle as a general basis for regulation. In addition the 
US strongly disagrees with EU that 'precaution' has become a rule of international law. 
According to the United States, the 'precautionary principle' cannot be considered a general 
principle or norm of international law because it does not have a single, agreed formulation. 
Thus, the United States considers precaution to be an 'approach', rather than a 'principle' of 
international law. For more on the US argument see EC - Biotech Products, supra n 108. 
T. N. Godavarman Thirumalpad v Union of India (2002) 10 SCC 606. 
Preamble of the Convention. For text see 26 ILM (1987) 1529. 
Preamble of the Protocol. For text see 26 ILM (1987) 1550. 
Preamble of the Convention. For text see 31 ILM (1992) 818. 
Preamble, Articles 5, 6 and Annex. For text see 34 ILM (1995) 1542. 
Preamble, Articles 10(6) and 11(8) of the Protocol. For text see 39 ILM (2000) 1027. 
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principle is reflected in a number of international agreements from other regimes 
including some multilateral trade agreements such as the Agreement on the 
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement).217 Among the 
MEAs, the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety is marked for its 'overtly precautionary 
approach' .218 
Although the courts and some commentators are reluctant to accept the precautionary 
principle as a general principle of law, others have a different view.219 For example, 
Brownlie observes that since the application of this principle is based on foreseeable 
risk to other states, it is 'encompassed within the existing concepts of state 
responsibility,.220 A similar view is manifested in an ILC report on transboundary 
harm that 'the precautionary principle is already a component of existing customary 
rules on prevention of harm and environmental impact assessment, and could not be 
divorced there from' .221 Thus, the precautionary principle may influence the 
interpretation and application of ambiguous treaty norms. 
2.5.2. Norms of political significance 
As mentioned earlier, the international community sometimes adopts instruments in 
order to establish a peaceful, prosperous and just world, committing themselves to 
pursue common objectives and goals to uphold the principles of human dignity, 
equality and equity at the global level. Such objectives and goals are of political 
217 For the discussion on the SPS Agreement precautionary measures see Chapter 3. 
218 • Blrnie et aI., supra nil, 640. 
219 See supra n 210. 
220 Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public Infernafionallaw (6th edn, Oxford, 2003) 276. 
221 ILC special rapporteur, 'Report on the transboundary harm' (2000), GAOR Al55/10, para. 716. 
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significance, as these are the standards the international community has established 
for itself. 
For example, at the Millennium Summit in September 2000 the largest gathering of 
world leaders in history adopted the UN Millennium Declaration, committing their 
nations to a new global partnership to reduce extreme poverty and setting out a series 
of time-bound targets, with a deadline of 2015, which have become known as the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 222 The MDGs are quantified targets for 
addressing extreme poverty in its many dimensions - income poverty, hunger, disease, 
lack of adequate shelter and exclusion - while also promoting gender equality, 
education and environmental sustainability. 
In the Millennium Declaration, the international community has reaffinned its support 
for the principles of sustainable development, including those set out in Agenda 21 
and agreed upon at the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development.223 Furthennore, Article 6 of the Millennium Declaration listed equality, 
solidarity, tolerance, respect for nature and shared responsibility as the 'fundamental 
values' of the international community in order to detennine international relations in 
the twenty-first century.224 By recognizing 'respect for nature' as one of the 
fundamental values, it requires the international community to show prudence 'in the 
management of all living species and natural resources, in accordance with the 
precepts of sustainable development'. The key development from the Rio Conference 
to the Millennium Declaration is that by acknowledging 'respect for nature' as a 
222 The United Nations Millennium Declaration (2000). UN Doc.Al55/L.2. Text available at: 
<http://www.un.org/millenniumldeclarationlares552e.htm> . 
223 Para IV (22) of Millennium Declaration. 
224 P ara 6 of the Millennium Declaration. Para 22 of the Declaration also reaffirms its support for 
the principles of sustainable development including Agenda 21. 
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fundamental value of the international community, it recognizes the intrinsic value of 
the environment. 225 
In order to transfer this value into action, the Millennium Declaration identifies 
'protection of the common environment' as one of the key objectives of the 
international community.226 As mentioned earlier, the common environment includes 
the earth's biodiversity and atmosphere; in order to achieve the objective to protect 
biodiversity, it sets a target of integrating the principles of sustainable development 
into country policies and programmes and of reducing biodiversity loss by 2010, by 
implementing the CBD in its entirety. However, a 2010 report shows that the 
international community has failed to achieve this goal, as the loss of biodiversity is 
continuing at an alarming rate.227 
The Millennium Declaration has acknowledged the collective responsibility of the 
international community to uphold the principle of equity in order to perform its 
duties towards 'the children of the world, to whom the future belongs' .z28 In this 
context, Article 22 explicitly reaffirms its support for the principle of sustainable 
development and Agenda 21, and urges that the international community make every 
effort 'to free all the humanity' and, above all, present and future generations 'from 
225 
226 
The Oxford dictionary defines 'respect' as 'a feeling of admiration for someone or something 
because of their qualities'; 'consideration for the feelings and rights of others'; 'avoid harming 
or interfering with something'. 
See part IV and paras. 21-3 of the 2000 Millennium Declaration. The Declaration adopted 
eight goals to improve the lives of hundreds of millions of people around the world, to meet by 
2015. 
227 h T e Millennium Development Goals Report 2010 (UN, New York, 2010) 52-4. Available at: 
228 
<http://www .un.org/millenniumgoals/pdf/MDG%20Report%2020 1 0%20En%20r 15%20-
low''1020res%2020 I 00615%20-.pdf > [20 March 20 11]. 
See para 2 of the Millennium Declaration. 
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the threat of living on a planet irredeemably spoilt by human activities, and whose 
resources would no longer be sufficient for their needs' .229 
2.5.3. Considering the ultimate values of the international community 
Some values are universal in nature: for example, the purposes and principles of the 
Charter of the United Nations, which have proved to be timeless and universal. They 
include the preservation of peace, sovereign equality, the rule of law and protection of 
human rights, and all other values founded upon them. 
Furthermore, the Rio treaties, the CBD and the Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (FCCC) mention climate change and biodiversity as the 'common concern' of 
humankind and provide rules for their protection and use. By acknowledging climate 
change and biodiversity as the 'common concern' of humankind, the Rio treaties may 
intend to include the preservation of the planetary life support system as an ultimate 
value of the international community. Although the precise legal implications of this 
type of norm are unsettled, the notion of 'common concern' gives the international 
community of states both a legitimate interest in resources of global significance and a 
common responsibility to assist in their protection.230 
In this context, this thesis argues that preserving the life-support systems of the planet 
is not only an obvious prerequisite to the attainment of all political aspirations and 
229 b I id., para 21. 
230 • Dmah Sheiton, 'Common Concern of Humanity' (2009) 39 EPL 83 at 85; Jutta Brunnee, 
'Common Areas, Common Heritage and Common Concern' in Jutta Brunnee and Alien Hey 
(ed), The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law (OUP, Oxford 2007) Ch 23 at 
564-7; UNEP, Report of the Group of Legal Experts to Examine the Concept of the Common 
Concern of Mankind in Relation to Global Environmental Issues (1990); Robin R. Churchill 
and David Freestone (eds.), International Law and Global Climate Change (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publisher, Leiden 1991). 
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goals, but 'also a prerequisite to pursuing the ultimate values of the international 
community. These values may also contribute to balancing the environment and trade 
consideration in international legal order.23l 
2.6. Conclusions 
Sections 2.2 to 2.4 of this chapter discussed the techniques and approaches available 
in international law to resolve inconsistencies between overlapping and conflicting 
treaties norms. It is apparent from the discussion that which technique or approach 
will be effective in solving a certain problem depends on the precise nature of the 
problem. Since dilemmas between treaties may take many forms, several techniques 
or a blend of techniques may be required to address them. However, any attempt to 
reconcile inconsistencies between competing or conflicting norms should start with 
the most simple [but effective] techniques, only moving on to more demanding 
techniques where necessary. 
Section 2.5 shows that responding to treaty conflict may require techniques beyond 
those provided by the relevant provisions of the Vienna Convention. The rules 
provided by the Vienna Convention serve as basic rules, but a practical approach is 
required following the practical diversification of conflicts. In this context, this thesis 
proposes that norms and principles external to the treaty can serve as an aid to 
interpretation and can also contribute to balancing the environmental and trade 
relationship. This section focuses on the various normative standards for regulating 
the environmental and trade relationship which have been set up by the international 
community in various international instruments. 
231 For further discussion see Chapter 8. 
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International instruments like the Stockholm Declaration, Rio Declaration, WCS and 
Johannesburg Declaration provide principles upon which the environmental and trade 
relationship should be predicated. Such principles can only be given effect if they are 
expressly included in treaty texts. Certain principles, like sustainable development, 
have been recognized as meta-principles, which act upon other legal rules and 
principles and exercise a kind of 'interstitial normativity'. Others are considered 
fundamental sectoral principles, for example the precautionary principle. 
The other categories of norms discussed in section 2.5 include norms having inherent 
societal and constitutional importance, for example the preservation of the peace, the 
eradication of poverty and the protection the environment. These are the fundamental 
political aspirations and ultimate values of the international community, which have 
been endorsed by states in order to fulfil its collective responsibility towards 
humankind. Thus, it has been argued that such norms should find reflection in the 
international treaty regimes, at least in the circumstances where there is a need to 
resolve conflicts between individual instruments. 
The following chapters set out to examine the extent to which the abovementioned 
normative standards adopted by the international community of states are 
appropriately balanced in MEAs and multilateral trade agreements. 
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3. The protection of environmental interests in the multilateral trading system 
3.1. Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to assess how successfully the WTO multilateral trading 
system has accommodated the protection and preservation of the environment 
concerns within its basic trade remit. It examines the 1994 Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organisation (hereinafter WTO Agreement) and its 
annexed agreements including the 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(hereinafter GA17), the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (hereinafter TBT 
Agreement), the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures(hereinafter SPS Agreement), the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (hereinafter TRIPS Agreement) and the Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (hereinafter SCM Agreement)232, as trade-
related environmental measures can fall for consideration under one or more of these 
agreements; furthermore, most of them contain specific provisions for environmental 
exceptions. 
This chapter also analyses the practices of the GATT/WTO panels and the WTO 
Appellate Body with regard to environmental measures which affect free and non-
discriminatory trade rules and seek justification under the 'General Exceptions' of 
Article XX of the GATT 1994. The ongoing efforts under the Doha Development 
Agenda and the regular Trade and Environment Committee (CTE) also contribute to 
the protection and preservation of the environment. Hence, attention will be drawn to 
the negotiations launched by the 2001 Doha Ministerial Declaration (DMD) and the 
mandate of the CTE. 
232 For the text of the WTO Agreement and its annexed agreements see supra n 6. 
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This chapter argues, that although the multilateral trading system has formally 
embraced 'sustainable development' and 'protection and preservation of the 
environment' as objectives, it has failed to balance environmental and trade concerns 
in practice. The reasons are: first, WTO treaty institutions' non-cooperation with 
MEA institutions; second, the practice of WTO panels and the Appellate Body of 
interpreting 'general exceptions' narrowly; and third, the failure of WTO institutions 
to search for better ways to balance this relationship. In recent decisions, the WTO 
Appellate Body has attempted to clarify the balance between trade rules and 
environmental protection issues. However, the discussion in this chapter shows that 
where environmental and trade interests overlap, they are yet to be ready to give 
priority to environmental concerns over trade, if needed. 
This chapter consists of two sections. The first section summarizes the multilateral 
trading system in a nutshell, including a brief historical background, and outlines the 
fundamental principles and 'general exceptions' of the GATT and the implementation 
process of the multilateral trade rules. This discussion also identifies those provisions 
of the multilateral trade agreements which allow environmental concerns to be 
addressed in the MTS. Section 11 examines the extent to which the trade rules and 
WTO panel and Appellate Body's decisions allow WTO Members to adopt trade-
restrictive measures that provide protection to environmental interests, in 
circumstances where environmentally inspired rules seek justification under Article 
XX of the GA TT 1994, as discussed in section I. 
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3.2. An overview of the multilateral trading system 
In the aftennath of the Second World War, in 1946 the United Nations Economic and 
Social Council (ECOSOC) adopted a resolution in favour of fonning an International 
Trade Organisation (ITO) to oversee international trade. The negotiations over the 
ITO had three objectives, namely to draft the ITO Charter, prepare schedules for tariff 
reductions and prepare a multilateral treaty that preserved the tariff concessions and 
contained general principles of trade, namely the GATT. Since work on tariff 
reduction on the GA TT was completed, the negotiating countries decided to adopt a 
Protocol of Provisional Application (PPA) to bring the GATT into force in order to 
protect the concessions that had already been made and to boost trade liberalization. 
Accordingly, the PPA and the GATT 1947 came into force on 1 January 1948. On the 
other hand, although the drafting of the ITO Charter was completed in March 1948, 
the ITO never entered into force since ratification proved to be impossible for some 
members, specifically the US, because the US Congress refused to give its approval 
on several occasions.233 
The GATT was ultimately applied as a provisional agreement for forty-six years 
(1948-94) and became the pennanent institutional basis for the multilateral trading 
system. In spite of its success in establishing tariff reductions on trade in goods, the 
GATT members felt the necessity for a more 'sophisticated institutional framework' 
than that of the GATT to address complex issues related to the reduction of non-tariff 
barriers.234 Accordingly, the Uruguay Round negotiations for an international 
233 For more about the fate of the ITO see William Diebold, The End of the ITO (International 
Finance Section, Department of Economics and Social Institutions, Princeton University, New 
Jersey 1952) and Andreas Lowenfeld, International Economic Law (OUP, Oxford 2002). 
234 For GAITs limitations see Van Den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade 
Organization (2nd edn, CUP, Cambridge 2008) 80-1; Surya Subedi, 'The Road from Doha: 
The Issues for the Development Round of the WTO and the Future of International Trade' 
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organization for trade extended into several new areas in addition to trade in goods, 
namely trade in services and intelJectual property?35 After a crucial process of 
negotiations, the WTO Agreement was signed in Marrakesh on 15 April 1994236 and 
entered into force on 1 January 1995. From an original membership of just twenty-
three states under the GAIT 1947, the WTO now has 153 members, with about thirty 
countries currently negotiating to join.237 
The original GATT 1947 articles were taken up as Annex lA to the WTO Agreement 
and are referred to as the GATT 1994. The WTO is therefore the continuation of the 
GATT system and GATT is still the WTO's principal rulebook for trade in goods. The 
WTO Agreement is the founding instrument of the WTO and serves as an 'umbrella 
agreement' to its annexed agreements.238 Among the annexed agreements the TBT 
Agreement and the SPS Agreement, set out specific rules dealing with technical 
barriers to trade. The rules of the former agreement (TBT Agreement) apply to the 
general categories of technical barriers to trade, while the rulcs of the latter agreement 
(SPS Agreement) apply specifically to sanitary and phytosanitary measures. The 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS 
Agreement) is designed to enhance the protection of intellectual property rights, while 
(2003) 52 ICLQ 426; and John Jackson, The World Trade Organisation Constitution and 
Jurisprudence (The Royal Institution of International Affairs 1998), 15-20. 
235 For further discussion on the Uruguay Round negotiations see Van Den Bossche, supra n 234, 
82-4; Terence Stewart, The GATT Uruguay Round (Kluwer International Law, the Netherlands 
1993), vol. IV; John Jackson, World Trading System: Law and Policy of International 
Economic Relations (2nd edn. MIT Press, Cambridge 1997) Ch 2. 
236 See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations, 15 April 1994 (1994),33 ILM 1140. 
237 For WTO Members and date of their membership, visit <http://www.wto.org>(accessed on 28 
April 2011). 
238 h T ere are sixteen different multilateral agreements (to which all WTO Members are parties) 
and two different plurilateral agreements (to which only some WTO Members are parties) 
under the umbrella of the WTO Agreement. 
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the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement) IS 
designed to regulate the use of subsidies and applies to non-agricultural products. 
3.2.1. Objectives and purposes 
The objectives of the multilateral trading system as stated in the preamble of the WTO 
Agreement are:239 
raising standards of living, ensunng full employment and a large and 
steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, and 
expanding the production of and trade in goods and services, while allowing 
for the optimal use of the world's resources in accordance with the objective 
of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the 
environment.. . 
Hence, the key objectives of the multilateral trading system are the increase in 
standards of living, the attainment of full employment, economic growth, and the 
expansion of production of and trade in goods and services. But it is clear from the 
preamble that these objectives are also conditional upon taking into account 'the 
objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the 
environment' . 
The 'objective of sustainable development', as mentioned in Chapter 1, includes the 
integration of environmental protection and economic development; sustainable 
utilization and conservation of natural resources; the right to development; and inter-
and intra-generational equity. It means that utilization of natural resources and 
239 See the preamble of the WTO Agreement for the detailed policy objectives of the WTO. 
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economic policies involving the environment should aim to conserve the environment. 
The following sections of this chapter aim to review these basic principles, those 
substantive, procedural and institutional rules of the multilateral trading system which 
are relevant for the protection of environmental interests and to observe the extent to 
which the multilateral trading system maintains its 'objective of sustainable 
development'. Before moving on to the discussion on the rules and principles of the 
WTO Agreement and its annexed agreements, it is vital to understand the DMD 
mandate for negotiations on environment, as they will affect the implementation of the 
WTO Agreement and its annexed agreements. 
3.2.2. The Doha Ministerial Mandate (DMD) on the environment 
After many failed attempts, developed countries and environmental groups finally 
succeeded in placing environment issues on the negotiating agenda of the Doha 
Ministerial Conference held in 2001.240 In the Doha Round, WTO Members adopted 
the DMD, which brought environmental issues within the WTO negotiation. The 
WTO Members in the DMD reaffirmed their commitments to the objectives of the 
WTO Agreement, stating that 'the aim of upholding and safeguarding an open and 
non-discriminatory multilateral trading system, and acting for the protection of the 
environment and the promotion of sustainable development can and must be mutually 
supportive' .241 
240 
241 
The First Ministerial Conference after the establishment ofthe WTO took place in Singapore in 
1996, the Second in Geneva itself in 1998 and the Third in Seattle in 1999. 
Ministerial Conference, Doha Ministerial Declaration, WTIMIN(Ol)/DEC/1 (2001) paras. \,2 
and 6. 
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Thus, paragraphs 31 and 32 of the DMD aim to clarify the inter-relationship between 
the WTO rules and the MEAs. Paragraph 31 of the DMD launched negotiations 
'[W]ith a view to enhancing the mutual supportiveness of trade and environment' and 
'without prejudging their outcome', on three main themes. These themes are: i) the 
relationship between existing WTO rules and specific trade obligations set out in 
MEAs; ii) the collaboration between the WTO and the MEAs Secretariats and 
granting observer status; and iii) the reduction or elimination of tariff and non-tariff 
barriers to environmental goods and services. 
The negotiations on the first theme intend to address how WTO rules are to apply to 
WTO Members that are parties to environmental agreements, in particular to clarify 
the relationship between trade measures taken under the environmental agreements 
and WTO rules. The second theme agrees to negotiate two issues: the procedures for 
regular information exchange between MEAs Secretariats and the relevant WTO 
committees and the criteria for the granting of observer status to MEA Secretariats. 
Currently, the CTE holds an information session with different MEA Secretariats once 
or twice a year to discuss the trade-related provisions in them in order to expand the 
scope of existing cooperation. Several MEA Secretariats have been granted 
observership to the CTE in order to implement the second issue, and a number of them 
are also invited to attend meetings of the committee's special negotiating sessions (as 
'ad hoc' observers). However, a later discussion in this thesis shows that WTO 
practice on granting observer status has proved controversial, as MEA treaty 
institutions whose work is related to the WTO have been denied such status.242 In the 
third theme, the ministers agreed to negotiations on the reduction or elimination of 
242 For further discussion see Chapter 8. 
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tariff and non-tariff barriers to environmental goods and servIces, for example 
catalytic converters, air filters or consultancy services on wastewater management. 
Paragraph 32 of the DMD is also. relevant to these negotiations, adding that '[T]he 
outcome of ... the negotiations carried out under paragraph 31(i) and (ii) shall be 
compatible with the open and non-discriminatory nature of the multilateral trading 
system, shall not add to or diminish the rights and obligations of members under 
existing WTO Agreements'. Under this clause, environmental protection measures 
must be i) consistent with WTO rules; ii) take into account the capabilities of 
developing countries; and iii) meet the legitimate objectives of the importing country. 
Paragraph 32 is discussed with the CTE, as it pays particular attention to negotiations 
of the areas mentioned in this paragraph. 
Lack of progress in the Doha Round of negotiations persuaded WTO Members to 
launch a package negotiation called 'the July 2008 package' in order to conclude the 
Round. The goal of 'the July 2008 package' was to agree 'modalities,243 in agriculture 
and non-agricultural market access (NAMA) - i.e. the formulas and other methods to 
be used to cut tariffs and agricultural subsidies, and a range of related provisions - and 
to look at the next steps in concluding the Doha Round of negotiations. As part of this 
programme, a number of ministers started intensive negotiations and managed to 
produce several drafts. As regard to the environmental concerns, they agreed a draft 
Ministerial Decision on Paragraphs 31(i) and 31(ii).244 The format is based on the 
clusters of issues identified from Members' proposals for negotiation including 
243 
'Modalities' are ways or methods of doing something. 
244 Draft Ministerial Decision on Trade and Environment, CTESS TN/TE/20, 21 April 2011. 
Available at: 
<http://www.wto.orglenglishltratop e/dda e/chair texts 1 1 e/chair texts 1 1 e.htm> (accessed 
1 May 2011). - - - - - -
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national coordination; dispute settlement; technical assistance to developing country 
members; elements on information exchange; and criteria for observers.245 
The draft Ministerial Decision on Trade and Environment may bring the 
environmental negotiations launched in the Doha Round near conclusion: but it is too 
early to say how far it has been successful in accomplishing the values of the DMD. 
However, what is appearing from the draft text is that it consists of general statements 
about the putative mutual supportiveness of MEAs and trade rules rather than 
providing specific rules. 
As regards the mandate in Paragraph 31 (iii), the Trade Negotiation Committee (TNC) 
must provide a report which contains the reference universe of environmental goods 
of interest to members based on Members' submissions.246 Nonetheless, the WTO 
Members are required to negotiate various issues including preambular language; 
coverage; treatment of tariffs and non-tariff barriers, including special and differential 
treatment; and cross-cutting and development elements in order to arrive at a draft 
outcome and modalities.247 
3.2.3. Relevant provisions of the multilateral trading system 
At the core of the multilateral trading system are two non-discrimination principles: 
the most-favoured nation (MFN) principle and the national treatment principle. The 
MFN treatment obligation in Article I of the GATT 1994 prohibits a WTO member 
'from discriminating between' all other WTO Members, while the national treatment 
24S WTO CTESS TNITE/I9, 22 March 2010. 
246 WTO CTESS, TN/TE/20, Annex II.A, 21 April 2011. 
247 WTO CTESS TN/TE/20, 21 April 2011. 
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obligation in Article III of the GATT 1994 prohibits a WTO member 'from 
discriminating against' another WTO member inside its territory.248 These 'non-
discrimination mandates' are essential for the full implementation of the 'Schedules of 
Concessions', which are binding obligations under Article 11 of the GA TT 1994, even 
though the 'general exceptions' provision of the GATT, Article XX, constitutes 
conditional exceptions to GATT obligations. This Article may be applied to justify 
certain environmentally inspired rules that affect free trade. In addition to Article XX 
of the GATT 1994, the TBT, SPS, SCM and TRIPS Agreements also contain some 
exceptions for measures protecting environmental interests. 
3.2.3.1. The key principles of the MTS 
The MFN principle of Article I of the GATT 1994 is designed to ensure equality of 
treatment of 'like product[s] originating in or destined for the territories of all other 
contracting parties'. 249 Thus, all tariffs for any treatment given to the products of one 
WTO member must also be given to 'like' products of all other WTO Members. This 
immediate and unconditional equal treatment extends to i) 'custom charges and 
duties', ii) 'all rules and formalities connected with importation and exportation' and 
iii) internal taxes, charges, and domestic regulation of a product's distribution, sale 
and use.250 The MFN principle was considered in the earlier GATT Belgian Family 
Allowances case,251 which involved a Belgian law that exempted tax on foreign 
products which had a system of family allowances similar to that of Belgium. On the 
other hand, countries which had a different family allowance system or no system at 
248 Bossche, supra n 234, 321. 
249 Article I( I) of GA IT, 1994. 
250 Ibid. 
251 Belgium - Family Allowances (1952) GA IT BISD IS/59. 
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all were subject to certain conditions before they could be considered for such 
exemptions. A GA IT dispute settlement panel concluded that such regulations were 
inconsistent with the MFN treatment obligation of Article I of the GATT 1947, as it 
discriminates between like products on the basis of distinctions between the social 
conditions linked with the manufacture of products in different countries. 
The other key principle on non-discrimination is the national treatment obligation, 
which ensures that imported and locally produced goods should be treated equally - at 
least after the foreign goods have entered the market of the importing WTO member 
state.252 The purpose of Article III of the GAIT 1994 'is to ensure that internal 
measures not be applied to imported and domestic products so as to afford protection 
to domestic production' .253 Consequently, Article III obliges WTO Members to 
provide equality of competitive conditions for imported products in relation to 
domestic products.254 
Further, Articles 111(2) and 111(4) of the GA TT 1994 contain specific prOVlSlons 
relating to internal charges and taxes, and internal measures. Article 111(2) deals with 
internal taxes of imported and domestic products, more especially those which prevent 
Members from imposing internal taxes on imported products 'in excess of those 
applied ... to like domestic products'. Two types of restrictions are covered by Article 
111(2), for 'like' products and for other products in the matter of internal taxation. 
When products are 'like' products there is no need for additional criteria in 
determining that the measure is discriminatory: any excess taxation is automatically 
m Article III of the GAIT. 
253 WTO, EC: Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products - Report of the 
Appellate Body (hereinafter EC - Asbestos) (5 April 2001) WT/DS135/AB/R, para. 97. 
254 Japan - Alcoholic Beverages 11, supra n 87, para, F. 
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considered to give protection to domestic products. On the other hand, if the products 
are not 'like' products, three criteria need to be fulfilled to determine infringement of 
Article 111(2): first, the imported and the domestic product must be 'directly 
competitive and substitutable'; second, they must be 'not similarly taxed'; and third, 
the measures must be applied 'so as to afford protection' .255 
As mentioned earlier, Article 111(4) GAIT 1994 deals with internal measures, and 
provides that members cannot have one rule for domestic products and another less 
favourable rule for foreign products. It is not necessary to show that the regulations 
concerned actually had the effect of protecting domestic products; it is enough to 
show that the regulation is less favourable than that afforded to 'like' products of 
national origin.256 In this connection, 'regulations' not only cover technical regulations 
concerning the characteristics of products but also other measures which create 
competitive conditions favouring domestic products. 
The GA TT also contains provisions concerning non-tariff barriers for trade in goods. 
Article XI of the GATT prohibits WTO Members from imposing quantitative 
restrictions such as 'quotas, import or export licenses or other measures' on products 
imported from or destined for any other country, except for prohibitions and 
restrictions imposed under specific, listed circumstances (relating to food shortages, 
commodity regulation and agricultural or fisheries products). The reference to 'other 
25S Ibid, para. H, 116. 
256 11'S 
v, - Gasoline, supra n 36. In this case the panel and Appellate Body both found that the 
measure treated imported gasoline 'less favourably' than domestic gasoline in violation of 
Article 1II(4), as imported gasoline effectively experienced less favourable sales conditions 
than those afforded to domestic gasoline. In particular, under the regulation, importers had to 
adapt to an average standard, i.e. 'statutory baseline', that had no connection to the particular 
gasoline imported, while refiners of domestic gasoline had only to meet a standard linked to 
their own product in 1990, i.e. individual refinery baseline. 
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measures' extends Article XI GAIT 1994 restrictions beyond quotas. It refers not only 
to laws and regulations but also to non-mandatory government involvement.257 
Article XI covers measures which are not covered by Article Ill. For example, a ban 
on a foreign product 'produced and harvested in a particular way' is not covered by 
Article III but is considered to be an import ban under Article XI.258 Article XI GAIT 
1994 therefore regulates measures affecting the importation (or exportation) of a 
product, while Article III GA IT 1994 regulates internal requirements affecting 
imported products.259 
If a measure violates the GA IT principles, in order to be justified in the WTO 
multilateral trade agreements it must fall under the listed 'general exceptions' 
provision of Article XX of the GA IT 1994. 
3.2.3.2. The GATT 'general exceptions' relevant to environmental protection 
Article XX, in paragraphs (a) to 0), sets out specific grounds of justification for 
measures which are inconsistent with provisions of the GAIT 1994. Among them, 
paragraphs (b) and (g) had been addressed in various GA ITIWTO decisions as 
exceptions relevant for the protection of environmental interests.26o Along with those 
257 Japan-Trade in Semi-Conductors (1989) GAITBISD 35S/116, paras. 106-9. 
258 US -Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (hereinafter Tuna 1)( 1991) (Regarding unadopted reports 
in Japan - Alcoholic Beverages, supra n 87, the Appellate Body viewed that unadopted panel 
reports had no binding effects but could nevertheless serve as 'useful guidance').The same 
approach was adopted by the panel in US - Shrimp, supra n 105, para. 7.17. In this case the 
panel finds that United States measures prohibiting the import of products because of their 
method of production constituted a restriction fall under Article XI( 1) ofthe GA TT, 1994. 
259 Canada - Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act (1984) GAIT BISD 30S1140, 
para. 5.14. 
260 Article XX(a) is not particularly relevant for environmental protection, but has the potential to 
be used to protect animal welfare, an issue which has been addressed in the CITES. 
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two paragraphs, the following discussion includes paragraphs (a) and (d), as they also 
have the potential to balance the environmental and trade relationship. 
The pertinent section of Article XX of,the GA IT 1994 reads as follows: 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner 
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction 
on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent 
the adoption or enforcement by any Contracting Party of measures: 
(a) necessary to protect public morals; 
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; 
(d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not 
inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement, ... ; 
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such 
measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on 
domestic production or consumption. 
In deciding whether a measure can be justified under Article XX GAIT 1994, one first 
needs to examine whether the measure can provisionally be justified under one of the 
specific exceptions listed in paragraphs (a) to (j) of Article XX - in this case the 
paragraphs (a), (b), (d) or (g). If the measure is justified under one of those exceptions, 
then it must be determined whether the application of the measure meets the 
requirements of the introductory clause (known as 'the chapeau') of Article XX. The 
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burden of showing that a measure complies with the requirements of the introductory 
clause of Article XX GA TT 1994 falls to the respondent party. 261 
(a) Invoking the environmental exceptions 
Article XX(b) together with Article XX(g) legitimises environmentally inspired 
measures that depart from core GATT rules. A three-step analysis is required to justify 
the application of Article XX(b) GATT 1994.262 First, the policy in respect of the 
measure( s) for which the provision was invoked must fall within the range of policies 
designed to protect human, animal or plant life or health. Second, the inconsistent 
measure(s) for which the exception is being invoked must be necessary to fulfil the 
policy objective. Finally, the measure(s) must be applied in conformity with the 
requirements of the introductory clause of Article XX GA TT 1994. 
The main challenge in adjudicating Article XX(b) is to show that a contested measure 
is 'necessary'. In EC-Asbestos, the Appellate Body held that a measure is 'necessary' 
under Article XX(b) if no GATT consistent alternative is reasonably available and 
provided that it requires the least degree of inconsistency with other GA TT 
provisions.263 In this case, the Appellate Body held that the 'necessary' standard is to 
be judged through a process of weighing and balancing of a series of factors. The 
factors to be weighed could include: 'i) the relative importance of the common 
interests or values pursued by the measure, ii) the contribution made by the measure to 
261 
262 
263 
In US - Gasoline, supra n 36, the Appellate Body stated 'The burden of demonstrating that a 
measure provisionally justified as being within one of the exceptions set out in the individual 
paragraphs of Article XX does not, in its application, constitute abuse of such exception under 
the chapeau, rests on the party invoking the exception' . 
US - Gasoline, panel report, adopted on 20 May 1996, WTIDS2/R para. 6.20; US -
Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (hereinafter Tuna Il) (1994), unadopted, GATT DS29/R444, 33 
ILM 839. 
EC-Asbestos, supra n 253, paras. 164-75. 
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the realization of the ends pursued by it, and iii) the restrictive impact of the measure 
on the international commerce,.264 
In EC-Asbestos, the Appellate Body said that 'it is undisputed that WTO Members 
have the right to determine the level of protection ... that they consider appropriate in a 
given situation' .265 However, to establish that a trade-restrictive measure is necessary, 
the defending government bears the burden to prove that there were no other 
'reasonable' less trade-restrictive measures available which could have achieved the 
same end. In justifying its measure, a government may 'rely in good faith, on 
scientific sources which, at that time, may represent a divergent, but qualified and 
respected, opinion'. 266 
Another key element of the analysis of the necessity of a measure under Article XX(b) 
GATT 1994 is the contribution it brings to the achievement of its objective. A 
contribution exists when there is a genuine relationship of ends and means between 
the objective pursued and the measure at issue. To be characterized as necessary, a 
measure does not have to be indispensable. However, its contribution to the 
achievement of the objective must be material, not merely marginal or insignificant. 
Thus, the contribution of the measure has to be weighed against its trade 
restrictiveness, taking into account the importance of the interests or the values 
264 WTO, US: Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services 
(hereinafter US - Gambling) - Report of the Appellate Body (20 April 2005) WT/DS285/R and 
WT/DS285/ABIR, para. 306; WTO, Brazil: Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres 
(Hereinafter Brazil - Retreaded Tyres) - Report of the Appellate Body (17 December 2007) 
WT/DS3321R and WTIDS332/AB/R. paras. 176-82; WTO, Korea: Various Measures in Beef-
Report of the Appellate Body (10 January 2001) WT/DSl61/AB/R and WT/DSI69/AB/R, 
265 
para. 142. 
EC-Asbestos, supra n 253, para. 168. Also see Brazil - Retreaded Tyres, supra n 264, para. 
210. 
266 EC-Asbestos, supra n 253, para. 178. 
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underlying the objective pursued by it.267 The more vital the common interests or 
value pursued, the easier it would be to accept as 'necessary' the measures designed to 
achieve those ends. Some commentators have expressed the view that the Appellate 
Body's approach to the application of Article XX(b) GATT 1994 as bringing it 'closer 
to the proportionality' .268 
On the other hand, Article XX(g) GA TT 1994 concerns measures relating to the 
'conservation of exhaustible natural resources'. In order to justify the application of 
Article XX(g), the Appellate Body in US - Gasoline established a four-step test:269 i) 
that the measure for which the provision is invoked concerns 'exhaustible natural 
resources'; ii) that these measures are related to the 'conservation' of those resources; 
iii) that the measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic 
production or consumption (Le. the measures concerned impose restrictions not just in 
respect of imported products, but also with respect to domestic products); and iv) that 
the measures are applied in conformity with the requirements in the chapeau of Article 
XX GATT 1994. 
With respect to the first element of the test, the Appellate Body in US-Shrimp adopted 
an 'evolutionary' approach to the interpretation of the term 'exhaustible natural 
resources' .270 The Appellate Body held that since this term 'does not have static 
content', it 'must be read by a treaty interpreter in the light of contemporary concerns 
of the community of nations about the protection and conservation of the 
267 Brazil-Retreaded Tyres, supra n 264, Appellate Body Report, para. 210. 
268 For example, Ilona Cheyne, 'Proportionality, Proximity and Environmental Labelling in WTO 
Law', (2009) 12 JIEL 927 at 948-50; Birnie et al.,supra 11, 774. Others have argued the 
opposite: see Howse and Elisabeth Tu··rk, 'The WTO Impact on Internal Regulations', in 
Bermann and Mavroidis (eds), Trade and Human Health and Safety (CUP, Cambridge 2006), 
113. 
269 US-Gasoline, panel report, supra n 262, para. 6.35. 
270 US-Shrimp, supra n 105, paras. 129 and 130. 
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environment' .27J Thus, to detennine the present meanmg of 'exhaustible natural 
resources' it referred to the 1973 CITES, the 1979 Convention on Conservation of 
Migratory Species, the 1982 UNCLOS, the 1992 Rio Declaration, and the 1992 CBD. 
However, in a later case of EC - Biotech, the Appellate Body considered how 
agreements external to the WTO-covered agreements could be taken into 
consideration and concluded that they can be used as an aid to the interpretation of the 
existing WTO provisions, not as the applicable law between the parties.272 
Regarding the second element, the Appellate Body interpreted the words 'relating to 
h . , ""1' d . ,273 Th' ... t e conservation as meanmg pnmarI y aIme at conservatIOn. IS 
interpretation has been questioned, as the two phrases are not synonymous. In US-
Shrimp, the Appellate Body took a different approach to the 'relating to' element, 
examining the relationship between the structure of the measure in question and the 
conservation objectives being sought to be achieved and concluded that the measures 
should be 'reasonably related' to the conservation objectives.274 The third element of 
the test under Article XX(g) GAIT 1994 is a requirement of 'even-handedness' in the 
imposition of restrictions on imported and domestic products.275 Thus, Article XX(g) 
does not require imported and domestic products to be treated absolutely equally; it 
requires treatment in an 'even-handed' manner, which is a lose to the concept of 
'fairness'. 
271 Ibid. 
272 EC-Biotech Products, supra n 108, paras. 7.70-7.95; see Margaret Young, 'The WTO's use of 
relevant rules ofintemationallaw: An analysis of the Biotech case' (2007) 56 ICLQ 907. 
273 Canada - Measures Affecting Exports of Un processed Herring and Salmon (hereinafter 
Canada - Salmon and Herring) (1988) GAIT BISD 35S/98, paras. 4.5--4.6. In US - Gasoline, 
the Appellate Body accepted this interpretation, supra n 36, 17. 
274 US - Shrimp, supra n 105, para. 141. 
27S US - Gasoline, supra n 36, 19. 
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Article XX(a) GATT 1994 concerns measures necessary for the protection of public 
morals. Article XX(a) has two elements: i) the measure needs to be necessary; and ii) 
the measure must protect public morals. Article XX(a) was referred to in US-Tuna /, 
where Australia, a third party to this case, suggested that the measure at issue could be 
justified under Article XX(a) as a measure against inhuman treatment to animals, i.e. 
animal welfare.276 However" the panel did not address this issue in its discussion, 
arguing that Article XX(a) GAIT 1994 could be applicable only if Australia 'could 
justity measures regarding inhumane treatment of animals, if such measures applied 
equally to domestic and foreign animal products; a panel could not judge the morals of 
the party taking the measure but it could judge the necessity of taking measures 
inconsistent with the General Agreement, and their consistency with the Preamble to 
Article XX' .277 Since then animal rights activists have been pushing for the inclusion 
of animal welfare standards in WTO multilateral trade negotiations as a 'non-trade 
concern' , arguing it is a moral issue.278 
In US - Gambling, the panel for the first time attempted to examine the meaning of 
the term 'public morals' in Article XIV of the GATS, which almost overlaps with 
Article XX of the GAIT 1994. To determine the ordinary meaning of the term 'public 
morals', the panel consulted dictionary definitions for the terms 'public' and 'morals'. 
Following the dictionary meaning, the panel (also quoted with apparent approval by 
the Appellate Body) considered that 'the term "public morals" denotes standards of 
right and wrong conduct maintained by or on behalf of a community or nation'. 
Considering the fact that standards of right and wrong change over time, the panel was 
276 Tuna I, supra n 258, para. 4.4. 
277 Ibid 
278 For further discussion on the animal welfare issue in the WTO, see section 3.3.5. 
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of the view that 'the content ... can vary in time and space, depending upon a range of 
factors, including prevailing social, cultural, ethical and religious values' .279 
Furthermore, the Appellate Body has stated on several occasions in the context of 
Article XX GA TT 1994 that Members, in applying similar societal concepts, have the 
right to determine the level of protection that they consider appropriate. Similarly the 
panel in US - Gambling, when reviewing Article XIV GATS, was of the view that 
Members should be given some scope to define and apply for themselves the concepts 
of 'public morals' in their respective territories, according to their own systems and 
scales of values.28o Just as Members are free to determine their appropriate level of 
protection of public health in the context of Article XX(b) GA TT 1994, they should 
also be free to determine their public morals. Accordingly, the panel considered that 
states have discretion in deciding what is regarded as contrary to public morals in their 
own states.281 The Appellate Body also upheld the panels view.282 
The Article XX( d) GA TT 1994 exception sets out a test for the provisional 
justification of otherwise GATT-inconsistent measures. To be provisionally justified 
under Article XX(d), a GATT-inconsistent measure needs to satisfy two elements:283 i) 
the measure must be designed to secure compliance with national law; and ii) the 
measure must be necessary to ensure such compliance. In Mexico - Soft Drinks, the 
panel found that Article XX( d) GA TT 1994 does not provide an exception for 
measures designed 'to secure compliance with' obligations of a WTO member under 
279 US - Gambling, supra n 264, para. 6.461. 
280 Ibid. 
281 Ibid. 
282 Ibid. 94 and 298. 
283 WTO, Canada: Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of Imported Grain -
Report of the Panel (27 September 2004) WTIDS276!R, para. 6.218. 
96 
another international agreement; rather, the phrases circumscribe the scope of Article 
XX(d) GAIT 1994.284 In this way, the Appellate Body made it clear that 'laws and 
regulations' refer to domestic rules and not the obligations of another WTO member 
under an international agreement.285 
Thus, the phrase 'laws and regulations' is qualified by the phrase 'not inconsistent 
with the provisions of this Agreement',286 i.e. the 'laws and regulations' referred to in 
Article XX(d) have to be GAIT-consistent. Regarding the second element, the 
Appellate Body has held in an earlier case, when deciding whether a measure is 
'necessary' under Article XX(d), that it is necessary to 'weigh and balance' four 
factors: i) the trade impact of the measure; ii) the importance of the interests protected 
by the measure; iii) the contribution of the measure to the end pursued; and iv) the 
existence of alternative measures that a member could reasonably be expected to 
pursue. 287 
(b) Satisfying the requirements of the chapeau 
The function of the chapeau is the prevention of abuse of the exceptions specified in 
the paragraphs of Article XX GAIT 1994.288 The chapeau emphasizes the manner in 
which the measure in question is applied. Specifically, the application of the measure 
284 W TO, Mexico: Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages (hereinafter Mexico - Taxes 
on Soft Drinks) - Report of the Appellate Body (24 March 2006) WT/DS30S/R and 
WTIDS30S/AB/R, para. 8.ISI. 
285 b I id., para. 69. 
286 WTO, EC: Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products 
and Foodstuffs (Australia) - Report of the Panel (20 April 2005) WT/DS290/R, para. 7.331. 
287 K orea - Various Measures in Beef, Appellate Body Report, supra n 264, para. 165. 
288 US - Gasoline, supra n 36, 14. For discussion on the interpretation of the chapeau by the 
GAIT/WTO panel and Appellate Body, see Arwel Davis, 'Interpreting the Chapeau of GAIT 
Article XX in Light of the "New" Approach in Brazil - Tyres' (2009) 43 Journal of World 
Trade 507. 
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must not constitute a 'means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination' or a 
'disguised restriction on international trade'. 
In US - Shrimp, the Appellate Body stated that for a measure to constitute 'arbitrary 
or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail', 
three elements must exist:289 i) the application of the measure must result in 
discrimination; ii) the discrimination must be arbitrary or unjustifiable in character; 
and iii) this discrimination must occur between countries where the same conditions 
prevail. The Appellate Body in US - Gasoline suggested that the terms 'arbitrary 
discrimination', 'unjustifiable discrimination' and 'disguised restriction' must be read 
side by side, as they impart meaning to one another, thereby making it clear that 
'disguised restriction' includes disguised discrimination in international trade.29o In 
US - Gambling, the panel considered that 'disguised restriction' should be read as 
embracing restrictions amounting to arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination in 
international trade, taken under the guise of a measure formally within the terms of an 
exception listed in Article XIV GATS, which is almost analogous to Article XX GATT 
1994.291 
US - Gasoline was the first case to provide an authoritative interpretation of the 
chapeau in relation to the individual sections of Article XX GA TT 1994.292 In this 
case, it was held that the measures taken by the US fulfilled the Article XX(g) 
exceptions but failed to meet the requirements of the chapeau, and accordingly could 
289 us -Shrimp (Article 21.5), Appellate Body Report, para. 118. 
290 US - Gasoline, supra n 36, 23. 
291 US - Gambling, supra n 264, para. 6.579. 
US - Gasoline. supra n 36, 44. 292 
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not be justified under Article XX.293 In US - Shrimp, the Appellate Body again 
clarified the relationship of Article XX's introductory clause to the exception from the 
general GATT rules. The Appellate Body found that the US import ban measures were 
covered by Article XX(g) GATT 1994, but nevertheless were not justified under the 
chapeau due to 'the unilateral character of application' of its import ban, which had a 
discriminatory influence and was accordingly unjustifiable. 
Some were of the view that unlike the GATT panels, the Appellate Body in US -
Shrimp did not totally condemn unilateral action294, as it stated: '[T]he unilateral 
character ... heightens the disruptive and discriminatory influence of the import 
prohibition and underscores its unjustifiability' .295 However, at the same time the 
WTO does not give free rein to unilateral measures, as such measures have to satisfy 
the chapeau conditions, which leaves open the possibility of finding that they are 
valid.296 
3.2.3.3. Environmental exceptions under the SPS, TBT, SCM and TRIPS 
Agreements 
As with Article XX of the GA TT, most of the annexed WTO agreements contain some 
form of exception for measures protecting environmental interests. For example, 
Article 5(2) of the SPS Agreement requires WTO Members to take into account 
'relevant ecological and environment conditions' as part of the risk assessment 
293 Ibid.,45. 
294 • Blmie et al., supra n 11, 776. 
295 US - Shrimp, supra n 105, para. 172. 
296 Nita Ghei, 'Evaluating the WTO's Two-Step Test for Environmental Measures under Article 
XX' (2007) 18 Colorado JIELP 117 at 148. 
criteria. Article 2(2) of the TBT Agreement also recognizes protection of the 
environment as its objective. Article 27(2) of the TRIPS Agreement pennits members 
to refuse the patenting of an invention where preventing the domestic commercial 
exploitation of that invention is necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health, or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment. 
The WTO rules on s u b s i d i ~ s s and subsidized trade are set out in Articles VI and XVI 
of the GATT 1994 and, most importantly, in the SCM Agreement. The object and 
purpose of the SCA! Agreement is to impose multilateral disciplines on subsidies 
which distort international trade?n Article 1 (1) of the SCM Agreement defines 
subsidies broadly to include a financial contribution by a government, or any public 
body, which confers a benefit.298 However, the WTO rules on subsidies do not apply 
to all 'financial contributions by the government that confer a benefit'. They apply 
only to specific subsidies, i.e. those granted to an enterprise or industry, or a group of 
enterprises or industries.299 The non-actionable subsidies that were provided for under 
Article 8(2)( c) of the SCM Agreement were used to promote the adaptation of existing 
facilities to new environmental requirements. However, this provision expired in its 
entirety at the end of 1999 with the intention of allowing Members to capture 'positive 
environmental externalities' when they arose. 
3.2.4. Implementation 
From the above discussion on environmental exceptions, it is apparent that the 
complex nature of the multilateral trading system does not provide a straightforward 
297 WTO, Brazil: Export Financing Programme for Aircraft - Report of the Appellate Body (20 
August 1999) WT/OS/46/ABfR, see panel report, para. 7.26. 
298 Article 1(1) of the SCM Agreement. 
299 Ibid. Article 1(2). 
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framework for environmental protection. The protection of environmental interests in 
the WTO multilateral trade agreements depends significantly on the interpretation of 
Article XX GA TT 1994. However, both the interpretation of Article XX and its 
application to the multilateral trade agreements are difficult in practice, as they 
overlap with the MEAs. This overlapping relationship has been addressed through two 
WTO institutions: the CTE and the WTO dispute settlement system. 
3.2.4.1. The Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE) 
In 1992, the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) 
recognized that the multilateral trading system could be an important tool to carry 
forward international efforts for economic growth and poverty elevation, making trade 
a powerful ally of sustainable development. At that time, the system came under the 
GATT. As discussed earlier, the preamble of the WTO Agreement again recognizes 
sustainable development as a central principle, and it is an objective running through 
all subjects in current Doha negotiations. 
Towards the end of the Uruguay Round in April 1994, a Ministerial Decision was 
adopted by the GATT Contracting Parties to establish a Committee on Trade and 
Environment (CTE).300 The CTE is a specialized forum for dialogue on trade and the 
environment. The CTE began work with a lO-point work programme,301 including 
examination of: 1) the relationship between the rules of the multilateral trading system 
and the trade measures contained in MEAs; 2) the relationship between environmental 
300 S ee Trade and Environment, GA IT Ministerial Decision of 14 April 1994 (1994) 33 ILM 1267. 
301 GAIT Ministerial Decision on Trade and Environment, 15 April 1994. Available at 
<http://www.wto.orglenglishldocs_e/legal_e/56-dtenv_e.htm> (accessed on 24 December 
2010). 
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policies relevant to trade and environmental measures with significant trade effects 
and the provisions of the multilateral trading system; 3) the relationship between the 
provisions of the multilateral trading system and: (a) charges and taxes for 
environmental purposes; and (b) requirements for environmental purposes relating to 
products, such as standards and technical regulations, and packaging, labelling and 
recycling; 4) the provisions of the multilateral trading system dealing with the 
transparency of trade measures used for environmental purposes, and environmental 
measures and requirements, which have significant trade effects; 5) the relationship 
between the dispute settlement mechanism in the multilateral trading system and those 
found in MEAs; 6) the effect of environmental measures on market access and the 
environmental benefits of removing trade restrictions and distortions; 7) the issue of 
exports of domestically prohibited goods; 8) the relevant provisions of the TRIPS 
Agreement; 9) the work programme envisaged in the Decision on Trade in Services 
and the Environment; and 10) input to the relevant WTO bodies on appropriate 
arrangements for relations with intergovernmental and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs). 
As discussed earlier, since the 2001 Doha Ministerial Conference, items 1, 5 and 10 
are now formally included in the Doha negotiations as a result of the DMD. While the 
CTE must pay particular attention to: i) the effect of environmental measures on 
market access; ii) the relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and the CBD; and 
Hi) environmental labelling requirements. The effect of environmental measures on 
market access is particularly important to the work of the CTE because it holds the 
key to ensuring that sound trade and environmental policies work together. WTO 
member governments acknowledge the protection of the environment and health as 
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legitimate policy objectives. But they also acknowledge that measures designed to 
meet these objectives could hinder exports. Therefore, a balance is needed, between 
safeguarding market access and protecting the environment. 
The CTE' s broad mandate has contributed to identifying and understanding the 
relationship between trade and the environment in order to promote sustainable 
development. However, the CTE has been unsuccessful in providing any concrete 
decision in relation to its mandate since its establishment. 302 Despite years of 
discussion, its findings have had no real impact. Moreover, it has proven unable to 
agree on any recommendations and instead, has settled for playing a primarily 
analytical role. 
CTE's progress has been blocked for various political reasons. First, there is a division 
between developed and developing Members. For example, on the one hand, 
developed Members, such as the European Union (EU) and the US, support the 
introduction of environmental values more explicitly into trade agreements. On the 
other hand, developing Members are sceptical about doing so, as they see it as a cover 
for discrimination against their products.303 Second, there are growing differences 
between the EU and US over such matters as the precautionary principle, most 
recently reflected in the EC - Biotech304 dispute over GMOs. The WTO's consensus 
decision-making process also contributes to deadlock in meetings of the Members, 
delaying the CTE's work in progress. However, some progress has been made in 
302 S teve Chamovitz, 'A New WTO Paradigm for Trade and the Environment' (2007) II SYbIL 
15 at 2S. 
303 Report of the CTE, WT/CTE/I(l996). 
304 EC - Biotech Products. supra n 1 OS. 
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meeting environmental concerns in GATTIWTO panels and particularly in Appellate 
Body's decisions. 
3.2.4.2. Dispute settlement 
The WTO has a compulsory binding dispute settlement system created by the 1994 
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Dispute 
(DSU).305 The WTO dispute settlement system is administered by the Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB) (here the General Council acts as the DSB). Disputes between 
Members arising under the multilateral trade agreements are first sent for 
consultations.306 Where consultations fail, the complaining Member can request the 
DSB to establish a pane1.307 If dissatisfied with the panel's verdict, either or both of 
the parties to the dispute may appeal the panel report.308 The WTO DSB can provide 
three types of remedy for breaching WTO law: withdrawal of the WTO-inconsistent 
measure, compensation; and retaliation (suspension of concessions or other 
obligations).309 
The WTO dispute settlement system is limited to Members of the WTO.3IO No 
individual, international organization, non-governmental organization or industry 
association is entitled to initiate proceedings regarding breaches of WTO law. The 
jurisdiction of the dispute settlement organs extends only to matters arising under the 
305 See Articles XXII-XXIII GA 1T and also see Annex 2 of the WTO Agreement. 
306 Article 4 of the DSU. The provisions on consultation, good offices, conciliation and mediation 
are designed to encourage this. 
307 Ibid, Article 6. 
308 Ibid., Article 17. 
309 Ibid., Articles 3(7), 21 and 22. 
310 US - Shrimp, supra n 105, para. 10 l. 
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covered agreements.311 However, the WTO dispute settlement system is 'neither self-
contained nor static' ,312and is open to considering international law rules and 
principles in order to resolve disputes. In this context, Article 3(2) of the DSU 
provides that the existing provisions of the 'covered agreements' are to be clarified 'in 
accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law', which 
has been understood as interpreting the WTO agreements in accordance with Articles 
31-33 of the Vienna Convention. 
The current WTO dispute settlement system is well regarded by Members, but there is 
always room for further improvement.313 The 1994 Marrakesh Ministerial Conference 
mandated WTO member governments to conduct a review of the DSU within four 
years of the entry into force of the WTO Agreement, i.e. by 1 January 1999. The DSB 
started the review in late 1997, and held a series of informal discussions on the basis 
of proposals and issues that members identified. However, the DSB could not reach a 
consensus on any amendment to the DSU. Since then discussions on amendments to 
the DSU continued. Currently, DSU reform negotiations take place in the context of 
Doha Development Round.314 The negotiations were originally set to conclude by 
May 2003, but to date, Members have not been able to reach agreement on the reform 
of the DSU.315 
311 Article 2 of the DSU. 
312 Bimie et aI., supra n 11, 764. 
For criticism of the WTO DSB see, James Hecht, 'Operation ofWTO Dispute Settlement Panels: 313 
Assessing Proposals for Reform' a paper presented at American Bar Association Section of 
International Law and Practice, Georgetown University Law Center, 20-21 January, 2000. 
Available at: <http://www.law.georgetown.edu/journals/gjillsympOO/documents/hecht.pdt> 
(accessed on 20 February 2012). 
314 b d 1 i . 15, para 30. 
31S In May 2003, the chair of the DSB circulated a document known as 'Chairman's Text' 
containing proposals for reform of the DSU. For an amendment version of the 'Chairman's 
Text' see, Dispute Settlement Body - Special Session - Report by the Chairman, Ambassador 
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Ihe proposals for DSU reform can be divided into three groups: i) proposals with 
respect to the proceedings of WIO dispute settlement; ii) proposals with respect to the 
institutions of WIO dispute settlement; and iii) proposals with respect to systemic 
issues, such as transparency of WIO dispute settlement, the amicus curiae brief issue 
and special and differential rights for developing country Members.316 While further 
improvement of the WIO dispute settlement system would be useful, such 
improvement is not the main challenge to the system. Ihe main challenge relates to 
the genuine danger that Members overburden, and thus undermine, the dispute 
settlement system as a result of their inability to agree on rules governing politically 
sensitive issues concerning international trade. Since 1995, the WIO dispute 
settlement system has been put to the test by politically sensitive disputes on issues 
touching on public health (e.g. EC - Hormones, EC - Asbestos and EC - Biotech), 
environmental protection (e.g. US - Gasoline, US - Shrimp and Brazil - Retreaded 
Tyres), public morals and public order (E.g. US - Gambling) etc. 
So far, the WIO dispute settlement system has performed well in handling these and 
other sensitive disputes. However, the task may steadily become more difficult as the 
WIO is drawn more deeply into politically controversial issues. Some observers fear 
the system may soon be overwhelmed and suggests governments to settle disputes 
through negotiations and to improve the ability of the political institutions of the WIO 
to address the major issues confronting the multilateral trading system.317 
Peter Balas, to the Trade Negotiations Committee, TN/DS/9, 6 June 2003. Available at: 
<http://docsonline.wto.orglgen_home.asp?language=I&_ =1> (accessed on 18 February 2012). 
316 V d an en Bossche, 'Reform of the WTO Dispute Settlement System: What to expect from the 
Doha Development Round?', in Steve Chamovitz et aI., Law in the Service of Human Dignity: 
Essay in Honour of Florentino Feliciano (CUP: 2005), pp. 103-26. 
317 Cl aus-Dieter Ehlermann" Some Personal Experiences as Member of the Appellate Body of the 
WTO, Policy Papers, RSC No. 02/9 (European University Institution, 2002) p. 14. 
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(a) Environmental disputes in the GATTIWTO 
Since the entry into force of the WTO in 1995, the WTO DSB has had to deal with a 
number of disputes concerning environment-related trade measures. Under the GATT, 
six panel proceedings involving an examination of environmental measures or human 
health-related measures under Article XX GATT 1947 were completed: US -
Canadian Tuna,318 Canada - Salmon and Herring,319 Thailand - Cigarettes,320 US-
Tuna (Mexico),321 US - Tuna (Mexico) IJ,322 US - Tuna (EEC;J23 and US -
Automobiles324. Three of the six GATT cases concerned a US ban on imports of tuna 
brought respectively by Canada, Mexico and EEC. The Canada - Salmon and 
Herring case, brought by the US dealt with Canada's export ban on certain 
unprocessed herring and salmon. The other two GA TT cases are Thailand - Cigarettes 
with respect to Thailand's prohibition on imports of cigarettes and other tobacco 
preparations from foreign countries, and US - Taxes on Automobiles, referred by the 
EC, which dealt with a US regulation giving privileges to domestic products over 
foreign like products. 
So far, under the WTO, six disputes have led to the adoption of panel and Appellate 
Body reports. They include the following four: US - Gasoline,325 US - Shrimp, 326 EC 
- Asbestos,327 Brazil - Retreaded Tyres328 and US - Tuna II (Mexico;J29. Among 
318 us - Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products from Canada (1982) GA rr 
BISO 29S/91. 
319 C d ana a - Salmon and Herring, supra n 273. 
320 
321 
Thailand - Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes (herein Thailand-
Cigarettes), adopted on 7 November 1990, BISO 37S/200, 30. 
Tuna I, supra n 258. 
322 WTO, US: Measures Concerning the Importation. Marlceting and Sale of Tuna and Tuna 
Products - Report of the Panel (Hereinafter US - Tuna 1/ (Mexico) (15 September 2011) 
WT/OS3811R. 
323 Tuna 1/, supra n 262. 
324 
32S 
US - Taxes on Automobiles (1994), unadopted, GATTDS311R. 
US - Gasoline, supra n 36. 
326 US - Shrimp, supra n 105. 
327 EC - Asbestos. supra n 253. 
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them, US - Shrimp was followed by a procedure under Article 21.5 of the DSu.330 All 
the cases mentioned above except US - Tuna (Mexico) II dealt with the violation of 
the basic principles of the WTO rules, and the respondents raised the Article XX 
• general exception' as a defence.331 In these cases, exceptions were used to impose 
technical regulations to protect consumer safety, animal or plant life or health, 
exhaustible natural resources and so on. 
In general, following an earlier decision of a GA TT panel, these exceptions have been 
narrowly construed by WTO panels, making it difficult for Members to rely on them 
in subsequent disputes.332 However, the WTO Appellate Body has not necessarily 
adopted the same approach. Instead, in US - Gasoline333it advocated for 'a kind of 
balancing between the general rule and the exception' ,334 when it stated: 
The context of Article XX(g) includes the provisions of the rest of the 
General Agreement, including in particular Articles I, III and XI; 
conversely, the context of Articles I and III and XI includes Article xx. 
Accordingly, the phrase "relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources" may not be read so expansively as seriously to subvert the 
purpose and object of Article III:4. Nor may Article III:4 be given so broad 
a reach as effectively to emasculate Article XX(g) and the policies and 
interests it embodies. The relationship between the affirmative 
commitments set out in, e.g., Articles I, III and XI, and the policies and 
328 d d Brazil- Retrea e Tyres, supra n 264. 
329 US - Tuna Il (Mexico), supra n 322. 
m I 
331 
An Article 21.5 panel reviews the existence and consistency of govemmenta measures taken to 
implement the DSB recommendations and rulings with a covered agreement. 
US - Tuna II (Mexico), supra n 322, deals with Articles 2,5,6 and 8 of the TBT Agreement and 
Articles I and III of the GATT 1994. 
332 In the US - s.337 of the Tariff Act 1930 (1989) GATT BISD 36S/345, a GA IT panel decided 
that exceptions are to be construed narrowly. See GATTpanel report, para. 5.9. 
333 US - Gasoline, supra n 36, 16--17. 
334 B ossche, supra n 235, 618. 
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interests embodied in the "General Exceptions" listed in Article XX, can 
be given meaning within the framework of the General Agreement and its 
object and purpose by a treaty interpreter only on a case-to-case basis, by 
careful scrutiny of the factual and legal context in a given dispute, without 
disregarding the words actually used by the WTO Members themselves to 
express their intent and purpose. 
It seems that although the Appellate Body has not expressly endorsed a narrow 
interpretation of the exceptions of Article XX GA IT 1994, stating that Article XX(g) 
'may not be read so expansively as seriously to subvert the purpose and object of 
Article 111:4', it provides greater protection to free trade objectives. 
This 'kind of balancing' approach is noticeable in some other WTO environmental 
disputes. For example, as discussed earlier, in US - Gasoline, the Appellate Body 
applied the 'less trade-restrictive' test in order to pennit import restrictions. In this 
case, the Appellate Body also implied the 'even-handedness' test to the measure, 
seeking justification under Article XX(g) GAIT 1994.335 The WTO panels and the 
Appellate Body have applied 'weighing and balancing' in a number of environmental 
disputes to detennine whether or not a measure is 'necessary' under paragraphs (b) 
and (d).336 
From the earlier discussion on GA IT environmental exceptions, it is irrefutable that 
the WTO panels, and especially the Appellate Body, have taken a more liberal 
approach to interpreting the exceptions of Article XX GA IT 1994 in order to 
335 us - Gasoline, supra n 36, 21. 
336 K 
orea - Various Measures in Beef, Appellate Body Report, supra n 264, para. 162-3; EC -
Asbestos, supra n 253, para. 172. 
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accommodate non-trade values, especially environmental interests, compared to the 
former GATT panels. The WTO DSU provides that the provisions of the 'covered 
agreements' are to be clarified 'in accordance with the customary rules of 
interpretation of public international law'. 337 Therefore, in interpreting the WTO 
Agreement, the panels and the Appellate Body must follow international law on the 
interpretation of treaties as codified in Articles 31-33 of the Vienna Convention,338 not 
in accordance with specific GA TTIWTO canons of interpretation.339 This more 
'consistent and internationally principled approach' of the Appellate Body in 
interpreting Article XX GATT 1994 might allow for greater tolerance for legitimate 
measures of environmental protection.34o 
3.3. Areas of overlap and the balance 
In light of the above GATTIWTO rules, this section of the chapter analyses the 
balance between trade and environmental consideration in the WTO and its annexed 
agreements, focusing on possible overlap with the MEAs. 
3.3.1. Trade restrictions to protect resources beyond national jurisdiction 
MEAs aiming at conservation of natural resources may authorize Contracting Parties 
to impose unilateral trade sanctions upon other countries in order to protect resources 
or the environment in areas beyond their jurisdiction. This raises the question whether 
337 Article 3(2) of the DSU. 
338 See Chapter 2 for the text of Articles 31-33 of the Vienna Convention. 
339 US - Gasoline. supra n 36; Japan - Alcoholic Beverages, supra n 87; EC- Hormones, supra n 
162. 
340 Bimie et aI., supra nil, 764-5. 
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there is any scope under WTO multilateral trade agreements for unilateral state action 
of this kind? 
This issue was addressed in both Tuna I and Tuna 11 decided by GA TT panels. In Tuna 
i41, the panel had to decide on two issues: i) can one country tell another what its 
environmental regulations should be; and ii) do trade rules permit action to be taken 
against the method used to produce goods (rather than the quality of the goods 
themselves)? It concluded: i) that the US could not embargo imports of tuna products 
from Mexico simply because Mexican regulations on the way tuna was produced did 
not satisfy US regulations; and ii) GATT rules did not allow one country to take trade 
action for the purpose of attempting to enforce its own domestic laws in another 
country - even if such action was aimed at protecting animal health or exhaustible 
natural resources. The term used here is 'extra-territoriality'. In Tuna 11, the panel had 
to decide on the legality of a secondary embargo of tuna products from countries that 
processed tuna caught by the offending country. 342 The panel condemned the 
unilateral boycott.343 
Both GA TT panels also concluded that such a unilateral measure imposed by US could 
not be justified under Article XX(b), as it failed the 'necessary test', forced other 
countries to change their conservation standards and did not satisfy the standard of 
Article XX(g).344 However, the GATT panels on Tuna I and Tuna 11 came to different 
conclusions regarding the territorial application of Articles XX (b) and XX(g) GA TT 
1947. The Tuna I panel concluded that these provisions only protected natural 
341 Tuna I, supra n 258. 
342 Tuna 11, supra n 262, para. 5.29. 
343 b I id, paras. 5.38-5.39. 
344 Ibid, para. 5.26 and Tuna I, supra n 258, para. 5.33. 
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resources and living things within the territorial jurisdiction of the country's 
concern.
345 In contrast, the Tuna II panel could not find any valid reason to support 
this conclusion.346 Nevertheless, it distinguished between extraterritorial and extra-
jurisdiction application of Article XX, and ruled that governments can enforce an 
Article XX(g) restriction extraterritorially only against their own nations and 
vessels.347 
However, it was the WTO Appellate Body decision in US - Shrimps which gave clear 
extraterritorial scope to Article XX(g), in which it detennined that the provision 
applies to exhaustible resources beyond areas of national jurisdiction as well as to 
domestic resources.348 As mentioned earlier, the Appellate Body has adopted an 
expansive interpretation of the tenn 'exhaustible natural resources', which qualifies as 
virtually all living and non-living resources. It also takes a more 'nuanced approach' 
to the 'relating to' element. 
3.3.2. Trade restriction to protect the domestic environment 
MEAs generally invoke three types of trade restriction in order to protect the domestic 
environment, namely import restrictions, export restraints and high-level standard 
setting. 
345 Tuna I, supra n 258, paras. 5.26 and 5.31. 
346 Tuna 1/, supra n 262, para. 5.20. 
347 b d I i ., para. 5.20. 
348 US - Shrimp, supra n 105, para. 132. 
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3.3.2.1. Import and export restrictions 
Any import restrictions on products must comply with Articles I, 11, III and XI of the 
GATT 1994; those that do not must find an applicable exemption under Article XX. In 
addition, product restrictions are subject to the SPS and TBT Agreements, which deal 
respectively with sanitary and phytosanitary measures and product standards. Both 
agreements allow Members to set environmental standards but at the same time they 
balance their autonomy so that the standards they set do not undermine the 
GATTIWTO objectives. 
Import restrictions on environmentally harmful products can be justified by applying 
Article XX(b) GA TT 1994. This provision can be invoked broadly to protect the 
domestic environment. However, as mentioned earlier, such trade-restrictive measures 
must be 'necessary' and fulfil the conditions of this sub-provision, i.e. like products 
produced domestically must be similarly restricted and discrimination among 
countries similarly situated must be prohibited, besides fulfilling the conditions of the 
chapeau to Article XX. 
Regarding export restriction, the issue arises whether a country may ban or restrict 
exports of natural resource products on the ground that it is necessary for conservation 
purposes. Such restriction would have to qualify under Article XX(g) of the GA TT. As 
mentioned earlier, to qualify under this provision the export restrictions must be taken 
into account 'in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or 
consumption' . 
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Additionally, some trade restrictions may also implicate the SPS Agreement, which 
explicitly requires WTO Members to take 'necessary' sanitary or phytosanitary 
measures to protect human, animal or plant life or health. In this context, Article 5(6) 
of the SPS Agreement specifies that such measures must 'not be more trade-restrictive 
than required to achieve their appropriate level of ... protection'. This provision 
presumes the right of each state to choose its own level of protection unilaterally. 
A SPS measure must be based on 'scientific principles' and also take into account 
available 'scientific evidence' .349 Thus, the SPS Agreement uses 'science' as a 
touchstone to justify such measures. A WTO member applying SPS measures must 
establish that there is 'sufficient scientific evidence' available for assessment of risk to 
human, animal or plant life or health.35o Where scientific evidence is insufficient 
regarding the risk at issue, Article 5(7) of the SPS Agreement permits WTO Members 
to adopt, under certain conditions, provisional SPS measures.351 The precautionary 
approach finds reflection in Article 5(7) of the SPS Agreemen?52 as a ground for 
justifying SPS measures that would otherwise be inconsistent with the members' 
obligations set out therein although the Appellate Body has refused to accept the 
precautionary principle as a principle of international law. 
As the Appellate Body found in EC - Hormones, the 'precautionary principle, at least 
outside the field of international environmental law, still awaits authoritative 
formulation', and was not specifically written into the relevant covered agreements 
349 Article 2(2) of the SPS Agreement. 
350 Ibid., Article 5( 1). 
351 
352 
For the interpretation of Articles 2(2),5(1),5(5) 5(6) and 5(7) see WTO, Australia: Measures 
Affecting Importing of Salmon - Recourse to Article 21(5)- Report of the Appellate Body (6 
November 1998) WT/DSI8/AB/R; WTO, Japan: Measures Affecting Agricultural Products 
(hereinafter Japan - Agricultural Products}-Report of the Appellate Body (19 March 1999) 
WT/DS761R and WTIDS76/AB/R; EC- Hormones, supra n 162. 
EC- Hormones, supra n 162, para. VI. 
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dealt with in the case, i.e. the SPS Agreement.353 The Appellate Body went so far as to 
assess whether the principle could override established trade rules, but concluded that 
'the precautionary principle does not, by itself, and without a clear textual directive to 
that effect, relieve a panel from the duty of applying the normal (i.e. customary 
international law) principles of treaty interpretation in reading the provisions of the 
SPS Agreement'. It was thus unable to 'override the provisions of Articles 5(1) and 
5(2) of the SPS Agreement' .354 Unsurprisingly, with the precautionary principle barred 
from full consideration, the contested measure was found to be inconsistent with the 
SPS Agreement. 
In brief, Article 5(7) of the SPS Agreement permits parties to adopt provisional SPS 
measures when the measure is: i) imposed in respect of a situation where 'relevant 
scientific information is insufficient'; and ii) adopted 'on the basis of available 
pertinent information' .355 Pursuant to the second sentence of Article 5(7), such a 
provisional measure may not be maintained unless the Member in question: iii) 
'seek[s] to obtain the additional information necessary for a more objective 
assessment of risk'; and iv) 'review[s] the measure accordingly within a reasonable 
period of time', as determined in Japan - Measures Affecting Agricultural 
Products. 356 
In this case, the WTO Appellate Body found that these four requirements are 
cumulative in nature; therefore, whenever one of these requirements is not met, the 
measure will be found to be inconsistent with the SPS Agreement. Furthermore, 
3S3 Ibid., with reference to the Gabcikovic-Nagymaros Case, supra n 38, paras. 111-14, 140. 
354 EC- Hormones, supra n 162, para. 124. 
355 Japan - Agricultural Products, supra n 351, Appellate Body Report, para. 89. 
356 Ibid. 
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Article 2(3) of the SPS Agreement requires such measures to be consistent with the 
conditions of the chapeau to that provision. 
3.3.2.2. High level of environmental standard setting 
Do the WTO multilateral trade agreements permit trade-restrictive measures that set 
up a high level of environmental protection? As mentioned earlier, WTO Member 
states are free to choose their own level of protection under the SPS Agreement, and a 
high level of environmental protection can be chosen. In EC - Hormones, the 
Appellate Body clarified the criteria for adopting and applying high level standards 
under the SPS.357 First, high level protection, which is permitted under Article 3(3) of 
the SPS Agreement, must be based on a 'risk assessment' and 'sufficient scientific 
evidence' .358 However, the limitations of the application of the precautionary 
approach need to be taken into consideration in this context, as discussed earlier. 
Second, since the SPS Agreement does not define risk assessment, members are free to 
consider both 'available scientific evidence' and 'relevant economic factors' .359 
However, a 'rational relationship' must be established 'between the trade measure and 
the risk assessment', and the scientific reports relied upon must rationally support the 
import restriction.360 Third, such a measure must not be arbitrary or an unjustifiable 
discrimination and disguised restriction to international trade.361 If the above criteria 
are fulfilled, a WTO member may choose the level of protection it wants to adopt 
regarding its own natural resources, environmental quality, and health and safety. 
357 EC 
- Hormones, supra n 162. 
358 Articles 5(1) and 2(2) of the SPS Agreement. 
359 Ibid., Articles 5(2) and 5(3). 
360 EC - Hormones, supra n 162, para. 193. 
361 Article 5(5) of the SPS Agreement. 
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Another way of ralsmg environmental standards is through eco-Iabelling. TBT 
Agreement permits members to adopt eco-Iabelling in order to protect the environment 
but requires that eco-Iabelling regulations are not 'more trade-restrictive than 
necessary' to fulfil a legitimate objective?62 The WTO panel in the US - Tuna 
(Mexico) II case decided that two elements 'must be shown' for a measure to be 
considered more trade-restrictive than necessary: (i) the measure must be trade-
restrictive; and (ii) the measure must restrict trade more than is necessary to fulfil the 
measure's legitimate objective.363 The preamble to the TBT Agreement makes clear 
that each Member has the right to decide for itself which legitimate objectives to 
pursue and to take measures to meet those objectives 'at the levels it considers 
appropriate', including with respect to measures to protect animal life or health or the 
environment and to prevent deceptive practices.364 
However, a WTO panel in the US - Tuna (Mexico) 11 case interpreted 'necessary' to 
be 'understood as an enquiry into whether such trade-restrictiveness is required to 
fulfil the legitimate objectives pursued by the Member at its chosen level of 
protection' .365 The panel adopted a very broad interpretation of 'legitimate objective', 
and viewed that to be 'legitimate' US objective of protecting dolphins requires 
showing that another measure has been taken to preserve 'other marine species and 
the environment of the ETP [Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean] as a whole'. 366 
362 Article 2(2) of the TBT Agreement. 
363 US - Tuna Il (Mexico), supra n 322, para. 4.95. 
364 Preamble of the TBT Agreement. 
365 US _ Tuna Il (Mexico), supra n 322, para. 7.460. 
366 US - Tuna II (Mexico), supra n 322, para. 4.90. 
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3.3.3. Process and production methods 
The TBT Agreement applies to any technical regulation that deals with a product 
characteristic, including 'packaging, marking and labelling requirements as they apply 
to a product, process or production method' .367 However, it does not allow mentioning 
products' characteristics and/or process and production methods (PPMs) in the label 
as the GATT 1994 does not discriminate between 'like products' based on such PPMs. 
The WTO PPMs do not constitute part of 'likeness of products'. In Tuna I, the panel 
stated that products cannot be considered 'unlike' for the purpose of Article 111(4) of 
the GATT 1947 because they are made by different production processes.368 
This principle has since been applied and accepted in other cases. The WTO Appellate 
Body in Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages suggested that the important factors in 
determining what constitute 'likeness' are the product's physical characteristics, 
nature and quality, and its end uses, even though they may have been produced in a 
very different way.369 In a recent decision the WTO panel viewed that labelling to 
protect 'human health and safety, animal or plant life or health, or the environment' is 
a positive obligation under Article 2(2) of the TBT Agreement and is not formulated as 
an exception.37o However, the panel refused to include PPMs as part of labelling. It 
viewed that:371 
labelling provisions do not require the importing Member to comply with 
any particular fishing method (these measures do not state, for example, 
that no tuna may be imported if it originates in a country where tuna is 
367 Annex I, para. 1 of the TBT Agreement. 
368 The decision was unadopted and this conclusion was not necessary for the decision; therefore, 
some controversy exists over its legal implication. 
369 Japan - Alcoholic Beverages, supra n 87. 
370 Para. 2.458. 
371 US _ Tuna 11 (Mexico), supra n 322 para. 7.372 
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caught by setting on dolphins). Rather, it is the products themselves that 
need to comply with the requirements of the labelling scheme, if they wish 
to benefit from the label and make dolphin-safe claims on the US market. 
3.3.4. Environmental protection under the TRIPS Agreement 
The TRIPS AgreemenP72 introduced intellectual property rules into the multilateral 
trading system. Its preamble reflects two competing goals as the main objectives: 'to 
reduce distortions and impediments to international trade, ... taking into account the 
need to promote effective and adequate protection of intellectual property rights, and 
to ensure that measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do not 
themselves become barriers to legitimate trade'. The TRIPS Agreement covers a 
number of types of intellectual property rights, such as patents, copyrights, 
trademarks, industrial designs and geographical indications. 
Of these, patents are the most important 'for the development of both beneficial 
biotechnologies and marketable environmental technologies that generate less waste 
and pollution'. 373 Article 27(1) of the TRIPS Agreement provides patent protection to 
any invention, 'whether products or processes', in all fields of technology, provided 
that: i) the invention is new; ii) it requires an inventive step; and iii) it is capable of 
industrial application. However, Article 27(2) of the TRIPS Agreement allows WTO 
Members to exclude from patentability inventions that endanger human, animal or 
plant life or health, or the environment. It reads: 
372 For further discussion on how the Uruguay Round brought intellectual property rights -
copyrights, trademarks, patents etc. - into the WTO framework through the TRIPS Agreement, 
Carlos M Correa and Abdulqawia A Yusuf(ed), Intellectual Property and International Trade: 
373 
The TRIPS Agreement (Kluwer Law International, The Netherlands 2008). 
Birnie et aI., supra nIl, 805. 
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Members may exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention within 
their territory of the commeccial exploitation of which is necessary to 
protect ordre public or morality, including to protect human, animal or 
plant life or health pr to. avoid serious prejuq.ice to the environment, 
provided that such exclusion is not made merely because the exploitation is 
prohibited by their law. 
This broad exception authorizes Members to refuse to grant patents to 
environmentally risky inventions. However, the actual effect of this exception depends 
on the illterpretation of the two qualifying conditions, 'necessary' and 'not made 
merely because the exploitation is prohibited by their law'. Although it is yet to be 
clarified,374 it is presumed that the WTO dispute settlement organs will go for a strict 
interpretation, as it has been the practice of both WTO panels and the Appellate Body 
to narrowly construe exceptions.375 Thus, a strict interpretation of this article would 
only allow Members to exclude from patentability inventions 'when there is a 
substantial international consensus in favour of non-patentability,376 and only where 
no other means are available to protect the environment. 
Furthermore, Article 27(3)(b) of the TRIPS Agreement allows WTO Members to 
exclude the following products and process from patentability: i) plants and animals, 
other than microorganisms; and ii) the essential biological processes for the 
production of plants and animals, other than non-biological or microbiological 
374 Bruce Harper, 'TRIPS Article 27.2: An Argument for Caution' (1997) 21 Wm & Mary Envtl L 
& Pol'y Rev 381. 
375 Bona Cheyne, 'Environmental treaties and the GATT' (1992) 1 RECIEL 14 at 17-8; Chris 
Wold, 'Multilateral environmental agreements and the GATT: conflict and resolution?' (1996) 
26 Environmental Law 841 at 843. 
376 B irnie et aI., supra n 11, 807. 
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procedures. Although naturally occurring plants cannot be patented, Article 27(3)(b) 
provides that Members who have excluded plant varieties or even plants in general 
from patentability must introduce an 'effective sui generis system' or a combination 
of patent and sui generis systems domestically. The sui generis system refers to the 
International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV), established 
by the UPO V Convention in Paris in 1961 and revised periodically. 377 States adhering 
to UPOV undertake to create a system of granting plant breeder rights (PBRs) under 
their domestic laws. The TRIPS Agreement supplements UPOV by requiring all WTO 
Members to grant protection to PBRs, either through UPOV or by allowing for their 
patentability. Thus, the TRIPS Agreement requires either patent protection of plant 
varieties or a sui generis system for plant variety protection. 
However, it does not provide protection to traditional knowledge as such.378 In this 
way, sui generis provisions could permit forms of statutory exemptions in individual 
members' territories, whereby they could regulate such matters as bio-prospecting.379 
Bio-prospecting is the exploration, extraction and screening of biological diversity and 
indigenous knowledge for commercially valuable genetic and biochemical 
resources.380 Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement contains provisions for granting 
compulsory licensing to allow WTO Members to facilitate bio-prospecting activities, 
377 In 1972, 1978 and 1991. On international regimes for plant genetic resources see Gregory 
Rose, 'International Regime for the Conservation and Control of Plant Genetic Resources' in 
Michael Bowman and Catherine Redgwell (ed), International law and the Conservation of 
Biological Diversity (Kluwer Law International, the Netherlands 1996) Ch 8, 145. 
378 Mary Footer, 'Our Agricultural Heritage: Sustainability, Common Heritage and 
Intergenerati6nal Equity', in Nico Schrijver and Friedl Weiss (eds.), International Law and 
Sustainable Development: Principles and Practice (Martinus NijhotT Publishers, Leiden 2004) 
433. 
379 
'Bio-prospecting' is the exploration or screening of natural biodiversity or agricultural 
biodiversity in order to identify potential commercial applications from those genetic resources. 
380 I Wa ter Reid, Sarah Laird, Rodrigo Gamez et al. (ed), A New Lease on Life. in Biodiversity 
Prospecting: Using Genetic Resources for Sustainable Development (World Resources Institution, 
Washington 1993). 
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for example, granting compulsory licences to a pharmaceutical company that wishes 
to access certain genetic resources for pharmaceutical research.381 However, the 
TRIPS Agreement places procedural limits on the ability of governments to provide 
such licensing.382 
3.3.5. Animal welfare issue 
The WTO dispute settlement may apply Article XX(a) as a 'trade concern'. In China 
- Audiovisual Services,383 the Appellate Body found that China could invoke Article 
XX(a) of the GATT 1994 to justify provisions found to be inconsistent with China's 
trading rights commitments under its Accession Protocol and Working Party Report. It 
also found that a requirement in one of China's measures could be characterized as 
'necessary' to protect public morals within the meaning of Article XX(a), but 
ultimately concluded that China had not demonstrated that the relevant provisions 
were 'necessary' for these purposes. As a result, China had not established that these 
provisions were justified under Article XX(a) GATT 1994/84 and the public morals 
exception did not prevail as a defence. 
Arguably, public morals could be invoked as a ground for justification by a member 
adopting or maintaining an import or export ban on child labour, alcoholic beverages 
or pornographic material. Similarly, trade-related animal welfare measures could 
potentially be recognized under the multilateral trade agreements. Animal rights 
activists are pushing for the inclusion of animal welfare standards in the WTO 
381 Car10s Correa, 'Patent Right', in supra n 372, Chapter 8, 245-9. 
382 For more about these limitations, see the text of Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
383 WTO, China: Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain 
Publications and A udiovisual Entertainment Products - Report of the Appellate Body (19 
January 2010) WTIDS363/AB/R, para. 7. 
384 [bid, para. 34. 
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multilateral trade negotiations, arguing that this is urgently needed to effectively 
enforce animal standards worldwide, and to improve the appalling condition of 
slaughterhouses and stop animal cruelty. 
Many countries are already adopting trade-related animal welfare measures to prevent 
animal cruelty. The EU is playing a leading role by adopting animal welfare 
standards, including new slaughter rules, and revising legislation for the welfare of 
animals used in scientific procedures. A revised EU legislation, which was first 
proposed by the European Commission in 2008, aims to strengthen the protection of 
animals still needed for research and safety testing. A panel has been established by 
the WTO at the request of Canada on European Union - Measures Prohibiting the 
Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, which is the first full-blown animal 
welfare case before the WTO DSB, and there is increasing hope that this issue will 
bring the EU's defence under Article XX(a) to the fore. 385 
3.4. Conclusions 
Over the past decade, the WTO has devoted considerable attention to the relationship 
between trade and environment, and included it on the agenda of the Doha Round. In 
parallel, the jurisprudence on trade and the environment has experienced significant 
advances. There is no denying that the WTO system has matured since GATT. 
However, even today the WTO dispute settlement organs opt for a narrow 
interpretation of the Article XX 'environmental exceptions' and the DMD has moved 
forward, but has not gone far enough nor in a timely fashion with its environmental 
385 h T e Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO on 21 April agreed to establish a panel, at the 
request of Norway, to examine measures imposed by the EU prohibiting the importation and 
marketing of seal products from Norway. 
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agenda. Additionally, the CTE's achievement has been modest thus far in seeking to 
balance environmental and trade concerns. 
In conclusion, it can be said that recourse to Article XX cannot justify the measures 
that 'undermine the WTO multilateral trading system,386as it is evident that these 
measures have no protectionist effect for the environment. Neither the preamble of the 
WTO Agreement nor the international policy documents gives the trade liberalization 
objectives priority over the objectives of environmental protection but instead seek to 
balance these objectives. 
However, the interpretation of Article XX by the WTO panels and the Appellate Body 
in recent rulings demonstrates that the WTO is gradually developing an environmental 
conscience but this does not amount to full environmental protection nor does it give 
environmental policy priority over trade. It can only do so much; it cannot change or 
replace the rules. The WTO itself has been less successful in its search for better ways 
to integrate both concerns. The draft text of the Committee on Trade and Environment 
Special Session has shown that the WTO has made some progress to resolve this 
problem. 
It is apparent from the panels' and Appellate Body's interpretation of the various 
exceptions in Article XX of the GA TT 1994 that environmental protection is not a 
primary objective of the multilateral trading system. Instead the multilateral trading 
system allows environmental measures to the extent that they are consistent with 
substantive trade rules. In addition, it is the practice of the panels and the Appellate 
386 us - Shrimp, supra n 105, para. 7.44. 
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Body to interpret exceptions narrowly, which reduces the scope of environmental 
protection even further. Exceptions may not be read so expansively or seriously as to 
subvert the object and purpose of the GATT 1994.387 On the other hand, nor may the 
GATT be given so broad a reach as to emasculate the exceptions entirely. It is correct 
to say that environmental concerns and the arrangements focused on in Articles XX(b) 
and (g) GA TT 1994 may 'justify an exception to the principles of trade liberalisation 
embodied in the WTO system, but are by no means afforded equal footing with the 
various trade disciplines' .388 
The chapeau conditions in Article XX are strictly applied by the panels and the 
Appellate Body to justify trade-related environmental measures. The Appellate Body 
agreed that in some cases, 'discrimination' could be based on serious concern for the 
protection of 'human, animal and plant life', provided that it is not 'arbitrary' or 
'unjustifiable' .389 In this way, the Appellate Body has in principle accepted measures 
that are 'necessary to protect human, animal and plant life' but at the same time 
required that they be the least inconsistent with the GATTIWTO rules.390 However, a 
question arises as to what would happen in the case of a trade-restrictive measure 
which was not the least inconsistent with the GA TTIWTO rule but nonetheless was the 
most effective to 'protect human, animal and plant life'? WTO jurisprudence suggests 
that a trade measure taken under the MEA would have to pass the least-trade-
restrictive test in order to meet the requirement under Article XX(b) GA TT 1994 that 
the measure be 'necessary'. 
387 Ibid., 16-17. 
388 • Lmdroos and Mehling, 'From Autonomy to Integration?' supra n 21. 265. 
389 US - Gasoline, supra n 36, 47. 
390 Ibid,49. 
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The current approach does not give sufficient weight to environmental protection. The 
GAIT/WTO regime needs to adopt a 'proportionate approach' to weigh 'the costs' 
(trade restriction) and 'benefits' (environmental protection) and to disallow measures 
only if their cost significantly exceeded the benefit. It cannot be denied that the WTO 
Appellate Body has provided a more generous interpretation of environmental 
exceptions in WTO rules compared to the previous GAIT panels. Nevertheless, it is 
feared that if environmental disputes continue to be settled in the WTO dispute 
settlement system, it will limit the scope and operation of the MEAs. The following 
chapter discusses the ITT A to analyse the extent to which a particular commodity 
agreement makes allowance for the protection of environmental interests. 
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4. Protection for the Tropical Timber Forest in the ITTA 
4.1. Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to analyse the extent to which the 2006 International 
Tropical Timber Agreement (hereinafter the Agreement or the ITTA),391 successor of 
the ITT A 1983 and ITTA 1994,392 manages tropical forests for the production of timber 
and other products while still maintaining considerable biodiversity values. 
The ITT A is a commodity agreement393 dealing with trade in tropical timbers. 
However, the ITTA is not a conventional commodity agreement, as it refers to 
conservation, sustainable forest management, sustainable utilization and the 
maintenance of ecological balance in its various provisions.394 The Preamble of the 
Agreement recalls various leading environmental policy documents related to 
conservation and sustainable development. It has made a commitment to make its 
sustainable forest management goals consistent with the sustainable development 
goals to which the international community has committed in a series of international 
instruments, such as the 1973 CITES, the 1980 World Conservation Strategy, the 1992 
Rio Declaration, the 1992 CBD and the 2002 Johannesburg Declaration. 
The ITTA 2006 reaffirms International Tropical Timber Organization'S (ITTO) 
longstanding philosophy of using tropical forests in a sustainable way for economic 
development. The Agreement also recognizes the contribution of sustainable forest 
391 
392 
393 
The lIT A 2006 entered into force on the 7th December 2011 the after rati fication of the 
Agreement by the West African nation of Benin. Through this ratification it reached the 
ratification threshold required in Article 39 of the Agreement. For ITTO news release see. 
<http://www . itto.int/news Jeleases/id=2851 > (accessed on 20 January 2012). 
For the text of the I1TA, 1983, 1996 and 2006 see <http://www.itto.int> (accessed on 6 January 
2011 ). 
Bowman, Davies and RedgweU, supra n 8, 18. 
394 Preamble (t), (g), Article l(q) of the 200611TA. 
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management to sustainable development and poverty alleviation, and the achievement 
of internationally agreed development goals, including those contained in the 
Millennium Declaration.395 This chapter analyses the extent to which the 2006 ITTA 
provisions are successful in matching its trade objectives with the conservation 
objectives mentioned in these MEAs, as well as in the ITTA's own preamble. The 
chapter is divided into two sections. Section I presents an overview of the Agreement, 
which includes ITTA's institutional arrangements, objectives and purposes, key 
provisions and implementation procedure. It also analyses the Agreement's provisions 
to observe the extent to which environmental concerns have been considered in this 
commodity agreement. In the light of the section I discussion, section 11 examines the 
extent to which the IITA impacts upon traditional approaches to exploitation. 
4.2. Overview of the ITTA 
Since the early 1970s there has been widespread public concern about the rate at 
which tropical forests are being degraded or destroyed. These processes have been 
going on in certain localities for a long time, but they have accelerated greatly since 
the 1960s as a result of mechanisation, improved transport, and economic and 
population growth. Whilst almost everyone was alarmed at the rate of deforestation 
occurring in many tropical countries, there was also considerable agreement that the 
tropical timber trade is one of the keys to economic development in those countries. 
The reconciliation of these two seemingly disparate considerations underpins the 
entire history of the !ITA. 
395 Article I(f) of the ITTA, 2006. 
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The first IITA was adopted on 18 November 1983 and entered into force on 1 April 
1985. It remained in force for an initial period of five years and was twice extended 
for further three-year periods. The Agreement was, however, renegotiated during 
1993-94. The successor agreement, the ITTA 1994, was adopted on 26 January 1994 
and entered into force on 1 January 1997. It contains broader provisions for 
information sharing, including on non-tropical timber trade data, allows for 
consideration of non-tropical timber issues as they relate to tropical timber, and 
includes 'the IITO Objective 2000' for achieving exports of tropical timber and 
timber products from sustainably managed sources by the year 2000. The lTTA 1994 
also established the Bali Partnership Fund (BPF) to assist Producer members in 
achieving the 'Year 2000 Objective'. Initially intended to last for four years, the lTTA 
1994 was extended twice for three-year periods and was extended indefinitely in 
2007. 
In 2003 negotiations began on a successor agreement to the lTTA 1994. The lTTA 
2006 was adopted in Geneva on 27 January 2006, but as mentioned earlier, is yet to 
enter into force. For the purpose of the Agreement, the members are divided into two 
categories: Consumers and Producers.396 To date, 57 members have signed the 
Agreement, of which 54 have ratified; 20 of these are Consumer members and 34 
Producer members.397 
4.2.1. Institutional arrangements 
The lIT A 1983 established the International Tropical Timber Organization (lTTO), 
headquartered in Y okohama, Japan, which provides a framework for tropical timber 
396 See Article 4 of I7TA 2006. 
397 See ITTO official website at: <http://www.itto.int> accessed on 6 January 2011. 
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Producer and Consumer countries to discuss and develop policies on issues relating to 
international trade in, and utilization of, tropical timber and the sustainable 
management of its resource base. The ITTO also administers assistance for related 
projects. ITTO has two categories of membership: producing and consuming. 
The governing body of the ITTO is the International Tropical Timber Council (lTTC), 
which is composed of all the organization's members398, and meets at least once a 
year399 to take decisions related to ITTO's administrative and programme work and to 
• 400 'rh C '1 . d b fi . 401 h' h approve new proJects. e OunCI IS supporte your committees , w IC are 
open to all members and observers, and provide advice and assistance to the Council 
on policy and project issues. These committees are supported by the Expert Panel for 
the Technical Appraisal of Projects and Pre-projects, which reviews project proposals 
for technical merit and relevance to ITTO objectives. 
ITTO's small secretariat of about 35 staff is based in Yokohama, Japan.402 It is headed 
by an Executive Director who is responsible to the Council for the administration and 
operation of the Agreement in accordance with decisions made by the Council. The 
organization also has regional offices in Latin America and Africa to assist with 
project monitoring and other duties. 
ITTO occupies an unusual position in the family of intergovernmental organizations. 
Like all commodity organizations it is concerned with trade and industry, but like an 
398 See Article 6(1) of the IITA 2006, 
399 Ibid. Article 9{ I ). 
400 Ibid. Article 7(a). 
401 These are the committees on Reforestation and Forest Management; Forest Industry; Economic 
Information and Market Intelligence; and Finance and Administration. See Article 26{ I) of the 
I7TA 2006. 
402 Ibid. Article 3(4). 
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environmental agreement it also pays considerable attention to the sustainable 
management of natural resources. 
4.2.2. Objectives and purposes of the ITTA 
More than 1.6 billion people depend to varying degrees on forests for their 
livelihoods, in particular for fuelwood, medicinal plants and forest foods. 
Approximately 300 million people depend on forests directly for their survival, 
including about 60 million people of indigenous and tribal groups, who are almost 
wholly dependent on forests. Forests play a key role in the economy of many 
countries. Deforestation and forest degradation, almost entirely in the tropics, also 
affect 89% of threatened birds, 83% of threatened mammals and more than 90% of 
threatened plants.403 
Consequently, ecologists began to put pressure on the ITTO to enclose some 
guidelines in the IITA to protect tropical forests from over-utilization and to protect 
the overall biodiversity of the tropical forests. In response, the [ITA 1994 expressly 
recalled the Rio Declaration and the CBD in stating its objectives. Furthermore, it 
adopted Sustainable Forest Management (SFM) as a policy following Principle 12 of 
the Rio Declaration, which guides states to promote a supportive and open economic 
system that would lead to economic growth and sustainable development in all 
countries in order to better address the problems of environmental degradation. 
403 Data collected from IUCN official website. available at: 
<http://www.iucn.orglaboutlworklprogrammes/forestliyf/introductionl> (accessed on 12 June 
2011). 
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In this context, the 2002 Johannesburg Declaration vows to implement sustainable 
development principles at all levels for a long-term perspective. Accordingly, the 
2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development adopted a plan for the 
implementation of the sustainable development principle and provided guidelines to 
change unsustainable patterns of consumption and production. It also influenced the 
lIT A 2006 to shift its objectives towards sustainable consumption and production to 
promote social and economic development. The negotiating parties of the Agreement 
recognized that a flourishing trade in tropical timber, if based on a well-managed 
forest resource, could be key to sustainable development, providing valuable foreign 
exchange and employment while protecting natural forests from destruction and 
degradation. 
The IITA 2006 has two mam objectives:404 i) to promote the expanSlon and 
diversification of international trade in tropical timber from sustainably managed and 
legally harvested forests; and ii) to promote the sustainable management of tropical 
timber-producing forests. The Agreement sets out the organization's long-standing 
aims of enhancing the capacity of members to export tropical timber from sustainably 
managed forests and to improve market transparency, forest-based enterprises and 
sustainable forest management (SFM).405 It also expands the scope of previous 
agreements to include objectives related to poverty alleviation, forest law 
enforcement, non-timber forest products and environmental services, voluntary market 
mechanisms such as certification, and the role of forest-dependent communities. 
404 Article 1 of the [ITA 2006. 
405 See ITTO Action Plan 2008-20 11, ITTO Policy Development Series 18. Available at: 
< h t t p : / / w w w . i t t o . i n t l p o l i c y p a p e r s ~ u i d e l i n e s > . .
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These broad and extended objectives show ITTA's intention to balance both the 
economic and the environmental concerns and interests. It was correct to understand 
that without conserving the tropical timber forest it would ultimately become 
impossible to carry on the timber trade. Therefore, the ITTA 2006 included the 
'sustainable forest management' concept in its provisions to improve ecosystem 
services and forest resilience. 
4.2.3. Sustainable Forest Management (SFM) 
The aim of ITTA's SFM prpgramme is to ensure that the goods and services derived 
from the forest meet present-day needs without hampering their continued availability 
and contribution for future generations. The ITTO defines sustainable forest 
management as:406 
the process of managing permanent forest land to achieve one or 
more clearly specified objectives of management with regard to the 
production of a continuous flow of desired forest products and 
services without u.,due reduction of its inherent values and future 
productivity and without undue undesirable effects on the physical 
and social environment. 
This definition clearly does not show that it is ITTO's intention to preserve all the 
biodiversity that a tropical forest contains. It tolerates some loss of biodiversity as 
long as forests continue to provide the required goods and services. It is apparent that 
the ITTO is clearly giving priority to conserve those forest resources which have 
406 See ITIC decision 6(XI}/20 (28 November 1991). 
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instrumental value.407 Therefore, some ecologists are of the view that 'sustainable 
forest management' aims for sustainable production and environmental management 
of forests, which are currently or potentially exploitable for timber.408 This view 
relates to maintaining the forest ecosystem in a certain desired condition and to 
maintaining the potential of the forest to provide a sustainable yield of a product or 
products. 
In this context, Article 2(2) of the 2006 ITTA states that 'sustainable forest 
management' will be understood according to the organization's relevant policy 
documents and technical guidelines. Accordingly, the ITTC appears to interpret SFM 
in a broader context than ITTA 1994 when it identified an accurate and up-to-date 
multipurpose forest inventory (inter alia timber, carbon, socio-economic and 
livelihood issues) as essential to securing sustainable forest management.409 The 
purpose of a forest inventory is to provide information about the state of the forests of 
a nation or region, designed to guide the planning of future activities by governments, 
industrialists and forest owners. Forest inventory plans are usually based on area, 
species and growing volume of trees, but this alone would not suffice to achieve Sf M 
goals. Ideally, forest inventory plans should also incorporate socio-economic and 
livelihood issues. This approach is also supported by the Agreement, which 
recognizes 'the role of the forest dependent indigenous people and local communities' 
as a part of sustainable forest management.4lO 
407 S ee Chapter 5 for various environmental values. 
408 Duncan Poore, Changing Landscapes (Earthscan Publications, London 2003) 16, and Barbier, 
Burgess et al., The Economics of the Tropical Timber Trade (London, Earthscan, 1994) 3. 
409 See ITTC decision 3(XLII)/17 (12 May 2007). 
410 See Article l(r) of the [ITA 2006. 
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The SFM has focused on the use of timber and other forest products as renewable and 
sustainable products, the threat posed by deforestation and the need to strengthen 
international forest policy towards conserving all forest values. Therefore, SFM 
national policies must ensure that the productive capacity of the land is not lost and 
that all relevant environmental and social values are considered. Thus, a country can 
only be said to be managing its forests truly sustainably when its entire tropical forest 
area and all of the potential values it generates are managed sustainably. 
4.2.4. Implementation 
ITTO develops internationally agreed policy documents to promote sustainable forest 
management and forest conservation, and assists tropical member countries to adapt 
such policies to local circumstances and to implement them in the field through 
projects. In addition, ITTO collects, analyses and disseminates data on the production 
and trade of tropical timber, and funds projects and other actions aimed at developing 
industries on both community and industrial scales.411 
In 1990 IITO members agreed to strive for an international trade of tropical timber 
from sustainably managed forests by the year 2000. This commitment became known 
as the 'Year 2000 Objective', and a large part of the IITO programme of projects and 
activities was devoted to its achievement.412 An assessment made in 2000 showed that 
tropical countries had made significant progress in the formulation and adoption of 
policies compatible with the Objective, but less evidence was found of progress in 
411 See ITTO Action Plan 2008-2011, supra n 405. 
412 IITO decision 1 O(XXVI) (3 June 1999). 
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implementing such policies.413 Recognizing this lack of progress, ITTO members 
restated their commitment to moving as rapidly as possible towards achieving exports 
of tropical timber and timber products from sustainably managed sources, renaming 
this commitment 'ITTO Objective 2000'. It remains a central goal of the organization. 
ITTO has developed a system for assessing the status of production forests in member 
countries. To aid the assessment, it developed one of the first criteria and indicators 
(C&I) for SFM in the Tropics in 1992.414 This was updated in 2005.415 The C&I 
provide member countries with a tool for monitoring, assessing and reporting changes 
and trends in forest conditions and management systems at national and Forest 
Management Unit (FMU) levels. By identifying the main elements of sustainable 
forest management, the C&I provide a means of assessing progress towards 
sustainable forest management and the ITTO Objective 2000, which is 'to enhance the 
capacity of members to implement a strategy for achieving exports of tropical timber 
and timber products from sustainably managed sources' .416 The information generated 
through the use of these C&I assist producer countries in developing strategies for 
sustainable forest management. 
To improve the implementation of the ITTO mandate and policy, ITTO cooperates 
closely with other international organizations with forest-related mandates. It is a 
founding member of the Collaborative Partnership on Forests (CPF),417 which was 
413 ITTC, 'Review of progress towards the Year 2000 Objective' (2000). Available at: 
<http://www . itto.int/resourceO I /#reports>. 
414 ITTO, 'Criteria for the Measurement of the Sustainable Tropical Forest Management' (1993) 
ITTO Policy Development Series No. 3. Available at: 
<http://www . itto. intlresourceO I /#reports>. 
415 ITTO, 'Revised IITO criteria and indicators for the sustainable management of tropical forests 
including reporting format' (2005), ITTO Policy Development Series No. 15. 
416 ITTO decision 10(XXVI) (3 June 1999). 
417 Members of the CPF are: The Centre for International Forestry Research (CIFOR), the Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the Global Environmental Facility 
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established in 2000 to support the work of the United Nations Forum on Forests 
(UNFF) and to enhance coordination among the international conventions, 
organizations and institutions with forest-related mandates.418 To strengthen 
collaboration in the pursuit of their common objectives of conserving and sustainably 
managing tropical forest resources, the ITTO and the CBD recently signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding.419 ITTO also cooperates with a wide range of 
regional- and national-level organizations and other civil-society and private-sector 
stakeholders. 
(a) Dispute settlement 
Article 31 of the IITA 2006 states: 
[A ]ny member may bring to the Council any complaint that a member has 
failed to fulfil its obligations under this Agreement and any dispute 
concerning the interpretation or application of this Agreement. Decisions by 
the Council on these matters shall be taken by consensus, notwithstanding 
any other provision of this Agreement, and be final and binding. 
The ITTC, the governing body of the ITTO, accordingly serves as the dispute 
settlement body. Council members generally take all decisions and all 
recommendations by consensus.420 If consensus cannot be reached, the ITTC takes 
(GEF) Secretariat, the rrro, the IUCN, the International Union of Forest Research 
Organizations (IUFRO), the CBD Secretariat, the United Nations Convention to Combat 
Desertification (UNCCD) Secretariat, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 
the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the UNFF Secretariat, the UNFCCC 
Secretariat, the World Agro-forestry Centre (ICRAF), and the World Bank. 
418 IITO Action Plan, supra n 405. 
419 In October and December 2010, respectively, the governing bodies of CSD and IITC adopted 
decisions welcoming the IITO/CBD collaboration; see CBD decision X/36 and ITTC decision 
6(XLVI). 
420 See Article I 2( 1) of the 117 A 2006. 
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decisions and recommendations by a majority vote 421, unless the [TT A provides for a 
special vote.422 The Council has chosen to interpret the requirement for a 'special 
vote' under Article 7 to be one that only needs to be invoked if the Council cannot 
reach agreement by consensus. Votes in the Council are distributed in accordance with 
the share of world trade held by member countries.423 The producer members shall 
together hold 1,000 votes and the consumer members shall together hold 1,000 votes. 
4.3. ITTA's schemes for the protection of the environment 
The Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) defines 
economic instruments as 'that affect costs and benefits of alternative options open to 
economic agents, with the effect of influencing behaviour in a way that is favourable 
to the environment' .424 The use of economic instruments to protect the environment 
has been criticised for being 'non-coercive' and 'autonomous,.425 Yet, the 
international community in various policy documents (as discussed in chapter 2) 
recommended states to use economic instruments to protect the environment as they 
are powerful social forces to be used and harnessed for the common goals of 
economic development and environmental protection.426 The ITTA and the MEAs 
discussed in the following chapters use economic instruments such as eco-Iabelling 
421 Ibid. Article 12(2). 
422 Article 2(8) of the IITA 2006 defines Special vote as 'a vote requiring at least two-thirds of the 
votes cast by producing members present and voting and at least 60 percent of the votes cast by 
consuming members present and voting, counted separately, on condition that these votes are 
cast by at least half of the producing members present and voting and at least half of the 
consuming members present and voting'. 
423 Ibid Article 10. 
424 
425 
426 
OECD, Environmental Policy: How to Apply Economic Instruments (Paris: 1991) 10. 
Richard Stewart, 'Economic, Environmental, and Limits of Legal Control' (1985) 9 Harv ELR 1. 
Peter Sand, 'Sticks, Carrots and Games' in Michael Bothe and Peter Sand (eds.), Environmental 
Policy: From Regulation to Economic Instruments ( Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, the Hahue : 
2003) 5-6. 
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schemes (used in ITTA, CBD and Biosafety Protocol), quotas system (used in CITES) 
and subsidies (used in CBD and ITTA) etc to protect the environment. 
As mentioned earlier, the ITTA includes the concept of 'sustainable forest 
management' to protect the environment. The tools it uses for the development of 
sustainable forest management are eco-labelling and forest certification. ITTO C&I 
serve as a framework for the development of eco-Iabelling procedures and national 
forest certification standards. These are marked-based instruments that intend to create 
an economic incentive for timber companies to improve forest management. 
4.3.1. Eco-labelling 
One of the economic incentives for forest protection is eco-Iabelling of timber and 
other forest products, which involves the provision of information on the 
environmental impacts of their production, use and disposal. For timber products, the 
emphasis is generally on the extent to which harm to the ecological integrity of 
forests, biodiversity and other environmental values is minimized in the production 
process. 
Accordingly, eco-Iabelling is of interest to environmentalists, consumers and industry 
as a mechanism to help consumers exercise preferences for products whose 
production, use and disposal impose a lighter burden on the environment and natural 
resources compared to competing products. Consumers obtain get better information 
about the impacts of the products they buy, helping them use their purchasing power 
to encourage environmental protection. In this context, Agenda 21427 encourages 
427 Agenda 21, Chapter 4, 4.21. 
139 
'expansion of environmental labelling and other environmentally-related product 
information designed to assist consumers to make informed choices' . 
However, its practical implication is neither so simple nor as favourable to the 
environment. Since timber-labelling schemes have primarily been voluntary and non-
governmental, producers have not been required to conduct their activities in any 
particular way. Rather, such schemes merely promote truthful communication from 
producers to consunlers about the environmental impacts of certain products and their 
production processes. However, to be effective, an eco-Iabelling initiative must be 
linked to a system for independent certification of labelled products, so that buyers 
have assurance of the accuracy and good faith of producers' representations. 
4.3.2. Forest certification 
Forest certification is a voluntary process by which the planning and implementation 
of 'on-the-ground' forestry operations are audited by a qualified, independent third 
party against a predetermined standard designed to ensure that operations are 
environmentally sustainable and socially acceptable.428 Certificates can be used as a 
source to send the message to consumers that a particular timber or timber product has 
been exported from 'sustainably managed and legally harvested sources and which are 
legally traded' .429 The ITTC is of the view that certification will improve market 
transparency and will also help to promote responsible producer and consumer 
choices in supply and demand for forest products.43o To advance the 'IITO Objective 
2000', the ITTC recognized forest certification as 'an important voluntary market-
428 S ee ITTO, 'ITTO/IUCN Guidelines', supra n 27. 
429 See Article l(k) of the ITTA 2006. 
430 See ITTC decision I 0 (XXX)/22 (2 June 2001). 
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based tool to encourage and create incentives for sustainable forest management'.431 
Subsequently, the I1TA 2006 encouraged its members to share information to 
introduce certification as a voluntary mechanism to promote sustainable management 
of tropical forests.432 
The forest certification is divided into three main activities of equal importance: 
standard setting, the certification process and accreditation of certifiers. Standards433 
are documents which set out the requirements that must be met by the forest manager 
and against which certification assessments are made. Certification is the process of 
establishing whether or not the standard has been met. Accreditation is the mechanism 
for ensuring that the organizations which undertake certification are competent and 
produce credible results. Sometimes this process is described as 'certifying the 
certifiers' . 
The effectiveness of the process of establishing whether or not the standard has been 
met depends mainly on the people and organizations responsible for managing and 
implementing the process. There are three types of assessment against a standard:434 i) 
first-party assessments carried out by an organization on itself, which are often 
referred to as internal audits; ii) second-party assessments carried out by one 
organization on another with which it has a relationship of some sort (a common 
example is a supplier audit); or iii) third-party assessments carried out by an 
431 See lITe decisionl0 (XXX)122 (2 June 2001). 
432 See Article 1(0) of the /ITA 2006. 
433 S b 
434 
tandards are documents stating the requirements which must be met y a company, or a 
product, and against which certification assessments are made. The International Organisation 
for Standardisation (ISO) defines a standard as 'a document, established by consensus and 
approved by a recognised body, that provides, for common and repeated use, rules, guidelines 
or characteristics for activities or their results, aimed at the achievement of the optimum degree 
of order in a given context' (ISO 1996). 
Nussbaum, Jenning et al., Assessing Forest Certification Schemes: A Practical Guide (ProForst 
Publications, 2002) 22. 
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organization which is completely independent of the organization being assessed, and 
is called a certification body. Although the assessment team does not usually make the 
final certification, they are responsible for most of the technical process of collecting 
information to establish compliance with the standard. 
Forest certification is a relative newcomer to the world of standards and certification, 
but is increasingly accepted as an assurance of legality and sustainable forest 
management, which takes account of both timber and non-timber forest products. At 
the global level, there are two competing certification schemes with different 
operating modalities: the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) and the Programme for 
the Endorsement of Forest Certification (PEFC). The FSC provides all the necessary 
elements of certification through centralized decision-making on standards and 
accreditation. The PEFC, on the other hand, operates as a system for mutual 
recognition between national certification systems. Almost two-thirds (65%) of the 
world's certified forests (in 22 countries) carry a PEFC certificate, while the FSC's 
share is 28% (in 78 countries); the remaining forests are certified solely under national 
systems. Most of the certified forests in the Tropics are FSC-certified.435 
The criteria of these certification schemes give attention specifically to the need to 
conserve biodiversity. For example, Principle 6, Criterion 2 of the FSC, states that:436 
Safeguards shall exist which protect rare, threatened and endangered species 
and their habitats (eg nesting and feeding areas). Conservation zones and 
protection areas shall be established appropriate to the scale and intensity of 
43S ITTO, 'Developing Forest Certification' (2008) IITO Technical Series No. 29. Available at: 
<http://www . itto.intlresourceO 1 /#reports>. 
436 FSC 1996. 
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forest management and the umqueness of the affected resources. 
Inappropriate hunting, trapping and collecting shall be controlled. 
Various studies conducted on the impact of the certification process on biodiversity 
have concluded that certification does improve conservation of biodiversity and has a 
significant impact on the way that forest managers implement conservation 
437 H . h 1" l' f d' measures. owever, even acceptmg t e pre lmmary cone USlons 0 current stu les 
and the apparent beneficial impacts of forest certification on wildlife conservation, the 
following discussion shows that there is still a long way to go to reach sustainable 
wildlife management in certified timber production forests. 438 
4.3.2.1. Effectiveness of the certification and eco-Iabeling in the protection of the 
environment 
Most of the tropical forest coverage is located in developing countries, and a number 
of them depend heavily on timber exports for foreign exchange. In developing 
countries as a whole, about 25% of the wood that is not used for fuel is exported. 
Malaysia and Indonesia combined account for about 86% of total exports from 
tropical countries. In some developing countries, logging for export is the largest 
contributor to deforestation or forest degradation; in the Sarawak state in Malaysia, for 
example, approximately 80% oflogs eventually become exports.439 Consequently, it is 
437 See Newsom and Hewdoitt, The Global Impacts of Smart Wood Certification (Trees Program 
Rainforest Alliance, 2005); Nussbaum and Simula, Forest Certification: A Review of Impacts 
and Assessment Framework (The Forest Dialogue Yale University, School of Forestry and 
Environmental Studies, 2004). 
438 IITO, 'Developing Forest Certification', supra n 435. 
439 ElIiott and David, Certification and Ecolabelling of Timber and Timber Products (N.d.: n.p. 
Manuscript on file with CIEL, 1996). 
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unlikely that these developing countries will give priority to the protection of the 
environment over the economic benefit achieved from logging. 
A recent ITTO study concluded that some progress has been made by ITTO producer 
countries in the development of forest and timber certification.44o However, the rate of 
achievement still pales in comparison to the advancement gained by developed 
countries. While certified forests in ITTO producer countries have expanded 2.6 times 
from 6.4 million hectares in 2002 to 16.3 million hectares in 2007, developing 
countries' share of the world's certified forests actually fell from 7% in 2002 to 5% in 
2006.441 
In addition, the development and implementation of SFM, certification and eco-
labelling impose financial costs and require technical expertise, which are less likely 
to be available to developing country producers than to those in developed 
countries.442 Finally, some commentators also argue that certification and eco-
labelling could, if structured identically for all types of producers, work unfairly to the 
detriment of small producers, each of whom will be obliged to assume the same fixed 
costs as larger competitors.443 
Finally, Article 12 of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT)444 clarifies 
and establishes requirements for special treatment of developing country Members in 
440 ITTO, 'Developing Forest Certification', supra n 435. 
441 Ibid. 
442 Ibid. 
443 International Experts Working Group: Joint German-Indonesian Initiative, 1996. Report of 
Meeting on Trade, Labelling of Forest Products and Certification of Sustainable Forest 
Management, 12-16 August 1996, Bonn. 
444 The TBT Agreement provides for special and differential treatment of developing countries 
through clauses modifying or softening the requirements in the Article 4 (Code of Good 
Practice) and the rest of the TBT Agreement. Article 4 of the TBT Agreement imposes the Code 
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light of their special circumstances. Some of these obligations could prove beneficial 
for eco-Iabelling efforts: for example, provision for technical assistance to developing 
country Members in order to 'ensure that the preparation and application of technical 
regulations, standards and conformity assessment procedures do not create 
unnecessary obstacles to the expansion and diversification of exports from developing 
country Members' .445 However, other provisions could seriously undermine the eco-
labelling of products from developing countries by allowing developing countries to 
avoid complying with measures established by others - including those necessary to 
eco-Iabelling programme,s - if these measures conflict with their 'special needs' .446 
This flexibility could discourage developing country Members from giving priority to 
the environmental purposes of eco-labelling programmes. 
As a result, there is a need for cooperative consultations among relevant international 
and national institutions to develop policies on eco-Iabelling and other market-based 
instruments for environmental policy that consider, but are not completely determined 
by, global market concerns. Forest certification and eco-labelling will succeed as a 
tool to promote environmental protection only if programs are based on standards that 
effectively identify the least environmentally destructive alternatives.447 
of Good Practice (the Code) on standard-setting bodies (either directly for central government 
standard-setting bodies or indirectly for other bodies, as discussed above). The obligations 
imposed in the Code concern the process of creating and implementing standards themselves 
(as opposed to related processes, such as conformity assessment, discussed below) and the 
substantive content of these standards. 
445 Article 12(7) of the TBT Agreement. 
446 For example, Article 12(4) of the TBT Agreement exempts developing country Members 'to 
use international standards as a basis for their technical regulations or standards, including test 
methods, which are not appropriate to their development, financial and trade needs' , 
447 Cook, Downes et al.. Applying Trade Rules to timber Eco-labelling (ClEL Discussion Paper. 
1997) 44 
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4.3.3. Subsidies 
Subsidisation is a government activity which occurs when governments provide 
certain economic benefits to their producers. Subsidies448 often, but not always, result 
in a reduction in the price of goods produced by those producers, as they usually lower 
the marginal cost of production. To facilitate international trade in tropical timber the 
ITTC decided to undertake a study on subsidies affecting tropical timber products,449 
and subsequently adopted the Action Plan 2008-2011, which was designed to assist 
tropical member countries to manage and conserve the resource base for tropical 
timber. Section 3 of the Action Plan identifies specific goals and supporting actions 
for ITTO's substantive work.45o Section 3.1 of the Action plan established two 
goals,451 the second of which seeks to promote tropical timbers from sustainably 
managed sources and provides a forum for discussion on non-discriminatory trade, 
subsidies for competing products, shortcomings in enforcement of forest law and 
regulation, and other factors that may affect the marketability and access of tropical 
timber products. 
448 
449 
450 
4S1 
Article I (a)( I) of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) defines 
Subsidy as 'a financial contribution by a government or any public body'. This can include 
such things as: 
(i) a government practice [involving] a direct transfer of funds (e.g. grants, loans, and equity 
infusion), potential direct transfers of funds or liabilities (e.g. loan guarantees); 
(ii) government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected (e.g. fiscal incentives 
such as tax credits); 
(iii) [the provision of] government goods or services other than general infrastructure; 
(iv) a government payment to a funding mechanism ... 
See IITC decision 2(XXXVII)/20 (18 December 2004). 
The Action Plan identifies three areas of ITTO's substantive work (called goals), i.e. economic 
information and market intelligence, r e f o r e ~ t a t i o n n and forest management and forest industry. 
These goals and actions aim to guide the relevant IITO committees in making policy and 
project recommendations to the Council and provide a frame of reference for the Council itself 
in considering issues and in taking decisions on policy initiatives and project activities. See 
supra n 405. 
Goal 1: Improve transparency of the international timber market; Goal 2: Promote tropical 
timber from sustainably managed sources. 
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Participation in the eco-Iabelling and certification process does, however, impose 
costs on participating producers, including compliance with periodic monitoring after 
certification and application. Subsidies reduce the cost associated with certification 
and eco-Iabelling, encouraging producers to manage the tropical forests sustainably. 
They could be used to differentiate products that are traded internationally, so as to 
alter patterns of trade. For example, they could be targeted on sustainably produced 
tropical timber in order to encourage the trade in this timber rather than the trade in 
timber from unsustainably managed tropical forests. 
Nevertheless, as a number of trade-related concerns have been raised regarding the 
eco-Iabelling of timber, the WTO might argue that eco-Iabelling and certification can 
be used as a disguised protectionist measure and can discriminate against imported 
products based on process and production methods (PPMs) (as discussed in Chapter 
3). There are also concerns that national or regional criteria may work to the 
advantage of domestic or regional producers, even absent protectionist motivations, 
because the criteria were developed on the basis of the specific conditions in that 
region. For example, European standards that penalize harvesting from old growth 
forests will likely work in favour of European producers and against many foreign 
producers, because Europe has almost no old-growth forest remaining in contrast to 
other timber-producing regions. 
4.3.4. The ITTA in cooperation with relevant environmental institutions 
Since the conservation of biodiversity is an integral part of the sustainable forest 
management, in 1993 the ITTO and International Union for the Conservation of 
Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) produced a joint guideline - the 'Guidelines on 
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the Conservation of Biological Diversity in Tropical Production Forests' - for tropical 
forest conservation and use.452 In 2005 the ITTC proposed the updating of the 
'Guideline' to take into account new developments in conservation and sustainable 
forest management. In 2009 the ITTC adopted a revised set of 'ITTO/IUCN 
Guidelines' .453 These guidelines are designed to assist policymakers and forest 
managers by bringing together in one place the specific actions that are needed to 
improve biodiversity conservation in tropical production forests. 
ITTO has also been working with other MEAs institutions to create more certainty 
about its role. CITES and CBD are the most relevant conservation agreements to the 
ITTA's mandates, as they both address socio-economic development and conservation 
issues concurrently. The Preamble of the CBD reaffirms that states are responsible for 
using their 'biological resources in a sustainable manner'. Most recently, the CBD 
adopted the 'Addis Ababa Principles and Guidelines for the Sustainable Use of 
Biodiversity' (hereinafter CBD Guidelines), which address a number of issues relating 
to biodiversity in managed systems.454 The application of the ITTO/IUCN Guidelines 
would be an important step for countries in implementing their obligations under the 
CBD. Thus, to ensure cooperation between the ITTO and CBD in order to pursue their 
common objectives, recently the ITTO and the CBD have adopted an MoU.455 This 
collaboration specifically focuses cooperation in four areas: enhanced biodiversity 
conservation in production forests and rehabilitation of secondary forests, including 
promotion of the ITTO/IUCN Guidelines; improved conservation and management of 
452 ITTO 'ITTO/IUCN Guidelines in the Conservation of Biological Diversity in Tropical 
Production Forest' (1993) IITO Policy Development Series No. 5. 
453 'IITO/IUCN Guidelines', supra n 27. 
4S4 
455 
Secretariat of the CBD, 'Addis Ababa Principles and Guidelines for the Sustainable Use of 
Biodiversity' (Montreal 2004). This publication is part of a series of the CBD Guidelines. 
A vailable at: <http://www.CBD.intldoc/publications/addis-gdl-en.pdf>. 
See Chapter 1 of the thesis. 
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protected areas in relation to SFM, including transboundary conservation areas; 
enhanced provision of environmental services from tropical forests through SFM; and 
improved welfare of indigenous and local communities based on the sustainable 
management and conservation of tropical forests and sustainable use of their 
biodiversity. 
CITES has included tree species (afromosia, bigleaf mahogany and ramin) in its 
Appendix II.456 The CITES Secretariat realizes the challenges that range states of these 
timber species face to implement CITES requirements. Thus, the ITTO and the CITES 
Secretariats are collaborating on a programme of activities aimed at ensuring that 
international trade in CITES-listed timber species is consistent with their sustainable 
management and conservation. The specific objective of the 'ITTO - CITES Program 
for Implementing CITES Listings of Tropical Timber Species' is to assist national 
authorities to meet the scientific, administrative and legal requirements for managing 
and regulating trade in timber species included in the CITES Appendix 11 and, in 
particular, to develop guidance to ensure that utilization is not detrimental to the 
survival of these CITES-listed timber species.457 
4.4. Conclusions 
For the purpose of the IITA, the term 'tropical timber' means 'tropical wood for 
industrial uses', i.e. a tropical timber forest is a 'supply forest' for industries.458 The 
uncertainty regarding the balance between sustainable use and the conservation in the 
456 See Chapter 5 for CITES Appendices. 
457 See CITES Conf. Resolution 14.4. 
458 Defined in Article 2(1) of the /ITA. Tropical timber grows or is produced in the countries 
situated between the Tropic of Cancer and the Tropic of Capricorn. The term covers logs, sawn 
wood, veneer sheets and plywood. 
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ITTA starts with the very name of the agreement and from the categorization of 
membership of the ITTO .. The name 'International Tropical Timber Agreement' 
clarifies that this agreement is about tropical timber, not tropical forest as a whole. It 
re-states idea that the ITTA considers tropical forest as a source of timber459 having 
considerable economic value for being a tradable resource. 
In 2006 the ITTO prepared a report reviewing the status of forest management in all 
33 of ITTO's producer member countries.460 Using information submitted by the 
countries themselves and supplemented by data from a wide range of other sources, it 
addresses the policy and institutional settings in each country, the approaches taken to 
the allocation and management of resources, and the status of management of those 
resources. The data indicate that significant progress has been made since 1988 
towards the sustainable management of natural tropical forests, but the extent of such 
progress remains far from satisfactory.461 Significant areas of tropical forest are still 
lost every year, and unsustainable (and often illegal) extraction of tropical forest 
resources remains widespread.462 It is clear from the report that the security of the 
tropical forest estate is still in jeopardy in many countries.463 
It is also apparent from this chapter's discussion that despite the evolutionary 
development of the ITTA over successive instruments to include the sustainable 
development principle, its key characteristic as a commodity agreement is undisputed, 
459 Article 2(1) of the 200617TA defines 'tropical timber' as: 
tropical woodfor industrial uses, [emphasis added] which grows or is produced in the countries 
situated between the Tropic of Cancer and the Tropic of Capricorn. The term covers logs, 
sawnwood, veneer sheets and plywood. 
460 ITTO, '2006 Status of tropical forest management' (2005) ITTO Technical Series No. 24. 
A vailab le at: <http://www . itto .intlresourceO 1 /#reports>. 
Ibid. 461 
462 Ibid. 
463 Ibid. 
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and its ultimate objective, to promote and expand trade, has never changed. It is still 
effectively little more than a commodity market adjustment among consumer and 
producer states, with a commitment to increase international trade in tropical timber 
from sustainably managed and legally harvested forests. 464 
It is also doubtful how far the parties of the ITT A with contrasting economic interests 
in tropical forest management would consider conservation objectives seriously. For 
consumers, forest management is essential so that there will be continuity of tropical 
timber supply. On the other hand, for producers, which are mostly developing 
countries, forest management is important to balance supply and demand of timher, 
which ensures a stable economy. 
464 Bowman, Davies and RedgweU, supra n 8, 636. 
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5. Wildlife trade under CITES 
5.1. Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to analyse two issues: i) the extent to which the 1973 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
(hereinafter the CITES or the Convention)465 permits wildlife trade and ii) the 
compatibilities of the CITES trade restrictive measures with the WTO rules. CITES is 
designed to protect specimens of species determined by the Convention to be 
presently or foreseeably threatened by international trade. Therefore, CITES is 
primarily a conservation treaty, and its long-term conservation goals are to monitor 
and stop commercial international trade in endangered species; maintain species under 
international commercial exploitation in an ecological balance; and assist countries 
towards a sustainable use through international trade. 
Despite the fact that CITES is a conservation treaty, it by no means prohibits trade in 
endangered species entirely. However, CITES' approach towards trade differs from 
that of the multilateral trade agreements. The term 'trade' is being used in a broad 
sense in CITES. According to CITES, 'trade means export, re-export, import and 
introduction from the sea' of the specimens of species.466 Therefore, any sorts of 
international movements of specimens of any species mentioned in the Appendices 
of the Convention are considered to be 'trade' under CITES' provisions. 
465 For CITES text see 993 UNTS 243; UKTS 101 (1976) Cmnd. 6647; (1973) 12 ILM 1085. 
CITES came into force on I July 1975. 
466 • ArtIcle l(c) of the CITES, 1973. According to Article I(d) and (e) of the CITES, 1973, "re-
export" means export of any specimen that has previously been imported and "induction from 
the sea" means transportation into a state of specimens of any species which were taken in the 
marine environment not under the jurisdiction of any state. 
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In economic terms, trade means the exchange of goods and services for commercial 
purposes.467 In CITES, commercial trade is generally discouraged, and commercial 
trade of Appendix I species468 is prohibited. Commercial trade for Appendices 11 and 
III species is allowed, but is subject to various restrictions provided by CITES: for 
example, trade should not be detrimental to the survival of the species, and living 
specimens should be prepared and shipped, minimizing the risk of injury, damage to 
health or cruel treatment, etc.469 
Since the term 'commercial purposes' was not defined in CITES itself, the Parties 
were at liberty to interpret it in different ways. Recognizing this, the CITES-COp470 
has established general principles471 and provided examples472 for the Contracting 
Parties to help them in assessing the commercial473 aspects of the intended use of 
Appendix I specimens to be imported. The COP recommends that the term 
commercial purposes should be defined by the country of import as broadly as 
possible, so that any transaction which is not wholly 'non-commercial' will be 
regarded as 'commercial'. In transposing this principle to the term 'primarily 
commercial purposes', it can be argued that all uses whose non-commercial aspects 
do not clearly predominate are considered to be primarily commercial in nature, with 
the result that the importation of specimens of Appendix I species is not permitted. 
467 Compact Oxford English Dictionary (OUP 2006). 
468 CITES Appendices have been discussed in a latter section. 
469 Articles IV and V of the CITES. 
470 CITESConf. Resolution 5.10. 
471 
472 
473 
It's a repetition of the Fundamental Principles laid down in Article 11 of CITES, i.e. trade in 
Appendix I species must be subject to particularly strict regulation and authorized only in 
exceptional circumstances. 
The examples recognize categories of transactions in which the non-commercial aspects mayor 
may not be predominant, depending upon the facts of each situation. The categories are purely 
private use, scientific purposes, education or training, biomedical industry, captive-breeding 
programmes and importation via professional dealers. 
An activity can generally be described as 'commercial' if its purpose is to obtain economic 
benefit, including profit (whether in cash or in kind) and is directed towards resale, exchange, 
provision of a service or other form of economic use or benefit. 
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The burden of proof for showing that the intended use of specimens of Appendix I 
species is clearly non-commercial rests with the person or entity seeking to import 
such specimens. 
With this approach to trade in endangered species, the application of CITES' licensing 
system restricting wildlife trade has led to concern for the protection of trade interests 
in the Convention. This chapter seeks to analyse the extent to which CITES makes 
allowances for such interests. It consists of two sections. Section I provides an 
overview of the Convention, including its objectives, fundamental principles, key 
provisions and implementation processes. Special attention is given to the institutions 
established under CITES and its reservation procedure. Section 11 analyses the extent 
to which the Convention permits trade in endangered species of wild fauna and flora. 
It also observes the extent to which the Convention authorizes or envisages the 
implementation or recognition of restrictions upon trade. 
5.2. Overview of CITES 
The origin of CITES lies in the global concern over the conservation impact arising 
from the exploitation of, and international trade in, wild species, expressed at the 
seventh General Assembly of the International Union for Conservation of Nature and 
Natural Resources (lUCN).474 With the benefit of greater information on the 
threatened status of many species, delegates urged governments to restrict imports of 
animals in accordance with export regulations of countries of origin.475 
474 The IUCN is now the World Conservation Union. GA held in Warsaw, Poland, in 1960. Visit: 
<http://www.iucn.org>. 
475 For an illustration of the volumes of international trade in wildlife during the 1960s, see 
International Trade in Animal Products Threatens Wildlife (US Fish and Wildlife Services, 
1982). 
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As a result of these discussions, IUCN's General Assembly passed a regulation in 
1963 calling for 'an international convention on regulation of export, transit and 
import of rare or threatened wildlife species or their skins and trophies'. Elements of 
this regulation can be found in CITES. 
The first draft of CITES was circulated in 1964, followed by a second draft in 1971. 
Progress towards making the Convention a reality accelerated in 1972, when the 
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment adopted its Action Plan for 
the Human Environment.476 A revised draft Convention was then put forward by the 
US, which served as the basis for discussion at the Plenipotentiary Conference to 
Conclude an International Convention on Trade in Certain Species of Wildlife, held at 
the Pentagon from 12 February to 2 March 1973. After ten ratifications477, the 
Convention entered into force on 1 July 1975. For many years CITES has been among 
the conservation agreements with the largest membership, now totalling 175 
Parties.478 
5.2.1. CITES' institutional arrangements 
CITES' institutional arrangements consist of the COP, a Secretariat, the executive 
Standing Committee, and three functional committees which were given permanent 
status in 1987.479 Most of the institutional structure of CITES emerged only after the 
476 This plan included Recommendation 99.3, proposing that 'a plenipotentiary conference be 
convened as soon as possible, under appropriate governmental or intergovernmental auspices, 
to prepare and adopt a convention on export, import and transit of certain species of wild 
animals and plants'. 
477 Canada, Chile, Cyprus, Ecuador, Nigeria, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, the United States of 
America and Uruguay were the first countries to ratify the Convention. 
478 See CITES' official website <http://CITES.org> accessed on 2 December 2010. 
479 Animal, Plants and Nomenclature Committees were consolidated by the CITES Conf. 
Resolution 9.1. 
155 
treaty's entry into force.48o The COP is the decision-making body on all matters 
related to CITES, and meets every two to three years. 
The COP has a variety of functions: it reviews progress under the Convention; 
considers proposals to amend the lists of species in Appendices I and 11; considers 
discussion documents and reports from the Parties, the permanent committees, the 
Secretariat and working groups; recommends measures to improve the effectiveness 
of the Convention; and makes provisions necessary to allow the Secretariat to function 
effectively.481 The COP's recommendations are not generally considered 'hard law', 
but they have shaped the CITES regime and should be regarded as 'soft law in 
nature' .482 Thus, the COP's recommendations for interpreting and elaborating the text 
of the Convention are not legally binding, but can constitute a 'subsequent agreement 
between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its 
provisions', which means that they must at least be 'taken into account' .483 
The CITES Secretariat is administered by UNEP and is located in Geneva, 
Switzerland. It has a pivotal role, fundamental to the Convention. Its functions are laid 
down in Article XII of CITES. The Secretariat performs many different functions, 
which include: arranging meetings of the Parties, and preparing reports and draft 
resolutions. An institutional innovation was the establishment of subsidiary bodies, 
which operate between meetings and conferences. The Standing Committee was set 
up in 1979 and provides policy guidance to the Secretariat concerning the 
480 Peter Sand, 'Whither CITES? The Evaluation of a Treaty Regime in the Borderland of Trade 
and Environment', (1997) 8 EJIL 29 at 35. 
481 CITES Article XI. 
482 Bowman, Davies and RedgwelI, supra n 8,488; Sand, 'Whither CITEs?' supra n 480, 35. 
483 Article 31(3)(a) of the Vienna Convention. 
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implementation of the Convention, and oversees the management of the Secretariat's 
budget. 
CITES Contracting Parties are also required to designate specific national authorities 
to administer the Convention's provisions, creating a global network of institutions 
that cooperate directly with their counterparts in other states. These authorities are 
known as Management Authorities (MA) and Scientific Authorities (SA).484 The 
Management Authority is an administrative body which grants permits and certificates 
for wildlife trade, while the Scientific Authority advises the MA on the practical effect 
of the trade of specimens of Appendix I and Appendix 11 species. 
The establishment of the SA and MA is particularly significant for two reasons.485 
First, as each Party has two permanent bodies responsible for implementing CITES 
provisions, it is likely that each Party will make at least some effort to enforce the 
Convention. Second, although CITES' mandate is limited to international trade, some 
Parties have given their MAs and SAs additional responsibilities related to wildlife 
conservation. Therefore, their establishment has helped to regulate international trade 
as part of an organized and rational approach to the overall management of wildlife 
resources in these countries. 
5.2.2. Objectives and purposes of the Convention 
CITES' purpose is to protect plant and animal species from unregulated international 
trade. However, CITES is regarded as both a 'conservation and trade instrument' .486 In 
484 CITES Article IX(1). 
485 B . 
owman, Davles and Redgwell, supra n 8, 490. 
486 Hill, 'The Conservation on International Trade in Endangered Species: Fifteen Years Later' 
(1990) 13 Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Journal, 245. 
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this context, conservationists are often placed in two camps for the purposes of 
wildlife conservation: the so-called 'protectionist group', with its belief that wildlife 
should be protected for its own sake, and the 'sustainable use group', advocating the 
consumptive use of wildlife at a sustainable level as a means of conserving. CITES 
reflects both approaches to the conservation of wildlife, recognizing the ever-growing 
value of wildlife from aesthetic, scientific, cultural, recreational and economic points 
of view. Accordingly, it prohibits commercial trade in species threatened with 
extinction (Appendix I species), while allowing the sustainable use of species whose 
existence is not yet threatened. It is a trade agreement in the sense that it uses trade 
measures to accomplish its conservation objectives, namely the permit system. 
A protectionist approach, based on the intrinsic value of biodiversity, is arguably 
reflected in the concern for the welfare of live animal specimens prepared and shipped 
for export. These state that an export permit shall only be granted when the MA is 
satisfied that conditions of transportation will be such as to 'minimize[ s] the risk 
injury, damage to health or cruel treatment' of such specimens. However, this 
provision may also be motivated by a 'utilitarian concern' to decrease the high 
mortality of the specimens during the shipment, which would in time impose further 
pressure on populations in the wild. 
The sustainable utilization of natural resources represents an important component of 
sustainable development. The preamble of CITES states that Contracting Parties must 
protect wild fauna and flora for both the current generation and 'generations to come'. 
This part of the preamble adheres to elements of the sustainable development 
principle. In the context of CITES, the sustainable utilization objective forms an 
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essential element in balancing trade and environmental interests. It recognizes that the 
unfettered depletion of wild fauna and flora will ultimately limit economic growth, 
and therefore restricts the trade in endangered species of wild fauna and flora. 
In order to establish a notion of integration between CITES' procedures and the 
principles of sustainable use, CITES-COP has recommended using the Convention of 
Biological Diversity (CBD)'s Addis Ababa Principles and Guidelines for the 
Sustainable Use of Biodiversity in the implementation by CITES Parties of Article IV 
and other relevant provisions of the Convention.487 As mentioned in the Addis Ababa 
Principles and Guidelines for the Sustainable Use of Biodiversity,488 one of the 
conditions which need to be taken into consideration during implementation of 
sustainable use programmes, plans and policies is that: 
[T]he supply of biological products and ecological services available for 
use is limited by intrinsic biological characteristics of both species and 
ecosystems, including productivity, resilience, and stability. Biological 
systems, which are dependent on cycling of finite resources, have limits 
on the goods they can provide and services they can render. Although 
certain limits can be extended to some degree through technological 
breakthroughs, there are still limits, and constraints, imposed by the 
availability and accessibility of endogenous and exogenous resources ... 
As the vast majority of CITES Parties are Parties to the CBD, CITES has acquired 
enormous help from the CBD in integrating sustainable development principles into 
its procedures. For example, the Secretariats of CITES and CBD signed a 
487 CITES Conf. Resolution 13.2. Also see Chapter 6 for the definition of sustainable use as given 
in the CBD and for Addis Ababa Principles and Guidelines. 
488 'CBD Guidelines', supra n 454. 
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Memorandum of Understanding, which provides for institutional cooperation between 
themselves, including the exchange of information, coordination of work programmes 
and joint conservation action.489 Therefore, the CBD and its Subsidiary Body on 
Scientific, Technical and Technologica! Advice (SBSTT A) will be working on case 
studies to test these Sustainable Use Principles and Guidelines. Thanks to this co-
operation from CBD, CITES' future depends on the effective implementation of 
sustainable development goals in order to achieve the balance between progressive 
economic development and the conservation of wildlife for future generations.49o At 
the fourteenth meeting of the CITES-COP, former Secretary General Willem 
Wijnstekers stressed the adaptability of CITES, as evident in its success in balancing 
conservation and sustainable development, but highlighted the need for adequate 
resources to allow for CITES' expansion into new policy areas.491 
Embracing international community values has broadened CITES' goals to monitor 
and stop commercial international trade in endangered species; maintain species under 
international commercial exploitation in an ecological balance; and assist countries 
towards sustainable use through international trade.492 
489 Article 4 of the 'Memorandum of Understanding between the Secretariat and the Secretariat of 
the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
(CITES)' UNEP/CBDICoP/3IInf.39 (15 October 1996). 
490 David Ong, 'The Conservation on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES, 1973): 
Implications of Recent Developments in International and EC Environmental Law', 10(1) JEL 
(1998) 291 at 292. 
491 'Fourteenth Conference of the parties to CITES' (2007) 21 Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 
published by the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD). Available at 
<http://www.iisd.calvoI21!enb2151e.html> (Accessed on 25 March 2011). 
492 CITES Conf. Resolution 14.2; CITES Strategic Vision 2008-13. 
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5.2.3. The fundamentals of the CITES regime 
Article 11 of CITES lays down the fundamental principles governing the listing criteria 
of a species in Appendix I, 11 or Ill. Appendix I includes 'all species threatened with 
extinction which are or may be affected by trade'. Appendix 11 covers: 
(a) all species which although not necessarily now threatened with extinction 
may become so unless trade in specimens of such species is subject to strict 
regulation in order to avoid utilization incompatible with their survival; and 
(b) other species which must be subject to regulation in order that trade in 
specimens of certain species referred to in sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph 
may be brought under effective control. 
Appendix III is concerned with species which 'any Party identifies as being subject to 
regulation within its jurisdiction for the purpose of preventing or restricting 
exploitation, and as needing the co-operation of other Parties in the control of trade' . 
These principles clearly require more detailed guidelines on the listing, deletion and 
transfer of species in the Appendices. In 1976 the COP adopted the Berne Criteria for 
the addition of species to Appendices I and 11 and for the deletion of species from 
Appendices I and 11.493 These soon came to be seen as outdated and unsatisfactory in 
certain respects, which led to the adoption of the 'Fort Lauderdale Criteria' at the 
ninth CITES-COP meeting.494 This new set of criteria replaced the 'Bern Criteria' 
with a comprehensive mechanism for dealing with the inclusion and deletion of 
species in Appendices I and 11. In 2010, at the Doha Conference, the Parties resolved 
to revise the Fort Lauderdale Criteria because of the inadequacies involved in the 
493 Resolution Conf 1.1. 
494 CITES Conf. Resolution 9.24. 
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procedure for amending the Appendices. This led to the adoption of Resolution 9.24 
(Rev. CoP 15), containing a comprehensive set of criteria for the amendment of 
Appendices I and 11 and repealing thirteen earlier Resolutions dealing with the 
inclusion and deletion of species. 495 
5.2.3.1. Criteria for categorizing species 
As mentioned earlier, CITES attempts to balance legitimate trade interests in 
renewable resources with the need to protect endangered species.496 Accordingly, it 
allows international trade in endangered species listed in Appendices I, 11 and III 
under certain conditions. Furthermore, it is designed as a flexible instrument that 
would adapt itself to changing circumstances. Consequently, the Contracting Parties 
are allowed to amend Appendices 1 and 11 listings under the Fort Lauderdale criteria 
discussed above. CITES also contains provisions that tolerate a certain degree of 
deviation from full compliance. For example, CITES' reservations provision and 
certain exceptions mentioned in Article VII allow Contracting Parties to carry on trade 
in endangered species. The following discussion focuses on the extent to which CITES 
permits trade in endangered species. 
(a) Inclusion of species in Appendix I 
CITES imposes restrictions on the commercial trade of endangered speCles. As 
mentioned earlier, species are listed in three Appendices, with differing levels of 
protection. Article 11(1) of CITES provides that: 
Appendix 1 shall include all species threatened with extinction which are or 
may be affected by trade. Trade in specimens of these species must be 
495 CITESConf. Resolution 9.24 (Rev. CoP 15), Annex 1. 
496 Gwyneth Steward, 'Enforcement Problems in the Endangered Species Convention: 
Reservations Regarding the Reservations Clauses' (1981) 14 Comell ILJ 429. 
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subject to particularly strict regulation in order not to endanger further their 
survival and must only be authorized in exceptional circumstances. 
The Fort Lauderdale criteria recognize that to be included in Appendix I, a species 
must meet certain biological and trade criteria. They specify that a species 'is or may 
be affected by trade' ir97 : 
i) it is known to be in trade (using the definition of 'trade' in Article I of the 
Convention), and that trade has or may have a detrimental impact on the 
status of the species; or 
ii) it is suspected to be in trade, or there is demonstrable potential 
international demand for the speCies, that may be detrimental to its 
survi val in the wild. 
A further uncertainty was that the Convention does not define what is meant by 
'threatened with extinction', which gave rise to different approaches to interpretation. 
This lack of uniformity was rectified by the Resolution Conf 9.24 (Rev. CoPI5), 
which provided criteria to determine when species are threatened with extinction. A 
species is considered to be threatened with extinction if at least one of the two 
following criteria is met.498 First, the wild population is small, as characterized by i) a 
decline in the number of individuals or the area and quality of habitat; or ii) each sub-
population being very small; or iii) large short-term fluctuations in population size; or 
iv) a high vulnerability to either intrinsic or extrinsic factors. Second, the wild 
population has a restricted area of distribution and is characterized by i) fragmentation 
or occurrence at very few locations; or ii) large fluctuations in range or the number of 
497 CITES Conf. Resolution 9.24 (Rev. CoP14), Annex 5. 
498 Ibid., Annex I. 
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sub-populations; or iii) a high vulnerability; or iv) a decrease in range, number of sub-
populations, number of individuals, quality of habitat or species' reproduction 
capacity. 
Commercial trade in Appendix I species is generally prohibited in the Convention.499 
However, Article III of CITES authorizes non-commercial trade in Appendix I 
species, subject to the grant of import and export permits.50o Key conditions to be 
satisfied include that: i) the specimen to be traded was obtained legally; ii) the 
exportation will not be detrimental to the survival of the species; and iii) the proposed 
recipient will be suitably equipped to house and care for any living specimens. 
(b) Inclusion of species in Appendix 11 
A species should be listed in Appendix 11 if501 : 
i) the species will satisfy one of the Appendix I criteria in the near future unless 
trade is regulated; or 
ii) exploitation has, or may have, a detrimental impact on the species by either 
exceeding the level that can be sustained in perpetuity or the harvesting will 
put the population level at the mercy of threats from extrinsic factors. 
The Convention makes no mention of the inclusion of species that are lookalikes of 
Appendix I species. Thus, COP in its very first meeting addressed this issue and 
499 See Article H(l) of CITES on commercial trade of Appendix I species. CITES Appendices have 
been discussed in the 'Trade measures provided by CITES' section. 
soo CITES Article H(2)-{3). 
SOl CITES Conf. Resolution 9.24 (Rev. CoP 15), Annexes 2a and 2b. 
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decided that species which looked like Appendix I species should be included in 
Appendix 11.502 
Lookalike species should be. included in Appendix 11 if: 
i) the species resembles an Appendix I or 11 species, such that a non-expert will 
not be able to distinguish between them; 
ii) the species is a m e m ~ e r r of a group of which the majority of the species are 
included in Appendix I or 11, and the remaining species must be listed to 
effectively regulate the trade. 
(c) Amending Appendices I and 11 
There can be circumstances when the Contracting Parties require the consideration 
of proposals for the amendment of Appendices I and 11. The Convention itself is 
silent on the issue of circumstances justifying the deletion of species from the 
Appendices or the down-listing of species from Appendix I to Appendix 11. The Fort 
Lauderdale criteria address this issue and recommend the Contracting Parties to 
apply the precautionary approach, and in case of uncertainty either as regards the 
status of a species or the impact of trade on the conservation of a species, to act in 
the best interest of the conservation of the species concerned and adopt measures 
that are proportionate to the anticipated risks to the species.503 As there is no 
established standard available for the application of the precautionary approach, a 
member state can propose to down-list a specie from Appendix I to Appendix 11, 
arguing that there is not sufficient scientific evidence to believe that that particular 
S02 CITES Conf. Resolution 1.1. 
S03 CITES Conf. Resolution 9.24 (Rev. CoP 15), Annex 4. 
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species needs protection under Appendix I. While the truth is, they want to increase 
trade regardless of the impact on the conservation of species. 504 
Article 11(3) of the Convention states that 'Appendix III shall include all species 
which any Party identifies as being subject to regulation within its jurisdiction for the 
purpose of preventing or restricting exploitation, and as needing the co-operation of 
other Parties in the control of trade'. The objective of Appendix III is to permit 
Contracting Parties to seek international assistance with enforcing its domestic 
legislation with regard to species not listed in Appendix I or 11. Article 11(3) provides 
for the inclusion of species in Appendix III only if the proposing Party requires the co-
operation of the other Parties to control trade in the species listed.505 
It is the responsibility of CITES' Contracting Party to implement the Fort Lauderdale 
criteria in regard to Appendices I, 11 and III species, while permitting or restricting 
endangered species trade. How they will implement the Convention's provisions 
depends on their approach towards the concept of conservation. They can have both a 
protectionist and a conservationist stance for protecting endangered species or have a 
sustainable use stance for regulating wildlife trade. Hepworth provides a clear picture 
of this division in the following terms506: 
[F]or some countries sustainable use lies at the heart of conservation and 
development requirements, while others are suspicious that without clear 
definition the term could be used to justify an increase in trade on economic 
grounds regardless of the impact on the conservation of species. 
504 Robert Hepworth, 'The Independent Review of CITES' (1998) I J1WLP 419. 
505 The criteria for listing species in Appendix III can be found in CITES Conf. Resolution 9.25 
(Rev. CoPI5). 
506 Robert Hepworth, supra n 504, 419. 
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5.2.3.2. The regulatory system 
(a) Trade of Appendix I species 
Appendix I includes species threatened with extinction, which are on their account 
subject to the most stringent regulations. The export of any specimen of Appendix I 
species requires the prior grant and presentation of a permit. An export permit is only 
to be granted where: i) a SA of the state of export has advised that such export will not 
be detrimental to the survival of species; ii) a MA of the state of export is satisfied that 
the specimen was not obtained in contravention of laws of that state for the protection 
of fauna and flora; iii) a MA of the state of export is satisfied that any living specimen 
will be so prepared and shipped as to minimize the risk of injury, damage to health or 
cruel treatment; and iv) a MA of the state of export is satisfied that an import permit 
has been granted for the specimen. 507 
Article III of CITES provides that an import permit is required before an Appendix I 
species may be imported. An import permit will only be granted where: i) a SA of the 
state of import has advised that the import will be for purposes which are not 
detrimental to the survival of the species involved; ii) a SA of the state of import is 
satisfied that the proposed recipient of a living specimen is suitably equipped to house 
and care for it; and iii) a MA of the state of import is satisfied that the specimen is not 
to be used primarily for commercial purposes.508 
These exceptions must be read together with the fundamental principle laid down in 
Article 11(1). It is the task of the SA, under Article III(3)(a), to determine whether the 
purposes, other than primarily commercial purposes, of an importation are detrimental 
S07 CITES Article 1II(2). 
sos Ibid., Article III(3). 
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to the survival of the species, and whether trade is beneficial to Appendix I species 
survival. 509 
(b) Trade of Appendix 11 species 
Trade in Appendix 11 species is governed in accordance with the provisions of Article 
IV of CITES. 51O International trade in specimens of Appendix 11 species may be 
authorized by the granting of an export permit or re-export certificateS)); no import 
permit is required by the Convention (though some countries adopt stricter measures 
under Article XIV). The export of any specimen of Appendix 11 species requires a 
permit. An export permit can only granted where: i) a SA of the state of export has 
advised that such export will not be detrimental to the survival of that species; ii) a 
MA of the state of export is satisfied that the specimen was not obtained in 
contravention of the laws of that state for the protection of fauna and flora; and iii) a 
MA of the state of export is satisfied that any living specimen will be prepared or 
shipped as to minimize the risk of injury, damage to health or cruel treatment.512 
The import of Appendix 11 species does not require a permit. Article IV(4) of CITES 
states that '[T]he import of any specimen of a species included in Appendix 11 shall 
require the prior presentation of either an export permit or a re-export certificate'. The 
difference between the import of Appendix 1 specimens and the import of Appendix 11 
specimens is that Article 111(3) requires the prior grant and presentation of an import 
permit for the former, but Article IV(4) does not prescribe a similar permit for the 
latter. Clearly, the trade control regulations for Appendix 11 species are less onerous. 
509 For further discussion see CITES exceptions section. 
510 Ibid. Article IV(l). 
511 Ibid. Article IV. 
512 Ibid. Article IV(2). 
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Although the import of Appendix II species does not require a permit, numerous 
importing countries have adopted legislation requiring import permits for all CITES 
species, as permitted under Article XIV. They have done this to avoid enforcement 
difficulties. The presence of an import permit allows the MA of a state to check the 
validity of export and re-export documents prior to and at the time of importation. 
(c) Trade of Appendix III species 
International trade in the species listed in Appendix III is allowed only upon the 
presentation of the appropriate export permits or certificates.513 The requirements for 
the issuance of such an export permit are the same as the requirements, as mentioned 
above at (ii) and (iii) for Appendix I species.514 
5.2.4. Implementation 
Illegal trade in specimens of species listed in the Appendices of the Convention can 
cause serious damage to wildlife resources, reduce the effectiveness of wildlife 
management programmes, and undermine and threaten legal and sustainable trade 
(particularly in the developing economies of many producing countries). 515 Therefore, 
an effective enforcement mechanism is essential to monitor and prevent illegal trade. 
Article VIII (l) of CITES concerns the measures to be taken by the Parties to 
enforce the provisions of the Convention. According to the Article, 'the Parties shall 
take appropriate measures to enforce the provisions of the present Convention and to 
513 Ibid. Article V. 
514 Ibid. Article V(2). 
SIS CITES Conf. Resolution 11.3 (Rev. COP 14), Compliance and enforcement, Gigiri (Kenya), 
10-20 April 2000. 
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prohibit trade in specimens in violation thereof'. Since CITES is not a self-executing 
treaty, its Parties have responsibility for enforcing its provisions in each Party 
state.516 
Self-executing treaties are enforceable by virtue of the agreement itself, whereas 
non-self-executing treaties are dependent upon enabling legislation by the Parties for 
their enforcement. As mentioned in the Rio Declaration517 , states have the sovereign 
right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies. 
Therefore, CITES recognizes its Parties' sovereign right to adopt their own 
conservation legislation within the framework of the CITES system. Rather than 
imposing a supranational regulatory mechanism of its own, CITES relies on the 
reciprocal recognition of national regulatory decisions, provided that these are made 
in accordance with mutually agreed standards.s18 Therefore, there is no single 
uniform 'model law' suitable for CITES' implementation in all countries.s19 
CITES enforcement is left to individual Contracting Parties and each state Party is 
responsible, through the exercise of its customs controls, for ensuring that listed 
species and specimens imported and exported are covered by the appropriate permits. 
Therefore, custom officers need to be properly traineds20 and made aware of the 
CITES provisions, including its exceptions. Inefficient customs authorities sometimes 
provide loopholes for illegal trade. Recognizing this need, the COP recommended that 
the Secretariat should increase its efforts on capacity building and training of CITES 
516 CITES Article VIII(I). 
517 Principle 2. 
518 Sand, 'Whither CITES', supra n 480,47. 
519 
520 
For CITES implementation see Emonds, Guidelines for National Implementation of the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (Gland, 
International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, 1981) and Bowman, 
Davies and Redgwell, supra n 8, 518-25. 
The Secretariat arranges enforcement seminars for custom officers and Interpol. 
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enforcement officers, in particular in developing countries, countries with economies 
in transition and small island developing states. 521 
CITES' enforcement mechanisms are based on effective cooperation among its Parties 
to adopt the necessary legislation to implement its provisions. Therefore, the lack of 
efficient communication can cause CITES to fail in achieving its goal. CITES has 
indeed been criticized for its limited success in the practical effectiveness of its 
enforcement. After considering this limitation, the COP in its eleventh session 
provided a detailed guideline for the 'compliance and enforcement' procedure, which 
offers a practical mechanism for tackling a complex and difficult international 
problem. 
Regarding the enforcement activities of the Secretariat, the COP urged its Parties, and 
intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to provide additional financial 
support for the enforcement of the Convention, by providing funds for the 
enforcement assistance work of the Secretariat. The COP also directed the Secretariat 
to pursue closer international ties between the Convention's institutions, national 
enforcement agencies and existing intergovernmental bodies, particularly the World 
Customs Organization, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime and ICPO-Interpo1.522 
Regarding the communication of information and coordination between CITES and 
national legislation, the COP has recommended that MAs should coordinate with 
governmental agencies responsible for enforcement of CITES, including Customs and 
521 CITES Conf. Resolution 13.87. 
522 CITES Conf. Resolution 11.3 (Rev. COP 14). 
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Police, and, where appropriate, sectoral NGOs, by arranging training activities and 
joint meetings, and facilitating the exchange of infonnation. 523 
5.2.5. The Convention's reservation procedure 
CITES pennits Contracting Parties to enter a reservation in relation to species whose 
inclusion in the Appendices they find objectionable. Reservations may be taken in two 
situations. First, a new Party may enter a specific reservation with regard to i) a 
species included in Appendix I, II or III; or ii) any parts or derivatives specified in 
relation to a species included in Appendix Ill, when it deposits its instrument of 
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.524 Second, Contracting Parties may 
fonnulate reservation regarding the subsequent amendments to the Appendices,s25 
though these must be registered with the depositary government within 90 days of the 
adoption of the amendment to the Appendix. General reservations concerning the 
provisions of the Convention are prohibited.526 Reservations may be withdrawn at any 
time. 
Twenty parties had reservations (effective from September 2007) to the listing of 
s p ~ c i e s s in Appendices I and II.527 Contracting Parties are not obliged to provide 
reasons for making a reservation. However, in practice, it is the major wildlife 
importers that frequently enter reservation.528 For example, Japan has a current 
reservation to the listing of certain whales, as whale meat is regarded as a lUXUry in 
S23 Ibid. 
524 CITES Article XXIII(2). 
525 Ibid. Articles XV(3) and XVI(2). 
526 Ibid. Article XXIII(l). 
527 Bowman, Davies and Redgwell, supra n 8, 516. 
528 Gary Meyers and Kyla Bennett, 'Answering "The Call of the Wild": An Examination of US 
Participation in International Wildlife Law' (1989) 7 PACE ELR 104. 
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Japan.529 The effect of a reservation is to exempt the reserving Party from the 
requirements of CITES in relation to the species in question.53o Even then, however, 
when dealing with CITES Parties, they would be obliged to produce documentation 
comparable to that required by the Parties themselves.531 That means the effect of 
reservation is usually minimal on CITES objectives. 
5.3. Overlap and balance 
CITES is one of the few MEAs which use trade measures to achieve their objectives. 
Nevertheless, a fundamental difference between CITES and the multilateral trade 
agreements is that CITES places restrictions on trade in wildlife species in order to 
protect them, whilst the WTO promotes the elimination of trade restrictions and 
discriminatory trade measures to liberal trade. Consequently, the application of CITES 
trade-restriction provisions may raise questions about its compatibility with the basic 
principles of the multilateral trading system.532 
5.3.1. CITES permit system to control trade 
As mentioned earlier, CITES controls international trade in endangered species of wild 
flora and fauna through a permit system.533 CITES permit system requires that all 
proposals regarding the import, export, re-export and introduction from the sea534 of 
specimens covered by the Convention have to be authorized through a licensing 
system, i.e. based on a system of permits and certificates that may be issued if certain 
529 B . owman, Dav1es and Redgwell, supra n 8, 516. 
530 CITES Article XXIII (3). 
531 Ibid. Article X of CITES. 
S32 See Chapter 3. 
533 Ong, 'The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES, 1973)' supra n 
490,297. 
534 According to CITES Article 2, 'introduction from the sea' means transportation into a State of 
specimens of any species which were taken in the marine environment not under the 
jurisdiction of any State'. 
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conditions are met and that have to be presented before consignments of specimens 
are allowed to leave or enter a country. 
It has also been mentioned that trade measures vary according to the Appendices of 
the Convention in which the relevant species are listed. These measures are also 
focused on the purpose of the transaction, the conservation impact (determined by a 
SA), lawful acquisition and, where relevant, humane treatment concerns. Permits and 
certificates are endorsed (usually by Customs) upon exit, and presented (usually to 
Customs) on entry. Data collected from permits and certificates contribute to a body 
of information that allows Parties to follow international trade trends and to adapt 
their national and international conservation and trade policies as necessary. 
CITES permit system has been criticized for not providing a detailed system of rules 
and for relying on the discretion of its Parties to interpret and implement their own 
permit procedures.535 The COP has observed that false and invalid permits and 
certificates are used more and more often for fraudulent purposes and that appropriate 
measures are needed to prevent such documents from being accepted. 536 
Therefore, in its 2002 meeting, COP considered the need to improve and standardize 
permits and certificates537, and recommended that the data contained on permits and 
certificates must supply maximum information, as much for export as for import, to 
allow for verification of the conformity between the specimens and the document. At 
the same time, it recognized that the issuance of CITES permits and certificates serves 
m Ong, 'The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES, 1973)' supra n 
490,297. 
536 CITESConf. Resolution 12.3. 
S37 Ibid. 
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as a certification scheme for assuring that trade is not detrimental to the survival of 
those species included in the Appendices. This was the first step towards the 
development of one standard form for all CITES documents.538 
CITES permit system to restrict trade. of endangered species itself constitutes a 
continuous violation of GATT Article XI. 539 It is unlikely to receive an exemption 
under Article XX(b) and (g). The function of the Convention's permit system is to 
conserve wildlife extraterritorially in exporting states, which is only allowed under 
Article XX(g) if such restriction is extraterritorially enforced against one state's own 
nations and vessels.540 To be justified under Article XX(b), CITES permit system need 
to pass the 'necessity' test. Furthermore, the above permit system is only a minimum 
standard for Contracting Parties, whereas Article XIV permits them to adopt measures 
that are 'stricter' than the obligations stipulated under the Convention. Therefore, 
Contracting Parties are allowed to adopt a more trade-restrictive measure than that 
required by the above-mentioned permit system. 
For example, the Convention requires that import permits be issued only for trade in 
specimens of Appendix I listed species. Appendix 11 listing does not require an import 
permit, but in 1996 EC Regulation No. 338/97 entered into force, which imposed 
stricter domestic measures than those set forth in CITES. 54) Accordingly, EU Member 
States are under the obligation to require an import permit or import certificate for 
imports of all species appearing on CITES Appendices. Australia requires evidence of 
538 See Willem Wijnstekers, The Evaluation of CITES' (Sth Edn, Published by the CITES 
secretariat, 2005). Available as e-book at cites.org. 
539 Article XI prohibits the use of quantitative restrictions; see Chapter 3. 
540 Ibid. 
541 Article 4(2) of the Council Regulation (EC) No 338/97 of 9 December 1996 on the protection of 
species of wild fauna and flora by regulating trade therein.) 
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a management plan in exporting countries before it permits imports, and this has led, 
for example, to its refusal to allow the import of caviar. Among exporting countries, 
Brazil and Nigeria have banned the export of wildlife for commercial purposes. These 
export bans are prohibited by Article XI(1) of the GAIT, but could be saved by Article 
XX(b) and (g).542 There is, therefore, a potential for conflict present between the 
CITES and the GA IT. 
Furthermore, since CITES has not provided any definition for the term 'primarily 
commercial purposes', Parties are free to interpret it broadly so as to treat any 
transaction which is not wholly 'non-commercial' as 'commercial', resulting in a ban 
on importation. It is established in the multilateral trading system that members of the 
multilateral trade agreements must adopt a 'less trade-restrictive measure' whenever 
'necessary' to protect 'human, animal or plant life and health'. Therefore, CITES 
Parties' measures to restrict trade, since it interprets 'commercial purposes' broadly to 
include 'non-commercial purposes', could be in violation of Article XI of the GAIT 
and possibly be difficult to justify under Article XX(b), as they might not pass the 
GAIT 'necessity test'. 
5.3.2. CITES exceptions pursuing conservation objectives 
Some of the CITES exceptions are not only intended to achieve CITES objectives (Le. 
'protect' endangered species 'against over-exploitation'), but also to promote these 
objectives, for example, captive breeding543 and artificial propagation of plant species 
for commercial purposes.544 
542 For discussion on unilateral measures see Chapter 3. 
543 h T e term 'bred in captivity' refers to specimens born or otherwise produced in a controlled 
environment. 
544 CITES Article VII(4). 
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Captive breeding has two principal purposes: either (i) reintroduction of the species 
into the wild to increase small existing wild populations; or Cii) for commercial 
purposes, i.e. for trade. However, the trade in specimens of Appendix I species bred in 
captivity is permitted only if it is marked in accordance with the provisions on 
marking in the Resolutions adopted by the COP, and if the types and numbers of the 
marks are indicated on the documents authorizing the trade.545 
The term 'bred in captivity for commercial purposes', as used in Article VIIC 4), is 
interpreted as referring to any specimen of an animal bred to obtain economic benefit, 
including profit, whether in cash or kind, where the purpose is directed towards the 
sale, exchange or provision of a service or any other form of economic use or 
benefit. 546 As the commercial trade in specimens of Appendix I species is subject to 
strict regulation and only allowed in exceptional circumstances, captive bred 
Appendix I animals are artificially propagated, and Appendix I plants are deemed to 
be specimens of species included in Appendix 11 and are therefore treated in 
accordance with the provisions of Article IV of CITES. 547 In accordance with 
paragraph 5 of that Article, the import of specimens of Appendix I species bred in 
captivity or plant species artificially propagated for non-commercial purposes does not 
require even an import permit. 
Another typical purpose of 'breeding in captivity' is to increase small existing wild 
populations of Appendix I species and plants through reintroduction. Therefore, the 
545 CITESConf. Resolution 10.16 (Rev.). 
546 CITESConf. Resolution 12.10 (Rev. CoPI4). 
547 CITES Article VII(4). 
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breeding stock548 must be established in a manner that is not detrimental to the 
survival of the species in the wild. At the same time, it must be managed in a manner 
'capable of reliably producing second generation offspring549 in a controlled 
environment,550 so as to 'maintain the breeding stock indefinitely,.551 Similar criteria 
need to be fulfilled before plants can be considered 'artificially propagated'. This 
criterion assists Appendix I species to be capable of sustaining themselves without 
significant replacement from the wild before any international trade for commercial 
purpose is allowed. 552 
5.3.3. Relationship with the multilateral trade agreements 
CITES uses sanctions, i.e. suspension of trade as a compliance mechanism. 553 CITES 
can issue trade sanctions if a state fails to provide the required annual report on illegal 
trade, fails to implement CITES in domestic law and/or continues on significant trade 
in Appendix 11 species. In 2009 there were thirty-two trade suspensions in effect under 
CITES, four of which are not Parties to the CITES and two of which are WTO 
Members. 554 Although such suspension had not been challenged by a WTO Member 
who is non-Party to the CITES, there are possibilities that the compatibilities of CITES 
S48 The 'breeding stock' means animals that are used for reproduction. 
S49 'First-generation offspring (FI)' are specimens produced in a controlled environment from 
parents at least one of which was conceived in or taken from the wild; and 'offspring of second 
generation (F2) or subsequent generation (F3, F4, etc.), are specimens produced in a controlled 
environment from parents that were also produced in a controlled environment. 
S50 A 'controlled environment' is an environment that is manipulated for the purpose of producing 
animals of a particular species, that has boundaries designed to prevent animals, eggs or 
gametes of the species from entering or leaving the controlled environment, and the general 
characteristics of which may include but are not limited to: artificial housing; waste removal; 
SSI 
SS2 
SS3 
SS4 
health care; protection from predators; and artificially supplied food. 
CITES Conf. Resolution 2.12. 
Bowman, Davies and Redgwell, supra n 8, 513. 
Susan Biniaz, 'Remarks about the CITES Compliance Regime', in Ulrich Beyerlin, Peter-
Tobias Stoll and RUdiger Wolfrum (eds), Ensuring Compliance with Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, the Netherlands 2006) 89; Malgosia 
Fitzmaurice and Catherine Redgwell, 'Environmental Non-compliance Procedures and 
International Law' (2000) 31 NYIL 35. 
Bowman, Davies and Redgwell, supra n 8, 652. 
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trade measures with the WTO rules may anse In future. 555 A non-Party could 
challenge the import and export restriction that CITES applies against non-Parties, as 
it contravenes Article XI of the GATT. In this context, a WTO Panel in EC - Biotech 
decided that to be considered a 'relevant agreement' in a dispute, Parties to the both 
agreements need to be identical. 556 
There are two categories of CITES members when it comes to dealing with the subj ect 
of CITES and WTO obligations. There are (many) WTO Members that are also Parties 
to CITES, and there are (a few) WTO Members that are not Parties to CITES. There 
should be no problem when the Parties to both treaties are identical.557 For GATT 
(1947) Parties that are also Parties to CITES (1973), the view could be taken that 
CITES provisions should prevail. But it seems that this 'later in time' rule has failed to 
give CITES precedence over the GATT, as the Uruguay Round resets GATT's date to 
1994, arguably allowing it to 'leapfrog into dominance' over most environmental 
treaties that use trade measures.558 Although GA TT 1994 appears to be later in time 
than CITES 1973, GA TT 1994 is the continuation treaty of GA TT 1947, as it has been 
adopted by the WTO without any change. 
But this leads to the question that if a new treaty is the continuation of a previous one, 
then how can its relationship with the in-between treaties be determined? It could be 
555 Some commentators view such prospect as 'largely hypothetical', including Milano, 'The 
Outcomes of the Procedure and their Legal Effects', in Tullio Treves et al. (eds), Non-
compliance Procedures and Mechanisms and the Effectiveness o/the International Multilateral 
Agreements (TMC Asser Press, 2009) 412-13, Sand, 'Sanction in Case of Non-compliance and 
State Responsibility: Pacta Sunt Servanda - Or Else?' in 8eyerlin, Stoll and Wolfrum (eds), 
supra n 553, 267. 
SS6 EC - Biotech Products, supra n 108, para. 7.72. This issue wiII be discussed fully in Chapter 8. 
SS7 According to Article 30(4) of the Vienna Convention 1969, when two agreements signed by the 
same Parties relating to the same subject matter are in conflict, the agreement later in time (lex 
posterior) is presumed to prevail. 
SS8 Esty, supra n 22, 219. 
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argued that still CITES will prevail over the GATT 1994, as it is a specialized 
agreement. According to the 'lex specialis derogat legi generali' maxim, whenever 
two or more norms deal with the same subject matter, priority should be given to the 
norm that is more specific. CITES is more specialized in comparison to GATT 1994, 
as it particularly governs international trade in wildlife. 
Article XIV also sets out the Convention's relationship with other international 
agreements. Paragraph 2 of Article XIV in particular confirms that the Convention 
does not affect its Parties' obligations deriving from any 'treaty, convention or 
international agreement relating to other aspects of trade ... '. CITES' relationship with 
other international agreements thus depends on what is meant by other aspects of 
trade. 
However, from the discussion of the CITES permit system and especially its 
provisions for 'stricter domestic measures' mentioned in Article XIV(a), it is evident 
that CITES provisions may well conflict with the rules of the multilateral trade 
agreements. Therefore, a Party to the Convention that is also a Party to the WTO 
multilateral trade agreements, while implementing its obligations under the CITES, 
might find itself violating its trade obligations. 
5.3.4. Precautionary measures to amend Appendices I and 11 listing 
Annex 4 of Resolution Conf. 9.24 (Rev. CoP 15) recognizes the importance of Rio 
Principle 15 concerning the precautionary approach, for the amendment of 
Appendices I and 11. It reiterates the fact 
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that, when considering proposals to amend Appendix I or 11, the Parties 
shall, by virtue of the precautionary approach and in case of uncertainty 
either as regards the. status of a species or the impact of trade on the 
conservation of a species, act in the best interest of the conservation of the 
species concerned and adopt measures that are proportionate to the 
anticipated risks to the species. 
Conference Resolution 9.24 (Rev. CoP 15), Annex 4 outlines general and specific 
precautionary measures for Parties to take into account in the deletion or de-listing of 
species. For example, an Appendix I species may not be removed from the 
Appendices without first being transferred to Appendix 11, and such a de-listing may 
only occur when one of the following precautionary safeguards is met: 559 
559 
a) the species is not in demand for international trade, nor is its transfer to 
Appendix 11 likely to stimulate trade in, or cause enforcement problems 
for, any other species included in Appendix I; or 
b) the species is likely to be in demand for trade, but its management is 
such that the COP is satisfied with: 
i) implementation by the range states of the requirements of the 
Convention, in particular Article IV; and 
ii) appropriate enforcement controls and compliance with the 
requirements of the Convention; or 
c) an integral part of the amendment proposal is an export quota or other 
special measure approved by the Conference of the Parties, based on 
management measures described in the supporting statement of the 
CITES Conf. Resolution 9.24 (Rev. CoP 15), Annex 4. 
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amendment proposal, provided that effective enforcement controls are in 
place; or 
d) a ranching proposal is submitted consistent with the applicable 
Resolutions of the Conference ofthe Parties and is approved. 
However, Annex 4 does not provide any guidance as to when the precautionary 
approach might apply, or what action might be appropriate under it for the 
implementation of this provision. This absence of specific guidelines for the 
application of the precautionary approach allows the Parties to take the precautionary 
measures they believe to be in '.the. best interest of the conservation of the species 
concerned'. A number of differing interpretations can be made of this phrase, which 
can be interpreted either to facilitate or to restrict wildlife trade. It can be argued that 
in some cases, transferring species from Appendix 11 to Appendix I, or including 
previously unlisted species in Appendix I, may act against the best interest of the 
conservation of the species concerned, even if it meets the criteria for inclusion in 
Appendix I. This applies most particularly to species in taxa that are of interest to 
hobbyists (e.g. cacti and orchids amongst plants, and parrots and tortoises amongst 
animals). In such cases there is a risk that listing the species in Appendix I will attract 
the attention of traders and collectors, thereby increasing demand and the risk of 
illegal trade. This is recognized explicitly by the Parties in Resolution Conf. 9.18 
(Rev.), concerning regulation of trade in plants. 
It was mentioned in Chapter 3 that a risk assessment under the SPS Agreement does 
not permit the consideration of socio-economic factors. Instead, the SPS Agreement's 
risk assessment is based on 'scientific evidence'. Therefore, thinking that this decision 
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might provide better protection to a particular community's socio-economic situation, 
such measures might be considered as a disguised restriction under the multilateral 
trading system. 
5.3.5. CITES animal welfare measures and trade 
CITES contains various provisions intended to ensure the welfare of species 
introduced into international trade. CITES Articles Ill, IV and V require that an import 
permit or an export permit, or a re-export certificate for trade in specimens of species 
included in Appendices I, 11 and Ill, should be granted by the MA only if it is satisfied 
that 'any living specimen will be so prepared and shipped as to minimize the risk of 
injury, damage to health or cruel treatment'. The transport of captive bred animals or 
artificially propagated plants of Appendices 11 and III species, live specimens that are 
personal effectslhousehold goods and for pre-Convention specimens is covered by 
Article VIII, which requires that Parties must ensure the proper care of all living 
specimens during any period of transit, holding or shipment. 
If the above conditions are not met, a MA can refuse the trade of species listed in the 
Appendices. Such refusal can be considered as 'disguised restriction to trade' by a 
WTO Member, since animal welfare issue are not recognized in Article XX(a) of the 
GATT.560 
5.4. Conclusions 
CITES is an international treaty for the conservation of wildlife. However, it is not 
designed directly to conserve migratory or other species in their habitats or to protect 
S60 For further discussion on trade and animal welfare issues see Chapter 3. Also see Michael 
Bowman, 'Conflict or Compatibility? The Trade, Conservation and Animal Welfare 
Dimensions of CITES' (1998) I JIWLP. 
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them from threats to their existence such as pollution, over-exploitation or by-
catches. 561 Its sole aim is to prevent international commercial trade in endangered 
species (not only species of animals but also of plants) or their products.562 CITES 
strictly limits international trade in species in genuine need of protection and also 
allows a controlled trade in species that are able to sustain some exploitation. 
There are signs that CITES may indeed have reached its outer limits. CITES brought 
together the concepts of trade regulation and conservation found in the earlier 
agreements and also, innovatively, faced the challenges which came with 
globalization. CITES was deliberately designed as a flexible instrument to adapt itself 
to changing circumstances.563 Therefore, it was committed to working in cooperation 
with CBD and accepted the Addis Ababa Principles and Guidelines. Although its 
exceptions and enforcement mechanisms have been criticized, CITES is perhaps the 
most successful of all the international treaties concerned with the conservation of 
wildlife. 
Furthermore, CITES is a trading treaty in the sense that it allows a controlled 
international trade in species whose survival is not yet threatened but may become so. 
Therefore, it attempts to establish a balance between its environmental and trade 
considerations. However, some trade restrictions seem to be incompatible with WTO 
provisions, although no state has yet challenged the compatibility of CITES' trade 
restriction with those of the GATTIWTO. Since the number of Parties in both 
Agreements is increasing, the potential for a conflict between the CITES and the WTO 
is 'real' and growing. 
561 Bimie et aI., supra nIl, 685. 
562 Ibid. 
563 Sand, 'Whither CITEs?' supra n 480, 30. 
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6. CBD and its relationship with the multilateral trade agreements 
6.1. Introduction 
This chapter sets out to s t u ~ y y two issues: i) the extent to which the 1992 Convention 
on Biological Diversity (hereafter CBD or the Convention)564 allows trade in 
biological resources565 while conserving biological diversity566; and ii) the 
compatibility between the Convention's trade-related environmental measures and the 
rules of the multilateral trade agreements. 
The Convention aims primarily to conserve Earth's biological diversity; however, it is 
not a 'preservationist' agreement. The preamble of the Convention identifies 
instrumental values of biodiversity and its components, along with their intrinsic 
values.567 Thus, the objectives of the Convention go well beyond conservation of 
biological diversity per se and comprehend such diverse issues as sustainable use of 
biological resources, access to genetic resources, the sharing of benefits derived from 
the use of genetic resources and access to technology.568 It is evident from these 
broad-ranging objectives that the Convention does not intend to bring the utilization of 
564 
565 
566 
567 
568 
The Convention on Biological Diversity was adopted in Nairobi on 22 May 1992. For the full 
text see (1992) 31 ILM 822. 
According to Article 2 of the Convention, 'biological resources' include genes, species and 
ecosystems that have actual or potential value to people. 
Article 2 of the Convention defines the term 'biological diversity' broadly to include the 
viability of life in all forms, levels and combinations. For further details of the term, see 
Michael Bowman, 'The Nature, Development and Philosophical Foundation of the Biodiversity 
Concept in International Law' in Michael Bowman and Catherine Redgwell (ed), International 
law and the Conservation of Biological Diversity (Kluwer Law International, the Netherlands 
1996) 5-6; Jeffrey McNeely, Kenton Miller and WaIter Reid, Conserving the World's 
Biological Diversity (lUCN, 1990) 17-9. 
The 'instrumental value' ofbiodiversity is based on the idea that human use and benefit are the 
fundamental purposes for conserving biodiversity. On the other hand, 'intrinsic value' is based 
on the theory that nature has its own worth, unrelated to its usefulness for humankind. A 
species should therefore be protected for its own sake. This approach means that biodiversity 
and its components deserve preservation because of their own value. For more about different 
kinds of value of biodiversity and its components, see Bowman, supra n 566, 15-28; F 
Mathews, The Ecological Self (Routledge, 1991) Ch 4, 117-47; J Alder and D Wilkinson, 
Environmental Law and Ethics (Macmillan, 1999) Ch 2, 37-71; GilIespie, supra n 185, Ch 6. 
Article 1 of the CBD. 
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the biodiversity resources to an end. Yet, in order to avoid or minimize the adverse 
impact on biodiversity that may arise from resource utilization, the Contracting Parties 
are required to take a comprehensive set of actions in accordance with the relevant 
provisions of the Convention. 
The CBD is a framework agreement which lays down various guiding principles for 
Contracting Parties in order to develop national laws and policies to implement the 
Convention's objectives. Thus, although the Convention does not contain any specific 
trade-restrictive measures, the Contracting Parties, while implementing the 
Convention, may develop and adopt specific measures restricting trade in biological 
resources in pursuit of its objectives. Such measures are likely to run the risk of 
overlapping with obligations set out in the WTO multilateral trade agreements while 
dealing with the same subject matter. In addition to the discussion of the balance and 
overlap between the Convention and the multilateral trade agreements, special 
attention will be given to the CBD bodies' endeavours to coordinate with other 
convention bodies to facilitate a harmonious relationship between them. 
Accordingly, this chapter is divided into three sections. Section I aims to locate the 
environmental and trade balance in the Convention. In order to identify the extent to 
which the Convention allows scope for trade interests, it is necessary to consider the 
objectives, institutional arrangements, implementation procedures and provisions of 
the Convention whose implementation might have an effect on the trade of biological 
resources. This discussion is also important to understand the intention of the treaty 
maker, the scope of the Convention's provisions and their operation in practice, as 
well as the remedies provided by the Convention in case of a dispute concerning its 
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'interpretation and application' . Section 11 focuses on those provIsIOns of the 
Convention that overlap with trade rules and also examines the extent to which these 
provisions are compatible with the multilateral trading system. Finally, Section III 
discusses the Convention bodies' endeavours to coordinate with other convention 
bodies. 
6.2. Overview of the Convention 
The Convention on Biological Diversity is one of the two Rio instruments569 opened 
for signature at the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED). The Convention gained rapid and widespread acceptance, 
and entered into force on 29th December 1993; at present, 193 states and the 
European Community are parties.57o 
The Convention expressly recognizes the conservation ofbiodiversity as the 'common 
concern of humankind', while including 'state sovereignty' as a legally binding 
principle.571 It implies that states no longer have unfettered freedoms over their natural 
resources; while exercising such rights, states have to take into account legitimate 
concerns of the community of states with regard to the preservation of these 
resources. 572 In this context, the notion of 'common concern' gives the international 
community of states both a legitimate interest in resources of global significance and a 
569 The Rio Conference produced a number of instruments, of which only two comprised formal 
treaties: the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the 1992 
Convention on Biodiversity. 
570 The CBD official website <http://www.CBD.int/convention/parties/list/> (accessed 24 
September 2011). 
571 
572 
See the preamble and Articles 3 and 15 of the Convention. 
Bilderbeek, Wijgerde et aI., Biodiversity and International Law: The Effectiveness of 
International Environmental Law (IOS Press 1992) 87. 
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common responsibility to assist in their preservation.573 States' sovereign rights over 
their natural resources are balanced by duties deriving both from sovereignty itself and 
from biological diversity as a common concern of the entire international 
community.574 
6.2.1. Objectives and purposes 
The purpose of the Convention is to provide a framework for reversing biodiversity 
loss and for ensuring that biodiversity is used sustainably and that its benefits are 
equitably shared. To achieve this purpose, the Convention embraces three broad 
objectives, namely: i) the conservation of biological diversity; ii) the sustainable use 
of its components; and iii) the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising from 
the use of genetic resources.575 These objectives are to be pursued in accordance with 
the relevant provisions of the Convention. 
6.2.1.1. Conservation of biological diversity 
The conservation of biological diversity is the core objective of the Convention. The 
preamble of the Convention not only explicitly recognizes the 'intrinsic value of 
biological diversity', but also 'sets it apart as if to rank it equally' with all the various 
forms of value which follow. 576 The Convention has no further explicit elaboration of 
'intrinsic value of biological diversity' in the text, but its conservation obligations 
S73 UNEP, Report of the Group of Legal Experts to Examine the Concept of the Common Concem 
of Mankind in Relation to Global Environmental Issues (1990). 
574 Burhenne-Guilmin and Casey-Letkowitz, 'The Convention on Biological Diversity: A Hard 
Won Global Achievement', 3 YbIEL (1992) 43 at 48. 
S7S Article I of the Convention. 
576 Bowman, supra n 566, 20. 
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apply to all 'biological diversity', not.merely to 'biological resources'. 577 Furthermore, 
Article 22(1) of the Convention asserts that the Convention does not affect parties' 
rights and obligations deriving from other international agreements to which they are 
party, unless their exercise would damage or threaten biodiversity. This provision 
clearly shows that protection of biological diversity is an uncompromising objective 
of the Convention. 
The Convention does not define the term conservation; but contains provisions that 
address all three of its key pillars: preservation of biological diversity, maintaining 
essential ecological processes and sustainable utilization of biodiversity 
components.578 The concept of conservation as used in the Convention recognizes that 
the sustainable use of living resources, and the ecosystems of which they are a part, is 
a prerequisite for biological diversity conservation, and at the same time 
acknowledges the necessity for certain elements to be given special care and 
treatment. 
6.2.1.2. Sustainable use of biodiversity components 
Sustainable use of components of biodiversity is another of the three objectives of the 
Convention. It is the key to achieving the broader goal of sustainable development and 
is a cross-cutting issue relevant to all themes and areas addressed by the Convention 
and to all biological resources. Article 2 of the Convention provides the key legal 
definition of the concept of 'sustainable use' as 'the use of components of biological 
diversity in a way and at a rate that does not lead to the long-term decline of biological 
577 GiIlespie, supra n 185; Bowman, supra n 566, 15-28. 
578 McNeely et aI., supra n 566, 19. 
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diversity, thereby maintaining its potential to meet the needs and aspirations of present 
and future generations' .579 
The definition suggests that the use of the components of biological diversity should 
neither cause any significant decline in biodiversity resources nor harm any other 
components of biodiversity. The definition of 'sustainable use' is species- and 
ecosystem-oriented and can be consumptive580 or non-consumptive, 58 I which IS a 
significant departure from the concept of 'sustainable yield'. 582 Thus, the 
Convention's conception of 'sustainable use' requires that the exploitation of 
biological resources does not reduce the future use potential of the target population or 
impair its long-term viability; it must be compatible with the maintenance of the long-
term viability of supporting and dependent ecosystems; and it must not reduce the 
future use potential or impair the long-term viability of other species. 583 
In this context, the preamble of the Convention notes that 'where there is a threat of 
significant reduction or loss of biological diversity, lack of full scientific certainty 
should not be used as a reason for postponing measures to avoid or minimize such a 
threat'. Thus, the precautionary approach is subsumed within the Convention as a tool 
579 
S80 
S81 
S82 
S83 
Article 2 of the CBD. 
Consumptive uses of species include gathering, harvesting or hunting animals and plants for 
food, medicine; clothing, shelter, timber, fuel and fibre. Consumptive uses of ecosystems 
include converting a forest to grazing land, draining a wetIand for land or discharging 
pollutants into rivers. 
Non-consumptive uses of both species and ecosystems, the use of sacred sites for cultural and 
religious practices and some recreational uses. 
'Maximum sustainable yield' means the greatest yield of a renewable resource while keeping 
steady the stock of that resource. It is a conservation objective widely relied on in conservation 
treaties. However, it is no longer accepted as a conservation objective, as it fails to take into 
account not only economic objectives but also the ecological relationships of species. 
IUCN, Guidelines for the Ecological Sustainability of Non-consumptive and Consumptive Uses 
of Wild Species (Draft Guideline: 1994). 
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to deal with uncertainty related to the use of biodiversity.584 However, the preamble 
does not refer to the term 'precautionary principle' explicitly, but nonetheless reflects 
a precautionary approach, which closely parallels Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration, 
which states: 
'In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be 
widely applied by states according to their capabilities. Where there are 
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of scientific certainty shall not 
be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent 
environmental degradation'. 
The COP at its eighth meeting also acknowledges the precautionary approach as a tool 
to deal with uncertainty related to the use of biodiversity.585 Thus, the precautionary 
principle plays a vital role in the concept of sustainable utilization because it 
recognizes that action is needed when threats of biodiversity become apparent, and 
international bodies should not wait until exhaustive studies have been completed. 
6.2.1.3. Fair and equitable sharing of benefits 
The fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the use of genetic resources is 
the third objective of the Convention. Benefit sharing is an exceedingly broad concept, 
which includes appropriate access to genetic resources, transfer of related 
584 Eighth Ordinary Meeting ofthe COP to the Convention, Curitiba, Brazil, 20-3\ March (2006), 
see COP decision V1II/28, Annex 3(30). 
585 Ibid. 
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technologies and funding, each of which has been pursued in accordance with the 
relevant provisions of the Convention.586 
6.2.2. Provisions of the Convention relevant to trade interests 
The preamble of the Convention expresses the parties' 'determination' 'to conserve 
and sustainably use biological diversity for the benefit of present and future 
generations'. In order to achieve the conservation and sustainable use objectives of the 
Convention, the Contracting Parties are required to develop and adopt specific 
measures in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention. 
Implementation of the Convention's provisions concerning measures and incentives 
for conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity, regulating access to resources, 
and access to and transfer of technology by the Contracting Parties are liable to affect 
trade interests, since trade is often an underlying cause of the activities that threaten 
biodiversity.587 The following section analyses the above provisions of the Convention 
to observe the extent to which trade interests are accommodated under them. 
6.2.2.1. Measures for conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity 
Contracting Parties are required to develop and adopt national plans, programmes and 
strategies for conservation and sustainable use, integrate these into relevant sectoral 
and cross-sectoral plans and policies,588 monitor identified components of biodiversity 
586 Article 1 of the Convention. 
587 Downes, Integrating Implementation of the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Rules 
of the World Trade Organization (IUCN, 1999) 19. 
588 Article 6(a) and (b) of the Convention. 
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and identify 'processes and categories of activities589 which are having an adverse 
impact on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity.590 
The most significant obligations placed on parties concerning conservation are dealt 
with under Articles 8 and 9 of the Convention. These Articles contain a series of 
obligations concerning two interrelated approaches for biological diversity 
conservation: in-situ conservation and ex-situ conservation. 'In-situ conservation' 
means, according to Article 2 of the Convention, 'the conservation of ecosystems and 
natural habitats and the maintenance and recovery of viable populations of species in 
their natural surroundings and, in the case of domesticated or cultivated species, in the 
surroundings where they have developed their distinctive properties'. The in-situ 
conservation measures taken under the Convention can be divided into three groups: i) 
protection measures, ii) restoration measures and iii) preservation measures. 
Protection measures reqUlre: i) protected areas; ii) regulation and management of 
biological resources both inside and outside protected areas; iii) protection of 
ecosystems and natural habitats, and populations of species; and iv) environmentally 
sound and sustainable development in areas adjacent to protected areas. 591 The 
primary objective of a protection measure is the conservation of biodiversity; 
however, an area can be protected either for biodiversity conservation or for 
sustainable use, or both. Protection measures also require i) the controlled use and 
release of modified living organisms when they are likely to have adverse 
environmental impacts; ii) the prevention of the introduction of control or eradication 
S89 For example deforestation, over-use, unsustainable agriCUlture, drainage or filling of wetlands, 
urbanization, pollution, etc. are harmful activities and processes posing threat to biological 
diversity. 
590 • ArtIcle 7, in particular paragraphs (a) and (c). 
S91 See Article 8 (a}-(e) of the convention for protection measures. 
193 
of those alien speCIes which threaten the environment; and iii) the regulation or 
management of processes and activities that threaten biodiversity. As discussed in 
Section 11, such measures may restrict the import of products or species which have, 
or are likely to have, adverse environmental impacts. 
The in-situ conservation measures under the Convention go beyond protecting specific 
areas, and include measures to 'rehabilitate' and 'restore' degraded ecosystems and to 
promote the recovery. of threatened species. The IUCN has proposed a broad 
understanding of the terms 'rehabilitate' and 'restore', meaning 'so far as possible, 
bring disturbed and damaged systems back towards their natural conditions, or at least 
to the condition in which they are capable of sustained productive use'. 592 Thus, a 
restoration measure requires the development and implementation of recovery plans 
and management strategies.593 As part of their in-situ conservation, parties are also 
required 'to preserve and maintain knowledge, innovations and practices of 
indigenous and local communities embodying traditional lifestyles relevant for the 
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity'. 594 
'Ex-situ conservation', according to Article 2 of the Convention, means 'the 
conservation of components of biological diversity outside their natural habitat'. 
Contracting Parties are required to adopt appropriate measures, including the 
establishment of collections of plant and animal specimens and the possible 
reintroduction of species into their natural habitats in appropriate circumstances,595 to 
conserve components of biological diversity ex-situ. However, measures under Article 
592 Lyle Glowka, Francoise Burhenne-Guilmin and Hugh Synge, A Guide to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (lUCN Environmental Policy and Law Papers No. 30, 1994) 44. 
593 Article 8(t) of the Convention. 
594 Ibid., Article 80). 
595 Ibid., Article 9(c). 
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9( c) include reintroduction, and go beyond the recovery and rehabilitation of 
threatened species. 
The Convention states various obligations relating to the sustainable use of biological 
resources, which is interwoven into a number of articles. Among them, specific 
provisions relating to sustainable use are mentioned in Article 1 O(b), which requires 
parties 'to adopt measures relating to the use of biological resources in order to avoid 
or minimize adverse impacts on biological diversity'. It is evident from this paragraph 
that sustainable use measures need to take into consideration the impact of utilization 
not only on a particular resource, but on biological diversity as a whole. 
The above conservation and sustainable use measures must be taken in accordance 
with the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)596 procedure stipulated in Article 14 
of the Convention. Each Party must 'introduce appropriate arrangements to ensure that 
the environmental consequences of its programmes and policies that are likely to have 
significant adverse impacts on biological diversity are duly taken into account'. EIA 
covers all programmes and policies of governments such as trade, agriculture, 
fisheries, environment and transport, or indeed any programme and policy that could 
have environmental consequences. 
It is difficult to predict what impact the above conservation and sustainable use 
measures would have on trade, as the language of the Convention provisions is broad 
and somewhat obscure. Furthermore, since these measures are implemented by parties 
depending on their particular circumstances, the impact might vary in different 
S96 Environmental impact assessment is a procedure typically used to identify the environmental 
effects of a proposed project and to plan appropriate measures to reduce or eliminate its adverse 
impacts. 
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countries. However, there is no doubt that the Convention's provisions are intended to 
create a more rational system of conservation and use of natural resources. It allows 
utilization of biodiversity components, if such utilization does not impact adversely on 
biodiversity. In this context, the Contracting Parties apply the precautionary approach 
in order to determine the existence of 'a threat of significant reduction or loss of 
biological diversity'. The application of the precautionary approach to justify a trade 
restriction is a controversial issue. Section 11 of this chapter will discuss this issue in 
greater detail. 
6.2.2.2. Incentive measures to achieve CBD objectives 
An incentive measure is a specific inducement designed and implemented to influence 
societal actors to conserve biological diversity or to use its components in a 
sustainable manner. 597 Article 11 of the Convention requires Parties to adopt 
economically and socially sound measures that would act as incentives to encourage 
the conservation and sustainable use of components of biological diversity. This short 
article does not provide any further guidelines regarding its implementation. Incentive 
measures can be either positive or perverse. The Convention encourages incentive 
measures that are positive for conservation and sustainable use, but removes or 
mitigates incentive measures which are adverse to the Convention's objectives. 
A positive incentive measure is an economic, legal or institutional measure which 
influences decision-making by recognizing and rewarding activities that are carried 
out for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity. 598 There is a wide 
range of positive incentive measures available to encourage such action. Some of 
597 See Note by the Executive Secretary, 'Sharing of experience on incentive Measures for 
Conservation and sustainable Use', UNEP/CBDICOP/3/24 (1996). 
S98 COP Decision VIII/26, para. 4. 
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them are direct,599 such as payment for ecosystem servIces, which are sometimes 
depicted as conditional subsidies, and some indirect,600 such as eco-Iabelling 
initiatives. A later discussion shows that eco-Iabelling can restrict the import of goods, 
requiring them to meet a certain environmental standard fixed by a nation state. After 
realizing this connection, the CBD-COP in its sixth meeting endorsed a proposal for 
the design and implementation of incentive measures in order to attain the objectives 
of the Convention, especially in regard to the sustainable use of biological diversity.60I 
The COP also recognized that further work needed to be undertaken on positive 
incentives and their performance. 
On the other hand, perverse incentive measures induce unsustainable behaviour that 
reduces biodiversity. For example, subsidies to fishermen to improve their vessels 
could be disastrous and put the stocks of increasing numbers of fish species under 
increasing pressure. Thus, the CBD-COP suggested a three-phase process of 
removing policies or practices that generate perverse incentives or in mitigating their 
perverse effects on biological diversity: i) the identification of policies or practices 
that generate perverse incentives and their impacts; ii) the design and implementation 
of appropriate reforms; and iii) the monitoring, enforcement and evaluation of these 
reforms.602 
The removal or mitigation of perverse incentives undeniably has positive impacts on 
the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity, but might have negative impacts 
S99 These incentives require direct cash to conserve biological diversity; also known as positive 
monetary incentives. 
600 These incentives require no direct or specific budgetary appropriation for conservation and can 
be fiscal, or service or socially based; they are also known as non-monetary positive incentive 
601 
602 
measures. 
COP Decision VI/IS. 
COP Decision VII/IS. 
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on trade at least in the short term.603 Therefore, the COP stresses that these incentives 
and mitigation measures should be applied in a manner consistent with international 
law.604 To pursue these objectives, the COP requested the CBD Executive Secretary to 
compile and analyse the relevant information on the impacts of perverse incentive 
measures.605 
6.2.2.3. Measures to ensure fair and equitable sharing of benefits 
Genetic resources are 'genetic material of actual and potential value'. 606 Thus, for the 
third objective of the Convention, i.e. the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising 
from the use of genetic resources, intellectual property concerns are of primary 
relevance.607 One possible way qf sharing benefits arising from the use of genetic 
resources is to grant an intellectual property interest for a constituency within the 
country of origin, e.g. 'farmer's rights' for those that have developed plant resources 
over the centuries. As mentioned in Chapter 3, this type of intellectual property right 
has been included in the UPOV Convention, which directs its parties to grant plant 
breeders' right, a sui generis intellectual property right. 
Another way of sharing benefits arising from the use of genetic resources is to allow 
countries of origin a share in the proceeds of any subsequent intellectual property right 
exploitation of genetic resources by outsiders. With regards to this latter, the 
Convention requires its Parties to take measures to determine access their genetic 
603 Furthermore, the Agreement on Agriculture aims to reduce trade-distorting domestic support, 
which may also qualify as a perverse incentive measure under the CBD. 
604 COP Decision VII/I 8, 
60S COP Decision IX/6, para, 7. 
606 Article 2 of the Convention. 
607 Timothy Swanson, 'Economics ofa Biodiversity Convention', (1992) 21 Ambio: A Journal of 
the Human Environment, 250-7. 
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resources and also to share benefits arising from such use 'fairly and equitably' and 
upon 'mutually agreed terms' with the provider of genetic resources. 
A framework for the implementation of this objective is provided in Article 15 of the 
Convention. Whilst confirming, in Article 15(1), states' sovereign rights to natural 
resources and their authority to determine access to genetic resources in areas within 
their jurisdiction,608 the Convention requires parties to take appropriate measures to 
ensure that the use of genetic resources and the benefits arising from their utilization, 
as well as the traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources and the benefits 
arising from the utilization of such knowledge, are shared equitably between the 
'd d h .. C: • I h 609 resource provI er an t e party usmg It lor commercIa or ot er purposes. 
This exceedingly broad Article leaves the balancing to further negotiation.61o Provider 
parties are also required: i) to create conditions to facilitate access to genetic resources 
for environmentally sound uses; and ii) not to impose restrictions that run counter to 
the objectives of the Convention.61I Paragraphs 4 and 5 of Article 15 specifying these 
conditions provide that any agreement for access to genetic resources has to be subject 
to 'prior informed consent' from the country of origin, and also has to be reached on 
'mutually agreed terms' between the Contracting Party providing access to genetic 
resources and a private entity (often a commercial enterprise).612 In addition, Article 
80) contains provision to encourage the equitable sharing of the benefits arising from 
the utilization of knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local 
608 This issue has been mentioned in the preamble and Article 3 of the Convention. 
609 Article 15(7) of the Convention. 
610 Birnie et aI., supra n 11, 630. 
611 Article 15(1), (2) and (3) of the Convention. 
612 Glowka et aI., A Guide to the Convention on Biological Diversity, supra n 592, 82-3. 
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communities embodying traditional lifestyles relevant for the conservation and 
sustainable use of biological diversity. 
These provisions are also linked to the provisions on access to, and transfer of, 
technology. Article 16 of the Convention requires Parties to provide and/or facilitate 
the transfer to other Parties of technologies, including biotechnologies, 'that are 
relevant to the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity or make use of 
genetic resources and do not cause significant damage to the environment'. 613 
Furthermore, such transfer is required to be i) on 'fair and most favourable terms' and 
in other cases on 'mutually agreed' terms; ii) on terms which recognize and are 
consistent with the adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights. 
Article 16(3) of the C o n v e n ~ i o n n requires Parties to take measures 'with the aim that' 
Parties which provide genetic resources have access to and transfer of technology 
which makes use of these resources. In addition, Article 16(4) enables Parties to enact 
compulsory licensing regimes. It provides that '[ e ]ach Contracting Party shall take 
legislative, administrative or policy measures ... with the aim that the private sector 
facilitates access to joint development and transfer of technology ... for the benefit of 
both governmental institutions and the private sector of developing countries'. 
To assist Parties with the implementation of the access and benefit-sharing provisions 
of the Convention, the COP, at its meeting in Nagoya, in 2010, adopted the Nagoya 
Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of 
Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity 
613 Article 16(1) of the CBD. 
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(hereinafter the Nagoya Protocol),614 replacing the 'Bonn Guidelines on Access to 
Genetic Resources and Fair and Equitable Sharing of the Benefits Arising out of their 
Utilization' .615 The Nagoya Protocol creates a legal framework to regulate access to 
the genetic resources of countries and to provide for fair and equitable sharing of 
benefits from the utilization of those resources that contribute to the conservation and 
sustainable use of biodiversity.616 The key aspects of the Nagoya Protocol are as 
follows: 
i) it obliges Parties to share benefits on mutually agreed terms between the provider 
and user of genetic resources.617 Article 6 of the Nagoya Protocol emphasizes the 
'prior informed consent of the Party providing such resources' as a precondition to 
the approval of access. This provision is most significant, as the success of the 
Protocol will depend on its successful implementation. Successful implementation 
in turn depends on legal certainty, clarity and transparency in systems regulating 
access and benefit sharing.618 It also allows Parties providing resources to set out 
criteria and/or processes for obtaining prior informed consent or approval. 
ii) it also reqUIres Parties to '[P]ay due regard to cases of present or imminent 
emergencies that threaten or damage human, animal or plant health, as determined 
614 The Nagoya Protocol was adopted at the tenth Conference of the Parties on 29th October 2010 
in Nagoya, Japan. Fifty ratifications are needed for the Protocol to enter into force. Parties to 
the CBD have one year from February 2011 ~ o o sign the Protocol and then begin the 
implementation process. It is worth noting that the United States is not party to the CBD, so is 
unable to sign the Protocol. The text is available on the UN Treaty Section's website at: 
http://treaties.un.orgldoc/Treaties/2010/11/201 0 I 127%2002-08%20PM/Ch-XXVlI-8-b.pdf> 
[accessed on 30 December 2010]. 
For the text of the Bonn Guideline see Appendix I and 11, COP Decision V1I24. 
616 Article I of the Nagoya Protocol. 
617 Ibid., Article 5. 
615 
618 Ibid, Article 6. 
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nationally or internationally' in the development and implementation of its access 
and benefit-sharing legislation or regulatory requirements.619 
It is critical to determine the impact of the successful implementation of the Nagoya 
Protocol. The Protocol obliges its parties to establish clear rules and procedures for 
requiring 'prior inform consent' and the establishment of 'mutually agreed terms'. 
Parties have to develop their own national systems for the implementation of the 
Protocol consistently with its provisions. However, measures for fair and equitable 
sharing are conditional to contribute to the conservation of biological diversity and the 
sustainable use of its components.620 Although the Protocol provides requirements to 
prior inform consent and mutually agreed terms, Parties can still develop a system 
restricting access which would threaten or damage human, animal or plant health. 
6.2.3. Institutional arrangements 
The Convention creates an international structure which includes a Conference of 
Parties (COP), a permanent Secretariat, a Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical 
and Technological Advice (SBSTT A) and a Clearing House Mechanism (CHM) to 
exchange and share information in support of scientific and technical cooperation to 
support national implementation of the Convention's obligations and to promote 
continued international cooperation.621 
619 Ibid., Article 8. 
620 Ibid., Article I. 
621 Downes, Integrating Implementation of the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Rules 
of the World Trade Organization OUeN, 1999) 7. 
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The COP is the governing body of the Convention, as established under Article 23. Its 
key function is to keep the Convention's implementation under review. Other 
functions include reviewing scientific and other sources of advice, adopting protocols 
and amendments to the Convention and its annexes, and considering further 
amendments. The COP can also establish such subsidiary bodies as are deemed 
necessary to implement the Convention.622 The Secretariat of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, based in Montreal, Canada, was established under Article 24 to 
support the goals of the Convention. The Secretariat's key task is to arrange and 
service meetings of the COP.623 
In addition to these bodies, the Convention establishes an open-ended 
intergovernmental scientific advisory body known as the SBSTT A to provide the COP 
and, as appropriate, its other subsidiary bodies with timely advice relating to the 
implementation of the Convention.624 The meetings of the SBSTTA take place every 
year.625 As a subsidiary body of the COP, SBSTTA is to report regularly to the COP 
on all aspects of its work.626 The SBSTT A carries out its work through ad hoc open-
ended technical expert groups under the guidance of the COP. 
6.2.4. Implementation 
The CBD is a framework agreement. 627 It provides guidelines for the conservation of 
biodiversity and sustainable use of its components, but it is the Contracting Parties' 
prerogative to adopt or to develop specific measures to implement the Convention's 
622 Article 23(4) of the Convention. 
623 Ibid., Article 24(1)(b). 
624 Ibid., Article 25( I). 
625 COP Decision V 120, Canada, 22-23 February 1999 and 24-28 January 2000. 
626 Article 25(2) of the Convention. 
627 A framework agreement lays down various guiding principles which state parties are required 
to take into account in developing national law and policy to implement the agreement. 
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provisions. Implementation of the Convention is overwhelmingly the responsibility of 
individual Parties and most action for implementation needs to be taken at the national 
level. In this connection, the preamble of the Convention stresses the importance of, 
and the need to promote, international, regional and global cooperation among states 
and intergovernmental organizations and the non-governmental sector for the 
implementation of the Convention's objectives. 
Each Party has autonomy to decide how to go about implementing the general 
provisions of the Convention and the specific guidance provided by the COP. The task 
of assessing the state of overall implementation of the Convention is therefore 
dependent upon the submission of information by all Parties on the measures each has 
taken to implement the provisions of the Convention and the effectiveness of these 
measures. Article 26 of the Convention contains the obligation for each Party to 
provide this information. Without comprehensive compliance with this requirement, 
the COP is unable to operate effectively. 
On the other hand, a large number of other international and regional agreements 
address issues of relevance to the Convention. In this regard, the COP calls on the 
Executive Secretary to cooperate with relevant international organizations and 
processes in any work to be carried out. The Executive Secretary has signed a number 
of memoranda of cooperation with other relevant organizations. Section III of this 
chapter discusses how the CBD-COP is cooperating with the WIPO and the TRIPS 
Council to develop a common understanding of the relationship between Intellectual 
Property Rights and the relevant provisions of the TRIPS Agreement and the 
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Convention, particularly as it relates to the knowledge, innovations and practices of 
indigenous and local communities. 
6.2.4.1. Dispute settlement 
Article 27 of the Convention provides means for disputes concerning 'interpretation 
and application' of the Convention and its protocols, and Annex 11 sets out arbitration 
procedures. However, according to Article 27(1), the only compulsory method of 
settlement is negotiation. Other methods, such as resorting to arbitration or the lel, 
are optional, although Parties may declare acceptance of one or both of these methods 
as compulsory.628 However, such a declaration must be made in advance of failure to 
resolve the dispute by negotiation, by good office or by mediation.629 
This type of dispute settlement clause is a common feature in MEAs, which generally 
make no provision for binding compulsory settlements of disputes.63o In addition, 
while international organizations, NGOs and companies can all be party to an 
arbitration,631 only states can be party to the contentious proceedings before the ICJ, 
which offers little or no assurance that unresolved matters of 'interpretation or 
application' can be settled by any third-party process. But in environmental dispute 
settlements the involvement of a third party is significant because of the multilateral 
628 Article 27(3) of the Convention. 
629 Ibid. 
630 One exception of this claim is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS), which creates a binding system of adjudication and dispute resolution. 
631 In 2001 the Administrative Council of the Pennanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) adopted by 
consensus the Optional Rules for Arbitration of Disputes Relating to Natural Resources and/or 
the Environment ('Environmental Arbitration Rules'). For the text of the Rules, 
<http://www.pca-cpa.orgluploadlfilesIENVO/020CONC.pdf> accessed 17 June 2009. 
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character of many environmental problems.632 Thus, litigation plays a limited role in 
environmental dispute settlements. 
By virtue of these characteristics, dispute settlement in MEAs differs markedly from 
the WTO Agreement, which establishes its own system of specialized panels, an 
Appellate Body and arbitration for the purpose of settling trade disputes.633 As a result 
of the WTO's sophisticated dispute settlement system, questions concerning the 
relationship between the WTO trade agreements and MEAs occasionally come before 
6.3. Areas of overlap and possibility of conflict 
In the light of section I, this section of the chapter examines the effect of the 
implementation of the Convention's provisions on the multilateral trade agreements, 
focusing on overlap between the Convention's provisions and the rules of the 
multilateral trade agreements. Three specific areas of overlap are identified: 
application of the precautionary approach by the Convention and the SPS Agreement; 
incentive measures adopted by CBD Parties who are also members of the TBT 
Agreement and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) to 
encourage biodiversity-friendly activities; and the Convention's access and benefit-
sharing measures in relation to the TRIPS Agreement. Each area of overlap focuses on 
the extent to which the Convention's rules are compatible with those of the 
multilateral trade agreements. Since the CBD-COP plays an important role in 
providing guidance to Parties on the measures necessary to fulfil their obligations 
632 Birnie et aI., supran 11,251-3. 
633 The WTO dispute settlement system has been discussed at length in Chapter 3. 
634 For example, US - Shrimp, supra n 105. For discussion see Chapter 3. 
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under the Convention, the decisions taken by it in relation to the implementation of 
the Convention's provisions are also important to comprehend. For this purpose, 
relevant CBD-COP decisions, which elaborate upon the above provisions, will be 
taken into consideration. 
6.3.1. Overlapping precautionary measures 
The Convention Parties are '[ c ]oncerned that biological diversity is being significantly 
reduced by certain human activities' .635 Hence, in order to minimize or avoid adverse 
impacts upon biodiversity arising from the use of its components, the Convention 
requires the Contracting Parties to apply the precautionary approach in cases of 
scientific uncertainty related to such use. 
The precautionary approach recogmzes that action is needed when threats of 
biodiversity become apparent, with the result that international bodies should not wait 
until exhaustive studies have been completed. The Convention's precautionary 
measures to avoid or minimize adverse impact on biological diversity overlap with the 
SPS Agreement, which, under certain conditions, also permits provisional SPS 
measures in order to protect human, animal or plant life or health.636 
6.3.1.1. Precaution in the Convention 
There are various situations in which a precautionary approach has been adopted 
under the CBD. For example, Article 8(h) of the Convention requires each Party to 
prevent the introduction of, or to control or eradicate, those alien species that threaten 
635 Preamble of the Convention. 
636 For a discussion of the SPS Agreement's precautionary approach see Chapter 3. 
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ecosystems, habitats or species. As strangers to a particular ecosystem, invasive alien 
species have the capacity to inflict severe or catastrophic damage to the biodiversity of 
their hosts.637 The IUCN has identified it as one of the major threats to biodiversity.638 
Considering the severity of the threat arising from the introduction of alien species, 
the CBD-COP adopted the CBD Guiding Principles for the implementation of Article 
8(h) of the Convention.639 It maintained a three-tiered approach to invasive alien 
species regulation - first, prevention, followed by eradication and control.640 
Furthermore, the COP recommended that states should implement broader controls 
and quarantine measures for alien species that were, or could become, invasive.641 In 
this context, the CBD Guiding Principles endorse the use of the precautionary and 
ecosystem approaches as an appropriate standard in the context of invasive alien 
species.642 
Articles IO(b) and 7(c) of the Convention are also relevant to the precautionary 
approach. Article I O(b) of the Convention permits Parties to adopt measures relating 
to the use of biological resources to minimize or avoid adverse impacts on 
biodiversity. Such measures are founded on the Convention's identification and 
monitoring processes under Article 7(c). If 'processes and categories of activities,643 
637 
638 
SBSTT A report, Adverse Impacts of Invasive Alien Species, Annex, UNEP/CBDISBSTT A/617 
Dec 2000. 
IUCN Guidelines for the Prevention of Biodiversity Loss Caused by Alien Invasive Species 
(Species Survival Commission of IUCN). 
639 The SBSTT A considered alien species at both its fourth and fifth meetings and proposed that 
the COP adopt a set of guiding principles on the introduction of alien species. For detail see 
SBSTTA recommendations IV/4 and V/4. 
640 Principle 2 of the CBD Guiding Principles. 
641 Sixth meeting of the COP to the Convention, the Hague, Netherlands, 7-19 April (2002), see 
COP Decision VI/23, Annex, Guiding Principle 7. 
642 Ibid., Guiding Principle 1. 
643 For instance, deforestation, over-use, unsustainable agriculture, drainage or filling of wetlands, 
urbanization, pollution, etc. are hannful activities and processes posing a threat to biological 
diversity. 
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have had or are likely to have significant adverse impacts on biological diversity, the 
CBD Parties are required to 'regulate or manage' such 'processes and categories of 
activities,644 in order to minimize or avoid such impacts. 
The following analysis focuses on whether the overlapping precautionary provisions 
under the Convention and the SPS Agreement are fully compatible. 
6.3.1.2. The Convention's precautionary approach in relation to the SPS 
Agreement 
A 'precautionary approach' is apparent in the general international obligation upon 
states to control and regulate foreseeable risks. In this regard, the Trail Smelter 
Arbitration645 suggests that this obligation arises if there is a possibility for actual and 
serious harm. The Corfu Channel Casi46 suggests that it also arises when there is a 
known risk to other states. Therefore, foreseeing harm, in the sense of an objectively 
determined risk, is usually sufficient to engage the state's duty of regulation and 
contro1.647 However, risk is a complex concept and there is no universally agreed 
definition or standard for determining its existence, nor any agreed general rules or 
guidelines to regulate responses. Thus, international agreements often apply different 
standards to determine the existence of risk while incorporating or reflecting 
precautionary measures. These different standards lead to different scopes for 
application of the principle, which may create tension between agreements addressing 
the same subject matter. 
644 Article 8(1) of the CBD. 
645 Trail Smelter Arbitration (United States/Canada) (1939) 33 AJIL 182 and (1941) 35 AJIL 684. 
646 Corfu Channel (UK v Albania) (Merits), ICJ Rep. 1949, 18-22. 
647 Bimie et aI., supra n 11, 153. 
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The CBD and the SPS Agreement ostensibly employ different wording for the 
application of the precautionary approach: the former uses 'lack of full scientific 
certainty' while the latter uses 'lack of sufficient scientific evidence'. Both mention 
science in the formulation of their precautionary approach, but the variation of 
language establishes different requirements for the application of the precautionary 
approach. It could be argued that the scientific uncertainty standard used by the CBD 
covers two situations: (i) where risk assessment concludes that there remains a lack of 
certainty about the extent of potential adverse effects on biological diversity, and (ii) 
where there is insufficient information even to carry out a risk assessment. This 
formulation of the precautionary principle permits Contracting Parties to adopt 
precautionary measures in the absence of complete evidence of the harm that could 
occur from the use of components of biodiversity. Higher risks and/or greater 
potential harm to biodiversity require more reliability and certainty of information. 
Conversely, in case of minimal risk, a greater level of uncertainty of information can 
be accepted.648 
The CBD precautionary approach has lowered the standard of scientific proof of risk, 
requiring that where there is some evidence of risk of serious or irreversible harm, 
(even where uncertainty exists) appropriate action may be called for, and 'lack of full 
scientific certainty shall not prevent the proposal from proceeding' .649 The tests to 
deal with uncertainty and risk assessment are stated in extremely abstract terms in the 
Convention, giving little guidance as to concrete application. Thus, in order to take a 
trade-restrictive measure to prevent the incursion of an exotic species, it is sufficient 
648 Eighth Ordinary Meeting of the COP to the Convention, Curitiba, Brazil, 20-31 March (2006), 
see COP Decision VII\/28, Annex 3(30). 
649 See Article 8(7)(a) of the 2001 POPS Convention, which deals with listing harmful chemicals. 
See also Article 11 (8) of the 2000 Biosafety Protocol. 
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to show that alien species generally carry risks, or it can be shown that similar species 
in similar circumstances have been known to cause harm. 
The SPS Agreement, by contrast, provides a particular formulation of the 
precautionary approach, emphasizing the need for the collection of sufficient scientific 
evidence for conclusive proof of risk. Where prompt action is needed to avoid possible 
harm, Article 5(7) of the SPS Agreement permits a WTO Member to adopt provisional 
SPS measures in the absence of sufficient scientific evidence regarding the existence 
and extent of the relevant risk. However, the Member taking such precautionary 
measures is then required to search for more scientific information in order to assess 
the risk conclusively. In the SPS Agreement, the state in question is required to 
constantly seek further information. Yet this is surprising formulation, because if the 
evidence is sufficiently conclusive to leave little or no room for uncertainty in the 
calculation of risk, then there is no need for the precautionary principle to be applied 
at all.650 
Being an annexed agreement to the WTO Agreement, the purpose of the SPS 
Agreement is to minimize the negative effects of SPS measures, adopted or enforced 
by the Member states, on trade. Thus, SPS measures adopted or enforced by Member 
states must fulfil of two core principles of the GATT, i.e. the most-favoured-nation 
(MFN) and the national treatment principle, which are designed to exclude 
discrimination and protectionism respectively. The preamble of the SPS Agreement 
reaffirms that Members are not allowed to apply SPS measures 'which would 
650 Mox Plant Case (Provisional Measures) ITLOS No 10 (2001), paras 71-8\. See also 
Uruguay's argument in the Pulp Mills case. 
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constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between Members' or 'a 
disguised restriction on international trade' .651 
Despite the understanding of the reason behind the SPS Agreement's specific 
formulation of the precautionary approach, it is indisputable that this particular 
formulation of the precautionary approach under the SPS Agreement places its 
relationship with the CBD under stress. For example, the CBD Contracting Parties are 
required to adopt mitigation and preventive measures in order to prevent the 
introduction of alien species 'which threaten ecosystems, habitat or species'. Since the 
Contracting Parties apply the precautionary approach as the standard for their 
decision, the proof of scientific uncertainty is enough for them to prevent the 
transboundary movement of alien species or to adopt quarantine measures restricting 
trade of alien species. As mentioned above, they do not require conclusive proof of the 
existence of risk, and are not obliged to search for more evidence or carry out any 
future review of their decision. Hence, CBD parties applying SPS measures so as to 
restrict the trade in alien species, while performing their obligations of environmental 
protection and sustainable use of natural resources, may find themselves in breach of 
the rules of the SPS Agreement. The Members of the WTO Agreement may treat such 
measures as a disguised restriction to trade, as the conditions for SPS measures as 
mentioned in Article 5(7) of the SPS Agreement are not satisfied. 
The situation may therefore be complicated for a state which is party to the CBD and 
also a Member of the WTO Agreement, since in performing its obligation under the 
CBD it may find itself breaching its obligation under the SPS Agreement. There is a 
6S1 Preamble of the SPS Agreement. 
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potential conflict in the international regulatory framework in relation to invasive 
alien species owing to the lack of coordination between the CBD and the Committee 
on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Committee). The precautionary 
approaches under the SPS Agreement and the Convention are not inevitably 
incompatible, but undeniably have important different standards of proof in relation to 
risk assessment. The CBD-COP and the SPS Committee need to strengthen 
institutional coordination at international, regional and national levels on invasive 
alien species as a trade-related issue in order to develop a uniform international 
standard in the international regulatory framework in relation to invasive alien species. 
6.3.2. Incentive measures for conservation and sustainable use 
As mentioned in section I, Article 11 of the CBD obliges Parties to adopt 
economically and socially sound measures which act as incentives to conserve 
biological diversity and sustainable use of its components.652 Often, CBD Contracting 
Parties adopt subsidies and eco-Iabelling measures as an incentive for conservation 
and sustainable use. These issues are also addressed in the multilateral trade 
agreements. For example, the subsidies measures overlap with the 1995 WTO 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (hereinafter SCM), which also 
uses subsidies to pursue and promote economic and social policy objectives. The eco-
labelling schemes overlap with the TBT Agreement, which also addresses the issues 
relating to the labelling and packaging of products in international trade. The 
following discussion focuses on the extent to which the CBD's subsidies and eco-
652 See Note by the Executive Secretary, 'Sharing of Experience on Incentive Measures for 
Conservation and Sustainable Use', UNEP/CBDlCOP/3/24 (1996). 
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labelling incentive measures are compatible with those of the SCM and TBT 
Agreements. 
6.3.2.1. Subsidies and eco-labeling measures to pursue the Convention's 
objectives 
Subsidies are measures that may take the form either of positive or perverse economic 
incentives with regards to biodiversity. Subsidies such as payment for ecosystem 
services are positive incentive measures encouraged by the COP.653 On the other hand. 
subsidies in sectors such as fisheries, agriculture and forestry may encourage over-
investment in exploitative equipment and expansion of harvesting operations. thereby 
significantly intensifying the adverse impacts on biodiversity and serving as perverse 
incentive measures. The Convention encourages subsidies for positive incentive 
measures that are carried out for the conservation and sustainable use of natural 
resources.654 On the other hand, it discourages subsidies that create perverse 
incentives leading to the degradation and loss of biological diversity.655 
The Convention requires Contracting Parties to adopt 'economically' sound measures 
that act as incentives for conservation and sustainable use. Nevertheless, in order to 
adopt 'economically sound measures' it is necessary to put a price on ecosystem 
services, as sometimes protecting biodiversity is economically more beneficial than 
allowing its exploitation. For instance, in 2000 global benefits from coral reefs 
including tourism, fisheries and coastal protection were estimated at around US$30 
billion per year, and insect pollination of over forty commercial crops in the United 
653 COP Decision VIIV26, para. 4. 
654 Ibid. 
655 COP Decision IV/10, para. I(f), COP Decision VII/IS. 
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States alone at US$30 billion per year.656 Putting prices on ecosystem services helps 
governments make sound decisions as to whether to subsidize the utilization or the 
protection of biodiversity. For example, subsidies in sectors such as fisheries, 
agriculture and forestry are not always qetrimental for sustainability: subsidies paid to 
fishermen to work in other industries, rather than buying boats for fishing, may 
actually help to regenerate fisheries.657 
Another positive incentive measure is eco-Iabelling, which notifies the environmental 
impacts of producing or using a product and service. Eco-Iabelling is explicitly 
referred to in the CBD programme of work on incentive measures.658 The following 
discussion examines the extent to which the CBD rules allowing subsidies and eco-
labelling affect the SCM and TBT Agreements and also their compatibility. 
6.3.2.2. The CBD incentive measures in relation to the multilateral trade 
agreements 
To ensure that incentive measures adopted by the Contracting Parties advance the 
objectives of the Convention and remain compatible with obligations derived from 
other international agreements, the COP has demarcated boundaries for them. The 
COP, at its ninth meeting, decided that incentive measures should:659 i) contribute to 
the conservation of biological diversity and the sustainable use of its components, and 
not negatively affect the biodiversity and livelihood of other countries; ii) contribute 
656 See CBD official website <http://www.CBD.int/incentives/> (accessed on 25 April 2011). 
657 Margaret Young, 'Fragmentation or Interaction: The WTO, Fisheries Subsidies and 
International Law' (2009) 8 World Trade Review, 477. 
658 'The development of methods to promote information on biodiversity in consumer decisions, 
for example through eco-labelJing', in COP Decision V/15, para. 2(b). 
659 Ninth meeting of the COP to the Convention, Bonn, Germany, 19-30 May 2008, see COP 
Decision IXl6. 
215 
to sustainable development and the eradication of poverty; iii) take into account 
national and local conditions and circumstances; and iv) be consistent and in harmony 
with the Convention and other relevant international obligations. Despite the COP's 
attempts to regulate the adoption of incentive measures, the following analysis focuses 
on how they can be trade-restrictive and therefore in disharmony with trade rules. 
The SCM Agreement distinguishes between prohibited, actionable and non-actionable 
subsidies. Article 3 of the SCM Agreement prohibits export subsidies and import 
substitution subsidies. Apart from non-actionable and prohibited subsidies, all other 
subsidies are actionable if they are 'specific' and their use causes 'adverse effects'. 660 
This system of categorization of subsidies does not make any reference to issues 
related to environmental sensibility. In this context, the SCM defines 'subsidy' 
broadly as any financial contribution by a government or any public body conferring a 
benefit.661 Here, 'benefit' implies some kind of financial advantage to the recipient to 
pursue economic objectives. If a government gives a sum of money, it seems clear that 
this financial contribution would 'confer a benefit' to the 'recipient'.662 On the other 
hand, the CBD refers to subsidies which also confer a benefit upon the recipient, but 
with a view to the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity. As mentioned 
above, if a price has been put on an ecosystem service, protecting biodiversity is 
sometimes economically more beneficial than allowing its exploitation. However, the 
question arises, how is the WTO, which has expertise in tariff quotas and quantitative 
restrictions, supposed to come to terms with the complexity involved in the 
sustainability issue? 
660 Article 5 of the SCM Agreement. 
661 Ibid., Article 1(1). 
662 Appellate Body in Canada - Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft case was of the 
view that a 'benefit' focuses on the recipient and not on the government providing the financial 
contribution. Appellate Body Report, WT/OS70/AB/R (1997), para. 154. 
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The only way to understand this complexity is by learning from others, and yet it is 
not possible without interacting with other relevant treaty institutions which are 
addressing the same subject matter. For example, issues related to the sustainable 
utilization of fisheries are addressed by the SCM, along with numerous other 
international legal regimes.663 In recent years, as part of the Doha Round negotiations 
WTO Members have agreed to clarify and improve WTO disciplines on fisheries 
subsidies.664 This mandate was further elaborated in the Hong Kong Ministerial 
Conference in 2005, which called especially for the prohibition of certain fisheries 
subsidies that contribute to overcapacity and over-fishing.665 However, in the 
negotiations concerning the prohibition of subsidies to the fishing sector, none of the 
environmental treaty bodies were invited. Instead, a coalition of WTO Members 
grouped together in the negotiations, with the self-appointed label of 'Friends of the 
Fish'. WTO's unwillingness to establish institutional coordination with other relevant 
treaty bodies causes tension between the WTO and other agreements addressing the 
same subject matter. For example, subsidies provided to fishermen to work in other 
industries can be treated as subsidies distorting trade flow, and therefore are 
prohibited under the SCM. 
Other incentive measures of the CBD, i.e. the eco-Iabelling scheme, may also conflict 
with the TBT Agreement's labelling and packaging requirements. The Convention's 
eco-Iabelling schemes identify product characteristics and/or process and production 
methods (PPMsl66 that can differentiate between 'like' products by labelling some 
663 Two other instruments, the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and the CITES, have 
addressed this issue. 
664 The Doha Declaration 2001, para. 28. Also see Young, 'Fragmentation or Interaction', supra n 
657,477. 
665 The sixth WTO Ministerial Conference was held in Hong Kong, China, 13-18 December 2005. 
666 Bimie et aI., supra nIl, 785. 
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products as 'green'. But, in the TBT Agreement, the product process and production 
method (PPM) is irrelevant in determining whether products are 'like' unless the PPM 
by which a product is made affects the physical characteristics of the product. 
However, recognizing the tensions between the Convention's positive incentive 
measures and multilateral trading agreements, the COP has encouraged its Parties to 
carry out their analysis and evaluation of the relevant economic, social and cultural 
impacts of individual positive incentive measures at different levels and to 
communicate the results of this research to the Parties and to the Executive 
Secretary.667 
6.3.3. The Convention's IP provisions in relation to the TRIPS Agreement 
The issue of access to genetic resources is also dealt with by the TRIPS Agreement, 
which lays down mandatory minimum standards of intellectual property protection 
and enforcement.668 The following analysis explores the extent to which the 
intellectual property provisions of the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol are compatible 
with that of the TRIPS Agreement. 
First, the CBD and the TRIPS Agreement plainly derive from two different regimes of 
international law and aim to achieve two very different objectives. Although some of 
their provisions relating to intellectual property rights overlap, they are grounded on 
different principles. The Convention refers to intellectual property rights to achieve its 
667 Eighth Ordinary Meeting of the COP to the Convention, Curitiba, Brazil, 20-31 March (2006), 
see COP Decision VIILl26, para. 6(e). 
668 The 1883 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (last amended on 1979), 
the 1886 Bern Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (last revised in 
1971 and amended in 1979). 
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objective of equitable benefit sharing. On the other hand, the TRIPS Agreement 
provides intellectual property protection to ensure that measures and procedures to 
enforce intellectual property rights do not themselves become a barrier to trade. 
Second, the CBD protects indigenous people's traditional knowledge relating to 
genetic resources, which is mostly informal and passed from generation to generation. 
On the other hand, the TRIPS Agreement makes no mention of indigenous people's 
traditional knowledge protection and grants patents only to inventions based on new 
knowledge. Article 27(3)(b) extends patent protection for new products of 
biotechnology, without recognizing the existing knowledge of genetic resources which 
may have been exploited for such invention.669 
The much debated US patent for turmeric is an instance of granting patents based on 
existing knowledge rather than new knowledge, as envisaged in the TRIPS 
Agreement.670 In this case, a US patent on turmeric was awarded to the University of 
Mississippi Medical Canter in 1995, specifically for the 'use of turmeric in wound 
healing'. This patent also granted them the exclusive right to sell and distribute 
turmeric. Two years later, a complaint was filed challenging the novelty of the 
University's 'discovery', as in India, turmeric has been used medicinally for 
thousands of years. In 1997 the patent was revoked. This case shows that the TRIPS 
Agreement does not provide effective protection for traditional knowledge as such. 
669 For discussion on the TRIPS Agreement see Chapter 3. 
670 In the mid-1990s this product became the subject of a patent dispute with important 
ramifications for international trade law. For details see Prakash, 'Trade and Development Case 
Studies: Country Studied: India', Trade and Development Centre, 
<http://www.itd.orglissues/india6.htm#Tunneric>accessed20May2009;andDutfield.·Is 
Novelty Still Required for Patents in the United States? The Case of Tunneric', Bulletin of the 
Working Group on Traditional Resources Rights, 4. 
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The Doha Declaration has considered this issue and instructed the Council for TRIPS 
to look at the relationship b e t w e e ~ ~ the .TRIPS Agreement and the CBD, the protection 
of traditional knowledge and folklore. 671 It adds that the TRIPS Council's work on 
these topics is to be guided by the TRIPS Agreement's objectives and principles.672 As 
discussed in Chapter 3, the application of Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement 
needs to be consistent with that of Article 27(3)(b), and they do not provide any 
exception for traditional knowledge. 
Third, the CBD requires that the benefits ansmg from the utilization of genetic 
resources and related traditional knowledge be shared in a 'fair and equitable' manner 
with Parties providing such resources and with the holders of traditional biodiversity-
related knowledge. However, the TRIPS Agreement is primarily concerned with 
ensuring adequate protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights and has 
no provisions for the sharing of benefits arising out of the use of the traditional 
knowledge in the new invention protected through patents. Furthermore, equity issues 
are not a central consideration. 
The Convention's IP provisions are flexible, general and elaborate, whereas the TRIPS 
Agreement's IP provisions are specific and limited to the boundary of the multilateral 
trading system. As a result, the CBD's access and benefit-sharing arrangements may 
pose a challenge to the objectives and principles of the TRIPS Agreement. In addition, 
in implementing the Convention's Nagoya Protocol a country of origin may enter into 
different arrangements with different countries, whereby different IP standards are 
agreed for the same end products. 
671 Paragraph 19 of the 2001 Doha Ministerial Declaration. 
672 Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
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6.4. Coordination with other convention bodies 
6.4.1. The CBD and other convention bodies 
From the above discussion, the tension between the Convention and the multilateral 
trade agreements is apparent. To resolve such tension, Article 22(1) of the Convention 
provides a 'conflict clause' which is concerned with its relationship with other 
international agreements. It reads: 
[T]he prOVISIons of this Convention shall not affect the rights and 
obligations of any Contracting Party deriving from any existing 
international agreement, except where the exercise of those rights and 
obligations would cause a serious damage or threat to biological 
diversity. 673 
A nearly identical 'conflict clause' is included in the Nagoya Protocol: 
[T]he provisions of this Protocol shall not affect the rights and obligations of 
any Party deriving from any existing international agreement, except where 
the exercise of those rights and obligations would cause a serious damage or 
threat to biological diversity. This paragraph is not intended to create a 
hierarchy between this Protocol and other international instruments.674 
The first clause in both provisions suggests that the eRD and the Nagoya Protocol do 
not ignore their parties' rights and obligations deriving from other agreements, 
including multilateral trade agreements. But the second clause limits the application of 
673 Article 22(1) of the CBD. 
674 Article 4(1) of the Nagoya Protocol. 
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such rights and obligations by requiring them not to damage or threaten biodiversity. 
The CBD conflict clauses are very general and brief. Perhaps at the time the CBD was 
adopted, a more specific 'conflict clause' might have prejudiced the negotiation 
process. Yet, this provision inevitably permits the CBD Parties much greater latitude 
to adopt policies and measures restricting trade of components of biodiversity in order 
to avoid or minimize 'a serious damage or threat to biological diversity'. 
However, a significant development is apparent in the Nagoya Protocol's conflict 
clause compared to those of the CBD and Biosafety Protocol:675 in particular, the 
Nagoya Protocol's conflict clauses are more specific and elaborate. In particular, its 
concern is not confined to the Protocol Parties' rights and obligations deriving from 
other existing international agreements, as the above-mentioned conflict clauses are. 
Rather, it specifies the Parties rights and obligations even further, by allowing them to 
develop and implement other relevant agreements including specialized access and 
benefit-sharing agreements, 'provided that they are supportive of and do not run 
counter to the objectives of the Convention and this Protocol'.676 This conflict clause 
may not claim absolute hierarchy over other international agreements, but it is 
nevertheless clear to declare its priority over future international agreements, 
including other access and benefit-sharing agreements by ensuring that they do not 
oppose the objectives of the Convention and the Protocol. 
Nevertheless, the third paragraph of the conflict clause emphasizes that the Nagoya 
Protocol 'should be implemented in a mutually supportive manner with other 
international instruments relevant to this Protocol'. The CBD-COP, in its various 
675 f For discussion 0 the Biosafety Protocol's conflict clause see Chapter 7. 
676 Article 4(2) of the Nagoya Protocol. 
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decisions, has also attempted to establish cooperation with other international 
agreements, realizing the importance of 'mutual supportiveness' among the relevant 
international agreements for the implementation of the CBD. The CBD-COP has, 
moreover, expressly recognized the fact that 'the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement 
and the CBD are interrelated.677 Therefore, efforts are needed to develop further 
cooperation between the CBD and other relevant international fora, with the aim to 
retain mutual supportiveness between the CBD and international intellectual property 
law for the questions which could affect the implementation of the Convention or 
which are closely related to it. Those questions include the issues of the possible 
impacts of IP rights on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, as 
well as their relationship with access and benefit sharing (ABS) and with the valuation 
and protection of traditional knowledge of indigenous communities. 
To ensure consistency in implementation, the CBD Secretariat keeps the WTO 
informed of the decisions of the COP that are of relevance to the work of the WTO 
and its committees.678 At the same time, the COP requested the Executive Secretary of 
the Convention to apply for observer status in the CTE, for the purpose of 
representing the Convention in meetings whose agendas have a relationship with the 
Convention.679 Further to the request of the CBD-COP, the Executive Secretary was 
granted observer status for the Committee on Trade and Environment in Regular 
Session.680 
677 CBD-COP decision V/26 (section B, para. 2). 
678 Decision IIl/17. 
679 Decision IIl/ 17 para. 6, Argentina (1996). 
680 For the current situation regarding the participation of MEAs Secretariats in relevant WTO 
committees see WT/CTE/W/411Rev.8 (2001). A list of the international intergovernmental 
organizations granted observer status to WTO bodies at: 
<http://www.wto.org!englishltheWTO_e/igo_obs_e.htm> (accessed 16 June 2009). 
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The CBD-COP has repeatedly emphasized the need to further explore the 
interrelationship ~ e t ~ e e n n the Convention and the provisions of the relevant bodies of 
the WTO, especially the TRIPS Agreement, the TBT Agreement and the SPS 
Agreement, and stressed the need to ensure mutual supportiveness of the Convention 
and the provisions of these Agreements.681 Hence, the CBD-COP requested the 
Executive Secretary to apply to the WTO for observer status in the meetings of the 
Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures and the Committee on Technical 
Barriers to Trade, and also to renew the application for observer status in the Council 
for the Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.682 
However, the Convention Secretariat has still not been granted observer status in the 
TRIPS Council,683 the SPS Committee or the TBT Committee. 
The US continues to oppose granting observer status to the Secretariat of the CBD, 
arguing that the CBD did not have a broad interest in TRIPS issues. The EU, Peru, 
Brazil and India, however, pointed out that the CBD Secretariat should be an observer 
given that the Doha mandate explicitly instructs the TRIPS Council to look at the 
relationship between TRIPS and CBD. The CBD-COP, at its tenth meeting in Japan 
in 2010, further requested the Executive Secretary to renew the Convention's pending 
applications for observer status in relevant bodies of the WTO.684 
6.4.1.1. Collaboration with WIPO 
Article 16(5) of the Convention states: 
681 Decisions III117, IVI15, V/26 B, VII20, VIII26, VIII/16 and X1/27. 
682 Decision VII20, paras 29 and 30, Netherlands (2002). 
683 See Charnovitz, 'A New WTO Paradigm' supra n 302, 27. 
684 Decision X/20, para. 18. 
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[C]ontracting Parties, recogmzmg that patents and other intellectual 
property rights may have ~ ~ influence on the implementation of this 
Convention, shall cooperate in, this r ~ g a r d d subject to national legislation and 
international law in order to ensure that such rights are supportive of and 
do not run counter to its objectives [emphasis added].68s 
To this effect, the COP, from its second meeting, has addressed certain intellectual 
property-related issues pertaining to the implementation of the Convention.686 Since 
2002, these have been addressed in cooperation with the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO)687 in the context of the MoU between the Secretariat of the CBD 
and WIPO, and ongoing coordination between WIPO and the Secretariat of the 
CBD.688 
The CBD-COP invited WIPO to investigate and analyse issues such as the impact of 
intellectual property rights on the access/use of genetic resources and scientific 
research, the role of customary law, the relationship between disclosure requirements 
and international legal obligations, the efficacy of disclosure requirements, the 
feasibility of an internationally recognized certificate of origin system, monitoring, 
compliance and enforcement, and the role of oral evidence of prior art in granting 
685 Article 16(5) of the CBD. 
686 See, for instance, Decisions IlI12, III115, IV/S, IV/9, IV/IS, V/16, V/26, VIII 0, VII24 
and VII2S. 
687 WIPO is an intergovernmental organization that became, in 1974, one of the specialized 
agencies of the United Nations system of organizations. WIPO is established to promote the 
protection of intellectual property worldwide through cooperation among states, and to 
administer various treaties dealing with legal and administrative aspects of intellectual 
property. 
688 Decisions VII24 D, VIII19, V1II/4, VIIl/12, IX/13 and IXI14. 
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intellectual property rights.689 The COP further elaborated on these issues and invited 
WIPO to prepare a technical study on methods consistent with obligations in treaties 
administered by WWO for requiring disclosure within patent applications.69o It also 
invited WIPO to take into account the CBD's work on these topics and called for 
WIPO's work to be supportive of the CBD, to address issues on model provisions on 
disclosure requirements and to devise options for incentive measures for applicants.691 
In response to the COP's invitation, WIPO consulted a wide range of stakeholders, 
such as indigenous peoples and local communities, NGOs, governmental 
representatives, academics and the private sector, to identify their intellectual property 
needs and the expectations of the holders of traditional knowledge and the cultural 
expressions. Thereafter, it established the WIPO Intergovernmental Committee on 
Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore 
(lGC).692 The mandate of the IGC was to facilitate discussion on intellectual property 
issues that arise in the context of: i) access to genetic resources and benefit sharing; ii) 
the protection of traditional knowledge, innovation and creativity; and iii) the 
protection of the expression of folklore. To implement these mandates, the work of the 
IGC has led to the development of two sets of draft provisions: one for the protection 
of traditional cultural expressions/folklore (TeEs) and another for the protection of 
689 'Role of intellectual property rights in the implementation of access and benefit-sharing 
arrangements', COP Decision VII24, Annex C (3). 
690 Ibid., Annex C (4). 
691 See Decision V1I119, Access and benefit sharing as related to genetic resources (Article 15) 
<http://www.biodiv.orgldecisions/default.aspx>accessed6June2009.This Decision, along 
with the CBD Decision on Article 80), Decision VII/6, were sent to the IGC in order to 
develop positive and defensive protection of TK see WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/6/13, 15 
March 2004. 
692 The WIPO Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources. 
Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (lGC) was established by the WIPO General Assembly in 
October 2000 at its twenty-sixth session as an international forum for debate and dialogue 
concerning the interplay between intellectual property (IP), and traditional knowledge (TK), 
genetic resources and traditional cultural expressions (TCEs)/(folklore). 
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traditional knowledge (TK) against misappropriation and misuse, and the intellectual 
property aspects of access to and benefit sharing in genetic resources.693 The draft 
provisions are formally published as working documents for the IGC but have not yet 
been adopted or endorsed by the IGC, as the IGC is still reviewing them. 
While the draft objectives and principles have no formal status, they illustrate some of 
the perspectives and approaches that are guiding work in this area, and could suggest 
possible frameworks for the protection of TCEs and TK against misappropriation and 
misuse. These draft materials are being used as points of reference in a range of 
national, regional and international policy discussions and standard-setting 
processes.694 
This institutional collaboration between the CBD-COP and WIPO may bring new 
hope to future negotiations on the Convention and TRIPS Agreement's 
inconsistencies. However, such collaboration is only possible if the CBD Secretariat is 
given observer status in different WTO committees, and especially in the TRIPS 
Council. 
6.4.1.2. CBD-COP and WIPO coordinating with the WTO 
To facilitate the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement, the TRIPS Council 
concluded with WIPO an agreement on cooperation between WIPO and the WTO, 
693 For the most recent version of draft provisions, <http://www.wipo.intitkienl> (accessed 5 
January 2011). 
694 For the international standards emerging from WIPO and the CBD collaboration for the 
protection of TCEs and TK against misappropriation and misuse, see WIPO Intergovernmental 
Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources: Traditional Knowledge and 
Folklore, 'The Protection of Traditional Knowledge: Revised Objective and Principles' 
prepared by the Secretariat, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/9/5, Geneva, 24-26 April (2006) 
<http://www.wipo.intimeetings/enldoc_ details.jsp?doc Jd=55136> accessed 8 May 2009. 
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which came into force on 1 January 1996. As explicitly set out in the preamble to the 
TRIPS Agreement, the WTO desires a mutually supportive relationship with WIPO. 
For this purpose, the WTO is reviewing the TRIPS Agreement, particularly with 
respect to Article 27(3)(b). 
Article 27(3)(b) of the TRIPS Agreement, which deals with patentability or non-
patentability of plant and animal inventions and the protection of plant varieties, was 
due for review four years after the WTO Agreement came into force, i.e. in 1999. This 
issue was first raised at the WTO's Third Ministerial Conference695 , but the 
Conference was 'suspended' without any agreement on where negotiations stood or 
how they would proceed. The WTO's Fourth and Fifth Ministerial Conferences696 
failed to modify Article 27(3)(b) in any manner or form. However, paragraph 19 of 
the Doha mandate has broadened the discussion by instructing the TRIPS Council to 
consider the relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and the CBD, and the 
protection of traditional knowledge and folklore. 697 
The relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and the CBD was subject to heated 
discussions at the Hong Kong WTO Ministerial Conference when calls were made for 
the requirement to disclose the origin of genetic resources in patent applications.698 At 
the TRIPS Council meeting in October 2007, WTO Members from developed and 
developing countries continued to be divided on biodiversity issues. Members from 
the Least Developed Counties (LCDs) announced their support for the biodiversity-
695 Seattle (30 November-3 December 1999). 
696 Doha (9-14 November 2001) and Cancun (10-14 September 2003) respectively. 
697 Under the reviews Article 27.3(b) or the whole of the TRIPS Agreement under Article 71.1 
<http://www.wto.org/engiishitratop_e/trips_e/art27_3b_background_e.htm> (accessed 20 May 
2009). 
698 WTO Ministerial Conference, December 2005. 
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related TRIPS proposed amendment. 699 While most developing countries proposed 
'disclosure' requirements as an obligation under the TRIPS Agreement, developed 
nations largely wanted these requirements to stay outside the purview of the TRIPS 
Agreement, with Switzerland proposing the WIPO Patent Cooperation Treaty as a 
solution, the EU proposing enforcement issues 'outside patent law' and the US 
proposing use of national legislation, including contracts rather than a disclosure 
obligation. 
The disagreement over the TRIPS Agreement has continued into the Mini-
Ministerial700 talks. The TRIPS Council has not announced further support for the 
proposed amendment to the TRIPS Agreement, which would require disclosure of 
origin on genetic resources and traditional knowledge. A Norwegian proposal for 
amending the TRIPS Agreement to make it mandatory for patent applicants to disclose 
any biological resources or associated traditional knowledge used in their inventions, 
has given a new push to the demand from developing countries701 and for the 
facilitation of coordination among CBD, WIPO and the TRIPS convention bodies. 
6.5. Conclusions 
The discussion in Section I revealed that the modem concept of conservation is 
sufficiently broad to include not only the classic elements of protection and 
preservation of biodiversity, but also the sustainable utilization of the components of 
biodiversity. The Convention is based on the rationale that sustainable use can be a 
699 For proposals and relevant documents circulated during the ministerial process, 
<http://www.wto.orgienglish/tratop_e/trips_e/art27_3b_background_e.htm> accessed 25 May 
2009. 
700 
701 
An informal meeting of selected trade ministers. They meet outside of the Ministerial 
Conferences. 
For the proposed text see <http://docsonline.wto.orgigen_searchResult> accessed 5 January 
2011. 
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valuable tool to promote conservation of biological diversity, since in many instances 
it provides incentives for conservation and restoration because of the social, cultural 
and economic benefits that people derive from that use.702 In turn, sustainable use 
cannot pe achieved 'Vithout effective conservation measures. To this end, the 
Convention acknowledges the necessity for certain elements to be given special care 
and treatment. 
In addition, monetary benefit gained from such utilization also needs to be shared with 
the resource providers to encourage conservation of biodiversity. Section 11 explained 
how the framework agreement itself does not prescribe any specific measures to fulfil 
its obligations, but provides guidelines for its implementation, which permit Parties to 
adopt or develop specific measures. It also demonstrates how measures taken by 
Parties to comply with the Convention's provisions overlap with the rules set out in 
the multilateral trade agreements, which address the same subject matter. 
It is evident from the chapter's discussion that the CBD puts trade of biological 
resources in an ecological context. Hence, the Convention's overlapping provisions on 
access to genetic resources, its precautionary approach, eco-Iabelling and the transfer 
of technology are not wholly compatible with the rules set out in the multilateral 
trading systems. It is not the case that the Convention's provisions are inevitably in 
conflict or disagreement with the multilateral trade agreements rules. Nevertheless, 
standards established by the CBD-COP in relation to the precautionary approach, eco-
labelling and intellectual property rights are not necessarily compatible with those 
under the SPS, the TBT and the TRIPS Agreements in the same subject matter. 
702 
'Addis Ababa Principles and Guidelines' supra n 454. 
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The CBD-COP is trying to coordinate with WTO institutions under the annexed 
agreements, but such attempt is hindered by the USA's politically motivated actions in 
not granting the CBD Secretary observer status in the TRIPS Council, the CTESS 
and/or the SPS Committee. However, to ensure mutual supportiveness of 
environmental protection and trade, it is significant that the Convention Secretary has 
been given observer status in all those institutional bodies which would permit him to 
participate in those trade council meetings when they are discussing issues relevant to 
the Convention provisions. 
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7. The Biosafety Protocol balancing environmental and trade interests 
7.1. Introduction 
This chapter analyses how environmental and trade interests are balanced in the 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(hereinafter the Biosafety Protocol),703 which provides an international regulatory 
framework to reconcile the respective needs for trade and environmental protection 
with respect to biotechnology. Hence, this chapter particularly examines the extent to 
which the Biosafety Protocol permits international trade in living modified organisms 
(LMOs)704 while protecting biodiversity and human health from its adverse effects. 
Since some multilateral trade agreements also address issues related to the 
transboundary movement of LMOs, there is a possibility that some of the Protocol's 
provisions may overlap with them. 70S Thus, the chapter further analyses the extent to 
which the Protocol's permitted trade-restrictive measures are compatible with the 
multilateral trade agreements that deal with the same subject matter. 
In this context, the preamble of the Biosafety Protocol has identified two key facets of 
modem biotechnology: on the one hand, the transfer of LMOs from one country to 
703 The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity (adopted 29 
January 2000, entered into force 11 September 2003) (2000) 39 ILM 1027. also available at 
<http://www .biodiv .org>. 
704 LMOs encompass all products obtained through the use of modern biotechnology except 
pharmaceuticals for humans (Article 3(g) and Article 5 of the Protocol). 
70S See the following, in which the authors have analysed the Protocol and have addressed the 
possibility of conflict with the multilateral trade agreements: Olivette Torres. 'The Biosafety 
Protocol and the WTO' (2003) 26 Boston CICLJ 263; Sean Murphy, 'Biotechnology and 
International Law' (2001) 42 Harv ILJ 42; Cosby and Burgiel, 'The Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety: An Analysis of Results' (2000) An IISD Briefing Note 
<http://iisd.orglpdflbiosafety.pdf.> accessed 25 June 2005; Aarti Gupta, 'Creating a Global 
Biosafety Regime' (2000) 2 International Journal of Biotechnology 205; Thomas Cors. 
'Biosafety and International Trade: Conflict or Convergence?' (2000) 2 International Journal of 
Biotechnology 27; Paul Hagen and John Weiner, 'The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety: New 
Rules for International Trade in Living Modified Organisms' (2000) 12 Georgetown IELR 697; 
Gretchen Gaston and Randall Abate, 'The Biosafety Protocol and the World Trade 
Organization: Can the Two Coexist?' (2000) 12 PACE ILR 107. 
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another has 'great potential for human well-being', while on the other, modem 
biotechnology possesses potential. threats to the environment and human health.706 
Proponents of biotechnology argue that it promises remarkable advances in medicine, 
agriculture and other fields, which may include new medical treatments and vaccines, 
new industrial products, and improved fibres and fuels. They also argue that 
biotechnology has the potential to lead to increases in food security, decreased 
pressure on land use, increase in marginal lands or inhospitable environments, and 
reduced use of water and agrochemicals in agriculture.707 
Opponents, by contrast, express their concern about the potential adverse effects of 
this new technology on biological diversity, and the potential risks to human health. 
The threats identified include: unintended changes in the competitiveness, virulence or 
other characteristics of the target species; the possibility of adverse impacts on non-
target species (such as beneficial insects) and ecosystems; the potential for weediness 
in genetically modified crops (where a plant becomes more invasive than the original, 
perhaps by transferring its genes to wild relatives); and the possible instability of 
inserted genes (the possibility that a gene will lose its effectiveness or will be re-
transferred to another host).708 
These diverse opinions on biotechnology have led to a consensus that, while modem 
biotechnology has great potential for generating improvements in human well-being, 
it must be developed and used with adequate safety measures for the environment and 
706 For the arguments in favour of and against both aspects see Mackenzie et al.. An Explanatory 
Guide to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (2003) IUCN Environmental Policy and Law 
Paper No. 46, 7-10; Marsha Echols, Food Safety and the WTO: The Interplay of Culture. 
Science and Technology (Kluwer 2001) 67-75. 
707 Ibid.; Robert Paarlberg, 'The Global Food Fights' Foreign Affairs, May/June 2000, 24-5. 
708 Cyril Kormos and Layla Hughes, Regulating Genetically Modified Organisms: Striking a 
Balance between Progress and Safety (Conservation International. 2000) 7-8. Available at 
<http://www .conservation.org>. 
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human health. In this regard, this chapter analyses the Protocol's regulatory 
requirements, such as the provisions on Advanced Informed Agreement (AlA), 
notification, documentation, non-Party obligation and liability and redress, in order to 
examine the extent to which the Biosafety Protocol regime permits international trade 
ofLMOs while protecting biodiversity and human health from its adverse effects. 
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section briefly illustrates the 
background and objectives of the Protocol, key provisions which have the potential to 
cause tension with the multilateral trade agreements, and finally the institutional 
arrangements and implementation process of the Protocol. The second section 
considers how and to what extent the Protocol provisions discussed in the preceding 
part, actually affect international trade in LMOs. In particular, it examines how the 
Protocol's provisions overlap with the WTO agreements, such as the SPS Agreement 
and the TBT Agreement, and to what extent these overlapping provisions conflict or, 
conversely, may be compatible. 
7.2. Overview of the Protocol 
The Biosafety Protocol governs the movements of LMOs resulting from modern 
biotechnology that may have an adverse effect on the conservation and sustainable use 
of biological diversity and human health. 709 
Articles 8(g) and 19(3) of the CBD, the Protocol's parent convention, seek to ensure 
that the development of appropriate procedures enhances the safety of biotechnology 
709 Article 1 of the Protocol. 
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in the context of the Convention's overall goals/ I 0 and reduces all potential threats to 
biological diversity, also taking into account the risk to human health. Article 8(g) 
deals with the measures that P a r t i e ~ ~ should take at the national level, while Article 
19(3) sets the stage for the development of an international legally binding instrument 
to address the issues of biosafety. A few years later, the Biosafety Protocol was 
accordingly adopted within the framework of the CBD, setting out for the first time a 
comprehensive regulatory system for ensuring the safe transfer, handling and use of 
LMOs subject to transboundary movement. 
The role of the US in the negotiation of the Protocol deserves special attention here. 
The US is not a Party to the CBD, but played an active role in the Protocol's 
negotiation process by virtue of being the major producer and exporter of LMOs. 
Initially, the US was reluctant to accept the CBD-COP's decision to set up a Protocol 
to regulate international trade in LMOs for biosafety. It insisted that there was no 
scientific evidence to establish that biotechnology products present any significant 
threat to the environment. 711 The US's view did not receive endorsement from 
developing countries or European nations. 
Additionally, an increasing number of European nations were already enacting 
protective measures regarding LMOs.712 In an attempt to reach a middle ground, the 
US introduced the concept of LMOs as a substitute for the previously established 
terminology of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs), and the concept of 
710 For example, Article 16(1) and Article 19(1) and (2) of the CBD recognize that access to and 
transfer of technologies, including biotechnology, are essential to achieve the Convention's 
conservation and sustainable use objectives. 
711 For the US's view on the Protocol see Gupta, 'Creating a Global Biosafety Regime' supra n 
70S, 20Cr9; Rafe Pomerance, 'The Biosafety Protocol: Cartagena and Beyond' (2000) 8 New 
York UELJ 614 at 615-19. 
712 b I id., 208. 
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'advanced infonned agreement' (AlA) as an alternative language for the concept of 
'prior infonned consent'. 713 The US was still not satisfied with the issue that the 
Protocol's obligations extended -to commodities intended for food or feed, or for 
processing, and therefore did not become a Party to the Protocol. 714 
7.2.1. Objectives and purposes 
Article 1 of the Biosafety Protocol states its objective as follows: 
[I]n accordance with the precautionary approach contained in Principle 15 of 
the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the objective of this 
Protocol is to contribute to ensuring an adequate level of protection in the field 
of the safe transfer, handling and use of living modified organisms resulting 
from modern biotechnology that may have adverse effects on the conservation 
and sustainable use of biological diversity, taking also into account risks to 
human health, and specifically focusing on transboundary movements. 715 
This statement clearly expresses concern about the potential 'adverse effects' resulting 
from international trade of LMOs, but at the same time does not intend to prevent their 
transboundary movement, considering the benefits humankind can receive from it. 
Rather, it relies on the precautionary approach to assess risks related to the 
transboundary movement of LMOs. Thus, the Protocol encompasses a range of 
measures, policies and procedures based on the precautionary principle for 
minimizing the potential risks that biotechnology may pose to the environment and 
713 Gupta viewed this shift from GMOs to LMOs as an effort by the US to divert the focus away 
from the genetically engineered aspect of the organisms and towards the fact that they are 
living organisms. See [bid 208,209. 
714 As a final point, it would have had to become a Party to the CBD before it could become a 
Party to the Biosafety Protocol. See Article 32 of the CBD. 
71S Article I of the Protocol. 
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human health. 716 Elements of the precautionary approach find reflection in the 
Protocol in various places, including the preamble and, as noted above, Article 1, and 
also in Articles 1 0(6) and 11 (8) and Annex Ill. By this means, the Protocol aims to 
achieve a balance between international trade of LMOs and biosafety. How far this 
goal has been achieved is a controversial matter. This issue will be discussed in detail 
in the second section of this chapter. 
7.2.2. The Protocol's key provisions 
The Biosafety Protocol is the only international instrument that deals exclusively with 
LMOs by establishing practical rules and procedures for their safe transfer, handling 
and use, with a specific focus on regulating the movements of these organisms from 
one country to another. The Protocol operates through two separate sets of procedures: 
one for LMOs that are to be intentionally introduced into the environment (such as 
seeds for cultivation, or animal breeding stock), and another for LMOs that are to be 
used directly as food or feed or for processing (such as corn and grain used for food, 
animal feed or processing). Both sets of procedures are designed to ensure that 
importing counties are provided with the information they need for taking decisions 
regarding a particular LMO import. 
7.2.2.1. AlA procedure for LMOs intended for release into the environment 
The transboundary movement of LMOs that are intended to be introduced into the 
environment is subject to an AlA procedure, under which the movement may proceed 
only after advance written consent has been given by the competent national authority 
716 For the literature on the precautionary principle see supra n 205, 209 and 210. 
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of the importing state.717 The AlA procedure is considered to be the 'backbone' of the 
Protocol, as it represents its main objective.718 The AlA procedure can be traced back 
to the CBD/ 19 but Article 7 of the Protocol sets out the procedure in detail. According 
to this Article, the purpose of the AlA procedure is to provide Parties with the 
information necessary to make informed decisions before agreeing to the import of 
LMOs into their territory. 
The AlA procedure applies to the first intentional transboundary movement of LMOs 
for intentional introduction into the environment of the Party of import.72o It includes 
four components: notification by the Party of export or the exporter; 
acknowledgement of receipt of notification by the Party of import; the decision 
procedure; and review of decisions.721 The Party of export must notify the Party of 
import by providing a detailed written description of the LMO in advance of the 
shipment. The Party of import is to acknowledge receipt of this information within 90 
days. Then, within 270 days of the date of receipt of notification, the Party of import 
must communicate its decision: (i) approving the import; (ii) prohibiting the import; 
(iii) requesting additional relevant information; or (iv) extending the 270 days by a 
defined period of time. The Party of import must indicate the reasons upon which its 
decisions are based, except in a case in which consent is unconditional. 
A Party of import may at any time, in light of new scientific information, review and 
change a decision. A Party of export or a notifier may also request the Party of import 
to review its decisions. However, decisions must be taken in accordance with the risk-
717 Article 10 of the Protocol. 
718 Hagen and Weiner, supra n 705, 704. 
719 Article 19(3) of the CBD. 
720 Article 7(1) of the Protocol. 
721 [bid Articles 8, 9, 10 and 12 respectively. 
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assessment procedure stipulated in Protocol Article 15 and Annex Ill. The AlA 
procedure explicitly recognizes the right of Parties of import to make decisions that 
would avoid or reduce potential adverse effects in the face of scientific uncertainty 
due to insufficient scientific information and knowledge. This precautionary approach 
overlaps to some extent with the SPS Agreement. Further discussion in the next 
section considers this issue, analysing the extent to which the Protocol's precautionary 
approach is comparable with the relevant provision ofthe SPS Agreement. 
The Protocol's AlA procedure does not apply to certain categories ofLMOs, i.e. those 
in transit (Article 6); destined for contained use (Article 6); or intended for direct use 
as food or feed, or for processing (Article 7(3)). It should be noted that, while the 
Protocol's AlA procedure does not apply to certain categories of LMOs, Parties retain 
the right to regulate their importation on the basis of their own domestic legislation. 
This could lead to division among states, where different measures are taken by 
individual states regarding the same LMOs, leading to tension in environmental and 
trade relationships. In addition, the Party of import may also specify in advance to the 
Biosafety Clearing-House that it will exempt certain imports of LMOs from the AlA 
procedure.722 Finally, the COP-MOP may in future decide to exempt additional 
LMOs from application of the AlA procedure. 723 
7.2.2.2. LMOs intended for use as food or feed, or for processing 
The transboundary movement of LMOs intended for direct use as food or feed, or for 
processing (LMOs-FFP) is subject to a 'less onerous regime' than the AlA 
722 Article 13 of the Protocol. 
723 Ibid. Article 7(4). 
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procedure.724 Under this procedure, a Party may make a decision to ban or limit 
imports under its 'domestic-regulatory framework' as long as it is 'consistent with the 
objective of the Protocol'. 725 Generally, the Party must inform other Parties through 
the Biosafety C l e a r i n g - H o ~ s e , , within 15 days, of its decision regarding domestic use 
of LMOs that may be subject to transboundary movement.726 In addition, Parties must 
make copies of applicable national laws, regulations and guidelines available to the 
Clearing-House.727 
Developing country Parties and those Parties with economies in transition may, in the 
absence of a domestic regulatory framework, declare through the Biosafety Clearing-
House that their decisions on the first import of LMOs-FFP will be taken in 
accordance with a risk assessment, as set out in the Protocol, and a specified 
timeframe for decision-making.728 In case of insufficient relevant scientific 
information and knowledge, the Party of import may use a precaution, i.e. apply the 
precautionary principle, in making their decisions on the import ofLMOs-FFP.729 
7.2.2.3. Documentation requirement for different types of LMOs 
The documentation requires a declaration of the presence of LMOs in the content of 
shipments. Article 18 of the Protocol sets forth different requirements for different 
types of LMOs. Documentation accompanying shipments of LMOs meant for 
intentional release into the environment, such as seeds for planting, must identify the 
shipment as containing LMOs, as well as indicate the identity and relevant traits of the 
724 Birnie et aI., supra n 11, 640. 
725 Article 11 of the Protocol. 
726 Ibid. Article 11 (1). 
727 Ibid. Article 11(5). 
728 Ibid. Article 11(6). 
729 Ibid. Article II (8). 
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LMOs. 730 Documentation accompanying shipments of LMOs destined for contained 
use, such as vials of the organisms for scientific or commercial research, simply 
identify the shipment as containing LMOs.731 The second section of this chapter 
shows how this documentation requirement may conflict with the GATT 1994 and the 
TBT Agreement. 
7.2.2.4. Trade with non-Parties 
A state cannot become Party to the Protocol unless it also becomes a Party to the 
parent Convention, the CBD.732 Article 24 of the Protocol addresses the obligations of 
Parties in relation to the transboundary movements of LMOs to and from non-Parties 
to the Protocol. It provides that transboundary movements of LMOs between Parties 
and non-Parties must be carried out in a manner that is 'consistent with' the objective 
of the Protocol. 733 Parties may enter into agreements and arrangements with non-
Parties regarding such transboundary movements.734 Moreover, Parties are required to 
encourage non-Parties to join the Protocol and to contribute information to the 
Biosafety Clearing-House.735 
The first meeting of the COP-MOP adopted a decision providing further guidance on 
transboundary movements of LMOs between Parties and non-Parties.736 In this 
meeting the COP-MOP went beyond Article 24 of the Protocol by encouraging non-
730 Article 18(2)«c) of the Protocol. 
731 Ibid. Article 18(2)(b). 
732 Article 32 of the Convention provides that only states that are Parties to the Convention may 
become Parties to the Protocol. Thus, the Protocol begins with the qualifiers that 'The Parties 
to the Protocol, Being Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity .. .'. 
733 Article 24(1) of the Protocol. 
734 Ibid. 
735 Ibid Article 24 (2). 
736 Decision BS-IIlt. For discussion on COP-MOP first meeting see Ruth MacKenzie, 'The 
Cartagena Protocol After the First Meeting of the Parties', (2004) 13 REClEL 270 at 275-6. 
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Parties to adhere to the Protocol's requirements on a voluntary basis, particularly 
those regarding the AlA procedure, risk assessment, packaging and identification of 
LMOs. Although this decision cannot directly create obligations for non-Parties, the 
Parties to the Protocol have an obligation to ensure that they conduct any 
transboundary movement of LMOs involving non-Parties in a manner that fully 
reflects their own obligations. It therefore operates in a similar fashion to CITES. 737 
However, Article 24 is not applicable where those involved in the trade are all, or 
both, non-Parties, but only where one party to the transaction is bound by the 
Protocol. It is to be remembered, however, that any non-Party to the Protocol which is 
at least a signatory would be obliged to refrain from acts that would be contrary to the 
objective and purpose of the Protocol.738 
7.2.2.5. The Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress to the Biosafety 
Protocol 
In the light of the fact that biotechnology is a new technology and the uncertainty 
about the impact of the international commercial trade of LMOs on the environment 
and human health, the Protocol's liability and redress regime concerns the question of 
what would happen if the transboundary movement ofLMOs were to cause damage. 
Article 27 of the Protocol required the COP-MOP at its first meeting to adopt a 
process with respect to the appropriate elaboration of international rules and 
procedures in the field of liability and redress for damage resulting from 
737 For CITES non-Party obligation see Chapter 5. 
738 Article 18(a) of the 1969 Vienna Convention. 
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transboundary movements of LMOs. 739 At its first meeting, the COP-MOP duly 
established an Ad Hoc Open-Ended Working Group of Legal and Technical Experts 
on Liability and Redress to elaborate options for elements of international rules and 
procedures on liability and redress under the Protocol. This led to a draft text being 
negotiated at the second and fourth meetings of the Group for a supplementary 
Protocol on liability and redress to the Biosafety Protocol. 
The fourth meeting of the Group was held in Nagoya, and a new international treaty, 
the Nagoya - Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress to the 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (hereinafter the Liability and Redress Protocol), was 
adopted on 16 October 2010.740 The new treaty was opened for signature from 7 
March 2011 to 6 March 2012 and will enter into force 90 days after being ratified by 
at least 40 Parties to the Biosafety Protocol. The next section of this chapter focuses 
on the possible effect of the Liability and Redress Protocol on the multilateral trade 
agreements. 
7.2.3. Institutional arrangements of the Protocol 
The Protocol's institutional arrangement is closely linked with the Convention's 
institutions: for example, the CBD-COP serves as the meeting of the Parties to the 
Protocol (COP_MOp).741 The rules and procedures for the CBD-COP apply, mutatis 
mutandis, to meetings of the Intergovernmental Committee for the Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety (ICCP)742 if not otherwise decided by consensus by the COP-
739 Article 27 of the Protocol. 
740 The Liability and Redress Protocol text is available at: 
<http://bch.CBD.intlProtocoIINKL text.shtml> (accessed I December 20 I 0). 
741 Article 29(1) of the Protocol. This provision is also mentioned in the first meeting of the COP-
MOP, decision SS-Ill, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 23-27 February (2004). 
742 Article 29(5) of the Protocol and also see decision EM-I/3, para. 7 (2000). 
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MOp.743 The main function of this body is to review the implementation of the 
Protocol and to make decisions necessary to promote its effective operation. 744 
Decisions under the Protocol can only be taken by Parties to it.745 Furthermore, Parties 
to the Convention that are not Parties to the Protocol may only participate as observers 
in the proceedings of meetings of the COP_MOp.746 
The Bureau of the CBD-COP serves as the Bureau of the COP_MOP.747 However, 
any member of the COP Bureau representing a Party to the Convention that is not also 
a Party to the Protocol is substituted by a member to be elected by and from among 
the Parties to the Protocol. 748 The Bureau provides administrative and general 
operational guidance to the Secretariat between meetings of the COP-MOP and 
performs functions requested by it. Like the Convention, the Protocol also has 
clearing-house requirements. However, the Protocol's clearing-house requirements 
differ considerably from those of the Convention.749 Crucial information on risk 
assessment, import decisions, national authorisations and national legislation, all 
central to the Protocol's effective functioning, are primarily available through the 
Biosafety Clearing-House. The Biosafety Clearing-House mechanism also includes 
information required under the AlA procedure, summarizes risk assessments and 
environmental review, bilateral and multilateral agreements, and reports on efforts to 
743 First meeting of the COP-MOP, decision BS-IIl, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 23-27 February 
(2004). 
744 h T e Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, Article 29(4). 
745 Ibid. Article 29(2). 
746 Ibid. 
747 Ibid. Article 30(2). 
748 Ibid. 
749 h For t e Convention's clearing-house requirements see the chapter on the Convention on 
Biological Diversity. 
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implement the Protocol and other scientific, legal, environmental and technical 
information.750 
7.2.4. Implementation 
The Contracting Parties to the Biosafety Protocol are required to 'take necessary and 
appropriate legal, administrative and other measures' to ensure 'an adequate level of 
protection in the field of the s ~ f e e transfer, handling and use of LMOs 'that may have 
adverse effects on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, taking 
also into account risks to human health'. 751 In order to establish an adequate level of 
protection, the Protocol authorizes national, regional and international 
implementation. 
A number of Articles of the Protocol provide guidance, tools and instruments for its 
implementation. For example, Article 2(4) of the Protocol not only authorizes national 
and regional governments to impose restrictions on the movement and use of LMOs, 
but also permits them to take measures that are more protective of the conservation 
and sustainable use of biological diversity than that called for in the Protocol itself.752 
Article 14 of the Protocol fulfils those roles where it states that Contracting Parties 
'may enter into bilateral, regional and multilateral agreements and arrangements 
regarding intentional transboundary movements of living modified organisms, 
consistent with the objective of this Protocol ... provided that such agreements and 
7 ~ O O Article 20(2)(3) of the Protocol. 
7 ~ 1 1 Ibid., Articles 1, and 2(1), (2). 
7S2 Ibid. Article 2(4). 
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arrangements do not result in a lower level of protection than that provided for by the 
Protocol' .753 
Nevertheless, such implementation needs to be in accordance with Party's other 
obligations under international law. In this context, the Protocol's preamble 
emphasizes 'that this Protocol shall not be interpreted as implying a change in the 
rights and obligations of a Party under any existing international agreements'. Article 
26 of the Protocol also provides a similar provision. It states that import decisions 
made by a Party 'under this Protocol or under its domestic measures implementing the 
Protocol', must be consistency with its international obligations, along with the 
Protocol's other considerations.754 The Protocol also insists on cooperation among 
Parties to develop and/or strengthen human resources and institutional capacities in 
biosafety, for the purpose of its effective implementation.755 
Furthermore, the Biosafety Clearing-House mechanism is designed to facilitate the 
exchange of scientific, technical, environmental and legal information on, and 
experience with, living modified organisms among the Parties of the Protocol. 756 In 
addition to information-sharing, it also assists Parties to implement the Protocol, 
taking into account the special needs of developing and least-developing country 
Parties. 
m Ibid. Article 14(1). 
754 For further discussion of the Protocol's 'saving clauses' see section 7.3.5 of this chapter. 
m Article 22(1) of the Biosafety Protocol. 
756 Ibid. Article 20. 
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For implementation at the national level, Contracting Parties must develop their 
national biosafety frameworks (NBFs).757 NBFs are expected to define national 
biosafety policies, regulatory regimes (laws, regulations and guidelines), systems for 
handling applications, mechanisms for enforcement and field monitoring, and systems 
for information-sharing and public participation. As mentioned above, the COP-MOP 
also provides decisions containing guidance, tools and institutional mechanisms to 
assist Parties to meet their obligations under the Protocol. 758 
7.3. Areas of overlap and possibility of conflict 
The Biosafety Protocol is the first MEA that encompasses significant trade and 
economic interests. It attempts to establish a balance between environmental and trade 
interests, and emphasizes their mutual supportiveness while regulating the 
transboundary movement of LMOs. This part of the chapter examines the extent to 
which the Protocol's provisions, as outlined in the previous section, have been 
successful in striking a balance between its two diverse objectives: the protection of 
the environment and the permissible trade of the LMOs. This discussion is founded on 
the overlapping environmental and trade provisions, focusing particularly on the 
extent to which the Protocol provisions are compatible with those of multilateral trade 
agreements. 
757 Ibid. Article 19( 1). 
758 Ibid. Article 29(4). 
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7.3.1. The Protocol's precautionary approach in relation to the SPS Agreement 
Among the MEAs, the Biosafety Protocol is notable for its 'overtly precautionary 
approach' .759 Given the lack of scientific certainty and consensus as to the potential 
impacts of the LMOs on the environment and human health,760 the precautionary 
principle plays a significant role in the Protocol's whole decision-making process. The 
Protocol refers to or reflects the concept of precaution in its preamble, objective and 
operative partS. 761 Articles 10(6) and 11 (8) of the Protocol set out a specific 
framework and operational guidance for the implementation of the precautionary 
principle. These articles provide that lack of scientific certainty due to insufficient 
relevant scientific information and knowledge regarding the extent of the potential 
adverse effects of a LMO on biodiversity, and taking into account risks to human 
health, shall not prevent a Party of import from taking a decision, as appropriate, with 
regard to the import of the LMO in question. 
Having carried out a risk assessment based on information provided in accordance 
with Annex I, and on the basis of Article 15 and Annex III of the Protocol, Articles 
1 O( 6) and 11 (8) permit a Party of import to prohibit or restrict a proposed import 
where uncertainty remains regarding the extent of potential adverse effects. In such 
circumstances, a Party of import is entitled under the Protocol to establish whatever 
level of health and environmental protection it deems 'appropriate,762 within its own 
7S9 Bimie et al., supra n 11, 640. 
760 Mackenzie and Sands, 'Prospects for International Environmental Law' in Christoph Bail, 
Robert Falkner and Helen Marquard (eds), The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety: Reconciling 
Trade in Biotechnology with Environment and Development? (Earthscan Publications Ltd, 
London 2002) 461. 
761 Articles, 1, 10(6) and 11(8), and Annex IlI(4) of the Protocol. 
762 Article 2(4) of the Protocol provides that this right is conditioned to be 'consistent with' a 
Party's other obligations under the international law, a controversial issue discussed elaborately 
as a separate topic later on in this part of the chapter. 
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borders and to decide what action to take.763 A Party has no obligation to seek further 
infonnation to enable a more objective, infonned assessment of the risk and to review 
the precautionary measures unless requested to do so by the Party of export.764 Thus, 
an import restriction under the Protocol may be for unlimited duration, or until the 
importing party decides that scientific certainty exists. 
Furthennore, Article 26 of the Protocol allows Parties to take into consideration socio-
economic factors arising from the impact of LMOs on biodiversity when reaching a 
decision on their importation and any domestic measures when implementing the 
Protocol.765 However, Article 26 does not provide any explanation of what constitutes 
a socio-economic factor, and only identifies one particular socio-economic 
consideration that Parties are expected to take into account, i.e. the value of biological 
diversity to indigenous and local communities. The following discussion sheds light 
on how the different fonnulations of the precautionary approach under the Protocol 
and the SPS Agreement generate inconsistencies in their application by Contracting 
Parties. 
763 This proposition was accepted by the CFI in Pjizer Animal Health v Council of EU [2002] ECR 
3305 Case T-13/99, para. 151. 
764 Article 12 of the Protocol requires the Party of import to review its decision upon request. 
where the Party of export or notifier considers that there has been a change of circumstances or 
where additional relevant scientific or technical information has become available. For further 
discussion see Simonetta Zarilli, 'International Trade in Genetically Modified Organisms and 
Multilateral Negotiations: A New Dilemma for Developing Countries' in Francesco Francioni 
(ed), Environment, Human Rights and International Trade (OUP, Oxford 2001) Ch 3, 57-64; 
Hagan and Weiner, supra n 705, 697; Gaston and Abate, 'The Biosafety Protocol and the 
World Trade Organization', supra n 705, 107. 
765 Article 26(1) of the Protocol reads: 
[T]he Parties, in reaching a decision on import under this Protocol or under its domestic 
measures implementing the Protocol, may take into account, consistent with their international 
obligations, socio-economic considerations arising from the impact of living modified 
organisms on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, especially with 
regard to the value of biological diversity to indigenous and local communities. 
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First, the standard for the application of the precautionary principle in the Protocol is 
the presence of 'scientific uncertainty'. The Protocol pennits a Party of import to 
restrict transboundary movement of LMOs because of scientific uncertainty, 766 which, 
according to the Protocol, occurs in two situations that indicate 'scientific 
uncertainty'. One is where there is insufficient infonnation even to carry out a risk 
assessment. The other is where the risk assessment concludes that there remains a lack 
of certainty about the extent of the potential adverse effects of the LMO on the 
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, taking into account risks to 
human health. 767 
The formulation of the precautionary principle in the Protocol is general, permitting 
precautionary measures in the absence of complete evidence of the harm that could 
occur from the importation of the LMOs. On the other hand, the SPS Agreement has a 
specific form of precautionary approach. A Member of the WTO Agreement, taking a 
SPS measure on the ground of precaution, requires 'sufficient scientific evidence' to 
justify such an action. If there is a lack of sufficient scientific evidence regarding the 
risk at issue,768 rendering a risk assessment impossible,169 a Member can adopt 
provisional SPS measures on the basis of available pertinent information.77o However, 
that Member must (i) seek further information for its risk assessment and (ii) review 
the SPS measures within a reasonable timeframe. Both are prerequisites for the 
766 Articles 10(6) and 11(8) of the Protocol. Such decisions must be taken in accordance with the 
risk assessment procedure stipulated in Article 15 and Annex 1II of the Protocol. 
767 Articles 10(6) and 11(8) of the Protocol. 
768 Either due to the small amount of evidence on new risks, or due to the fact that accumulated 
evidence is inconclusive or unreliable. 
769 Japan - Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples, Appellate Body Report, 
WT/DS2451ABI R (2003), Report adopted on 10 December 2003, para. 179. 
770 Article 5(7) of the SPS Agreement. 
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adoption of provisional precautionary SPS measures.771 The Protocol, by contrast, 
permits Parties to impose import restriction on LMOs on the ground of precaution for 
unlimited duration. In this regard, the Protocol's Parties are neither obliged to seek 
further information for an objective risk assessment nor to review their import 
restriction decision within a reasonable timeframe. 
Second, Article 26 of the Protocol obliges its Parties to consider 'socio-economic' 
conditions, especially the value of biological diversity to indigenous and local 
communities in making import decisions on LMOs. However, it does not provide any 
guidance on how socio-economic considerations can be 'taken into account' when 
implementing the Protocol provisions relating to LMOs import decision-making. 
Thus, this provision has the potential to become a tool for trade protectionism, 
providing a basis for restricting imports on LMOs on the ground that these products 
may lead to the loss of cultural traditions, knowledge and practices, particularly 
amongst indigenous and local communities. 772 
For example, the Party of import has the discretion to refuse the import of a particular 
LMO seed based on concerns that it may affect the livelihood of domestic agricultural 
interests.773 This decision is legitimate under the Protocol, but could be regarded as 
discriminatory, or as a disguised restriction on trade, according to Article I of the 
GA TT, which requires 'most-favoured nation treatment' among GA TT members, such 
that members cannot discriminate according to the country of origin; Articles 2(2) and 
771 
772 
That is why the WTO Appellate Body has suggested a case-by-case basis review depending on 
the specific circumstances of the case and the characteristics of the SPS measure. See Japan -
Agricultural Products, supra n 351., Appellate Body Report, para. 93. In this case, the WTO 
Panel and Appellate Body found that a period of three years exceeded a reasonable period of 
time for a provisional measure to be in place. 
See Mackenzie et al., An Explanatory Guide to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. supra n 
706,238. 
773 Hagen and Weiner, supra n 705, 709. 
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5(5) of the SPS Agreement, Article 2(1) of the TBT Agreement and the chapeau of 
Article XX of the GATT, all prohibit discrimination. By incorporating socio-economic 
considerations in the making of import decisions Article 26 also acknowledges the 
limitations of traditional scientific inquiry. It opens the door for Parties to the Protocol 
to apply 'sustainability science' to make import decisions, which can operate as a 
disguised restriction on trade and thereby conflict with the trade rules, which do not 
take into consideration non-scientific factors while assessing risk. 
Article 5(1) of the SPS Agreement, according to WTO jurisprudence, does recognize 
that a risk assessment 'is not only risk ascertainable in a science laboratory operating 
under strictly controlled conditions, but also ... the actual potential for adverse effects 
on human health in the real world .. .'.774 However, Article 5(3) of the SPS Agreement 
pennits Members to assess risks to animal and plant health, taking into account 
'relevant economic factors: the potential damage in tenns of loss of production or 
sales in the event of the entry, establishment or spread of a pest or disease; the costs of 
control or eradication in the territory of the importing Member; and the relative cost-
effectiveness of alternative approaches to limiting risks'. Although the WTO 
Appellate Body's decision in EC - Hormones is broad enough to allow social 
elements of risk to be taken into consideration, Article 5(3) of the SPS Agreement only 
considers the economic factors listed above. Hence, an import ban decision taken by 
the Protocol Parties based on purely socio-economic considerations could be 
considered discriminatory by Parties to multilateral trade agreements, such as the 
WTO Uruguay Round Acts. 
774 EC - Hormones, supra n 162, paras 179-86. 
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Finally, the Protocol and the SPS Agreement establish two different paradigms for the 
burden of proof for risk assessment. The Protocol states that the importing country 
may carry out the risk assessment, or request the potential exporting country to do 
SO.775 If the risk assessment is performed by the importer, it can recover the cost from 
the potential exporter.776 On the other hand, in the SPS Agreement, the importing 
country has to ensure that its decision is based on a proper risk assessment. It obliges 
the exporting country neither to carry out a risk assessment nor to pay for the cost of a 
risk assessment carried out by the importing country. Instead, the importing country 
bears this burden. 
Hence, although the precautionary approach finds some reflection in Article 5(7) of 
the SPS Agreement, the above discussion shows that the two agreements are 
incompatible in the sense that the Protocol's provisions concerning the rights and 
obligations regarding the use of scientific and socio-economic criteria in making 
import decisions, the duration of such restrictions and the burden of risk assessment, 
differ from the rights and obligations of WTO Members established under the SPS 
Agreement.777 
7.3.2. The effect of the Protocol's documentation requirements on trade 
agreements 
As mentioned earlier, Parties to the Protocol require accompanying documentation for 
all transboundary movements of LMOs778, including those intended for food or feed, 
77S Article 15(2) of the Protocol. 
776 Ibid. Article 15(3). 
777 d' For the Iscussion on relevant provisions ofthe SPS Agreement see chapter on the Convention 
on Biological Diversity. This discussion focuses on inconsistencies between the Protocol and 
the SPS Agreement. 
778 Ibid. Article 18 of the Protocol. 
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or for processing.779 For documentation purposes, the Protocol distinguishes between 
various categories of LMOs, primarily on the basis of their intended use.780 Each of 
these categories is subject to different treatment under the Protocol. These differences 
in treatment have the result that LMOs, or certain LMOs, are not like their non-LMO 
counterparts: 781 a distinction which is not recognized in the multilateral trade 
agreements. 
The concept of like products has not been defined in the GA IT 1994, although it has 
been used in several articles including Articles 1(1), 11 (2)(a), III(2), III(4), VI(l )(a). 
IX(l), XI(2)(c), XIII(l), XVI(4) and XIX(I) of the GAIT. The Appellate Body in EC 
- Asbestos observed that there is no 'one precise and absolute definition' available for 
'like'. It considered the dictionary definition of 'like', suggesting that 'like products' 
are products that share a number of identical or similar characteristics.782 After 
realizing that such dictionary meanings 'leave many interpretive questions open', the 
Appellate Body in EC - Hormones construed the term 'like' 'narrowly' in the context 
of Articles 11(2) and 111(4) of the GAIT 1994.783 The Appellate Body in Japan - Taxes 
on Alcoholic Beverages suggested that the important factors in determining what 
constitutes 'likeness' are the products' physical characteristics, nature and quality, and 
their end uses, even though they may have been produced in a very different way.784 If 
779 Ibid. Article 18(2)(a). 
780 ti 
781 
782 
LMO or Pharmaceuticals; for food, feed, or processes; for contained use; for international 
introduction into the environment. 
There is controversy on this issue amongst academics and between the EU and US. The EU is 
of the view that the only like product to a given imported LMO product is the same LMO 
product processed or produced domestically. On the other hand, the US considers that LMO 
products and their non-LMO conventional counterparts are like products. For more on this 
debate see EC - Biotech Products, supra n 108. Laurence Chazournes and Makane Mbengue, 
'GMOs and Trade: Issues at Stake in the EC Biotech Dispute', (2004) 13 RECIEL 289 at 291-
7; Ved Nanda, 'Genetically Modified Food and International Law - the Biosafety Protocol and 
Regulations in Europe' (2000) 28 Den J1LP 235. 
EC - Asbestos, supra n 253, paras 88 and 90. 
783 EC - Asbestos, supra n 253, para. 92. 
784 I Japan - A coholic Beverages, supra n 87. 
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products have identical physical characteristics or appearance but are produced using 
two different methods, the products will still be considered as 'like' products under 
the GATT 1994. This conclusion arguably makes LMO products potentially 'like' 
non-LMO products. 
Article 111(4) of the GATT 1994 applies to imported LMOs, which when dealing with 
internal measures provides that Members cannot have one rule for domestic products 
and another less favourable rule for foreign 'like' products. It is not necessary to show 
that the regulations concerned actually had the actual effect of protecting domestic 
products. It is enough to show that the regulation is less favourable than that afforded 
to 'like' products of national origin.785 In this connection, the term 'regulations' not 
only covers technical regulations concerning the characteristics of products but also 
other measures which create competitive conditions favouring domestic products. 
Since there has been no explicit determination by the WTO as to whether a particular 
LMO product should be considered a 'like product' to their conventional counterpart, 
the Protocol's documentation requirements could be challenged by an exporting 
country, which is a WTO Member/86 on the ground that imported LMOs are 'like 
products' to those produced nationally. Moreover, it could be argued that the 
Protocol's requirements on documentation for the import of LMOs impose an 
unjustifiable barrier to trade and violate the GA IT national treatment principle. 
However, this would come into play only if both states are WTO Members and Parties 
to the CBD, in which case the Protocol could be relevant.787 
785 us - Gasoline, supra n 36. Also see footnote 256. 
786 For discussion on the relevant provisions in the TBT Agreement and the WTO Agreement see 
chapter on the Convention on Biological Diversity. 
787 EC - Biotech Products. supra n 108. 
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Again, labelling regulations for LMO shipments that are not based on food safety or 
other SPS grounds are likely to fall under the TBT Agreement.788 The objective of the 
TBT Agreement is to ensure that technical regulations and standards, including 
packaging, marking and labelling requirements, do not create unnecessary obstacles to 
international trade. This Agreement would very likely be applied to any technical 
barriers to the import of LMOs, which are imposed not to protect the environment or 
human health as such but to inform consumers or to protect a state's economy.789 
Although the TBT Agreement recognizes countries' right to take measures through 
technical regulations and standards to fulfil legitimate national policy objectives, 
which include environmental objectives,790 it contains important qualifications to 
protect trade interests.791 In addition, technical regulations may not 'be more trade-
restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective' .792 Thus, the Protocol's 
documentation requirements for various LMOs might be considered unjustifiably or 
arbitrarily discriminatory against the import of LMOs, as the TBT Agreement does not 
differentiate between LMO and non-LMO products.793 
788 
789 
In the EC - Biotech Products, supra n \08, the Panel ruled that labelling requirement related to 
the safety (or safe use) of a product falls within the scope of the SPS Agreement. The 
application of the SPS or TBT Agreement to LMO labelling depends on the nature and purpOSI! 
of the measure under consideration. For further discussion see David Morgan and Gavin Goh, 
'Genetically Modified Food Labelling and the WTO Agreements', (2004) 13 RECIEL 306 at 
309-12. 
Sean Murphy, 'Biotechnology and International Law' (2001) 42 Harvard International Law 
journal 48. 
790 Article 2 para. 2.2 of the TBT Agreement. 
791 Ibid. preamble and Article 2. As discussed in Chapter 3, such measures must be based on 
available scientific and technical information; should not create unnecessary obstacles to trade; 
shall not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective; and are not to 
be applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail or a disguised restriction to 
international trade. 
792 • I ArtlC e 2(3) of the TBT Agreement. 
793 See Chapter 3 for the Tuna - Dolphin case. 
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7.3.3. The Protocol's non-Party obligation 
As mentioned in the preceding section, the Parties to the Protocol follow two separate 
procedures for transboundary movements of LMOs. These two procedures establish 
some practical rules for the Parties to follow, including the AlA procedure, risk 
assessment, notification, documentation and exchange of information through the 
Biosafety Clearing-House mechanism. Like other MEAs,794 the Biosafety Protocol 
also requires that transboundary movements of LMOs between Parties and non-Parties 
are undertaken in a manner 'consistent with the objective of this Protocol' .795 It also 
explicitly obliges Parties 'to encourage non-Parties to adhere to this Protocol' and 
particularly to release LMO-related information through the Biosafety Clearing-House 
mechanism of the Protoco1.796 Hence, although it is voluntary for non-Parties to 
comply with the Protocol's relevant provisions,197 it is a binding obligation for the 
Protocol's Parties to conduct any LMO trade in accordance with the Protocol's 
regulations, even if that trade involves a non-Party to the Protocol. Since a number of 
major exporters of LMOs are non-Parties to the Protocol, this provision may be 
significant for them, as it has the potential to affect their rights and obligations. 
For example, Article 8 of the Protocol obliges the Party of export to provide written 
notification to the Party of import prior to the intentional transboundary movement of 
a LMO. Where the Party of export is a non-Party but notifies 'in writing' the Party of 
import prior to the intentional transboundary movement of an LMO, it will have acted 
794 The following MEAs have restricted the rights of Parties to them to trade in covered products 
or wastes with non-Parties, to encourage non-Parties to become Parties to the MEA, or at least 
to comply with the obligations imposed under the MEA: the 1973 Convention on International 
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (1973) 993 UNTS 243, Article X; the 
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (1987) 26 lLM 1541, Article 4; the 1989 
Basel Convention on the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes (1989) 28 ILM 649, 
Articles 4, 11. 
795 Article 24 of the Protocol. 
796 [bid Article 24(2). 
797 8S-l/ll of the COP-MOP decision, Kuala Lumpur (2004). 
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like a Party in following the Protocol's provisions. However, if the non-Party exporter 
does not do this, a Party will not be able to insist. Nevertheless, the Party would 
almost certainly be in breach of its obligations on the basis of Article 24 if it accepts 
imports from that non-Party without any form of notification. In this situation, the 
non-Party's ability to export LMOs to the Party, which is the importer, will be 
affected, and it could argue that it had been treated in a discriminatory manner by the 
Party of import. This could lead to a significant challenge by a non-Party to the 
Protocol, which is a Party to the WTO Agreement, as has been demonstrated in the 
case of EC - Biotech. 
7.3.4. The Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress 
Liability and redress in the context of the Biosafety Protocol concerns the question of 
what would happen if the transboundary movement of LMOs caused damage. 798 The 
Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress provides international rules and 
procedures on liability and redress for damage to biodiversity resulting from LMO. Its 
broad application includes: damage resulting from any movement of LMOs, whether 
intentional or unintentional, legal or illegal, national or transboundary, and damages 
resulting from transboundary movement of LMOs by Parties and non-Parties. 799 The 
Protocol is called 'supplementary', as its rules are supplementary to general rules and 
procedures on civilliability.8oo 
Article 5 of the Protocol provides specific response measures for the operation of the 
Protocol's liability and redress regime. It also establishes the right of the competent 
798 Article 27 of the Biosafety Protocol. 
799 Article 3 ofthe Liability and Redress Protocol. 
800 Ibid. Article 12. 
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authority 'to recover the costs and expenses of, and incidental to, the evaluation of the 
damage and the implementation of any such appropriate response measures'. 80 I The 
competent authority reasons its decision based on the precautionary approach, since 
the Liability and Redress Protocol is based on the spirit of the Biosafety Protocol and 
promotes compliance with the Protocol's policies and standards. 
However, it is evident from the earlier discussion that the Protocol's precautionary 
approach, as a basis for risk assessment prior to an import decision. is not consistent 
with the SPS Agreement. The Protocol permits Parties to restrict imports of LMOs 
even in cases where full scientific certainty of the 'damage' is lacking. However, there 
is no uniform definition available for 'damage'. For the purpose of the Liability and 
Redress Protocol, 'damage' means 'an adverse or negative effect on biological 
diversity' which is measurable or observable and significant. 802 But the standard for 
what constitutes an 'adverse or negative effect' is not clear, since full scientific 
certainty is not necessary to determine 'damage'. The threat of incurring liability and 
the potential burden of redress measures may act as an incentive for Parties to the 
Protocol to adopt a more precautionary approach to economic activities, resulting in 
the avoidance of environmental risk and damage. 
The implementation of the Liability and Redress Protocol also covers damage 
resulting from the transboundary movements of LMOs from non-Parties. This non-
Party liability and redress obligation reinforces Article 24 of the Protocol. Where the 
WTO is also empowered to resolve such disputes, it seems that the non-Party can seek 
refuge in the WTO dispute settlement organs. In this situation, if damage has been 
801 Ibid. Article 5(5). 
802 Ibid. Article 2(2)(b). 
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caused by the LMO exporting state, which is a non-Party to the Protocol but a Party to 
theWTO Agreement, that non-Party will not be bound by the Protocol's liability and 
redress regime.803 
The Protocol makes a claim for 'mutual supportiveness', but establishes a certain 
authority of environmental norms and standards over the norms and standards 
established under the multilateral trade agreements. The major exporters of LMOs, 
like the US, since they are not Parties to the Protocol, can keep their options open to 
seek remedies under the WTO Dispute Settlement system. We have already witnessed 
in EC - Biotech what could happen when an environmental dispute is resolved by one 
of the trade dispute settlement organs such as a WTO panel. 804 
7.3.5. The effectiveness of the Protocol's 'savings clause' 
This section focuses on the Protocol's 'savings clause' provision to explain the extent 
to which this provision has sought to establish a balance with the multilateral trade 
agreements. In the Protocol's negotiation process, the 'relationship' issue was a major 
source of disagreement among the negotiating groups. The Protocol's final negotiation 
placed a politically compromised 'savings clause' in the preamble of the Protocol. The 
tension, politics and emotion surrounding the savings clause issue increased with the 
WTO Dispute Settlement Body's decision on EC - Hormones, which fuelled the 
presumption that environmental agreements were being treated as less important than 
803 S h ee EC - Biotec Products, supra n 108, para. 7.68. 
804 For more about the EC - Biotech Product see Chapter 3. 
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trade agreements.805 A later discussion shows that this emotion is reflected in the 
language of the Protocol's savings clause. It reads: 806 
... that trade and environment agreements should be mutually supportive 
with a view to achieving sustainable development, 
... that this Protocol shall not be interpreted as implying a change in the 
rights and obligations of a Party under any existing international 
agreements, 
... that the above recital is not intended to subordinate this Protocol to other 
international agreements, 
A savings clause is a declaratory statement reflecting the intention of the Parties, and 
therefore can be expressed either in a treaty's preamble or in its text. However, a 
suspicion arises that placing the savings clause in the preamble has the effect of 
weakening its application. Sinclair argues that although preambular language carries 
less weight than the operative language in the body of the text, as it does not state any 
obligation; nonetheless, the preamble determines the object and purpose of an 
agreement.807 The latter point leads to a further argument that '[O]ne must look at the 
treaty as a whole, including the preamble and any annexes', for the purpose of 
determining successive treaties' relationship or its interpretation.808 In this connection, 
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention reflects the principle that a treaty's preamble and 
80S In this case, the WTO Panel and Appellate Body found that the EC's ban on the import of meat 
from cattle treated with certain growth-promoting hormones violated Articles 3(3), 5( I) and 
5(2) of the SPS Agreement. 
806 Preamble of the Biosafety Protocol. 
807 See Sinclair, supra n 39, p 127-8; Chamey, supra n 100, 127-8. Also see Gerald Fitzmaurice, 
'The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 1951-4: Treaty Interpretation and 
Other Treaty Points' (1957) 33 BYIL 223. 
808 A ust, supra n 39, 235. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention reflects the principle that a treaty's 
preamble and annexes are part ofa treaty's text rather than ancillary or subsidiary portions. 
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annexes are part of a treaty's text rather than ancillary or subsidiary portions, and 
therefore is equally authoritative for the purposes it is intended to serve. 
Furthermore, according to Article 30(2) of the Vienna Convention, '[ w]hen a treaty 
specifies that it is subject to, or that it is not to be considered as incompatible with. an 
earlier or later treaty, the provisions of that other treaty prevail'. In this case, it may 
not matter too much where such a declaratory statement is placed, i.e. in the preamble 
or the body of the treaty text. However, in the absence of such an indication, the 
saving clause may create an obligation to give priority to one set of treaty provisions 
over another, in which case they are better not being placed in the preamble. 
Apart from its position in the text, it has been argued that the language of the 
Protocol's savings clause, rather than clarifying the Protocol's relationship with other 
. 11 . h d . I c.' 809 agreements, especla y WIt tra e agreements slmp y causes conlUSlOn. 
The first paragraph captures the Protocol's aspiration that trade and environmental 
policies and agreements should support each other. It reflects the Protocol's objective 
of protecting the environment without overburdening trade. The second paragraph, 
formulated in general terms, determines not to hinder the Contracting Parties' 
obligations under any international agreement to which they are also Party. Since 
many Parties to the Protocol are also Parties to the multilateral trade agreements, the 
second paragraph specifies that the Protocol does not change Parties' rights and 
obligations under 'any existing international agreements'. One possible interpretation 
of this paragraph is that the Protocol is not intended actually to amend the trade 
809 S" I 11 Imle et a . supra n ,794. 
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treaties, but that in the event of a conflict, the Protocol nonetheless prevails, 
consistently with the Vienna Convention. 
Nevertheless, it is the last paragraph which generates greater controversy and has been 
criticized for significantly weakening the effect of the previous two paragraphs.81O 
Some have even argued that this paragraph is the vanishing point of the savings 
clause, as it reaffirms Article 30(3) of the Vienna Convention. Birnie et a1. view these 
preambular paragraphs as simply a 'repetition' of 'the exhortation to balance trade and 
environmental concern' 811 , having more politically palatable value812 than practical 
application. They argue that this paragraph not only weakens paragraph two, but also 
establishes relative priority for other international agreements.B\3 The effectiveness of 
the Protocol's saving clause as a conflict-resolving technique, which establishes 
priority between successive treaties relating to the same subject matter, may be 
controversial; nevertheless, its significance as part of an interpretative process that 
seeks to resolve incompatibilities arising from overlapping treaty norms is 
undeniable.814 
7.4. Conclusions 
The Biosafety Protocol is the first MEA that encompasses significant trade and 
economic interests in the transboundary movement of LMOs. It attempts to establish a 
810 Ibid. 755. 
811 Ibid. 
812 • I Aartl Gupta, 'Governing Trade in Genetically Modified Organisms: The Cartagena Protoco on 
Biosafety' (2000) 42 Environment 22 at 31. Also see Safrin, 'The relationship with other 
agreements: much ado about a savings clause', in Christoph Bail, Robert Falkner and Helen 
Marquard (eds), The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety: Reconciling Trade in Biotechnology 
with Environment and Development? (Earthscan Publications Ltd, London 2002) 449. 
813 Bimie et aI., supra n 11, 794. Also see Safrin, ibid. 
814 This issue has been discussed in great detail in Chapter 8. 
263 
balance between environmental and trade interests, and emphasizes their mutual 
supportiveness while regulating the transboundary movement of LMOs. However, the 
discussion in this chapter demonstrates that a suitable balance does not appear to have 
been achieved. The Protocol's regulatory provisions, such as the AlA procedures, 
documentation requirements, liability and redress regime, saving clauses and non-
Parties obligations, have the potential to inhibit trade in LMOs in order to protect 
environmental interests. 
The core aspect of the Protocol, the precautionary approach, has a different 
formulation and weight from that in the SPS Agreement. The Protocol Parties can take 
decisions to prohibit or restrict the import of LMOs by applying this approach, which 
includes not only 'scientific uncertainty' and 'socio-economic' concerns as reasons for 
such refusal, but also permits measures that are more protective of the conservation 
and sustainable use of biological diversity. With the mandate of the precautionary 
approach, a Party of import that is a Party to both the Protocol and the WTO 
Agreement can take a decision to allow the import of a given LMO from one WTO 
Member but not from another, or permit the domestic production but not the import of 
a given LMO, violating core WTO principles. 
In addition, the Protocol's risk assessment, which is based on information provided in 
accordance with Annex I and Annex Ill, and on the basis of Article t 5 of the Protocol, 
requires that it 'should be carried out in a scientifically sound and transparent 
manner,.8IS It does not provide any definition for the term 'scientifically sound 
HIS See Article 15 and Annex IIl(3) of the Protocol. 
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manner', though similar language can be found in other agreements.816 The absence of 
an internationally agreed definition of 'scientifically sound manner' may give rise to 
disagreements between states, both as to the meaning of the phrase and the validity of 
inevitably divergent scientific views 'about the manner in which an inserted gene is 
likely to modify characteristics of the organism other than the intended changes, about 
the interpretation of data, and about the ecological and environmental effects of 
LMOs,.817 
On the other hand, the precautionary approach, as applied by the SPS Agreement, is a 
secondary aspect of the regime, to be applied according to multilateral standards818 
preserving the interest of the exporting countries.819 These different formulations of 
the precautionary approach under the Protocol and the SPS Agreement permit both the 
trade and environmental regimes to fulfil their respective diverse objectives, but 
thereby cause tension between them. 
Recognizing this tension between the Protocol provlsIOns and the rules of the 
multilateral trade agreements, the Protocol has incorporated a 'savings clause' 
provision in its preamble. However, from the discussion in the preceding section, it is 
evident that this 'savings clause' has not been worded in such a way as to resolve 
inconsistencies between trade and the environment. 
816 See also the SPS Agreement - 'scientific principles' (Article 2(2»; 'scientific justification' 
(Article 3(3»; and 'scientific evidence' (Articles 2(2) and 5(2». 
817 See Mackenzie et al., An Explanatory Guide to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosajety, supra n 
706, 108. 
818 According to the preamble of the SPS Agreement, SPS measures must be adopted 'on the basis 
of international standards, guidelines and recommendations developed by the relevant 
international organizations, including the Codex Alimentarius Commission, the International 
Office of Epizootics, and the relevant international and regional organizations operating within 
the framework of the International Plant Protection Convention ... '. 
819 Sydnes, 'Overlapping regimes: The SPS Agreement and the Cartagena Biosafety Protocol' in 
Young and others (eds), Institutional interplay: Biosafety and trade (United Nations University 
Press, 2008) 87, 88. 
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Finally, based on the above discussion, it can be argued that, although the Protocol 
attempts to establish a balance between environmental and trade interests in the 
regulation of the transboundary movement ofLMOs, the Protocol's primary objective 
is not to encourage or expand LMOs trade, but to ensure biosafety. The Protocol 
permits international trade of LMOs to the extent that it is consistent with the rules, 
principles and standards of the Protocol and its parent convention, the CBD. Thus, 
although the Protocol's preamble and operative texts restate the mutual supportiveness 
of trade and environmental agreements, the Protocol's broad precautionary approach, 
treatment of non-Parties, savings clause and liability and redress regime, and establish 
a form of nonllative priority of environmental rules and standards over trade, they are 
not absolute in their application. 
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8. Balancing MEAs and the multilateral trade agreements 
8.1. Introduction 
The aim of this thesis has been to explore the balance between trade and 
environmental considerations in international law. Chapter 2 illustrates various 
techniques used to resolve inconsistencies and to establish a coherent system in the 
relationship between trade and environment, advancing the specific approach 
introduced in Chapter 1. This illustration is followed by the analysis of the 1995 WTO 
Agreement and its annexed agreements, the 2006 International Tropical Timber 
Agreement (IITA) , the 1973 Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), the 1992 Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD) and the 2000 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (Biosafety Protocol), 
considering the balance which has been struck in both environmental and trade fora. 
This discussion reveals that the multilateral trade agreements contain specific 
provisions protecting the environment, including: Article XX(b) and (g) of the GA IT, 
Article 5(2) of the SPS Agreement, Article 2(2) of the TBT Agreement, Article 27(2) 
of the TRIPS Agreement and the provisions for 'sustainable forest management' in the 
IITA. 82o Simultaneously, the MEAs discussed in this thesis provide provisions 
allowing for trade restriction, or provisions that have the potential to restrict trade in 
order to protect the environment. CITES, for example, contains specific rules 
restricting international trade in specimens of selected species. 
By contrast, the CBD does not contain any specific trade restrictive measures, but 
provides various guiding principles for the Contracting Parties, allowing them to 
820 These Articles have been discussed extensively in Chapters 3 and 4. 
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develop and adopt specific measures restricting the trade in biological resources to 
pursue the Convention's conservation and sustainable use objectives. The other MEA, 
the Biosafety Protocol, has in various provisions made an effort to balance both trade 
and environmental concerns while regulating the transboundary movement of LMOs. 
MEAs and the multilateral trade agreements are treaties from different sectors of 
international law, but both address the issue of protection of the environment. In these 
circumstances, rules of MEAs and the multilateral trade agreements inevitably overlap 
by addressing the same subject matter but from different perspectives. For example, 
both the MEAs and the multilateral trade agreements provide rules for the application 
of the precautionary approaches, processes and production methods and intellectual 
property rights. Chapters 3 to 7 have focused on how MEAs and multilateral trade 
agreements have balanced environmental and trade concerns in the event of such 
overlap, and identified several inconsistencies between the rules established in the 
respective contexts. 
This chapter compares and contrasts the various solutions provided in these various 
agreements, and argues that environmental considerations are currently undervalued in 
comparison with trade considerations within the international legal order. 
Consequently, it aims to introduce formal legal mechanisms through which the 
inconsistencies and incoherence in overlapping treaty relationships can be addressed, 
and a better balance thereby achieved. 
For this purpose, it follows the approach outlined in Chapter 1 and applies the 
techniques identified in Chapter 2. It argues that environmental objectives are 
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inherently of equal or even higher priority, as is evident from current circumstances. 
Thus, balancing trade and environmental concerns in the international legal order 
requires better harmonization, or actual prioritization of the environmental interests in 
the event of conflict between trade and environmental interests. At this stage, this 
chapter analyses mechanisms through which the importance of the environmental 
objectives can be recognized more effectively within the international legal system. 
This chapter is divided into three sections. Section 8.2 compares the solutions 
provided in the multilateral trade agreements in the protection of environmental 
interests with the solutions provided in the MEAs in order to justify the claim that 
environmental interests are undervalued. In this context, section 8.3 focuses on the 
significance of the protection of the environment. It argues that environmental 
objectives are inherently equal or even of higher priority, at least in current 
circumstances. With that in mind, section 8.4 attempts to redress the trade and 
environmental balance in international law. 
8.2. Comparison of the trade and environmental balance 
Chapters 3 and 4 focused on how successfully the WTO multilateral trading system 
and the lIT A have accommodated concerns about the protection and preservation of 
the environment within their basic trade regimes. This section compares and contrasts 
the various solutions provided in the MEAs and multilateral trade agreements that are 
seen to balance trade and environmental concerns with solutions provided by the 
MEAs, and argues that environmental considerations are currently undervalued in 
comparison with trade considerations within the international legal order, causing an 
imbalance in their relationship. 
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8.2.1. Undervalued environmental objectives in the WTO Agreement 
The key objectives of the WTO multilateral treating system discussed in Chapter 3 are 
the achievement of economic growth and the expansion and liberalization of trade in 
goods and services. The WTO Agreement has also identified 'sustainable 
development' and 'protection and preservation of the environment' as its objectives. 
However, the structure and pWlctuation of the preamble make it difficult to work out 
the precise relationship between these v8:rious objectives: the words 'while allowing 
for the optimal use of the world's resources,821 might be read as treating sustainable 
development as a subordinate goal, but it is then unclear how the phrase 'seeking 
both' to protect and preserve the environment822 and to enhance the means for doing 
so fits in with that. Grammatically speaking, 'seeking' looks to be on a par with the 
word 'recognizing' at the very beginning of the first recital rather than with 'raising', 
'ensuring' and 'expanding' or 'allowing' in lines 2 to 4,823 which would seem to give 
environmental protection a very high priority, and a status separate from that of 
sustainable development for the purpose of this treaty. This section argues that despite 
its explicit reference to sustainable development and protection and preservation of 
the environment, the WTO has shown a reluctance to give sufficient effect to 
environmental concerns. 
To begin with, it is the practice of the WTO dispute settlement organs to interpret 
'exceptions' narrowly on the ground that a restrictive interpretation of exceptions 
upholds the treaty's objectives. However, it is not always the case that a narrow 
interpretation of exceptions will give effect to the purposes and objects of a treaty. 
Indeed, in some cases a broad interpretation of exceptions will be required to advance 
821 See preamble of the WTO Agreement [emphasis added]. 
822 Ibid. [emphasis added]. 
823 b I id., lines 2-4. 
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a treaty's objectives and purposes, as in the case of CITES, which permits exceptions 
for captive breeding and artificial propagation, and scientific research.824 This is 
because the exceptions are designed specifically to advance the treaty's objectives 
rather than to detract from them. In the present context, the narrow interpretation of 
the so-called 'environmental exceptions' undermines the 'sustainable development' 
and 'protection and preservation' objectives of the WTO Agreement, resulting in an 
imbalance between the trade and environmental concerns. 
Furthermore, the WTO dispute settlement organs actually go beyond the GA 7T/WTO 
requirements in interpreting the exceptions in order to protect trade interests. For 
example, Article XX(b) of the GA TT provides that trade-restrictive measures are 
allowed if such measures: i) are necessary to fulfil the policy objectives; ii) protect 
human, animal or plant life or health; and iii) are in conformity with the requirements 
of the introductory clause of Article XX, i.e. they do not allow arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination and/or a disguised restriction on international trade.825 In 
several cases, the WTO Panels have interpreted 'necessary' to mean that in order to 
qualify under Article XX(b), a measure must be the 'least trade restrictive' ,826 which 
neither takes into account the ordinary or general international law meaning of 
'necessary,827 nor adequately reflects the 'sustainable development' or 'protection and 
preservation' objectives of the WTO Agreement. 
In more recent cases, the Appellate Body has applied a 'weighing and balancing' 
approach to determine whether a measure is 'necessary' to protect human, animal or 
824 See Chapter 2. 
825 US - Gasoline, Panel Report, supra n 262; Tuna 11, supra n 262. 839. 
826 US - Section 337 of the Tariff Act, supra n 332. para. 5.26; Thailand - Cigarettes, supra n 320. 
1122; Ibid., Tuna ll. 
827 See the discussion in section 8.4.1.1. (a). 
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plant life or health under Article XX(b) of the GA TT. The Appellate Body has 
considered a series of factors in this 'weighing and balancing' process, including the 
contribution made by the environmental measure to the policy objective, the 
importance of the common interests or values protected by the measure, and the 
impact of the measure on international trade.828 The above interpretation by the 
Appellate Body is a significant improvement on the Panel's interpretation, but as 
usual, the Appellate Body has still chosen to follow a strict interpretation of the word 
'necessary'. The Appellate Body held that if the 'weighing and balancing' process 
concludes that the measure is prima facie necessary, this result must be confirmed by 
comparing the measure with possible alternatives, which might be less trade 
restrictive, while providing an equivalent contribution to the achievement of the 
objective pursued.829 
In conclusion, the interpretations of Article XX(b) and (g) of the GA TT do not 
adequately reflect the preambular objectives of 'sustainable development' and 'the 
protection and preservation of the environment', and have little real protectionist 
effect on the environment. An assumption of 'the superiority of economic interests' is 
manifest in this interpretation.830 
8.2.2. Trade-oriented 'sustainable forest management' 
The preamble (c) of the 2006 ITT A recalls all the leading environmental agreements 
and policy documents in the international community relating to conservation and 
sustainable development. Therefore, sustainable forest management goals are 
828 Korea - Various Measures in Beef, Appellate Body Report, supra n 264, para. 164; Brazil -
Retreaded Tyres, supra n 264, Appellate Body Report. 
829 Brazil - Retreaded Tyres, supra n 264, Appellate Body Report, para. 211. 
830 Jagdish Bhagwati, 'Trade and the Environment: The False Conflict?', in Durwood Zaelke (ed). 
Trade and the Environment: Law, Economics, and Policy (1993), 159-90, see 179. 
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expected to be consistent with. the goal of these conservation agreements and policy 
documents because they reflect the notion of sustainable development. Among them, 
CITES and the CBD are the most relevant to the ITTA's mandates, as they address 
development and conservation issues simultaneously. 
The ITTA introduces a 'sustainable forest management' (SFM) approach to balancing 
conservation and sustainable utilization objectives. The SFM approach encompasses 
the environmental, economic and socio-cultural objectives of forest management,831 
and also includes recognition that forest-related activities should not damage the forest 
to the extent that its capacity to deliver products and services - such as timber, water 
and biodiversity conservation - is significantly reduced. Forest management should 
also aim to balance the needs of different forest users so that its benefits and costs are 
shared equitably. Furthermore, the 2006 ITTA recognizes 'the role of the forest 
dependent indigenous people and local communities' as part of sustainable forest 
management. 832 
However, the definition of 'sustainable forest management' given by the ITTO differs 
considerably from the concept of 'sustainable use' by the CBD. The definition of the 
SFM clearly does not show that it is the ITTO's intention to preserve all the 
biodiversity that a tropical forest contains. It tolerates some loss of biodiversity as 
long as forests continue to provide the required goods and services. It is apparent that 
the ITTO is clearly giving priority to the conservation of those forest resources that 
have instrumental value.833 
831 For the definition of 'sustainable forest management' see Chapter 4. section 4.2.3. 
832 See Art. l(r) of the fifA, 2006. 
833 See Chapters 2, 5 and 6 for various environmental values. 
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The pursuit of sustainable use on the one hand permits utilization of the natural 
resources for economic development, but on the other hand restricts such use so as to 
protect and preserve the environment. Therefore, sustainable use of natural resources, 
which is an important element of sustainable development,834 forms an essential link 
between conservation and trade. Sustainable use is integrated into the modem concept 
of conservation, which recognizes that the sustainable use of living resources, and the 
ecosystems of which they are a part, is a prerequisite for biological diversity 
conservation and at the same time acknowledges the necessity for certain elements to 
be given special care and treatment. In other words, the current concept of 
conservation includes both the classic elements of protection and sustainable 
utilization.835 
'Sustainable use' requires that the use of biological resources does not reduce the 
future use potential of the target population or impair its long-term viability. It must 
also be compatible with the maintenance of the long-term viability of supporting and 
dependent ecosystems, and must not reduce the future use potential or impair the long-
term viability of other species.836 Thus, 'sustainable use' is species- and ecosystem-
oriented and can be either consumptive or non-consumptive. Arguably, the 
'sustainable use' approach acknowledges both intrinsic and utilitarian valuesK37 of 
natural resources and establishes a more integrated system of trade and conservation. 
However, the SFM approach is trade-oriented and does not protect biodiversity, which 
appears to lack instrumental value. It does not consider the fact that species are part of 
834 Birnie et aI., supra n 11, 119. 
835 Van Heijinsbergen, International Legal Protection of Wild Flora and Fauna (Amsterdam: 
1997),51-2. 
836 IUCN, Guidelines for the Ecological Sustainability of Non-consumptive and Consumptive Uses 
of Wild Species (Draft Guideline: 1994). 
837 See 'Addis Ababa Principles and Guidelines', supra n 454 para. 8(e). 
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the ecosystem, and therefore need protection if a healthy environment IS to be 
maintained. 
8.2.3. Higher standards for the precautionary approach 
The precautionary approach is a tool to deal with uncertainty related to the use of 
biodiversity.838 Thus, the precautionary principle plays a vital role in the concept of 
sustainable utilization because it. recognizes that action is needed when threats of 
biodiversity become apparent, and international bodies should not wait until 
exhaustive studies have been completed. The precautionary approach is subsumed 
within CITES, the CBD and the Cartagena Protocol as a tool to deal with uncertainty 
related to the trade of endangered species, the use of biodiversity and the 
transboundary movement of LMOs. A flexible approach in formulating the 
precautionary approach is significant to protect the environment. 
The MEAs' precautionary approach has lowered the standard of scientific proof of 
risk by requiring that, where there is some evidence of risk of serious or irreversible 
harm, albeit inconclusive, appropriate action may be called for and the 'lack of full 
scientific certainty shall not prevent the proposal from proceeding' .839 In contrast, the 
SPS Agreement has formulated the precautionary approach in such a way that the 
application of precautionary measures requires conclusive proof of a risk, which is a 
higher standard compared to the common formulation of the precautionary approach 
stated in principle 15 of the Rio Declaration. The main concern of the SPS AKreemenl 
should be that the precautionary measure is not a 'disguised restriction to trade': as 
838 Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration and Ibid., para. 8(f) and practical principle 5. 
839 See Article 8(7)(a) of the 2001 POPS Convention, which deals with listing harmful chemicals. 
See also Article 11(8) of the 2000 Biosafety Protocol. 
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long as this is not the case, such measures should be treated as justifiable in order to 
protect environmental and human health and to reduce unnecessary exposure to risks. 
In EC - Biotech, the SPS Agreement came into conflict with the Biosafety Protocol on 
the issue of the precautionary approach. In this case, the WTO Panel had the 
opportunity to clarify Article 5(7) of the SPS Agreement, but it avoided this issue on 
the ground that all Parties to the SPS Agreement were not necessarily Parties to the 
Biosafety Protocol.84o It also made clear that the precautionary approach is not a 
principle of customary international law and therefore it cannot override the specific 
provision of the SPS Agreement. 
Arguably, the reason why the Panel was so cautious was that if the precautionary 
approach were to be viewed as an established principle of international law, the 
interpretation and application of treaties would be affected, since general principles of 
law are of particular relevance to the interpretation of an unclear treaty rule. This 
would have a significant effect, because the precautionary approach is arguably 
already part of the international law of sustainable use of natural resources, including 
endangered species, biological diversity and forests, and is the basis for 
comprehensive environmental protection both nationally and internationally. 841 
8.2.4. Technical regulations and standards to protect the environment 
As discussed in previous chapters, MEAs and multilateral trade agreements contain 
provisions allowing member states to adopt technical regulations obstructing 
international trade to protect 'human health or safety, animal or plant life or health, or 
840 EC - Biotech Products, supra n 108, para. 7.68. 
841 Arie Trouwborst, Evolution and Status of the Precautionary Principle in International Law. 62 
International Environmental Law and Policy Series (Kluwer Law International: 2002),284. 
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the. environment'. 842 Such r e g u l ~ t i < ? n s s might take the form of eco-Iabelling or 
certification. 
Eco-Iabelling notifies consumers of the environmental impacts of producing or using a 
product and service. Such information helps customers to make choices regarding the 
products that are environment-friendly. Since eco-Iabelling is a voluntary measure, if 
a country fails to act to protect its own environment, other countries have no trade 
leverage to promote better environmental practices under the WTO. The WTO rules 
pennit eco-Iabelling, but do not allow including information related to process and 
production methods. Modem customers are aware of the impact that the production of 
goods may have on the environment and their health, and are keen to make the ri ght 
choices based on the information attached to products with different characteristics. 
However, the WTO does not only take customer preferences into account. 
Furthermore, WTO Members are not authorized to discriminate between products 
with the same physical characteristics based upon PPMs. Under GA TT and WTO 
rules, the process by which a product is produced is not an acceptable cause for trade 
restrictions. Only if the product itself is harmful can a country impose controls. The 
PPM is an important potential weapon for international environmental protection. If 
the WTO does not change its approach towards the interpretation of 'like products' so 
as to include PPMs, CBD Contracting Parties requiring foreign products to be eco-
labelled will prima facie violate Article 111(4) of the GATT 1994, even if the same 
restrictions are applied to domestic products. 
842 See Chapters 3, 6 and 7. 
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8.2.5. The TRIPS Agreement's limited environmental protection 
The TRIPS Agreement provides for the protection of plant varieties either through 
patent protection or a sui generis system. However, it does not provide protection for 
traditional knowledge as such.843 Sui generis provisions could permit forms of 
statutory exemptions in individual members' territories, whereby they could regulate 
such matters as bio-prospecting.844 Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement contains 
provisions for granting compulsory licensing to allow WTO Members to facilitate bio-
prospecting activities. 845 However, the TRIPS Agreement places procedural limits on 
the ability of governments to provide such licensing to ensure that measures and 
procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do not themselves become a barrier 
to trade. 846 
Furthermore, the TRIPS Agreement is primarily concerned with ensuring adequate 
protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights and has no provisions for 
the sharing of benefits arising out of the use of traditional knowledge in the new 
inventions, which are protected through patents. By granting patents only to 
inventions that are based on new knowledge, it protects the interests of commercial 
companies and deprives traditional knowledge holders from the 'fair and equitable' 
sharing of the benefits of utilizing such knowledge.847 
It is vital to preserve, protect and promote indigenous people's traditional knowledge 
relating to genetic resources, as such knowledge is valuable in protecting species, 
ecosystems and landscapes. The CBD has recognized these values of traditional 
843 F ooter, 'Our Agricultural Heritage', supra n 378. 433. 
844 See Chapter 3. 
845 Correa,' Patent Right' , supra n 372. 245-9. 
846 For more about these limitations. see the text of Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
847 Article 27(3)(b) of the TRIPS Agreement. For discussion see Chapter 3. 
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knowledge and i n c l u d e ~ ~ provisions protecting and promoting them.848 It also requires 
that the benefits arising from the utilization of genetic resources and related traditional 
knowledge be shared in a 'fair and equitable' manner with Parties providing such 
resources and with the holders of traditional biodiversity-related knowledge. The 
Convention's IP provisions are flexible, general and elaborate, whereas the TRIPS 
Agreement's IP provisions are specific and limited to the boundary of the multilateral 
trading system. 
8.3. Significance of environmental protection 
During the last few centuries - and the last five decades in particular - the global 
population has risen exponentially. With 6.8 billion people all seeking to secure the 
resources believed to be necessary for comfortable survival, the planet's finite natural 
resources and its ecology have suffered tremendously.849 This has given rise to 
accelerated species extinction rates,850 depletion of critically renewable and non-
renewable resources, and increased pollution. For our survival we depend entirely on 
natural resources. If the environment becomes polluted or damaged, our own survival 
will be threatened, as 'biodiversity and human well-being just cannot be separated' .851 
8.3.1. Environment is a means and an end in itself 
Trade is seen as one of the important means to achieving economic and social 
development. By contrast, protection of the environment might be seen both as a 
848 Article 80) of the CBD. For discussion see Chapter 6. 
849 WorldWatch Institute, State of the World: Innovations for a Sustainable Economy (New York: 
W.W. Norton and Company, Inc.: 2008). 
850 Wilson, The Future of Life (New York: Alfred A. Knopf Publishing 2002). 
851 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005), 'Ecosystem and Human Well-being' VollI, Ch 10. 
A vailable at: <http://www.maweb.orglenlScenarios.aspx#download>. 
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means of securing sustainable economic development and other key values, such as 
protection of human rights and preservation of peace, and as an end in itself. 
In order to secure more robust development, researchers have recently been working 
to develop new ways of assessing and valuing 'ecosystem services'. Applying 
economic thinking to the use of biodiversity and ecosystem services can help clarify 
two critical points: first, why prosperity and poverty reduction depend on maintaining 
the flow of benefits from ecosystems, and second, why successful environmental 
protection needs to be grounded in sound economics, including explicit recognition, 
efficient allocation, and fair distribution of the costs and benefits of conservation and 
sustainable use of natural resources. 
Humans rely on the way 'ecosystem services,852 control our climate, regulate 
pollution and secure pollination; however, these benefits gained from the natural 
world, which are essential for our survival, are not always fully appreciated because 
we get them for free. In the UK's first National Ecosystem Assessment report, lan 
Bateman concludes that, '[W]ithout the environment, we're all dead - so the total 
value is infinite' .853 The invisibility of biodiversity values has often encouraged 
inefficient use or even destruction of the natural capital that is the foundation of our 
economies. In this context, two international studies - the Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment (MEA)854 and the Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB)855 
8S2 Ecosystem services are the benefits people obtain from ecosystems. These are the products 
such as goods and services that come out of the ecosystem, for example food. water 
purification, spiritual experience, etc. The combination of these goods and services contributes 
to human well-being in terms of health, wealth and happiness. 
8S3 The UK National Ecosystem Assessment (UK NEA) is the first analysis of the UK's natural 
environment in terms of the benefits it provides to society and continuing economic prosperity. 
The report was published in March 2011 and is available in full at <http://uknea.unep-
wcmc.orglResources/tabid/82IDefault.asp> . 
854 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, supra n 851. 
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- have given broader views of society's environmental trajectory, and the costs and 
benefits of the protection of the environment. 
The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment was carried out between 2001 and 2005 to 
assess the consequences of ecosystem change for human well-being and to establish 
the scientific basis for actions needed to enhance the conservation and sustainable use 
of ecosystems and their contributions to human well-being. 856 The assessment focuses 
on the linkages between ecosystems and human well-being and, in particular, on 
'ecosystem services'. These include provisioning services such as food, water, timber 
and fibre; regulating services that affect climate, floods, disease, waste and water 
quality; cultural services that provide recreational, aesthetic and spiritual benefits; and 
supporting services such as soil formation, photosynthesis and nutrient cycling. The 
findings of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment have made explicit the 
contribution of ecosystem services to human well-being. Arguably, a safe and healthy 
environment is the prerequisite for the enjoyment of human rights. 
The TEEB synthesis shows how economic concepts and tools can help equip society 
with the means to incorporate the values of nature into decision-making at all levels. 
TEEB presents an approach that can help decision-makers recognize, demonstrate 
and, where appropriate, capture the values of ecosystems and biodiversity. The 
traditional view of economic growth is based on chasing GDP, which does not take 
into account the true value of nature. The concepts of ecosystem services and natural 
capital can help us recognize the many benefits that nature provides. For example, the 
855 TEEB (2010), The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity: Mainstreaming the Economics 
of Nature: A synthesis of the approach, conclusions and recommendations ofTEEB. Available 
at http://www . teebweb.orgllnformationMaterial/TEEBReports/tabidlI2 7 8/Defau It.aspx 
856 • Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, supra n 851. 
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total economic value of insect pollination worldwide is estimated at $153 billion, 
representing 9.5% of world agricultural output in 2005.857 
Of course, it is not possible to a put price on everything in nature, but equally we 
cannot ignore the importance of looking after it when we are striving for economic 
growth. Future economic growth will be undermined unless we understand the full 
value of the natural world on which our wealth, health and well-being depend. 85R 
Recognizing value in ecosystems, landscapes, species and other aspects of 
biodiversity is a feature of all human societies and communities, and is sometimes 
sufficient to ensure conservation and sustainable use. Thus, arguably, the preservation 
of the environment on the basis that a healthy environment can ensure a healthy 
society is a means to an end. 
8.3.2. Biodiversity under threat 
Despite the ongoing conservation efforts of the international community, the most 
recent assessments of global biodiversity find that species are continuing to decline 
and that the risk of extinction is growing; that natural habitats are continuing to be lost 
and becoming increasingly degraded and fragmented; and that the principal direct 
drivers of biodiversity loss (habitat disturbance, pollution (especially nutrient load), 
invasive alien species, over-exploitation and, increasingly, climate change) are either 
constant or intensifying.859 A third of all amphibians, a fifth of all mammals and an 
8S7 N Gallai, J Salles, J Settele et aI., 'Economic Valuation of the Vulnerability of World 
Agriculture Confronted with Pollinator Decline', (2009) 68 Ecological Economics. 810-21. 
858 The UK National Ecosystem Assessment (UK NEA), supra n 853. 
859 SHM Butchart, M Walpole, B Collen et aI., 'Global Biodiversity: Indicators of Recent 
Declines' (2010) Science, 328 at 1164-8. 
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eighth of all birds are now threatened with extinction.86o It is thought that 90% of the 
large predatory fish in the oceans have gone since the beginning of industrial trawling. 
Writing in the science journal Nature, a multidisciplinary group of scientists identified 
nine key safe-use planetary resource boundaries, three of which, they conclude, have 
already been transgressed (i.e. those relating to climate change, biodiversity and the 
operation of the nitrogen cycle). We are on the cusp of several others.l!61 The report 
warns of serious consequences for human societies as ecosystems become incapable 
of providing the goods and services on which hundreds of millions of people 
depend.862 Such thresholds have already been passed in certain coastal areas where 
'dead zones' now exist, for a range of coral reefs and lakes that are no longer able to 
sustain aquatic species, and for some dryland areas that have been effectively 
transformed into deserts. Similarly, thresholds have been passed for some fish stocks. 
Global biodiversity changes are important because they are irreversible; species that 
go extinct globally will never reappear. Losses of global biodiversity affect the 
provisioning of both types of ecosystem services - those that depend on abundance 
and those that depend on the maintenance of unique genetic combinations. The failure 
to account for the full economic values of ecosystems and biodiversity has been a 
significant factor in their continuing loss and degradation.863 
860 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, supra n 851. 
861 R o c k s t r ~ m m et aI., supra n 55, 461. 
862 Ibid., at 472-5. 
863 GB03 (2010) 'Global Biodiversity Outlook 3', seBD - Secretariat of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, Montreal. 
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8.3.3. Environment as the 'common concern of humankind' 
The notion of 'common concern of humankind' refers to 'humanity as a whole' whose 
concerns are at issue.864 Justice Weeramantry speculated that: 865 
We have entered an era of international law in which international law 
subserves not only the interests of individual States, but looks beyond them 
and their parochial concerns to the greater interests of humanity and 
planetary welfare ... International environmental law will need to proceed 
beyond weighing the rights and obligations of parties within a closed 
compartment of individual State self-interest, unrelated to the global 
concerns of humanity as a whole. 
Environmental issues are common to all humanity, and environmental benefits and 
burdens are shared by all. Thus, the CBD explicitly proclaims that 'the conservation of 
biological diversity is a common concern ofhumankind,.866 Such recognition does not 
impose specific rules and obligations on society as a whole, or on each individual 
member of the community, but establishes the general basis upon which the concerned 
community should act.867 
The ILC in its 1996 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts, featured harm to the environment in the list of possible crimes and 
suggested compensation for damage caused by an internationally wrongful act that 
864 Shelton, 'Common Concern', supra n 230, 83. 
865 Justice Weeramantry's separate opinion in the Gabcikovic - Nagymaros case, supra n 38, 115. 
866 Preamble of the CBD. 
867 Shelton, 'Common Concern', supra n 230, 85. 
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causes or threatens environmental damage.868 This notion of state criminality proved 
unacceptable to governments and was eventually omitted from the final draft.869 
However, arguably, the inclusion of large-scale harm to the environment as an 
example of possible criminal liability by states demonstrates the fundamentality of 
environmental interests ,to the international community. Furthermore, compensation 
claims for pollution costs have been dealt with by UNCC in the context of assessing 
Iraq's liability under internationcl law 'for any direct loss, damage - including 
environmental danlage and the depletion of natural resources ... as a result of its 
unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait' .870 
The IC] in its advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons is of the view that treaties relating to the protection of the environment could 
not deprive a state of the exercise of its right of self-defence under international law 
because of its obligations to protect the environment. Nonetheless, 
States must take environmental considerations into account when 
assessing what is necessary and proportionate in the pursuit of 
legitimate military objectives. Respect for the environment is one of 
the elements that go to assessing whether an action is in conformity 
with the principles of necessity and proportionality. 871 
868 Article 19 of the Draft articles on State Responsibility as adopted on first reading in 1996. For 
the text of the Draft articles adopted in first reading see ILC, Yearbook of the International 
Law Commission 1996, vol. II (Part 2), pp. 58-65. 
869 The 2001 Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, A/56/49(Vol. 1)/CorrA, 
A vailable at: 
<http://untreaty.un.orglilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20artic1es/9 _ 6 _ 200 I.pdf>, 
870 UN h EP, Protecting t e Environment During Armed Conflict (2009) 27. 
871 Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons, supra n 38, para. 30. 
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Indeed, this approach is also supported by the Millennium Declaration, which has 
included respect for nature as one of the fundamental values.872 By placing this 
attributed respect for nature, it recognizes the intrinsic value of the environment, and 
requires the international community to protect the 'common environment' in order to 
preserve the life-support system of the planet. 873 
The above discussion shows that the protection of the environment is a fundamental 
value of the international community, and like other fundamental values it should be 
protected through law, especially high-level norms of constitutional or international 
law. 
8.4. Striking a balance between trade and the environment 
This section proposes a series of systematic methods or techniques to resolve 
inconsistencies or tension identified between MEAs and multilateral trade agreements 
in this thesis and to improve coherence in this relationship. Sections 8.2 and 8.3 
demonstrated that, despite the fundamental significance of the protection of the 
environment, the multilateral trading system has systematically undervalued 
environmental considerations in the event of their overlap with trade concerns. 
Accordingly, this proposal for developing a coherent system of regulation of the trade 
and environmental relationship addresses approaches that will secure a better balance 
between them in the international legal order. 
In the light of the discussion of Chapter 2 and the methodology introduced in Chapter 
1, this section proposes three key approaches to balance trade and environmental 
872 See Chapter 2, section 2.5.2. 
873 Ibid. 
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considerations in the international legal order: first, harmonizing the apparently 
inconsistent nonns from the environmental and trade treaty regimes in order to reach a 
compatible obligation between them; second, prioritizing the conflicting nonns where 
it is necessary to balance the relationship; and third, an institutional approach for a 
coherent system of law. 
8.4.1. Harmonizing apparent inconsistent norms 
In the event of inconsistencies between trade and environmental nonns, an attempt 
should first be made to harmonize them. Interpretation is an established process to 
harmonize two or more apparently inconsistent nonns. Where the interpretation 
technique is insufficient in achieving this objective,874 other techniques as identified in 
Chapter 3 need to be taken into consideration: for example, amendment, modification 
or the adoption of new legislation. The following discussion focuses on methods to 
achieve a coherent and balanced system in the trade and environmental relationship by 
applying the harmonization approach. 
8.4.1.1. Re-interpretation to integration 
As discussed in section 8.2, the multilateral trading system undennines environmental 
considerations by interpreting the Article XX GAIT 'environmental exceptions' too 
narrOWly. Such interpretation does not properly reflect the objectives and purposes of 
the WTO Agreement and its annexed multilateral trade agreements. This section 
therefore proposes that to balance trade and environmental concerns more effectively 
in the international legal order, the WTO dispute settlement system must interpret the 
Article XX GAIT 'environmental exceptions' more broadly, giving effect to the 
874 See Chapter 3. 
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preambular objectives of the WTO Agreement. However, in order to achieve a 
coherent system of law it might also be necessary to consider along with specific 
treaty norms the additional norms identified in Chapter 2, which include: applicable 
external norms, fundamental trans-sectoral principles, general trans-/cross-sectoral 
meta norms, and norms deriving from political aspirations and fundamental values of 
the international community. 
(a) Broad interpretation of 'environmental exceptions' 
It was the practice under the former GATT panels to interpret Article XX exceptions 
narrowly to preserve 'the basic objectives and principles' of the GATT.875 The 
Appellate Body in US - Gasoline also suggested that the Article XX exceptions 
should not have been read so expansively that they subverted the purpose and 
objective of the GATT.876 The WTO Panel took the same view in EC - Biotech 
Products.877 But, the WTO objectives are more diverse than those of the GATT 1947 
and specifically include 'protection and preservation of the environment'. This 
permits decision-makers in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism to interpret the 
Article XX GATT exceptions in such a way as to give effect to the preambular 
objectives balancing trade and environmental concerns. This section of the chapter 
argues that to achieve this balance the WTO dispute settlement mechanism should 
look into the Article XX GATT exceptions individually, as it is not always the case 
that a narrow interpretation of exceptions protects the objective and purposes of a 
treaty. 878 
875 See chapter 3. Footnote 330. 
876 US - Gasoline, supra n 36, 18. 
877 • C For the diSCUSSIOn on E - Biotech Products case see chapter 3. 
878 See the example of the CITES exceptions. 
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For example, a broad interpretation of Article XX(b) and (g) of the GA TT might help 
to achieve the overall objectives and purposes of the WTO Agreement more 
effectively. As discussed in Chapter 3, the WTO dispute settlement system interprets 
the word 'necessary' in Article XX(b) narrowly in order to protect the fundamental 
principles of the GATT,879 thereby causing tension within the trade and environmental 
relationship. 
However, tensions within a particular treaty might be resolved by finding the ordinary 
meaning of the i n d i v i d ~ l l words when read together, and in the light of the objective 
and purposes of that individual treaty.880 For example, the tension between Articles III 
and XX of the GA TT can be resolved by giving effect to the ordinary meaning of each 
provision. The term 'necessary' used in Article XX(b) of the GATT has also occurred 
in a great many international agreements, including the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR). 
In an ordinary meaning, 'necessary' may carry a range of meanings or strengths, all 
the way from 'absolutely indispensable' down to 'corresponding to a need'. The 
European Court of Human Rights used the latter meaning for the word 'necessary' 
and held that the term 'necessary' goes beyond what is merely 'admissible', 'useful', 
'reasonable' or 'desirable', and is not synonymous with 'indispensible' .881 It implies 
that to be 'necessary', the measure in question must 'correspond to a pressing social 
need' and be 'proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued,.882 The WTO dispute 
879 Articles I and III of the GA IT. 
880 Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention. 
881 European Court of Human Rights, The Sunday Times v United Kingdom, Judgment of26 April 
1979, Series A no. 30, 35-6, para. 59. 
~ 2 2 b f I id. European Court 0 Human Rights, Silver and Others v United Kingdom, Judgment of25 
March 1983, Series. A no. 61, para. 97. 
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settlement organs should follow this practice of the ECHR, and adopt the least 
rigorous meaning of the term 'necessary' in order to interpret Article XX(b) of the 
GA TT. Such interpretation would justify a trade-restrictive unilateral measure under 
Article XX(b) of the GA TT which 'correspond[ s] to a pressing social need', is 
'proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued' and is 'not a disguised restriction on 
trade'. A broad interpretation of the word 'necessary' protects the overall objectives 
and purposes of the WTO Agreement and would also be within the context of the 
Agreement. 
However, the WTO Panel adopted the former meaning of the term 'necessary' and 
requires a measure to be 'least trade restrictive,883, and thus neither takes into account 
the ordinary meaning of 'necessary' nor reflects the preambular objectives of the WTO 
Agreement. The approach applied by the WTO dispute settlement system to determine 
whether a measure is 'necessary' requires that the 'weighing and balancing' result be 
confirmed by comparing the measure with possible alternatives, which might be less 
trade restrictive, while providing an equivalent contribution to the achievement of the 
objective pursued. 884 
However, the standard for determining what is 'necessary' should not be based on 
demonstrating that the measure in question is the 'least trade restrictive'. A trade-
restrictive measure should be accepted as 'necessary' if it is a reasonable and 
proportionate response to a proven need 'to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health' and not be 'arbitrary or unjustifiably discriminatory' towards international 
trade. As mentioned previously, the former interpretation manifests priority of trade 
883 United States - Section 337 of the Tariff Act, supra n 332 para. 5.26; Thailand - Cigarettes, 
supra n 320, 1122; Tuna I, supra n 258,839. 
884 Brazil- Retreaded Tyres, supra n 264, Appellate Body Report, para. 211. 
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interests,885 whereas the latter interpretation balances trade and environmental 
concerns. Such interpretation might justify a unilateral measure taken by a WTO 
Member in order to protect its domestic environment. 
Again, the original interpretation of another environmental exception in Article XX(g) 
'relating to '" the conservation' as meaning 'primarily aimed at conservation,886 has 
also failed to give due weight to sustainable development considerations. In US -
Shrimp, the Appellate Body took a different approach to the 'relating to' element, 
examining the relationship between the structure of the measure in question and the 
conservation objectives being sought to be achieved, and concluded that the measures 
should be 'reasonably related' to the conservation objectives.88? This broad 
interpretation of the phrase 'relating to' authorizes a WTO Member to adopt measures 
applicable to 'exhaustible natural resources' beyond its national jurisdiction. 
Regarding Article XX(d) of the GAIT, the Appellate Body made it clear that 'laws 
and regulations' refer to domestic rules and not the obligations of another WTO 
Member under an international agreement.888 Thus, the term 'laws and regulations' is 
qualified by the phrase 'not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement' ,889 i.e. 
the 'laws and regulations' referred to in Article XX(d) have to be GAIT-consistent.89o 
Yet, a broad interpretation of Article XX( d) to include other international agreements 
885 See section 8.2.1. 
886 Canada - Salmon and Herring, supra n 273, paras 4.5-4.6. In US - Gasoline, the Appellate 
Body accepted this interpretation, supra n 36, 17. 
887 US - Shrimp, supra n 105, para. 141. 
888 Mexico - Taxes on Soft Drinks, Appellate Body Report, supra n 284, para. 69. 
889 EC - Protection of Trademarks, supra n 286, para. 7.331 and EC - Protection of Trademarks 
and Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs - Complaint (US), 
Panel Report (2005), WTIDSI741R, para. 7.296. 
890 See Chapter 3, section 3.2.3.2. (a). 
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whose provIsIOns are GATT-consistent would authorize WTO Members to secure 
better compliance. 
It is apparent from the above discussion that a less restrictive interpretation of the 
Article XX GATT 'environmental exceptions' might authorize WTO Members to take 
more effective measures to protect the environment even without transcending the 
objectives and purposes of the WTO Agreement, taking into consideration relevant 
external treaty norms. 
(b) Interpreting WTO rules by reference to sources external to the Agreement 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the systemic integration objective of Article 31 (3)( c) 
acknowledges treaties as living instruments and permits the 'evolutionary 
interpretation' of a treaty norm in the light of changing values of the international 
community. 'Open and evolving' concepts, such as 'sustainable use' and the 
'precautionary approach', are included both in the MEAs and the WTO Agreements. 
Interpreting these concepts and principles only in the light of, and within the context 
of, an individual treaty might render the objective and purpose of the treaty obsolete 
or cause inconsistency with relevant rules of other treaties, customary rules or general 
principles of international law. Recognizing systemic integration as a legitimate goal 
of interpretation will help these concepts and principles to be applied coherently and 
to establish a balance between different interests. 
In EC - Biotech, the WTO Panel analysed the operation and application of its regime 
by the European Communities for the approval of biotech products and certain 
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measures adopted and maintained by EC member states prohibiting or restricting their 
marketing. 89 I In this case, the Panel accepted that the Cartagena Protocol is 
potentially relevant to the interpretation of the SPS Agreement. However, it chose not 
to explore whether the EC trade-restriction measures could be defended under the 
precautionary approach by reference to the Cartagena Protocol on the ground that all 
Parties to the latter instrument are not Parties to the SPS Agreement. The Panel made 
an oblique reference to the issue of whether non-WTO law could be applied by the 
WTO dispute settlement organs as 'applicable law between the disputing parties'. 892 
While mentioning Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention in relation to this issue, 
the Panel decided that Article 31 (3)( c) indicates that it is only those rules of 
international law which are 'applicable. in the relations between the parties' that are to 
be taken into account in interpreting a treaty.893 According to the Panel, this means 
that a WTO norm can only be interpreted by reference to a non-WTO Agreement, in 
this case the Cartagena Protocol, if all the WTO Members are Parties to that MEA. It 
found: 894 
This understanding of the term "the parties" leads logically to the view 
that the rules of international law to be taken into account in interpreting 
the WTO Agreements at issue in this dispute are those which are 
applicable in the relations between the WTO Members. 
891 EC - Biotech Products, supra n 108. 
892 b d I i ., para. 7.72. The Panel stated: 
It is important to note that the present case is not one in which relevant rules of international 
law are applicable in the relations between all parties to the dispute, but not between all WTO 
Members, and in which all parties to the dispute argue that a multilateral WTO Agreement 
should be interpreted in the light of these other rules of international law. Therefore. we need 
not, and do not, take a position on whether in such a situation we would be entitled to take the 
relevant other rules [Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention] of international law into 
account. 
893 Ibid. 
894 b I id., para. 7.68. 
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It is not clear what the Panel meant here; is it that all the Parties to the treaty under 
interpretation are required to be identical to the treaties relied upon, or only that the 
Parties to the dispute are required to be Parties to the both the treaty under 
interpretation and treaties relied upon? The former interpretation not only risks 
frustrating the purpose of Article 31 (3)( c) but is also unrealistic, because it is unlikely 
in practice that all WTO Members will be Parties to any particular MEA. A WTO 
Member that is not party to an environmental agreement does not bear the cost of 
requisite environmental protection, but would nonetheless benefit from 'the 
environmentally protective measures' that it creates; as such it would be a 'free rider 
of the system,.895 That is why the US is not a Party to the CBD or the Cartagena 
Protocol, despite being the biggest economy in the world and the largest producer of 
biotechnology goods and products. In addition, the 'parties to the WTO Agreement' 
include customs territories, which are simply unable to be Parties to MEAs,896 thus 
neutralizing the effect of Article 31(3)(c) if it is only applicable to treaties of identical 
membership. 
However, this interpretation precludes reliance upon treaties, such as the CBD, which 
have very wide, albeit not universal, acceptance in the international community. It 
also precludes reference to more specialized treaties such as the Cartagena Protocol, 
which is a protocol to the CBD, on the basis that it has not been ratified by all the 
Parties to the treaty under interpretation. 
89S Charney, supra n 99,529-30. 
896 Article XII (I) of the WTO Agreement reads 'Any State or separate customs territory 
possessing full autonomy in the conduct of its external commercial relations and of the other 
matters provided for in this Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements may accede to 
this Agreement, on terms to be agreed between it and the WTO'. 
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An all acceptable interpretation of an overlapping treaty nonn requires to be applied 
by reference to 'relevant rules of international law applicable in the relation between 
the parties'. Such rules are included in international agreements which have the 
general support of the international community. International agreements having 
nearly universal endorsement have great persuasive force as a basis for evolutionary 
interpretation, and therefore need to be taken into consideration as 'relevant rules'. 
The CBD is an almost universally endorsed agreement. Thus, interpretation of the 
WTO rules needs to take into consideration relevant rules of the CBD for subtle, 
evolutionary and policy-driven changes in its existing regime. The WTO dispute 
settlement organs can play an active role in this context by being interpreters of a 
body of fonnallegal rules. 
It is important to note that Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention provides only 
that these relevant external rules be 'taken into account', without specifying what the 
precise effect should be. To 'take into account' means to include something when 
making a decision or judgment: this provision accordingly provides an extremely 
flexible and open-ended mechanism for 'systemic integration' of treaties. It also 
applies in a wider context of a systemic vision of intemationallaw and is not restricted 
to cases of outright conflict. However, there still remains conceptual doubt as to the 
exact nature, purpose and scope of Article 31(3)(c). There is a need for further 
interpretation by the Court, as the ICJ in the Oil Platform case did not give guidance 
as to when and how Article 31(3)(c) should be applied. 
Above all, in the WTO context Article 31(3)(c) does not allow decision-makers to 
interpret rules having law-making effect, as Article 3(2) of the DSU provides that 
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'[R ]ecommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and 
obligations provided in the covered agreements'. In this way the parties have asserted 
their own competence to interpret WTO Agreements, 'thereby prioritizing their own 
political determinations over potential judicial decisions' .897 Furthermore, Article 
31 (3)( c) requires that a treaty be i ~ t e r p r e t e d d in the light of other rules of international 
law applicable to states' parties to that treaty, and thereby ensures or enhances the 
consistency of the rules of international law and contributes to the avoidance of 
conflict between them. 
It might be overly hopeful to consider such references as a sign that '[n]o longer can 
trade disputes be settled on the basis of trade rules alone'. 898 External rules of 
international environmental law have, so far, only been applied as factors guiding the 
interpretation of precepts within the trading system, such as Article XX(b) and (g) of 
the GATT. But mere mention of existing environmental arrangements is hardly 
evidence for the independent and equal consideration of international law beyond the 
agreements on free trade. 899 
(c) Harmonizing divergent standards 
As pointed out in Chapters 6 and 7, the precautionary language of the Cartagena 
Protocol and CBD is different from, though not necessarily incompatible with, that of 
the SPS Agreement. The Cartagena Protocol and the SPS Agreement have adopted 
two different formulations of the same precautionary approach. Since these different 
formulations are not inherently conflicting, they should to the greatest extent possible 
897 Boy\e and Chinkin, The Making of International Law, supra n 34, 275. 
898 Mark Halle, 'Trade and Environment: Looking Beneath the Sands of Doha?' (2006) 3 JEEPL 
107 at 115. 
899 Lindroos and Mehling, 'From Autonomy to Integration?' supra n 21, 264. 
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be interpreted to give rise to a set of compatible obligations. Such interpretation may 
require the interpreter of a treaty to take into account 'any relevant rules of 
international law applicable in relation between the parties'. 
In EC - Biotech, the Panel's interpretation of 'applicable in the relations between the 
parties' is based on the classical concept of state sovereignty and a state's voluntary 
consent to be governed by international law. The Panel did not consider the 
contemporary development of the concept of state sovereignty, especially in 
conservation agreements.900 In these agreements, states no longer have unfettered 
freedom over their natural resources. Instead, while exercising such right, they have to 
take into account the legitimate concerns of the community of states with regard to the 
preservation of these resources.901 In addition, as mentioned above, it is unlikely that 
environmental and trade agreements will ever have identical members. Therefore, 
treaties like the Cartagena Protocol, which has nearly universal membership, should 
be considered as a relevant rule while interpreting the SPS Agreement. 
As pointed out by President Higgins in the Oil Platform case, in applying Article 
31(3)(c) the court should consider the context of the treaty. The Protocol and the SPS 
Agreement both contain rules that govern the international trade in LMOs. The context 
of the Cartagena Protocol is not only relevant to the SPS Agreement but is also more 
specific, i.e. lex specialis. This means that the Cartagena Protocol may well be used 
to clarify the rules of the SPS Agreement. Therefore, the Panel in EC - Biolech could 
have interpreted the SPS Agreement's precautionary approach by reference to the 
approach adopted in the Cartagena Protocol. Such interpretation would not go against 
900 Handl, 'Environmental Security and Global Challenge'. supra n 205, 31. 
901 Bilderbeek, Wijgerde et aI., Biodiversity and International Law: The Effectiveness of 
International Environmental Law (lOS Press, 1992) 87. 
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the context of the SPS Agreement, as the preamble of the WTO Agreement has stated 
that 'sustainable development' and 'protection and preservation of the environment' 
are its objectives. 
In addition, such an interpretation would serve to balance both trade and 
environmental interests, as the precautionary approach has been developed 
considerably under the Cartagena Protocol. The Protocol considers 'socio-economic' 
conditions, i.e. non-scientific factors, especially the value of indigenous people, while 
assessing the risk of importing an LMO. In recent scientific development, a dynamic 
'sustainability science' approach is emerging which encompasses scientific, legal, 
economic and other disciplinary understanding and knowledge.902 This approach is 
gaining acceptability, as recognized in Principle 6 of the CBD's Addis Abba 
Principles, and reflected in the IUCN's 2004 Report on GMOs and Biosafety.903 By 
incorporating socio-economic considerations in the making of import decisions, 
Article 26 also acknowledges the limitation of traditional scientific inquiry, and opens 
the door for the Parties to apply 'sustainability science' to import decisions. The 
precautionary approach adopted under the Protocol reflects the changing social values 
and developments in international law in this approach and establishes an appropriate 
balance between trade and environmental concerns. 
The precautionary principle provides critical interpretative guidance for decision-
makers in cases where scientific uncertainty is a prominent factor in addressing 
invasive alien species risks. In EC - Hormones, the Appellate Body pointed out that 
902 See Bimie et aI., supra n 11, 646. 
903 Addis Ababa Principles and Guidelines for the Sustainable Use of Biodiversity was adopted at 
the 7th Conference of the Parties to the CBD in 2004. IUCN-WCU, 'Genetically Modified 
Organisms and Biosafety: A Background Paper for Decision-Makers and Others to Assist in 
Consideration ofGMO Issue' (Gland, 2004) 5. 
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the precautionary principle provides a common-sense model of decision-making in 
framing SPS measures:904 
[a] panel charged with determining, for instance, whether "sufficient 
scientific evidence" exists to warrant the maintenance by a Member of a 
particular SPS measure may, of course, and should, bear in mind that 
responsible, representative governments commonly act from 
perspectives of prudence and precaution ... 
The precautionary principle is directly embodied in key components of WTO 
Agreements. For example, the Appellate Body has pointed out that the precautionary 
principle is reflected in the right of members, under Article 3(3) of the SPS 
Agreement, to determine that an appropriate level of protection may be higher (i.e. 
more cautious) than provided for by international standards.905 
Merely pointing out that the precautionary principle cannot override specific SPS 
obligations,906 such as the need to prepare a risk assessment, does not limit its guiding 
role in its elaboration. Although undoubtedly the precautionary principle has not been 
written as an 'exception' to SPS disciplines, it may nevertheless be relevant if a 
conflict of norms arises.907 Likewise, it is not problematic that the precautionary 
principle cannot itself trump principles of treaty interpretation. The precautionary 
principle itself informs the context and other aspects of treaty interpretation, and for 
this reason it is highly relevant to the interpretation of WTO law. Thus, since scientific 
uncertainty is often a looming presence in the invasive alien species setting, the 
904 EC - Hormones, supra n 163, para. VI. 
90S Ibid. 
906 Ibid., para. n. 
907 Ibid. 
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precautionary principle has a prominent role in guiding decision-makers to appropriate 
outcomes. 
Another environmental standard that might come into conflict with multilateral trade 
agreement is eco-Iabelling. The labelling standards set up in the TBT Agreement are 
apparently inconsistent with those of the CBD and the Biosafety Protocol. The WTO 
Panel in US - Tuna (Mexico) 11 decided that labelling regulations should not be 'more 
trade-restrictive than necessary' to fulfil a legitimate objective.908 But, the Panel 
adopted a very broad interpretation of 'legitimate objective', and decided that to be 
'legitimate' a trade-restrictive measure is required to be part of wider conservation 
measures.
909 An interpretation of the phrase 'legitimate objectives' reflects the 
preamble of the TBT Agreement, which authorizes Members to decide for themselves 
which legitimate objectives to pursue and to take measures to meet those objectives 
'at the levels [they consider] appropriate'. thereby better balancing trade and 
environmental concerns. 
Furthermore, the WTO Panel in US - Tuna (Mexico) II have interpreted Article 2(2) 
of the TBT Agreement to include PPMs as part of the labelling requirement91O, since 
PPMs are not disguised restrictions to trade but established ways to protect the 
environment. 
8.4.1.2. Amending the WTO Agreement 
The other way to harmonize inconsistent norms from different sectors is to amend the 
treaty to change its substantive provisions. As discussed in Chapter 3, the WTO 
908 US - Tuna 11 (Mexico), supra n 322, para. 4.95. 
909 Ibid., para. 4.90. 
910 u.s 
- Tuna 11 (Mexico), supra n 322, para. 7.372. 
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Agreement does not contain any specific conflict clause. It could, however, follow the 
NAFTA example. Article 104 of the NAFTA expressly permits the use of trade 
measures to pursue extraterritorial environmental goals, where such measures have 
been authorized by an international environmental agreement and the NAFT A Parties 
have agreed that the trade obligations of such an agreement are to prevail over 
inconsistent NAFT A obligations. 
NAFTA Article 104(1) does apply the same 'least trade-restrictive' test as WTO 
dispute settlement mechanisms to the implementation of environmental policies.911 
Nevertheless, Article 104 represents a codification of what the likely outcome would 
be if any of the listed agreements were challenged before a WTO Panel. Article 104 
implies that, where there is a conflict between trade obligations under NAFTA and 
environmental obligations under other agreements, the NAFT A obligations prevail 
unless the competing agreement is listed in Article 104 or Annex 1 04( 1 ). 
The NAFT A adopts a consensual approach to environmental protection which could 
refine or redefine the relationship between MEAs and multilateral trade agreements. 
The WTO Agreement could add a conflict clause by identifying a number of MEAs 
with whom its provisions frequently overlap, agreeing that they will trump the WTO 
Agreement and its annexed agreements in the case of disharmony. However, such a 
conflicts clause may ultimately be inappropriate for the GA IT, or other WTO 
Agreements. In the case of NAFT A, its Parties are all signatories to these agreements, 
and much of the WTO controversy is over disputes between Parties and non-Parties. 
911 C ondon, supra n 25, 559. 
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8.4.1.3. Modification of apparent inconsistent norm 
As discussed in Chapter 2, Article 41 of t h ~ ~ Vienna Convention permits two or more 
Parties to a multilateral treaty to conclude an inter se agreement to modify an earlier 
treaty between themselves. Such agreements are treated as subsequent agreements and 
form part of the treaty context. For the purposes of interpreting a treaty, 'any 
instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion 
of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty' 
also comprises the treaty context, in addition to the treaty text itself.912 In other words, 
where a state has made a reservation on 'signing, ratifying ... or acceding to' a 
multilateral treaty, such instruments also fonn part of the context of the treaty. 
In addition, Article 31 (3)(a) of the Vienna Convention provides that together with the 
context, the interpreter shall take into account any subsequent agreement between the 
Parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions. 
This provision allows the Parties to modify the treaty and permits the COP to an MEA 
to adopt an authoritative interpretation of the treaty terms, which can amount in effect 
to an amendment. Most modern multilateral treaties have a formal amending 
procedure, but this process can be lengthy and uncertain. Yet, a subsequent agreement 
may modify the original treaty by inserting a new rule or amending an existing one 
without going through a formal ratification process.913 This technique is particularly 
useful if there is a need to 'fill a lacuna, to update a term, or postpone the operation of 
a provision' .914 For example, despite having a built-in amendment procedure, CITES 
was effectively modified by a resolution of the COP in 1987.915 Resolution Conf. 6.7, 
912 Article 3 1 (2)(b) of the Vienna Convention. 
913 Any amendment is subject to ratification. 
914 Aust, supra n 39, 241. 
915 CITESConfResolution 6.7. 
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adopted at the sixth meeting of the CITES-COP, required Parties to consult with a 
range of states prior to taking stricter domestic measures pursuant to Article XIV that 
might interfere with the trade in wild animals and plants. But such subsequent 
agreements have limited scope, as (strictly) they have to be consistent with the treaty 
context and are only designed to resolve inconsistencies within a treaty. 
Harmonization is only possible where the norms are divergent but compatible. Two or 
more treaties dealing with the same subject matter from different points of view do not 
necessarily create outright inconsistencies, although they may do. An interpretative 
approach alone cannot resolve true conflicts of norms of international law. It may, 
however, be part of a wider set of approaches which can resolve treaty inconsistencies 
by choosing between two rival norms. 
8.4.2. Prioritizing environmental protection 
Two norms addressing the same subject matter are in conflict where compliance with, 
or the exercise of, rights under one of the two norms constitutes a breach under the 
other norm.916 Where the overlapping norms from two different treaties are directly 
incompatible and it is not possible for a state which is a Party to both treaties 
simultaneously to comply with its respective sets of obligations, it becomes necessary 
to make a choice determining priority between the treaties in question. 
Such inter-relationship of treaties is first and foremost determined by the terms of 
those treaties.917 If neither treaty contains any provision governing its relationship 
with other treaties or such provisions are not adequate to provide any solution, the 
916 Pauwelyn, supra nIl, 274. 
917 Article 30(2) of the Vienna Convention. 
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various rules or techniques provided in the Vienna Convention need to be taken into 
consideration. The following discussion considers the extent to which specific 
provisions detennine the relationship between treaties: in particular, the rules of the 
Vienna Convention and the principles of international law may be applied to directly 
incompatible nonns, identified in environmental and trade agreements in order to 
detennine priority between them. 
8.4.2.1. Treaty provisions determining relationship with other agreements 
Treaty conflict clauses describe how their relationship with other treaties will be 
regulated where both treaties deal with the same subject matter. CITES (Article XIV), 
the CBD (Article 22), the Nagoya Protocol (Article 4) and the Biosafety Protocol 
(Preamble) all contain provisions governing their relationship with other treaties. The 
preamble of the WTO Agreement reflects assumptions about the interrelationship 
between trade and the environment, though neither the 1947/1994 GATT nor the WTO 
Agreement itself contains any specific provision governing its relationship with non-
WTO treaties.918 
(a) CBD and the Nagoya Protocol conOict clauses 
As discussed in Chapter 6, Article 22(1) of the CBD and Article 4 of the Nagoya 
Protocol do not subvert the Parties' rights and obligations deriving from other 
international agreements, but limit its application by reference to the condition that 
their exercise should not damage or threaten biodiversity. These conflict clauses could 
be interpreted in such a way that the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol provisions do not 
gain priority over other international agreements ordinarily, including the multilateral 
918 This controversial omission is seen as the reflection of the self-contained character of the WTO 
law. For the argument why WTO is not a 'self-contained' regime, see Pauwelyn, supra n 11, 
35-40. 
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trade agreements, but whenever the 'exercise of those rights' would have the 
possibility to ' c a u s ~ ~ serious damage. or threat to biodiversity' the CBD and the Nagoya 
Protocol p r o v i s i ~ n s s gain priority. 
The above interpretation of the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol conflict clauses would 
have a definite beneficial effect on the protection of the environment. Arguably, such 
interpretation would also be c o n s i ~ t e n t t with the WTO Agreement, as the preamble to 
the latter recognizes that trade should 'protect and preserve the environment' in a 
manner consistent with M e m b e r s ~ ~ different levels of economic development. The 
WTO . has also recognized that not only is there no inherent policy contradiction 
between an open, equitable and non-discriminatory multilateral trading system and the 
protection of the environment, but also that sustainable development positively 
requires the two systems to be mutually supportive.919 
Specifically, in paragraph 6 of the Doha Mandate, WTO Members noted that 'the 
aims of upholding and safeguarding an open and non-discriminatory multilateral 
trading system, and acting for the protection of the environment and the promotion of 
sustainable development can and must be mutually supportive'. This objective is also 
reflected in WTO's Director-General Pascal Lamy's speech on World Environment 
Day, that the WTO 'cannot proceed with business as usual - if our planet is to be 
preserved for future generations, we must protect our resources, our planet's 
biodiversity and our environment at large' .920 Therefore, although the CBD and the 
Nagoya Protocol conflict clauses do not claim hierarchy over the trade rules 
919 S Co ee, lor example, the Declaration of the Doha Ministerial Conference, 20 November 200 I, 
WT/MIN(OI)/DEC/l and the CTE Singapore Report. 
920 On the occasion of World Environment Day on 5 June 2010, 
http://www.wto.org/englishinews_e/newsIO_e/dgpl_05junlO_e.htm. 
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specifically, they should be interpreted as giving priority to environmental concerns 
over trade. 
(b) The preamble of the Biosafety Protocol 
As discussed in Chapter 7, the conflict clause of the Cartagena Protocol does not 
appear incompatible with those of the WTO Agreements,921 but its second and third 
conflict clauses are apparently so. It starts with the aspiration that trade and 
environmental policies and agreements should support each other, and proceeds to 
achieve the goal that the Protocol provisions do not hinder the Contracting Parties' 
obligations under any international agreement to which they are also Party. The third 
paragraph clarifies that although the Protocol does not change the Parties' rights and 
obligations under earlier agreements, it is also not intended to subordinate the Protocol 
to other international agreements. 
However, to ensure 'an adequate level of protection in the field of the safe transfer, 
handling and use or LMOs 'that may have adverse effects on the conservation and 
sustainable use of biological diversity, taking also into account risks to human 
health' ,922 the Protocol not only authorizes national and regional governments to 
impose restrictions on the movement and use of LMOs, but also permits them to take 
measures that are more protective of the conservation and sustainable use of biological 
diversity than those called for in the Protocol itself.923 In addition, the socio-economic 
impact of LMOs on hiodiversity, especially their value to indigenous and local 
921 Steve Chamovitz, 'The Supervision of Health and Biosafety Regulation of World Trade Rules' 
(2000) 13 Tulane ELJ 271 at 300 (stating that the Biosafety Protocnl appears compatible with 
the SPS Agreement); Gaston and Abate, 'The Biosafety Protocol and the World Trade 
Organization' supra n 705, 109 (concluding that trade measures contained in the Biosafety 
Protocol are compatible with WTO principles). 
922 Articles 2(1), (2) and I of the Protocol. 
923 Ibid., Article 2(4). 
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communities, may also be taken into account by Parties when taking any decision to 
permit the import of LMOs.924 In both instances, such measures are generally 
considered to be consistent both with the Protocol and with a Party's other obligations 
under international law, for example, international trade obligations. 
However, the discussion in Chapter 7 on Articles 2(4), 10(6), 11(8) and 26 of the 
Protocol reveals that Contracting Parties are permitted to take measures which can in 
fact be inconsistent with their obligations under other international agreements, 
especially with the multilateral trade agreements. As discussed earlier, Article 2(4) of 
the Protocol permits Parties to take action that is more protective than that called for 
in the Protocol, but clarifies that the application of this right needs to be 'in 
accordance' with Parties' other obligations under international law. This provision 
appears to guard against the adoption of unilateral discriminatory trade measures that 
contravene the multilateral trade agreements. However, Article 26( 1) of the Protocol 
undermines this trade protection reference by authorizing Parties to take into account 
socio-economic considerations while taking decisions on import permission ofLMOs. 
The Protocol's primary objective is not to encourage or expand the trade in LMOs but 
to ensure biosafety. The Protocol permits international trade of LMOs only to the 
extent that it is consistent with the rules, standards and norms of the Protocol and its 
parent convention, the CBD. Thus, although the Protocol's preamble and operative 
texts restate the mutual supportiveness of trade and environmental agreements, the 
Protocol's broad precautionary approach, non-party obligations and its liability and 
redress regime have the potential to slow or stop the flow of trade in LMOs. 
924 Ibid., Article 26(1). 
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(c) Article XIV of the CITES 
As discussed in Chapter 5, Article XIV of the CITES also contains provIsions 
governing its relationship with other agreements. Among these provisions, Article 
XIV(2) contains a broad statement clarifying the limits of the legal requirements in the 
CITES in the face of other domestic ,or international obligations: 
[T]he provisions of the present Convention shall in no way affect the 
provisions of any domestic measures or the obligations of Parties deriving 
from any treaty, convention, or international agreement ... 
This Article clarifies the point that the existence of a CITES permit system would not 
affect Parties' obligations arising from other domestic measures or international 
agreements. However, trade-restrictive measures taken by CITES Parties in the 
implementation of the power to create 'stricter domestic measures' and non-Party 
obligations have the potential to clash with multilateral trade agreements. CITES is not 
a self-executing treaty and its implementation requires domestic action by Contracting 
Parties. MEAs apply specific trade obligations to non-Parties' obligations. They can 
do so in two ways. The first is to apply the same measure to a non-Party as the MEA 
applies to a Party (as in the case of CITES), and the second is to apply a 
discriminatory measure against the non_Party.925 Both aspects are controversial within 
the WTO. 
Article VIII( 1) of the CITES contains the key provisions for its implementation, 
providing that '[T]he Parties shall take appropriate measures to enforce the provisions 
of the present Convention and to prohibit trade in specimens in violation thereof. 
92S Charnovitz, 'A New WTO Paradigm' supran 302, 33. 
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Furthermore, CITES Parties are not limited to adopting 'appropriate measures', and 
Article XIV (a) of the CITES provides Parties with the right to take 'stricter domestic 
measures' restricting or prohibiting trade in specimens of species included in the 
Appendices. It is important to remember that CITES applies the term 'trade' in a much 
broader sense than just buying and selling,926 effectively embracing the international 
movement of any specimens of species. 
Thus, the application of 'stricter domestic measures,927 by CITES Parties raIses 
questions over the compatibility of CITES provisions with the GA TTIWTO 
Agreements.928 Such measures may include unilateral action by CITES Parties, which 
could lead to discrimination in trade. Article 1 of GATT 1994 requires the WTO 
Members to treat 'like' products at the border in the same way, irrespective of their 
origin or method of production. However, the stricter domestic measures allow CITES 
Parties to adopt new requirements in national legislation for trade, which could 
discriminate between like products based on their origin or method of production once 
the products are within the territory of a WTO Member. 
Hence, it seems that although most of the treaties incorporate provisions regarding 
their relationship with other treaties, they do not really establish any clear hierarchy 
between them. Therefore, these provisions are of little help in resolving 
incompatibility between successive treaties. 
926 See Chapter 5 for discussion on how CITES defines trade. 
927 Ibid., for discussion on 'stricter domestic measures'. 
928 Environmental Resources Management, Study on How to Improve the Effectiveness of CITES 
(ERM, London 1996). 
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8.4.2.2. Priorities of environmental norms 
From the discussion of this thesis it is plausible to claim that protection ofbiodiversity 
has achieved a special status in international law. The definition and characteristics of 
jus cogens discussed in Chapter 3 could, in theory, be applied to the notion of 
environmental protection, though there is no real evidence in international law as yet 
to show that protection of the environment has actually achieved the status of jus 
cogens.929 However, considering the special status of the protection of the 
environment in international law, this section more modestly argues that in the event 
of conflict between trade and environmental norms, an environmental norm should 
normally be given priority over a trade norm where the application of the trade norm 
would seriously threaten environmental interests. 
A number of overlapping MEA and multilateral trade agreement norms might be 
resolved by giving priority to lex specia/is environmental treaty norms over lex 
generalis rules of the multilateral trade agreements. Furthermore, lex speciaUs may 
take precedence over lex generalis regardless of its priority in time. As regards 
temporal priority, Article 30(3) of the Vienna Convention provides that when not 
terminated under Article 59 of the Vienna Convention, 'the earlier treaty applies only 
to the extent that its provisions are compatible with those of the later treaty'. 
However, as discussed in Chapter 2, it is not permissible that an environmental 
agreement, making specific provision for trade restrictions, would displace the more 
general rules of the GATTIWTO Agreements.930 It is a matter of treaty interpretation, 
and in any event, the Parties for the two treaties arguably need to be the same. Thus, 
929 F furt or her discussion see Chapter 2, section 2.3.1.1. 
930 For example, the 1973 CITES, the 1987 Ozon Protocol and the 1989 Basel Convention. 
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simply by staying out of the environmental agreements, for example the CBD or the 
Biosafety Protocol, any WTO Member can ensure that it retains its trade rights under 
the multilateral trade agreements regardless of the lex specialis character of 
environmental agreements. 
8.4.2.3. Trade institutions prioritizing environmental norms 
Another way of achieving the suggested systemic priority of environmental protection 
over trade is through some internal action taken by the WTO and other trade 
institutions. In this context, the CTE and ITTO could play a positive role. However, 
such potential seems largely unrealistic at present, even though the trade institutions 
should take sustainable development principles more seriously. Moreover, it is 
unlikely that trade institutions would recognize themselves as formally subordinate to 
the environment, especially when they already have the upper hand in this 
relationship. 
Thus, the following sections argue that a radical change of outlook seems to be 
required in order to balance the trade and environmental concerns in the international 
law. It proposes that the treaty institution could play a more active role in innovating 
ways to establish collaboration between both sectors' institutions in order to advance a 
coherent system between them. 
8.4.3. Institutional innovation 
In order to achieve a more coherent relationship between trade and environmental 
concerns, this section considers the use of institutional innovation to amend. 
reconstruct or replace specific treaty norms to more faithfully reflect the political 
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aspirations and basic values of the international community. It is obvious that a 
reconstruction of this sort requires a great deal of effort or commitment from 
governments, as it involves legislative reform. Consequently, it is better used only as a 
last resort. 
With that in mind, this section proposes to begin with the easiest but most effective 
types of coordination, and only to move on to more complex processes where essential 
to achieve the desired reform. A useful first step would involve treaty institutions 
collaborating with others of their kind to exercise their powers in such a way as to 
enhance the systemic integration of different bodies of law. MEAs and the multilateral 
trade agreements discussed in this thesis contain provisions allowing such 
collaboration between treaty institutions.931 
8.4.3.1. Bilateral coordination 
The coordination between the CBD and the CITES Secretariats is a good example of 
bilateral coordination. As the vast majority of CITES Parties are Parties to the CBD, 
CITES has acquired enormous help from the CBD in integrating sustainable 
development principles into its procedures. For example, the Secretariats of CITES 
and the CBD have signed a Memorandum of Understanding which provides for 
institutional cooperation between the two Secretariats, the exchange of information, 
coordination of work programmes and joint conservation action.932 Therefore, the 
CBD and its Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice 
(SBSTT A) are working on case studies to test the Sustainable Use Principles and 
931 
932 
For example, the preamble of the Biosafety Protocol and Article \5(5) of the CBD. 
Article 4 of the 'Memorandum of Understanding between the Secretariat and the Secretariat of 
the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
(CITES)' UNEP/CBDICoP/3/Inf.39 (\5 Oct. 1996) 
312 
Guidelines. This cooperation between CITES and CBD facilitates the effective 
implementation of sustainable development goals in order to achieve the balance 
between progressive economic development and the conservation of wildlife for 
future generations.933 
Another example is the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the CITES 
Secretariat and FAO. When the CITES-COP included certain commercially exploited 
marine species within its framework, it did not have the data or technical expertise on 
marine species to prove scientifically that such species are endangered - but the FAO 
does. As a result, the two institutions have formed a 'Memorandum of Understanding' 
on joint work programmes. 
But such MoUs can be politically controversial, take a long time to develop934 and 
need adequate resources as they expand the policy area covered by particular 
agreements. For example, some of the major fishing states have argued that CITES has 
no mandate to deal with fisheries, and that any role for the CITES would constitute an 
incursion on the jurisdiction of the FAO. 
8.4.3.2. Broader intra-sectoral collaboration 
Institutional collaboration between treaties from within the same sector and addressing 
similar subject matter can enhance coherence and cooperation in implementation. For 
example, a Liaison Group of Biodiversity-related Conventions (BLG) has been 
established between the heads of the Secretariats of the six biodiversity-related 
933 0 
ng, 'The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES, 1973)" supra n 
490,292. 
934 h T e development of the MOU took over three years of FAO and CITES meetings. 
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conventions.935 This Group plays an important role in exploring options for enhancing 
synergies, avoiding duplication of efforts and improving the coherent implementation 
of biodiversity-related conventions. 
The BLG has developed an interactive CD-ROM on the application of the Addis 
Ababa Principles and Guidelines (AAPG) for the Sustainable Use of Biodiversily. 936 It 
explains the AAPG and their relevance in the context of each of the biodiversity-
related conventions. In addition to providing information on the application of the 
AAPG, it contains the full text of the principles and guidelines, relevant decisions, 
recommendations and resolutions, background documents, as well as other materials. 
including links to relevant websites. This joint collaboration between the biodiversity-
related conventions leads to the consistent application of treaty provisions. 
8.4.3.3. MoUs between treaty institutions from different sectors 
A Memorandam of Understanding concluded between treaty Secretariats may 
similarly define the relationship between treaties from different sectors. For example, 
the 2006 lIT A recognizes the importance of cooperation and coordination between the 
ITTA and other organizations to pursue its conservation and sustainable use objectives. 
Recently, the ITTO and the Secretariat of the eBD signed a MoU with the objective of 
developing and implementing joint activities for the conservation and sustainable use 
935 COP 7 Decision VIII26. In response to a call from the Conference of the Parties (Decision 
IXl27) of the CBD to enhance cooperation among the five biodiversity-related conventions the 
Liaison Group of the Biodiversity-Related Conventions ('the Biodiversity Liaison Group', 
BLG) was formed in June 2004. This group brings together the heads of the Secretariats of the 
five biodiversity-related conventions, namely: CBD; CITES; Convention on Migratory Species 
of Wild Animals (CMS); Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International Importance 
especially as Waterfowl Habitat (Ramsar); and Convention concerning the Protection of World 
Cultural and Natural Heritage (WHC). The BLG meets regularly to explore opportunities for 
synergistic activities and increased coordination, as well as to exchange information. 
936 Th e CD content is available to down load from <http://www.cbd.intlblgl>. 
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of forest biodiversity in the tropics.937 The MoU is ,aimed at facilitating the 
implementation of the ITTQ Work Program and Action Plan as well as the CBD 
programme of work on forest biodiversity.938 The MoU is designed for a timeframe of 
at least four years, and identifies activities on forests and biodiversity between the 
ITTO and CBD with the involvement of other relevant organizations. 
The COP has recognized CITES' role in promoting the conservation of timber species 
through trade, and welcomes the increase in cooperation between CITES and ITTO. 
The CITES-COP has recognized that Cn'ES can play a positive role in promoting the 
conservation ~ f f animals cmd plants, including timber species, through trade in 
accordance with the requirements of Articles Ill, IV and V of the Convention and 
through improving trade monitoring for evaluation of biological status and effective 
enforcement.939 Therefore, it has directed the CITES Secretariat to cooperate closely 
with the Secretariat of the IITO on matters related to tropical timber species 
threatened by international trade and the sustainable management of tropical timber 
producing forests. 94o The ITTO's collaboration with the CBD and CITES enhances 
consistent application of their rules, as these MEAs have a single standard for 
'sustainable use' of biological resources since they follow the standards of the Addis 
Ababa Principles. 
The CITES' Secretariat is to report at the 15th meeting of the COP on those 
discussions and on the progress made in implementing the MoU between FAO and the 
937 D ' 
urmg a Special Event on Biodiversity on Tuesday, 2 March 2010 in Tokyo. 
938 • I AttiC e 2 of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Secretariat of the International 
Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO) and the Secretariat of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD) (2010-14). 
939 CITES Conf. Resolution 10.13 (9-20 June 1997). 
940 • ResolutIOns of the Conference of the Parties 14.4, 14th meeting of COP (3-\5 June 2007). 
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CITES Secretariat.941 As discussed in Chapter 6, the collaboration between the CBD 
Secretariat and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) is in progress to 
adopt a MoU. However, such collaboration is not possible if the treaty institutions are 
not granted observer status in each other's meetings. 
8.4.3.4. Reciprocal cooperation 
This objective was recognized in the Plan of Implementation of the 2002 World 
Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg, which calls for efforts 
to 'strengthen cooperation among UNEP and other United Nations bodies and 
specialized agencies, the Bretton Woods institutions and WTO, within their 
mandates' .942 As mentioned earlier, in paragraph 31 (ii) of the Doha Ministerial 
Declaration (DMD), Ministers also agreed to negotiations on 'procedures for regular 
information exchange between MEA Secretariats and the relevant WTO committees, 
and the criteria for the granting of observer status' .943 In the Preamble of the DMD. 
Ministers welcomed 'the WTO's continued cooperation with UNEP and other inter-
governmental environmental organizations. [They encouraged] efforts to promote 
cooperation between the WTO and relevant international environmental and 
developmental organizations, especially in the lead-up to the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development to be held in Johannesburg ... ,944 
On 29 November 1999, a cooperation arrangement between the WTO and UNEP 
Secretariats was concluded to improve efforts towards the objective of sustainable 
development. This cooperation between the WTO and UNEP Secretariats aims to 
941 Decision 14.17 of the CITES-COP. 
942 Supra n 198. 
943 Supra n 15. 
944 Ibid. 
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encompass practical measures which could assist in the smooth and efficient 
functioning of both organizations in areas where interaction could be of mutual 
benefit. 945 The goal is to improve the working relationship at all levels in the two 
Secretariats, with respect to technical cooperation and research initiatives. 
The WTO Secretariat is an observer of the Governing Council ofUNEP, and UNEP is 
an observer of the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment. Such collaboration 
between UNEP and the WTO secretariats enables them to exchange relevant non-
confidential information, including access to trade-related environmental databases. 
and reciprocal representation at meetings of a non-confidential nature, in accordance 
with the decisions of the competent bodies of the respective organizations.946 
With a view to enhancing coordination between the provisions of the CBD and those 
of the relevant bodies of the WTO, especially the TRIPS Agreement, the TBT 
Agreement and the SPS Agreement, the CBD-COP has stressed the need to ensure 
mutual supportiveness of the two systems.947 Hence, the CBD-COP requested the 
Executive Secretary to apply to the WTO for observer status in the meetings of the 
Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures and the Committee on Technical 
Barriers to Trade, and also to renew its application for observer status in the Council 
for the Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.948 
Yet, the CBD Secretariat has still not been granted observer status in the TRIPS 
Council on account of continued opposition from the US. The US argues that the CBD 
945 WTO CTESS, 'Existing Forms of Cooperation and Information Exchange between UNEP/MEA 
and the WTO' (16 January 2007) TNITE/S/2/Rev.2. Available at: 
<http://www.wto.orglenglish/tratop_e/envir_e/envir_neg_mea_e.htm> (accessed on 14 February 
2012) 
946 Ibid. 
947 CBD-COP Decisions 111117, IVI15, V/26 B, V1/20, VIl/26, Villi 1 6, X1/27. 
948 CBD-COP Decision V1/20, paras 29 and 30, the Netherlands (2002). 
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does not have a broad interest in TRIPS issues. The EU, Peru, Brazil and India, 
however, have pointed out that the CBD Secretariat should be an observer given that 
the Doha mandate explicitly instructs the TRIPS Council to look at the relationship 
between TRIPS and CBD.949 The CBD-COP, in its ninth meeting, in Germany in 
2008, further requested the Executive Secretary to renew the Convention's pending 
applications for observer status in relevant bodies of the WTO.95o This restrictive 
attitude leads to a lack of understanding and is likely to affect the rules adopted by the 
WTO. It can also affect other regimes of international law dealing with the same 
subject matter. 
By contrast, most MEAs have permitted lOOs, NOOs and 'epistemic communities' to 
participate both in their treaty negotiation process and in their institutional decision-
making process later on. Once again, more effort is needed in the multilateral trade 
regime, as the WTO Agreements leave external bodies out of the negotiations, whether 
as participants or observers. In addition, its process for granting observer status is 
highly political and self-serving, which is why in the negotiation of measures 
prohibiting subsidies to the fishing sector, none of the environmental treaty bodies 
was invited. Instead, a coalition of WTO Members has grouped together in the 
negotiations with the self-appointed label of' Friends of the Fish' .951 
949 h . T e US contInues to oppose granting observer status to the Secretariat of the CBD. arguing that 
the CBD did not have a broad interest in TRIPS issues. The EU, Peru, Brazil and India, 
however, pointed out that the CBD Secretariat should be an observer given that the Doha 
mandate explicitly instructs the TRIPS Council to look at the relationship between TRIPS and 
CBD. Available at <http://ictsd.netlillibrary/392141> (accessed on 15.05.09). 
950 CBD-COP Decision IXl27. para. 10. 
951 F . Young,' ragmentatlon or Interaction', supra n 657, 490-1. 
318 
8.4.3.5. Development of liaison groups 
Another technique to pursue inter-institutional coordination is to follow the model of 
the existing liaison groups already operative within a certain field, for example, the 
CTE and WIPO and WTO liaison group. The GATT Contracting Parties adopted a 
Ministerial Decision to establish the WTO CTE. The major task of this committee is 
to examine the relationship between the WTO Agreement and MEAs. Although the 
CTE has so far failed to formulate concrete recommendations for reconciling this 
relationship, its report to the WTO Ministerial Conference952 may provide a 
foundation for future progress through its confirmation of the need for transparency 
and cooperation, and the determination to accommodate environment values in trade 
fora.953 Since the ITTA preamble refers to various conservation agreements in 
connection with its sustainable use objective, it could observe the BLG for guidance 
on interpreting relevant rules and thereby establish a better balance in its application. 
There is no doubt that such coordination can in principle be achieved. For example, to 
facilitate the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement, the TRIPS Council concluded 
with WIPO an agreement on cooperation between WIPO and the WTO,954 which 
could serve as a model for the governance of other linkage areas. Another example is 
the Liaison Group of Biodiversity-related Conventions referred to above, which 
ensures coordination among the biodiversity-related Conventions. These liaison 
groups can serve as a model to establish a complementary and cooperative 
9S2 Th 
e first WTO Ministerial Conference, which was held in Singapore in December 1996. 9S3 
9S4 
WTO Doe. WT/CTE/I (1996). 
'Agreement between the World Intellectual Property Organisation and the World Trade 
Organisation (1995) of 22 Dec. 1995' - Communication from the International Bureau of the 
WIPO and WTO Secretariat. The agreement entered into force on I January 2006. The text is 
available at 
<www. wipo.intlexportlsites/www/treaties/enlagreementlpdf/trtdocs _ wo030.pdf>. 
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relationship between MEAs and trade agreements, by fostering, for example. a 
consistent and coordinated approach to interpretation. 
From the perspective of general international law, these treaty bodies are neither 
intergovernmental conferences nor traditional international organizations. The 
limitation of such interpretation is that it interprets the treaties in their narrow sense.955 
An important question arises as to the binding effect of this type of authoritative 
interpretation by a treaty body, which is not expressly authorized by the agreement. In 
this connection, an interpretation adopted by the COP could be considered as a 
subsequent agreement or subsequent practice by the Parties of a treaty, which, 
according to Article 31(3) (a) and (b) of the Vienna Convention, is an element that 
may be taken into account in interpreting the treaty. Most of the multilateral 
agreements contain provisions for cooperation between treaty institutions. Such 
cooperation extends the possibility to ensure wider interpretation across different 
sectors. 
8.4.3.6. A global organization 
Human beings can hardly fail to be aware of the consequences of environmental 
degradation. But it is unlikely that they will easily abandon their exploitative 
behaviour to save the environment, as they seem temperamentally inclined to give 
way to their innate exploitative tendencies rather than to curb them, even when it is 
not in their best interests. An excellent example is provided by the recent global 
recession, which shocked the entire world financial system. The banks made 
borrowing cheap for countries and individuals by lowering interest rates. Everyone 
9SS For example, CITES Conf. Resolution 4.25 stated that Parties should interpret the Convention 
in a uniform manner and CITES Conf. Resolution 4.27 stated that 'the Convention should be 
interpreted in its narrow sense'. 
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was busy fulfilling their immediate needs and failed to foresee how out-of-kilter the 
world economy had become beneath the surface. This failure to foresee the timing, 
extent and severity of the crisis has caused the severe collapse of the world financial 
system.956 Another example is the failure of the international community to reach a 
climate deal. 
Thus, if it is left to individual states or sectoral treaty institutions, it is likely that they 
are going to give priority to immediate, narrowly conceived self-interest. In addition, 
the existing international legal system leaves it vulnerable to exploitation in situations 
where universal compliance may be crucial. In this context, this chapter proposes that 
a global mechanism that efficiently safeguards the basic values of the international 
community as well as solving treaty problems and thereby establishing order in the 
international legal system could be a way forward. 
Where the threat is grave, consensus is strong and the consequences of exemptions are 
severe, universal law is needed to protect the ultimate values of the international 
community, for example, the protection of biodiversity and climate change. The 
classic understanding of the universality of international law recognizes that there 
exists on a global scale an international law which is valid for and binding on all 
states.957 This understanding does not exclude treaty regimes or customary norms but 
embeds them in a universal and coherent legal system. It should include an executive 
function, i.e. machinery to translate concrete normative standards into law, and a 
function concerning settlement of disputes, i.e. the application of these rules so as to 
956 
957 
For a detailed analysis of the present financial crisis and its causes, see Gillian Tett. Fool's 
Gold (Abacus, London 2009). 
Jennings, 'Universal International Law in a Multicultural World', in M Bos and I Brownlic 
(eds), Liber Amicorumfor the Rt. Hon. Lord Wilberforce (1987), at 39, 40-1. 
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resolve conflicts. This institution could gIve direction for interpretation, further 
research and political proposals. A global institution legislating a broad set of rules 
and their enforcement would ensure a coherent system in international law. 
This global institution might incorporate a broad array of expertise from different 
specialized regimes, assist and proffer advice to small coordination groups, and 
ultimately assume responsibility for the codification and legislative reconstruction of 
norms so that they seamlessly reflect the underlying political aspirations and values of 
the international community. This idea of a utopian system of law may seem 
visionary, but not absurd. The detailed formulation of the remit of such a body is a 
task for another thesis. This thesis is limited to the less dramatic devices available in 
international law, as illustrated above. 
8.5. Conclusions 
From the above discussion, the following conclusions can be drawn: 
First, reconciling trade and environmental interests opens up the possibility of a 
richer, more sustainable, more profitable and fairer world. Thus, neither conflict nor 
fragmentation is expected in trade and environment relationship. International courts 
and tribunals have usually found ways to apply international law as an integrated 
whole. This approach needs to be reflected in the attitude of the Parties to 
international treaty regimes. Most of the time, however, Parties make treaty 
integration difficult through the Balkanization of dispute settlement and the selective 
choice of applicable law. However, the discussion of this thesis showed that if Parties 
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work with good faith and integrity it is possible to find ways to apply inconsistent 
trade and environmental norms in a coherent manner. 
Second, there will always be uncertainty about how different legal reglmes or 
different bodies of law interact. This examination of the interrelationship of 
international environmental and trade law showed that there is still room for balanced 
treaty integrations which require difficult judgments to be made, and entail complex 
legal arguments. These may only be achieved through a process of reasoning that 
makes trade and environmental regimes appear as parts of a coherent whole. However, 
to resolve any inconsistencies identified one should start with the simplest, least 
demanding techniques and only move to the next phase once it has become apparent 
that a solution is not available via a less intense or demanding mechanism. 
Based on the above methodology this thesis proposed a series of systematic methods 
or techniques to resolve inconsistencies or tension identified between MEAs and 
multilateral trade agreements in order to improve coherence in the environmental and 
trade relationship. It proposed three key approaches to balance trade and 
environmental considerations in the international legal order: first, harmonizing the 
apparently inconsistent norms from the environmental and trade treaty regimes in 
order to reach a compatible obligation between them; second, prioritizing the 
conflicting norms where it is necessary to balance the relationship; and third, an 
institutional approach for a coherent system of law. Which approach to follow 
depends on the nature of the conflict and the level of coherence intended to achieve. 
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Third, the WTO dispute settlement process should take into account global policy 
formulation in environment and trade while interpreting WTO provisions. They 
should interpret GATT XX environmental exceptions more broadly, giving effect to 
its objectives of 'sustainable development' and 'protection and preservation of the 
environment'. As discussed in the thesis Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention 
permits evolutionary interpretation of WTO rules by reference to sources external to 
the Agreement. Furthermore, the protection and preservation of the environment is a 
necessary prerequisite to the very operation of the multilateral trading system, since 
all commerce - indeed human survival itself depends on it. 
Fourth, the institutional implications of fragmentation have not been fully addressed 
by the ILC in its Report on Fragmentation. By taking into consideration only the 
substantive perspectives of treaty relationships, this report has failed to show the 
complete picture of the difficulties arising from the diversification and expansion of 
international law. Consequently, the study group's recommendations are also 
inadequate to provide a solution to the problem of fragmentation of international law. 
Since treaty institutions play a vital role in treaty operation and interpretation, 
coordination of treaty bodies from specialized regimes may play a vital role in 
balancing or coordinating overlapping rules. It is easy to achieve bilateral 
collaboration of treaty institutions especially treaty institutions dealing with similar 
issues from the same sectors. However, a global organization protecting ultimate 
values of the international community may require new legislation, which may prove 
difficult to agree on. 
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Fifth, the MEAs have achieved a better balance compared to the multilateral trade 
agreements. Their soft and flexible rules allow Parties to take measures suitable for 
individual situations. On the other hand, the trade rules are unduly rigid and tend to 
give excessive priority to trade interests undervaluing environmental interests. The 
discussion of this thesis demonstrated that environmental concerns are inherently of 
equal or even higher priority by comparison to trade interests. International legal 
system offers rules for harmonization of trade and environmental interests, or actual 
prioritization of the latter. However, a more realistic approach might be to concentrate 
on achieving a better harmonization of the two regimes through the various 
mechanisms considered in this thesis. 
From the above discussion, it is evident that no particular technique is sufficient on its 
own to establish an appropriate balance between MEAs and multilateral trade 
agreements. Which technique to adopt and which process to apply depends on the 
nature of the conflict. However, it is undeniable that both sets of bodies must 
endeavour to accommodate each other's legitimate interests while adopting, 
implementing or interpreting individual provisions. It seems that the MEAs have been 
more successful in accommodating these interests in a balanced manner. One of the 
reasons for this is their modem environmental treaty-making process, which is flexible 
enough to accommodate diverse and changing circumstances. In addition, it has 
ensured participation of different bodies including NOOs, which has provided the 
scope to reflect everyone's interest. 
On the other hand, although the WTO has made significant progress in its attitude 
towards environmental issues, there is still a long way to go. At present, WTO rules 
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are 'closed-circuit' and intrinsically superior. Since they are dominated by hard law, it 
may be difficult to accommodate soft rules. They have opened up to environmental 
concerns, but have yet to integrate them fully within their rules. 
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